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PREFACE 
The majority of the papers in the present volume were 
presented at, or prepared in conjunction with, meetings of 
the Seminar for Austro-German Philosophy, a group of 
philosophers interested in the work of Brentano and Husserl 
and of the various thinkers who fell under their influence. 
One long-standing concern of the Seminar has been to trace 
the origins of present-day structuralism and related move­
ments in the thought of nineteenth-century central Europe. 
This task has been admirably performed by Elmar Holenstein 
for the specific connections between Husserl and Jakobson 
and the Moscow and Prague Linguistic Circles (see the 
bibliography to Holenstein's paper below). But the (broadly) 
structuralist currents exhibited in, for example, the work 
of Meinong's Grazer Schule and, before that, in the writings 
of Herbart, Bolzano and Zimmermann, in the early psycho­
logical writings of Ehrenfels, or in the works of Austrian 
economists and political theorists, art historians and 
novelists, have remained almost wholly unexplored. The 
papers in this volume touch more or less obliquely on this 
theme. 
The preparation of the volume was made possible by the 
grant of a research fellowship by the University of Shef­
field, for which I should like to express my thanks. I am 
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ON THE POETRY AND THE PLURIFUNCTIONALITY 
OF LANGUAGE 
Elmar Holenstein 
§1. Introduction 
§2. From Bühler's three-function schema to Jakobson's 
six 
§3. From formalism to structuralism - from the separ­
ation of the work of art to the autonomy of the 
aesthetic function 
§4. Multi- versus monofunctionalism 
§5. On the plurifunctionality of the poetic text 
§6. On the plurifunctionality of the poetic device 
§1. Introduction 
The scientific works of the Prague linguistic circle on 
linguistics and literature are usually found under the head­
ing 'structuralism'. The rival term 'functionalism' is fre­
quently used, but more in the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union 
than in Western Europe. For American linguistics it is the 
functional approach which is the truly distinctive feature 
of Prague linguistics, that which sets it apart both from 
post-)Bloomfield structuralism, which limited itself to the 
formal classification of linguistic utterances, and from the 
transformational grammar of the Chomskyans, which dismisses 
the functional perspective as inessential for the explan-
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ation of language and of linguistic competence. In early 
accounts of their own position members of the Prague school 
habitually used simultaneously both the expression 'functio­
nal' and the expression 'structural' to characterise their 
works. 
In fact, functional analysis was the point of departure 
for the two main concerns of Prague linguistics, phonology 
and poetics. What distinguishes a linguistic sound, a pho­
neme, from a mere noise is the function it has of discrimi­
nating between meanings. What marks the difference between 
a poetic text and an ordinary linguistic text is the fact 
that the communicative function - through which language 
comes into being and which shows itself in the concentration 
on what is said - is overlaid by the aesthetic function -
which shows itself in a turn of attention (or set) towards 
the structure of the means of communication, i.e. of the 
linguistic utterance as such. 
Functional analysis led directly to structural analysis. 
Once function had been discerned the question arose what 
effect the function of discriminating between meanings has 
in the sound-system of a language and how the aesthetic fun­
ction, the focus on the linguistic medium as such, is brought 
about. In phonology questions like these led to the disco­
very of a hierarchically ordered system of binary distinct­
ive features. A system of binary oppositions can be con­
ceived as the most rational procedure for decoding infor­
mation. In poetics the attempt to determine the underlying 
structural base of the aesthetic function issued in the 
thesis that the principle of equivalence, which in normal 
speech is constitutive of the paradigmatic axis of selection 
(for the selection of a linguistic unity as a member of a 
linguistic chain from an arsenal of unities which are 
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meaningful in a similar way), also determines the axis of 
combination in a poetic text (Jakobson, 1960). Poetic 
texts are marked by a complex and varied network of rela­
tions of similarity and contrast between their components 
which gives them the character of a dense unity {Dichtung) . 
Within the theory of science the teleological approach 
has been conceded a heuristic value ever since Kant. It 
serves as a guiding thread for research which aims to set 
out in a systematic way the mechanisms which are the basis 
of a process oriented about some goal. One thinks of the 
way Harvey systematically set out the mechanism of the 
circulation of the blood in discovering the functions of 
the heart. In the linguistics of the last sixty years the 
heuristic fruitfulness of the teleological approach has 
shown itself in the way teleological explanation has comple­
mented not so much causal analysis but rather structural 
analysis. When teleology and functional analysis is dis­
cussed in contemporary literature in the philosophy of sci­
ence any reference to the extremely successful linguistic 
research in this direction is missing.1 Examples are limi­
ted to material taken from anthropology, psychology, socio­
logy and biology, although only in the case of biology are 
recent examples dealt with, while in the other sciences the 
old examples, to be found already in the classic works by 
Hempel and Nagel of the '50s, continue to be traded back 
and forth. The absence of linguistics is all the more 
regrettable in view of the fact that, quite apart from the 
combination of teleological and structural analysis, this 
discipline has brought to light a second original feature, 
the phenomenon of plurifunctionality. 
Literature in the philosophy of science proceeds as 
though an object or a process could have only one function. 
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Even in the case of the single venture in the direction of 
a plurifunctional perspective in the anthropological dis­
tinction between manifest and latent function, the former 
is characteristically dismissed from the start as a pseudo-
function. On this point analytic philosophy of science con­
curs with the functionalism of the '20s in the areas of art 
and architecture, which indulged in a pronouncedly extreme 
and, as can be shown, literally infantile monofunctional­
ism. The phenomenon of functional equivalence (one end, 
many means) has indeed been dealt with at length in the 
theory of science. A sentence can be emphasised not only 
by being written in capitals, but also by means of italics, 
by letter-spacing, or by underlining. The four techniques 
are functionally equivalent. The other alternative (one 
means, many ends) remains however unnoticed and unevaluated. 
Yet the (potential) plurifunctionality of an object is a 
factor which should not be underestimated if we want to 
talk about its survival, its future existence, something 
which is as important for a pragmatically oriented philoso­
phy of science as is the explanation of its present exist­
ence. An explicit thematisation of the phenomenon of pluri-
functionality is a contribution of the Cercle Linguistique 
de Pvague to the general philosophy of science which has 
still scarcely been acknowledged. It thereby anticipated 
by forty years in linguistics and, what should attract just 
as much attention, in the science of folklore, a' movement 
which has only gained prominence in recent years in archi­
tecture. After functionalism had stripped away so many 
functions people are today trying to give back to buildings, 
streets and whole cities ('multi-purpose user-facilities') 
something of their lost wealth of functions. 
Before turning to some problems posed by plurifunction-
ality it would seem to be a good idea to provide the begin-
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ning of an explanation of the word-field 'function'. 
Especially in German-language literature, talk of an 'aesth­
etic' or 'poetic' function of language may be bound up with 
scientific and technological connotations, from which one 
would like to see both they and one's self dissociated. 
Talk about a goal is much less likely than talk about func­
tion to lead to the suspicion that linguistic phenomena are 
being distorted: yet function and goal are two correlative 
concepts. Goals are normally ascribed to independent enti­
ties, functions to non-independent entities. What counts 
as independent and non-independent is to a certain extent 
a matter of one's perspective. If one considers a speaker 
as independent, one asks about the goal he has in mind when 
speaking. If on the other hand he is considered as non-
independent, as in the case of the spokesman for a corporate 
body such as a government, one asks about his function. 
Assigning the concept of function to a non-independent part 
of a more inclusive whole has also established itself in 
the metonymie use of the expression 'part' for function. 
Cultural entities, such as language, and actions, such as 
speaking, are per se non-independent. With reference to 
languages and speech acts one therefore asks not about 
their goal, except in the case where these are made inde­
pendent through personification, but about their function. 
One only speaks about the function of an object or process 
when these are either used by a subject in the service of 
a goal, or when they are integrated in a system which is 
goal-directed in the cybernetic sense. Functional analysis 
(of a non-independent part) and a final or teleological 
analysis (of the independent whole whose part it is) there­
fore presuppose each other. It is this intrinsic connec­
tion of functional analysis with the relation between a 
part and its wholes which yields the common denominator of 
functiónalism and structuralism. In coining the slogan 
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structuralism' in 1929 Jakobson had put forward the expo­
sition of the inherent lawful relations of an arbitrary 
group of phenomena, which were to be dealt with not as 
though they were a mechanical heap, but as a structural 
whole, as the specific interest of a science which could 
properly call itself structuralist. 
While the concept of a goal is only used when something 
is a means for a subject, 'function' can be used both for 
something which refers to a subject and for something which 
is integrated in a system. If not (only) the goal-oriented 
entity, but (also) the means is a subject, it is best to 
speak about its vole. Talk about its function is also 
usual, while talk about its goal is used only in special 
cases where objectualisation is involved. 
§2. From Bühler 's three-function schema to Jakobson1 s six 
A characteristic tray of Prague structuralism in gener­
al and of Roman Jakobson's theory in particular is the fact 
that poetics is treated as a component of linguistics which 
cannot be anything other than integral. One can go still 
further and put forward the view that the most important 
principles of structural linguistics have their starting 
point in the study of poetical language and are marked by 
this (Holenstein, 1975). This holds not least of functional 
analysis. This was neither an abstractly formulated func­
tional principle nor a schema of functions which was first 
of all discovered and tested in ordinary language and then 
subsequently extended to deal with poetic texts. It was, 
rather, precisely the other way round: the search for the 
essence of poetical language, poeticity, that which makes 
a linguistic utterance poetic, had led to the distinction 
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b e t w e e n d i f f e r e n t l i n g u i s t i c f u n c t i o n s and t o t h e d i s c o v e r y 
of c h a n g i n g h i e r a r c h i e s o f f u n c t i o n s . 
The e a r l i e s t moves i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n come f rom t h e 
p e r i o d of R u s s i a n f o r m a l i s m . A l r e a d y i n 1 9 1 6 , L . P . J a k u b i n -
s k i j , l i k e J a k o b s o n a f o u n d e r member of t h e P e t e r s b u r g " S o c ­
i e t y f o r t h e I n v e s t i g a t i o n of P o e t i c L a n g u a g e " ( O p o y a z ) , 
h a d d e s c r i b e d t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n o r d i n a r y and p o e t i c a l 
l a n g u a g e i n a t e l e o l o g i c a i p e r s p e c t i v e : 
L ingu i s t i c phenomena should be c l a s s i f i e d by taking account in 
each p a r t i c u l a r case of the i n t e n t i o n of the speaking sub jec t . 
If they are employed for the pure ly p r a c t i c a l aim of communi­
ca t ion then what i s involved i s the system of everyday language 
(of verbal thought) in which the l i n g u i s t i c components (sounds, 
morphological elements, e t c . ) have no autonomous value and are 
only a means of communication. But one can imagine other l i n ­
g u i s t i c systems (and they do in fac t ex i s t ) in which the p r a c ­
t i c a l aim takes second p lace (although without diappear ing 
completely) and where the l i n g u i s t i c components then take on 
a value of t h e i r own (Eikhenbaum, 1927, p . 3 9 ) . 
Three y e a r s l a t e r i n h i s famous l e c t u r e on "modern Russ ian 
p o e t r y " t o t h e Moscow C i r c l e of L i n g u i s t i c s Jakobson d i s ­
t i n g u i s h e d p o e t i c a l language a d d i t i o n a l l y from emot iona l 
language i n t h e p r o c e s s of a r g u i n g a g a i n s t a p s y c h o l o g i s t i c 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of p o e t r y . Whereas p r a c t i c a l everyday l a n ­
guage and emot iona l language a r e de f ined by t h e i r communi­
c a t i v e f u n c t i o n , p o e t r y i s de te rmined as ' l a n g u a g e in i t s 
a e s t h e t i c f u n c t i o n ' . P o e t r y i s ' s imp ly an u t t e r a n c e w i t h 
a s e t (Einstellung) towards e x p r e s s i o n ' (1921, p . 3 1 ) . Here 
words have , in C h l e b n i k o v ' s f o r m u l a t i o n ' a power and v a l u e 
of t h e i r own' whereas they remain i n d i f f e r e n t t o any r e l a t i o n 
t o t h e o b j e c t of d i s c o u r s e ( the r e f e r e n c e ) towards which 
one i s normal ly t u r n e d ( e i n g e s t e l l t ) i n p r a c t i c a l u se s of 
l anguage . P o e t i c language has t h i s i n common w i t h emo t iona l 
l a n g u a g e , t h a t t h e r e i s i n bo th a c l o s e c o n n e c t i o n between 
t h e phonic moment and t h e meaning. 
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In the programmatic "Theses of the Linguistic Circle of 
Prague" on the occasion of the first Slavists' conference 
in 1928 these approaches were taken over from Russian for­
malism. The section on the functions of language which, 
in accordance with the interests of the Prague audience, 
culminated in a paragraph about 'the poetic function', 
stresses throughout the variety of different functions. 
These were indeed listed, and again - as was typical for 
the Prague group - in binary oppositions: inner and manifest, 
intellectual and emotional (including the speaker-centred 
expressive and the hearer-oriented appellative function), 
practical and theoretical, as well as language with a 
communicative and language with a poetical function. The 
prominent position of inner language, which has such an 
interior position in analytic philosophy of language, may 
likewise be due to Russian influence. At the IXth Inter­
national Congress of Psychologists the two Russian psycho­
logists of language, Vygotskij and Luria had put forward 
the specific function of internal speech, and this, together 
with its specific structure, were dealt with by Vygotskij 
in 1935 in his book Thought and Language which has since 
become a classic of the psychology of language: its speci­
fic function consists in the solving of problems and in the 
organisation of the pursuant actions. It is important for 
the next stages that the "theses" (1929, pp.14, 21) assigned 
the two central functions, the practical communicative and 
the poetic function to the constitutive components of the 
speech event. This is completely in line with Jakobson's  
Moscow lecture mentioned above. In the communicative 
function the intention of the speaker is directed towards 
what is designated (le signifie) , in the poetic function 
towards the sign itself {le signe lui-même), the linguistic 
expression as such. 
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In the early '30s Karl Bühler, building on an earlier 
sketch (1918), published his famous scheme (1934, pp.24ff.) 
of linguistic functions (Fig.1): 
Objects and states of affairs 
\ / 
Representation 
Transmitter 
Expression Appellative function 
Receiver 
Fig.l 
It was natural for the Prague Circle to take up this so-
called Organon model. There was first of all a historical 
reason for this: Bühler was well-known to them through 
lectures he gave to their circle and through his Viennese 
colleague Trubetskoy. And also two substantive reasons: on 
the one hand there was a gap in Bühler's approach, with its 
claim to being systematic, namely the poetic function -
which for the Prague Circle was a cornerstone of linguistic 
functional analysis. Bühler connected poetic language with 
the function of expression, as was then quite common, and 
in any case not unexpected in the case of a psychologist. 
On the other hand the approaches of the Prague group and of 
Bühler had in common the attempt to assign functions to the 
constitutive components of the speech event, and to anchor 
the former in the latter. Bühler limited himself to three 
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extra-linguistic bases {Fundamenta) of the speech situation, 
the speaker, the hearer and the object of discourse. The 
linguistic components proper on the other hand he did not 
take into account, although his famous schema should have 
brought him to realise the importance of these. He does 
not make any use in his functional analysis of the central 
factor in his schema, the sign Z, although at the same time 
it is noticed and discussed by him in a differentiated way. 
Rendering the linguistic sign by means of a triangle over­
laid by a circle and the incongruence of the two figures is 
intended to indicate the apperceptive complementation which 
the sensible sound-material acquires in linguistic use. 
The model and the accompanying text directly invite one to 
pick out the code as an independent component - the code of 
the linguistic system, which is decisive for the appercep­
tive Gestalt of the sound-material; the apperceptive Gestalt 
being represented by the triangle, the sound-material by 
the circle. The physical channel which connects speaker 
and hearer is clearly distinguished from the merely inten­
tional or symbolic reference to the objects of discourse by 
the continuous lines. In other words it was to be expected 
that it would only be a question of time before there arose 
an immanent linguistic complement of Bühler's model (and 
not merely an external ad hoc accumulation as is the fate 
of most scientific models). The poetic function of lan­
guage corresponds to the sign as a whole, the meta-linguis-
tic function to the code, and the phatic function to the 
channel. 
Bühler's Organon model was filled out in two stages. 
The first step consisted in bringing together the two ap­
proaches, the Bühlerian trichotomy and the Russian formalist/ 
Prague structuralist dichotomy between the practical and the 
poetic function. It was first set out explicitly and in 
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p r i n t i n M u k a ř o v s k y ' s c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e Copenhagen Con­
g r e s s o f L i n g u i s t s i n 1 9 3 8 : 
a four th funct ion , unmentioned in Bühlers scheme, emerges. 
This function stands in opposi t ion to a l l the o t h e r s . I t 
renders the s t r u c t u r e of the l i n g u i s t i c sign the center of 
a t t e n t i o n , whereas the f i r s t t h ree funct ions a re o r ien ted 
toward e x t r a l i n g u i s t i c ins tances and goals exceeding the 
l i n g u i s t i c s ign . By means of the f i r s t t h ree funct ions the 
use of language achieves p r a c t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e . The four th 
funct ion, however, severs language from an immediate connec­
t i o n with p r a c t i c e . I t i s ca l l ed the a e s t h e t i c funct ion, and 
a l l the o thers in r e l a t i o n to i t can be ca l l ed c o l l e c t i v e l y 
the p r a c t i c a l func t ions . The o r i e n t a t i o n of the a e s t h e t i c 
function toward the sign i t s e l f i s the d i r e c t r e s u l t of the 
autonomy pecu l i a r to a e s t h e t i c phenomena ( E n g . t r a n s . , p . 6 8 ) . 
The m e t a l i n g u i s t i c f u n c t i o n was added i n 1952 as a 
f i f t h f u n c t i o n . (See Jakobson , 1953, p p . 5 5 6 f f . ) I t was t h e 
heyday of communication t h e o r y and of t h e l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s 
of l anguage . Communication t h e o r y led t o a s t r e n g t h e n e d 
and more p r e c i s e a t t i t u d e towards t h e l i n g u i s t i c code as an 
independen t f a c t o r of t h e speech even t and t h e r ep lacemen t 
of t h e ambiguous S a u s s u r i a n o p p o s i t i o n of langue-parole 
t h rough t h e more c o n c i s e o p p o s i t i o n code-message . The 
s y s t e m a t i c d i s t i n c t i o n between o b j e c t - and me ta - l anguage 
was urged from t h e s i d e of l o g i c ( T a r s k i , 1944)3 as a means 
of a v o i d i n g t h e an t i nomies (of t h e l i a r , of h e t e r o l o g i c a l 
t e r m s , e t c . , ) and in o r d e r t o make p o s s i b l e a d e f i n i t i o n of 
t r u t h . In t h e case of Jakobson (cf . h i s 1962) a d i f f e r e n t 
p r i o r i t y s t a n d s i n t h e fo reg round : t h e i n d i s p e n s a b i l i t y of 
m e t a l i n g u i s t i c u t t e r a n c e s fo r t h e a c q u i s i t i o n and u n d e r ­
s t a n d i n g of l anguage . New and s t r a n g e l i n g u i s t i c u n i t i e s 
a r e a c q u i r e d and made u n d e r s t a n d a b l e t h rough d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n 
from and p a r a p h r a s e d by means of u n i t s which a r e a l r e a d y 
f a m i l i a r . 
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Finally in 19 56 came the integration of what was now a 
six-member schema of functions of the phatic function, 
which had first been described by the functionalist Mali-
nowski.4 Certain linguistic utterances have as their func­
tion only to bring about, confirm or extend contact with 
someone without conveying information with any content. 
(Jakobson, 1960, pp.355f.) The text of the 1956 Presiden­
tial Address to the Linguistic Society of America (first 
published in 1976) combined into a single diagram (Fig.2) 
the six components of the speech event and the functions 
assigned to these (which four years later in "Linguistics 
and Poetics" were to be displayed in two figures: 1960, 
pp.353,357) : 
CONTEXT 
( r e f e r e n t i a l ) 
MESSAGE 
( p o e t i c ) 
ADDRESSER ADDRESSEE 
(emot ive) ( c o n a t i v e ) 
CONTACT 
( p h a t i c ) 
CODE 
( m e t a l i n g u a l ) 
F i g . 2 
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§3. From formalism to structuralism - from the separation 
of the work of art to the autonomy of the aesthetic 
function 
In the early phases of Russian futurism and formalism 
there was proclaimed and indeed there began the creation of 
a po'eesie pure and, as an extreme form, a poesie concrete. 
The poetic text was celebrated as a pure sound-formation 
which, when it pointed to anything outside itself at all, 
pointed not to objects which it designated clearly and 
about which it made propositions with a truth-value, but 
rather pointed - synaesthetically - to neighbouring sensa­
tions such as odours and colours. It was in this way that 
Ossip Brik analyses parallelism - an eminently grammatical 
procedure - as a mere repetition of sounds (Pomorska, 1968, 
pp.28ff). Those formalists who were acquainted with the 
philosophy of language were nevertheless soon making use of 
the Frege-Husserl distinction between the reference and the 
meaning of linguistic signs, particularly in order to spe­
cify the nature of poetic language. As a particularity of 
poetic language an inner connection between sound and mean­
ing was described, one indifferent to the object and to the 
truth-value of the proposition (and to its emotional poten­
tial) . Jakobson's pronouncement at that period has often 
been quoted (1921, p.41): 
Let others superimpose upon the poet the thoughts expressed in 
his works! To incriminate the poet with ideas and emotions is 
as absurd as the behavior of the medieval audiences that beat 
the actor who played Judas and just as foolish as to blame 
Pushkin for the death of Lensky. 
Later the thesis to the effect that the objectual reference 
retreats into the background, that there is in the extreme 
case a complete lack of objects for (also fictionality of) 
poetic propositions was corrected. It is not the lack of 
an extra linguistic reference which is characteristic of 
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poetical texts, but the way in which meaning and/or refer­
ence is made ambiguous (Jakobson, 1960, p.370). The move 
towards greater differentiation went hand in hand with the 
discovery of phonology, particularly with the discovery 
that the expressive material is inseparable in its Gestalt 
from its sign-function. Sound associations were experi­
mented with, not only the associations with other sounds 
and with colours and odours and with varieties of sense-
data but also with meanings. Sounds turned out to be pho­
nemes, 'i.e. accoustic presentations suited to associate 
themselves with meaning-presentations' (Jakobson, 1960, 
p.94). Certain sounds become associated at all only be­
cause they have meaning in common. The association owes 
its poetic attraction to the (semantic) unity in or under­
lying the (sensual) contrast between the two sound-forma­
tions: 'He is naked and bare'. Other sounds have a poetical 
effect, because they are ambiguous: 'The kosa ("braid" or 
"scythe") sometimes adorns the head, hanging down to the 
shoulders; sometimes cuts the grass.' In short:'the con­
tents are part of the structure of the poem.'5 
Language has a multi-dimensional structure and is 
plurifunctional. The poeticity of the text consists not in 
the exclusion of one of the relations which are constitutive 
of language, but only in a re-orientation of these relations. 
Having defined language with a communicative function in 
their "theses" (Thèses . . . , 1929, p.14) as 'dirig'e vers le 
signifi'e' the Prague linguists, with their keenness for 
binary oppositions, described language with a poetic func­
tion with good reason not as 'dirig'e vers le signifiant' 
but as 'dirig'e vers le signe lui-même' . Signs have, on the 
Saussurian view, two sides. They consist of a signan s and 
a signatum. Both components surface in poetry. 
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Nor, however, does the poeticity of a text consist in 
the exclusion of all practical function in favour of an 
isolated poetic function, but only in the presence and -
in the optimal case - in the dominance of the poetic func­
tion. In opposition to tendencies in early formalism Prague 
structuralism did not concentrate on isolating poetic language, 
the pure poetical text, but on the isolation of the 
poetic function. 'What we emphasise is not the separatism 
of art, but the autonomy of the aesthetic function' (Jakob-
son, 1934, p.412). There is no opposition to the view that 
a poetic text can also have functions other than the purely 
aesthetic: it can be propagandistic, therapeutic, document­
ary, informative, for example. What is opposed is simply, 
on the one hand the reduction of the poetic function to 
other functions of language, the psychologistic reduction 
to its emotive function, the spiritualistic reduction to 
the idea of disclosure of some sublime theme, the revela­
tion of otherwise inaccessible truths; and on the other 
hand the reduction of procedures which owe their develop­
ment primarily to the poetic function, to procedures with 
a merely utilitarian function such as the reduction of par­
allelism, an almost paradigmatic procedure, to humdrum 
mnemotechnical procedure (Jakobson, 1966, p.423). 'The 
poeticity ... is an element sui generis, an element that 
cannot be reduced mechanically to other elements' (1934, 
p.412). With the conception of an autonomous yet isolated 
poetical function Prague linguistics, - for which is charac­
teristic the dialectical unification of the opposites which 
Saussure and Russian formalism had split apart: synchrony-
diachrony, form-content, langue-parole , etc. - has gone 
beyond the false antagonism of those who would play poésie 
pure and poesie impure (engaged literature) off against 
each other. Simultaneously they have provided their most 
original contribution to functional analysis, the themati-
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sation of pluri- or multi-functionality and of variable 
hierarchies of functions. This was decades ahead of discus­
sions in the theories of science and of art (in particular 
of architecture). 
§4. Multi- versus monofunetionalism 
What makes the works of the Prague Circle so extra­
ordinarily fruitful is their concrete approach. Their pro­
grammatic theses were immediately followed by analyses of 
prototypical examples. After their insight into the neces­
sity to semiotics and aesthetics of perspectives which take 
into account the theory of action, they began with a sure 
instinct the analysis of those works of art in which action 
appears most directly, that is to say drama and in particu­
lar that sort of drama in which the 'recipients' are most 
actively involved, people's theatre. They developed an 
insight of theirs of great importance for functional anal­
ysis - that a thing is rarely given with only one function, 
but more normally with a whole bundle of functions - for 
the case of two illustrative multi-functional phenomena: 
dress and architecture, of which they gave detailed descrip­
tions. As soon as multi-functionality as such comes into 
the centre of attention the question arises of the relation 
between the functions. Is it a matter of affinity, of imp­
lication, of subordination, of incompatibility, of aversion? 
And what is the sort of possible change of function? This 
change does not consist in one function giving way to anoth­
er which has nothing in common with the first, as is still 
assumed in a somewhat unreflective way in the actual German 
work on aesthetic reception (i.e. the Rezeptionsästhetik). 
A more likely form is a change in the ranking (dominance) 
of functions and in the varying degrees of manifestation or 
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latency of the individual functions (Jakobson, 1935b). 
A first function of objects of use consists in the fact 
that - given their relation to a cognitive subject - they 
do not merely exercise their practical function but also 
- semiotically - express it. In the technical terminology: 
'The object not only performs, it also signifies its func­
tion' (Mukarovsky, 1937, p.236). A 'natural device' in 
architecture is the way in which building-elements, rooms, 
etc.. are given a form which indicates their specific 
function. Aesthetic architecture is distinguished from 
merely utilitarian architecture through the way the prac­
tical function of furniture and rooms is secondary, and 
serves primarily to give a semiotic form to space by direc­
ting the attention and the movements of the visitor. Of 
course the practical and the semiotic function may also 
part company. There are entire stylistic movements which 
set their heart on concealing practical functions behind 
architectonic constructions. Such a split is artistically 
attractive only when it is experienceable as something in­
tentional or when the distracting form stands in some other 
connection with the building, such as for example the case 
where, with its monumentality, it signals its importance or 
signals aesthetically its outstanding qualities. Only in 
bad architecture do function and form stand in a relation 
to one another which says nothing, neither in a positive 
nor in a contrastive way, nor so as to present consciousness 
with additional aspects through amplification. 
Certain functions are regularly supported by specific 
other functions. Thus the magical function of verbal as 
well as non-verbal rites is bound up in a striking way with 
the aesthetic function. Aesthetic effects are frequently 
the same as those intended by magic. Aesthetic works are 
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able to enchant. Their characteristic attractiveness pre­
destines them regularly to accompany the erotic function, 
which is likewise out to capture the senses. According to 
Bogatyrev (1937, p.75) the aesthetic function of clothes 
frequently has the subsidiary function of concealing the 
erotic function, precisely because of this affinity of 
effect. Today, where the erotic function no longer has to 
be hidden but at most justified, it is possible that the 
aesthetic function is merely an alibi. Bogatyrev's analy­
sis of national constumes shows that there are indeed com­
binations of latent and manifest functions in which the 
manifest function is by no means a pseudo-function, as is 
supposed to be the case in the examples of the Hopis' 
rain dance which is so popular in analytic philosophy of 
science. Here the manifest magical function is dismissed 
as a pseudo-function and the true function which is all 
that needs to be taken seriously by science - the strength­
ening of the group identity of the Indian tribe - is said 
to be latent. This function is claimed to be something the 
Indians are not aware of, but is noticed only by anthro­
pologists (Stegmüller, 1969, p.564). 
Apart from explanation, analytic functional analysis 
aims at the prediction of the existence of an object on the 
basis of a function which the object possesses in some sys­
tem. It ignores the fact that frequently secondary func­
tions guarantee the survival of an institution which has 
since lost the primary function to which it perhaps owes 
its origin. Magical rites, particularly, survive a ration­
alising period of enlightenment in virtue of a strong 
secondary aesthetic function, often too in virtue of a 
religious, regionalist-nationalist or even merely commercial 
transformation, which is often very easy to bring about. 
An example which is closer to home than the rain dances of 
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the Hopi Indians is our own Christmas tree. Here a cycle 
of functions can be observed which is also to be found in 
poetry. 'When, that is, products of literary poetry, them­
selves based on folk poetry, in turn penetrate back through 
to the people' (Bogatyrev, 1932/33, p.257). The Christmas 
tree owes its wide popularity in Eastern Europe to an 
aesthetic and/or status function, which caused it to be 
introduced by the mobile intellectual upper classes into 
the villages in which, then, its original magical function 
again gained the upper hand. 
It is however by no means always the case that when a 
primary function disappears, secondary functions continue 
to ensure the existence of a phenomenon: 
It happens that the loss of one function also involves the 
loss of other functions. Thus when national costumes disappear 
old clothes simultaneously lose their aesthetic value and are 
felt by the peasants to be less comfortable, less practical, 
etc. (Bogatyrev, 1930, p.335). 
Certain functions can dominate so strongly that they are 
able to conceal functional injury or breakdown in secondary 
respects. The dysfunctionality, the imperfections in the 
latter come to be realised only when the dominating function 
falls away. The aesthetic function in particular seems to 
be such that it induces secondary justifications of addit­
ional functions. Mukarovsky (1936, p.34) also sees in the 
aesthetic function a guarantee of the further development 
of a cultural phenomenon which has lost its practical func­
tion. Its aesthetic character is retained for future periods 
in which there occur possibilities of its being used 
in another practical function. 
Secondary functions can also serve for the classific­
ation of a domain of phenomena defined by the dominance of 
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another function. Thus literary genres can be character­
ised to a certain extent on the basis of a function which 
for them is of only secondary importance. At least in the 
case of classical examples the referential function is of 
great importance for epic poetry, the emotive function for 
lyric poetry (Jakobson, 1960, p.357) and, one might add, 
the appellative function for dramatic poetry with its moral­
ising and didactic tendency. 
The fate of whole artistic genres and stylistic tenden­
cies, their coming and going, seems often to be bound up 
less >with their aesthetic quality as with secondary func­
tions. A work of art which is emotionally no longer moving 
loses its topicality. It is in any case striking that 
aestheticians who see deleotave et movere as an essential 
property of works of art (cf. Jauss, 1977) frequently belong 
to the proponents of a relativistic historical point of 
view. For Jakobson, who defines the aestheticity or poet-
icity of a text in structural terms, being moved, which 
shows itself in pleasure, is secondary, something which 
varies according to the historical and biographical situa­
tion. One can appreciate a poem by Goethe as a work of art 
without having any pleasure in it.6 
Not only can different functions be compatible with 
one another, complement each other reciprocally, they can 
likewise stand in conflict with one another. The aesthetic 
function suggests itself once again as a prototypical exam­
ple of such conflict. For in a certain sense the aesthetic 
function turns out to be the 'dialectical negation of func­
tionality' (Mukarovsky, 1937, p.244), in so far as the 
subject's attention turns from causes and effects, and 
hence from the practical use of a work, to its structure 
in all its proud autonomy. The fact that a piece of 
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furniture is outstandingly beautiful can be an obstacle to 
its use. One experiences the tendency to put it on show 
instead of using it. In the same way the artistic form of 
a poem can distract from its content and its communication 
- unless it is a perfect poem in which content and concrete 
realisation (in audible recitation) are themselves structur­
al elements of the artistic whole. An object of use can 
also be constructed in like manner, i.e. such that its 
beauty is only fully displayed when it is used. In the 
case of a car the streamlined design stands out only when 
the car is driven. There is no aspect of reality and 
hence no function of language which cannot be employed as 
an aesthetical structural element. This is a first answer 
to Jauss's criticism (1977, p.168) of Mukařovsky that he 
leaves unexplained 'how the aesthetic function can be a 
dialectical negation of the communicative as well as the 
emotive function and is simultaneously supposed to be com­
municative'. A second answer involves referring to the 
attractiveness of the aesthetic structure, which directs 
the attitude or set of the subject to the work of art, 
certainly no longer only to its content - as is the case 
where the communicative function dominates - but also the 
interplay of formal and material factors which make of a 
text a whole valuable in itself ( 'se lbs twer t iges ' Ganzes) . 
Thirdly Mukarovsky's semiotic principle,'an object not 
only performs but also signifies its function', holds not 
only for objects with a practical function but also for 
those with an aesthetic function. A work of art performs 
not only the aesthetic function it is intended to perform, 
it simultaneously signals it also. Fourth, the truly dial­
ectical possibility that precisely because in poetry 'com­
munication is not really important' (Jakobson, 1934, p.406) 
and the truth content of a poem is secondary, the censor­
ship exerted by one's own unconscious and by authority -
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and how many poets have not used this opportunity, often 
unadmitted but highly consequential - is weaker, so that 
(prima facie fictive) poetry is often more faithful to the 
truth than a diary, more informative than a newspaper report, 
and more provocative than a handout of a professional agitator. 
With a little less pathos and a little more sarcasm one 
might quote here an example which is today more than well 
known: the disclosure of 'what we always wanted to know 
about (or see of) sexuality' occurred first on film and 
then on stage, step by step, in that exceedingly aestheti­
cally sensitive directors, first and foremost Ingmar Berg­
mann, proclaimed each successive stage in this stripping 
away as an imminent aesthetic necessity. This somewhat 
sarcastic excursus should not be taken to deny the close 
affinity between the erotic and the aesthetic. What leads 
to the mutual involvement of art and the erotic is their 
common sensual attractivity (see discussion of Bogatyrev, 
1937, above). While the sexual-erotic function in many con­
temporary films is nothing more than a substitute for the 
lack of any aesthetic function, the reverse is often true 
for dress. The aesthetic function may be a substitute for 
the weak or absent erotic function of clothes which have 
nothing attractive to reveal. 
So much concerning Jauss's problem of how an aesthetic 
work can be both communicative and emotional in spite of its 
dialectical negation of and its distraction from communica­
tion and emotion. The relation between functions is par­
ticularly complicated in the case of linguistic sounds (cf. 
Jakobson and Waugh, 1979) . The phonic materiality of 
sounds is such that they function immediately both synaesthet-
ically and associatively. There is a correlation between 
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the sound-opposition i and  and the visual opposition 
light and dark. The strikingly discrete structure of lin­
guistic sounds, however, also makes them mediately suitable 
for the construction of an exceptionally rational system of 
discriminations. The thirty phonemes of an average lang­
uage permit the formation of for example a repertoire of 
signs of 304 (810,000) combinations of four sounds. In 
natural language this bi-functionality of sounds leads to 
different constellations. The immediate latent function 
can be used in a subsidiary fashion, in that for certain 
semantic fields only particular phonemes, which directly 
symbolise these fields phonetically, are admissible. It 
can also censor selectively: it is statistically demonstra­
ble that lexemes, the meaning of which coincides with the 
immediate symbolism of the sounds, have greater chances of 
survival in the course of linguistic development. But the 
immediate meaning (that which is natural, latent and directly 
pertinent to sound-symbolism) and the mediate (artificial, 
manifest, arbitrarily assigned) meaning can also come into 
conflict. In everyday language, where attention is normally 
directed to what is said, this conflict usually goes unnoticed. 
In poetry on the other hand, with its set towards 
{Einstellung auf) the sign as a whole and its tendency to 
make manifest all the relations which contribute to the 
latent make-up of this sign (cf. Jakobson, 1960, p.373), 
this conflict is more than noticeable. The poet can exploit 
the conflict as a means of estrangement, but he can also 
try to balance it out by paying particular attention to the 
context. Thus French poets, faced with the relation bet­
ween the dark sound of jour and the light sound of nuit, 
compensate for this by means of a phonological and/or sem­
antic context which fits more neatly the sense-content of 
day and night (Jakobson, 1960, p.373). Finally, the con­
flict can also be heuristically effective by directing 
24 STRUCTURE AND GESTALT 
t h e a t t e n t i o n of s e n s i t i v e l a n g u a g e - u s e r s t o o t h e r l e s s 
d o m i n a t i n g c o m p o n e n t s of t h e signatum, w h i c h a g r e e more 
r e a d i l y w i t h t h e l a t e n t s o u n d - s y m b o l i s m . 
Ins tead of perce iv ing a con t rad ic t ion between the signaba and the 
phonet ic p e c u l i a r i t i e s of the corresponding signantia, I uncon­
sc ious ly assign to the var ious signaba d i f f e r e n t i a l n a t u r e s . Thus 
jour, in conformity with i t s dark vowel, p r e sen t s the dura t ive 
aspect of continuing ac t i on , nuit, with i t s l i g h t vowel, the p e r ­
fec t ive aspect of completed ac t i on . For me the day i s something 
which endures, n ight something which se t s i n , or comes to pass 
(night falls, as we say ) . The former connotes a condi t ion , the 
l a t t e r an event (Lévi -St rauss , 1976, p . 1 7 ) . 
The Prague t h e o r i s t s of a e s t h e t i c r e c e p t i o n of t h e '30s a r e 
ahead of t h e i r d e s c e n d a n t s in Konstanz in e x p l i c i t l y thema-
t i s i n g t h e complexi ty of changes of f u n c t i o n . In p a r t i c u l a r 
B o g a t y r e v ' s s e m i o t i c a n a l y s e s of fo lk -cos tume and customs 
(1936 and 1937) a r e a mine of i n f o r m a t i o n and i n s i g h t about 
t h e mani fo ld a s p e c t s of f u n c t i o n a l a n a l y s i s . The dynamic 
form of t h e phenomenon of p l u r i f u n c t i o n a l i t y , which 
i n v o l v e s a c o n t i n u o u s change in t h e h i e r a r c h y of f u n c t i o n s 
and a dominant f u n c t i o n which d e t e r m i n e s t h e mode of a p p e a r ­
ance of a l l t h e o t h e r f u n c t i o n s , i s he re c l e a r l y p r e s e n t e d 
in what i s one of t h e e a r l i e s t phases of t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n 
of t h e s e m a t t e r s . Bogatyrev (1937, p .43) s e t s out t h e 
fo l l owing o r d e r of r a n k i n g fo r everyday d r e s s (ranked i n 
o r d e r of power ) : 
1) p r a c t i c a l f u n c t i o n (be s t s u i t e d t o p r o t e c t i o n from 
co ld and h e a t , d i r t , i n j u r y ) ; 
2) i n d i c a t i o n of s o c i a l s t a t u s or c l a s s ; 
3) a e s t h e t i c f u n c t i o n ; 
4) i n d i c a t i o n of r e g i o n a l background. 
Sunday and h o l i d a y costume on t h e o t h e r hand shows t h e 
fo l l owing r e - d i s t r i b u t i o n of v a l u e s : 
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1) holiday or ceremonial function; 
2) aesthetic function; 
3) ritual function; 
4) nationalistic or regionalistic identification; 
5) indication of social status or class; 
6) practical function. 
In the exchange of the dominant function, individual sub­
ordinate functions are strengthened, others recede into 
the background or are eliminated, new ones are added, cer­
tain forms become obligatory, others optional. For example, 
if clothing associated with work or with a profession 
advances to the status of holiday costume, it becomes bind­
ing on a whole age or gender group (think, for example, of 
the growth in popularity of naval attire as Sunday clothes 
for children). Functions change with the transition from 
one bearer to another. Galoshes, whose dominant function 
in the Russian cities in which they first came into use was 
the practical one of protection from dust and dirt, acquire 
a largely aesthetic function in the countryside, where they 
are worn by young people sauntering through the streets on 
holidays in fine weather. Songs and costumes, where at 
first the aesthetic function dominated, come to lose this 
in favour of indication of age when they become reserved 
for children. 
The reality of the function of the identification of 
region and religion so heavily emphasised by Bogatyrev can 
be illustrated by a moralising gloss of the Freiherr von 
Knigge: 
The calvinist merchants of Emden set out their gardens in the 
Dutch style; now I once heard one of them say of another mer­
chant of the same confession who had however taken it upon 
himself to include in his garden certain alterations shocking 
to the reformed community, that this garden had a distinctly 
Lutheran stripe. 
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Characteristically, Knigge objects to this hypertrophy of 
the identification function because it is detrimental to 
what is for him the more important function of supra-
regional communication in society. 
I am of the opinion that these differences in the customs of 
the German states make it very difficult, in foreign provinces 
outside one's own native area, to start up friendships, to 
please in society, to have an effect on or win over other 
people. 
In view of this multifunctionality which one soon comes up 
against when one pays a little attention to the phenomena 
themselves, the question arises how both on the one hand 
analytic philosophy of science and on the other hand the 
architectural current which as 'functionalism' has entered 
into the history of art were able almost simultaneously to 
arrive at their naive unproblematic monofunctionalism. 
Monofunctionalism is typical of machines, of highly devel­
oped biological organs, of formalised languages and -
strikingly - of an early stage in the development of chil­
dren's intelligence. The architectural monofunctionalism 
of Le Corbusier and of the Bauhaus may in part go back to 
the fascination with machines: the house as machine'a 
habiter, the chair as machine a s'asseoir, etc.7 The 
unreflected monofunctionalism of analytic philosophy of 
science may well be conditioned by too one-sided a concen­
tration on biological examples, on the highly developed 
individual and collective studied in physiology and etho­
logy (cf. the specialised organs of 'higher' animals and 
the division of labour in communities of bees and ants; on 
this Mukarovsky, 1966, p.121), as well as by the logical 
ideal of univocal - and in their own way also unifunctional 
- terms of scientific language. One forgets too easily that 
the higher development consists not necessarily only in the 
formation of specialised organs but also conversely in a 
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plurifunctional adaptation of what was a monofunctional 
organ. Think of the role assigned to the human hand in 
the process of hominisation, its polyfunctionality in con­
trast to the hands of the other primates which merely 
scratch and seize. In the realm of sociology the experi­
ence of plurifunctionality, at least of that of members 
of human societies, is formulated most impressively by Max 
Frisch in what he says about the problems which have arisen 
in connection with foreign works (Gastarbeiter) in Switzer­
land: 'We called for labour power, but what we got was 
human beings'. In the third area of examples, the language 
of science, it has likewise become common knowledge that 
the survival value and the chances of survival of natural 
languages vis à vis formalised languages consists precisely 
in their plurifunctionality (including context-sensitive 
ambiguity). 
Monofunctionalism is, above all, as was remarked at the 
beginning of this paper, infantile. The child in the pro­
cess of acquiring language is for a long time unable to 
assign two different meanings to one linguistic form. Thus 
initially a French child uses the article les exclusively 
(as a pluraliser) to signalise a plurality. In order to 
signalise a totality (as a totaliser) as this article can 
simultaneously be employed in adult language, the child 
resorts at this early stage ostentatiously to an additional 
morpheme: toutes les voitures. Occasionally it will even 
take refuge in ungrammatical forms in order to keep apart 
two functions, such as indefinite reference and numerical 
indication which can simultaneously be expressed by the 
indefinite article in the adult language. Thus in order to 
indicate that what is in question is a single cow, it 
creates the ungrammatical expression une de vache (Karmiloff-
Smith, 1976, pp.300ff.). The child is unable simultaneously 
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to express two functions such as a wish and a piece of 
factual information, as this is normal in adult language 
by means of constative forms such as it is cold r when what 
is principally intended is the demand to close a window 
(cf. Halliday, 1977, pp.42, 71).8 
§5. On the pluvi functionality of the poetic text 
A consequence of the plurifunctionality of language is 
that the linguistic analysis of a poem cannot restrict 
itself to the poetic function (see Jakobson, 1960, p.357). 
It has to take into account the other functions of the text, 
not in an additive fashion but in an integrative way in 
relation to the dominating poetic function which transforms 
and unifies them into a structural and functional whole. 
Conversely, every study of linguistic phenomena has to 
analyse the role played in these phenomena by the poetic 
function. It plays a not inconsiderable role in propaganda 
texts, in rhetoric generally and, as Jakobson has pointed 
out, in the acquisition of language. 
The obstinate prejudice to the effect that structural 
poetics limits itself to a text-immanent, if not merely 
phonological-grammatical analysis of poems, is a complete 
misunderstanding of its intention and scope. It is a mis­
interpretation of the dominance of the poetic function 
(with its primarily phonological and grammatical means) to 
take this function to be exclusive. The failure to recog­
nise the central role played from the beginning in Prague 
linguistics by semantics, as well as pragmatics - in the 
form of functional analysis - in contrast to contemporary 
tendencies in American linguistics and analytic philosophy 
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of language, is probably due to a fixation on the revol­
utionary one-sidedness of Russian formalism and on positi-
vist/anti-mentalist one-sided emphases within currents of 
thought which likewise claim for themselves the term 
'structuralism'. Against the tendency to reduce linguistics 
to mere combinations, Jakobson (1949, p.38) coined the 
phrase: 'The primary function of the sign is to signify and 
not to figure in certain given constellations.' 
The same prejudice passes over the programmatic theses 
and theoretic reflections about just this theme (Jakobson 
and Tynjanov, 1928; Jakobson, 1935b). It passes over the 
exemplary studies in which interpretations are given of the 
poetry of the Hussites in its historical and sociological 
context (Jakobson, 19 36) and of the poems of Pushkin and 
Mayakovsky in their biographical and psychological context 
(Jakobson, 1930, 1937). Finally it overlooks Jakobson's 
interdisciplinary cooperation with a specialist on myths, 
Lévi-Strauss, in one of his best known poetic analyses, that 
of Baudelaire's Les Chats (1962). As a linguist, and in 
view of the dominance of the linguistic medium as such 
Jakobson does indeed limit himself, in most of his analyses, 
to displaying immanent linguistic structures. The occasional 
moves in the direction of the extra-linguistic context may, 
when considered independently of his theoretical reflections 
and studies of examples, make an anecdotal impression, as 
when Yeats' geometrical symbolism in which the number 3 and 
its exponents (32 ,33) plays a central role, is discovered 
not only in the number of word-categories of his poems but 
also in a confession in his 27th (33) year (1977, pp.42,51). 
Considerations of the extra-linguistic - context are fre­
quent and consistent enough to enable one to recognise the 
relation which, according to Jakobson, characterises the 
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r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n a p o e t i c a l t e x t , i t s a u t h o r , and i t s 
p e r i o d of g e n e s i s . The r e l a t i o n i s a d o u b l e o n e . I t i s 
p o e t i c a n d / o r f u n c t i o n a l . I n t h e f i r s t c a s e t h e h i s t o r i c a l 
s i t u a t i o n i s a c o n t e x t f o r t h e r e l a t i o n of w h i c h t o t h e 
p o e t i c a l t e x t a s s u c h t h e same p r i n c i p l e of e q u i v a l e n c e i s 
d e c i s i v e a s i s c o n s t i t u t i v e of t h e p o e t i c a l t e x t i n t h e 
n a r r o w e r s e n s e , t h a t i s , an e q u i v a l e n c e p r i n c i p l e i n t h e 
fo rm of m u l t i p l e r e l a t i o n s of s i m i l a r i t y and c o n t r a s t ( c f . 
1 9 3 7 , p . 1 6 2 ) . T h i s c o n t i n u e d r e l e v a n c e of t h e p r i n c i p l e of 
e q u i v a l e n c e i s v a l i d p r i m a r i l y f o r t h e v e r b a l c o n t e x t of a 
poem, c o n s i s t i n g of c o n t e m p o r a r y p o e t r y , of w h i c h an i n d i ­
v i d u a l t e x t i s a p a r t , and of t h e t r a d i t i o n a l p o e t r y w h i c h 
p r e c e d e s i t . 
Cer ta in ly we do not want simply to deduce the work from i t s con­
t e x t . On the other hand we are not allowed in the ana lys i s of 
a p o e t i c a l work to ignore d isguised and repea ted ly occurr ing 
correspondences between the work and i t s con tex t , e spec i a l l y 
regu la r connections between c e r t a i n t r a i t s common to many works 
of a s ing le author and some spec i f i c p l ace , time or b iographica l 
d e t a i l which in t h e i r o r i g in they a l l share . Context i s one of 
the components of speech: the p o e t i c function transforms i t as 
i t t ransforms every o ther component (Jakobson, 1937, p . 1 5 4 ) . 
The p o e t i c a t t r a c t i o n of P a s t e r n a k ' s metonymie s t y l e i s 
doubled when i t i s c o n t r a s t e d w i t h t h e m e t a p h o r i c a l s t y l e 
of Mayakovsky. Both s t y l e s a l s o have t h e i r c o r r e l a t e s in 
t h e a u t h o r s ' r e s p e c t i v e b i o g r a p h i e s , and in t h e a r t i s t i c 
and s c i e n t i f i c Wel tansehauung of t h e t i m e , i n which r e l a ­
t i o n s as such a r e more i m p o r t a n t than t h e a t o m i s t i c a l l y 
c o n s i d e r e d o b j e c t s they connec t ( Jakobson, 1935a) . 
Beyond t h i s r e l a t i o n s of e q u i v a l e n c e p l ay a r o l e n o t 
only in poems b u t a l s o i n t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of poems. 
Jakobson ' s a n a l y s i s of B r e c h t ' s p a r t y poem (1965) i s d e d i ­
c a t e d t o t h e Eas t German l i n g u i s t and f o l k l o r i s t Wolfgang 
S t e i n i t z , a d e d i c a t e d a d h e r e n t of t h e communist p a r t y . 
Jakobson had got t o know him i n 19 40 d u r i n g t h e i r common 
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exile in Sweden. While they were bidding each other farewell 
at the station in Stockholm, just before Jakobson was 
to start his hazardous voyage to New York, Jakobson remem­
bers Steinitz replying to his offer to help him settle in 
America as follows (1975, p.xii): 'I am a communist, my 
place is here...and after the war I intend to continue my 
work in a revolutionary Berlin.' Brecht's poem contains a 
repeated demand to those who are 'wise' not to leave the 
party: 
Gehe nicht ohne uns den richtigen Weg 
Ohne uns ist er 
der falscheste 
Sei bei uns weise! 
Trenne dich nicht von uns! 
One fails to grasp the intention of structural poetics 
and the essence of the aesthetic as such if one (cf. Jauss, 
1975, p.148) fails to see more than the classical theory of 
reflection in the setting out of positive or negative (or 
contrastive) relations of equivalence. The theory of 
reflection fails to take into account the specific hierarchy 
of linguistic functions in a poetic text. For the idea that 
the poetic text functions as a depiction - whether typified, 
alienated or whatever - of reality accords far too much 
importance to the cognitive function. Reflections, i.e. 
equivalences between literary text and surrounding context 
have no (or only a secondary) cognitive function, but 
rather a (dominating) aesthetic function in that they turn 
the attention of the subject to the artistic medium as such. 
Reflection is, like any content, part of the structure of 
the work of art and not its cognitive aim. The relation 
between the work of art and reality is pointed to in a 
direct indeed crude way (ad usum delphini) by wall paintings 
of the kind where there is a continuous transition from 
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painting to its surroundings and where one barely notices 
when the illusion of the picture stops and the palpable 
reality of the surroundings begins, or which objects (flow­
er pots, windows, flights of steps, etc.) are real and 
which are merely painted. Thanks to such continual equi­
valence relations, reality becomes part of the work of art. 
What both structuralism and functionalism are opposed 
to is an exclusively causal-historical explanation of cul­
tural phenomena, a one-dimensional, uni-directional rela­
tion between a work and its time. The correlation between 
the literary and historical series has its own structural 
laws which need uncovering (Jakobson and Tynjanov, 1928). 
More important than the causal relation which points back 
to the past is the teleological and functional relation 
which anticipates the future. A work has to be understood 
both on the basis of its genesis and on the basis of its 
character as a project. The futurists had declared the 
future to be the tense appropriate to poetry. Only weak 
poets wait on events, as Mayakovsky put it, in order to 
reflect them or, in the extreme case, to reflect about them; 
strong poets run ahead of their time, pulling it after them. 
In his obituary article for Mayakovsky Jakobson (1930) 
inquires into the literary anticipation of suicide by its 
most famous representative which, during the lifetime of 
the poet, was taken for a literary stunt and whose reali­
sation was then evaluated not as a 'literary fact' but as 
an absurdity. Before the effect upon the reader, which is 
placed in the foreground by the historians of the effects 
and of the reception of literature, there comes the (reflex­
ive) effect upon the author himself. 
The poet lives in a myth which he himself creates and consequently 
directs his life - more or less subliminally - towards the pattern 
created. In short, according to the results of Jakobson's 
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analysis, not only is the life situation active in the process 
of literary creation, but the product created is likewise active 
and often decisive in the poet's actual biography. Thus one 
cannot draw a sharp borderline between the two, nor can one 
generate one from the other unequivocally. Both sequences are 
in a relation of complementarity and form a kind of feed-back 
system (Pomorska, 1977, p.373). 
In the words of the poet Yeats (quoted by Jakobson and Rudy, 
1977, p.8): 
The friends that have it I do wrong 
Whenever I remake a song,  
Should know what issue is at stake: 
It is myself that I remake. 
§6. On the plurifunctionality of the poetic device 
The analysis can be taken further. Not only is the 
poetic text plurifunctional but so also is the poetic 
texture, the poetic device involved in lending shape to a 
text. The device to which a text owes its aesthetic charac­
ter - the projection of the principle of equivalence, of 
relations of similarity and contrast belonging to the axis 
of selection, onto the axis of combination, has many other 
consequences. The first of these is the much remarked 
plurivocity of poetic texts. 
First however a word about the 'structuralist' defi­
nition of poeticity in the terms of Jakobson's notion of 
projection. One can get a grip on what has value - beauty, 
goodness - or on what is dynamic - force, causation, inten­
tion - only by setting out invariant presuppositions and/or 
entailments of a structural sort. It is important to give 
metonymic definitions (to use Jakobson's terminology) e.g. 
of force as the product of mass and acceleration, of 
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causality as the invariant sequence of two events given 
additional boundary conditions to be more closely specified, 
of intentionality as the dependence - in the form of a 
feedback system - of a process on a plan. It is to meto­
nymic definitions such as this that modern natural sciences 
owe their striking success. Attempts to provide metaphor­
ical definitions, on the other hand, lead to open or hidden 
tautologies, as when causation is defined as production, or 
beauty as brightness, elegance, etc. 
The same structural property (a network of relations of 
equivalence in the syntagmatic axis of combination) which 
makes a text 'beautiful' is, we can say - modifying words 
of Kant9,- conducive to its plurivocity. For every lin­
guistic unity a distinction can be made between an invariant 
core-meaning and variable context-meanings. 'Coach' has 
quite different connotations when uttered in a station and 
when uttered in a garage, although the two referents have 
many common properties, a fact that is decisive for the use 
of a term. The context determines which are the connota­
tions which the core-meaning acquires. If the context to 
which a term is related is manifold then the term, too, will 
be ambiguous. The context is decisive for the over-deter­
mination of the term.10 In poetry, because the linguistic 
sequence is submerged under relations of similarity and 
contrast (at all linguistic levels), the context in which a 
term is experienced is at one and the same time made mani­
fold and acquires its own distinct profile. Relations of 
similarity and contrast have an associative effect, that is, 
they form contexts, and hence determine meaning. 'In poetry, 
any conspicuous similarity in sound is evaluated in respect 
to similarity and/or dissimilarity in meaning' (Jakobson, 
1960, p.372). The most transparent examples of plurivocity 
from poetically formed contexts are to be found in examples 
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of parallelism. In parallelism individual sentence-parts 
are made to approximate to one another through metrical and 
grammatical parallelisation and in their way their meaning 
is modified either metaphorically or, in a suitable context, 
antonymically (cf. Holenstein, 1976b, p.11f.). Particularly 
illustrative is a triplet from the Song of Judith (16.9) in 
which the beheading of Holophernes is described in song: 
Her sandal ravished his eyes,  
Her beauty captured his mind, 
The sword severed his neck. 
Through the immediate context, their object (eye and mind) , 
the verbs of the first two lines acquire a metaphorical 
meaning, whereas the additional context which is the 
parallel relation to the third line works to dissolve this 
metaphorical meaning. It becomes mixed with the original 
concrete meaning. At the same time to ravish and to capture 
take on a metonymic connotation. They appear as a prepar­
ation for the beheading (cf. R.A.Ρ.Roberts, 1977, p.988). 
The plurivocity of poetic texts is not something which 
is or should be resistant to inquiry, something for a 
romantic, anti-scientific 'symbolist' or 'hermeneuticist' to 
accept devoutly as a gift of grace or fate. Plurivocity is 
an automatic consequence of the mechanisms of language which 
the poet brings to emphasis (cf. Jakobson, 1960, p.370f.). 
The poetic device which makes a text beautiful functions 
both cognitively and emotively. Psychobiological investi­
gations of aesthetic experience (Berlyne, 1971; quoted by 
Bock, 1978, p.192), yielded the result that linguistic and 
non-linguistic material of medium complexity is felt to be 
pleasant whereas a degree of complexity which is too high or 
too low is experienced as unpleasant. An optimal degree of 
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complexity for some material is present when the recipient 
succeeds in grasping a unifying principle in the variety of 
what is offered. Invariance in what is variable and hence 
unity in multiplicity is just what the projection of the 
principle of similarity onto a linguistic sequence achieves. 
The same poetic device can, finally, function in yet 
another way - namely as a device of disautomatisation and 
as a mnemotechnic device. These are two functions which are 
cultivated by pragmatists among theoreticians of literature, 
the first by those with a sociological interest, the second 
by those whose orientation is psychological. The relations 
of similarity brought into being by the poet do indeed 
create not only unusual but also what, for the laws of 
everyday speech, are anomalous connections. The simplest 
example is the metaphor 'a laughing meadow1. Laughing and 
meadow are instances of incompatible word-categories 
according to the laws of linguistic combination. Only an 
animal, or even perhaps only a human being, can laugh. The 
unusual connection hinders understanding and calls forth 
the attention of the reader until he discovers the property 
which gives the connection a sense (cf. Hörmann, 1973, p. 
320ff). 
Jakobson (1965; 1966, p.423) has objected in quite 
striking terms to the two theses of disautomatisation and 
mnemotechnics. His opposition to the disautomatisation 
thesis in particular, which followed his own early work on 
deformation as a poetic device (1921, pp.90, 92, 103) to 
which his Prague colleague Mukařovsky had paid so much 
attention, may well surprise. But all that Jakobson is 
really objecting to is the elevation of disautomatisation 
of experience of the world and social life to the essence 
of poetic language, to the primary function of poetic 
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l a n g u a g e . The same h o l d s of t h e f u n c t i o n of m a k i n g memor­
a b l e ( t h e m n e m o t e c h n i c a l f u n c t i o n ) w h i c h p e o p l e h a v e t r i e d 
t o employ t o g i v e a g e n e t i c a c c o u n t of g r a m m a t i c a l p a r a l l e l ­
i s m , t h e more s o a s p a r a l l e l i s m i s t h e p r o t o t y p e of t h e 
p o e t i c p r i n c i p l e of t h e p r o j e c t i o n of r e l a t i o n s of e q u i v a l ­
e n c e o n t o t h e s y n t a g m a t i c a x i s . The e a s y m e m o r i s a b i l i t y 
of p o e t i c t e x t s c a n b e e x p l a i n e d a s much i n t e r m s o f t h e 
p s y c h o l o g y of a s s o c i a t i o n ( b a s e d on r e l a t i o n s of s i m i l a r i t y 
and c o n t r a s t ) a s i n t e r m s of t h e c o g n i t i v e p s y c h o l o g y w h i c h 
i s b a s e d on m e a n i n g f u l o r g a n i s a t i o n . P o e t i c t e x t u r e may, 
a f t e r a l l , s e r v e m e m o r i s i n g and d i s a u t o m a t i s i n g f u n c t i o n s . 
Bu t t h e p r a g m a t i c - u t i l i t a r i a n v i e w t h a t t h e p r i m a r y f u n c t i o n 
l i e s i n s u c h u s e i s p e r v e r s e . F o r t h e p r i m a r y f u n c t i o n c o n ­
s i s t s i n w h a t t h e t r a d i t i o n c a l l e d b e a u t y and w h a t n o w a d a y s 
i s c a l l e d a e s t h e t i c i t y , a t e r m no l e s s r i c h i n p r o b l e m s of 
i t s own. 
(Translated by Kevin Mulligan and Barry Smith.) 
Notes 
1. An exception i s the b i o l o g i s t E. Mayr (1974, p.114) who makes 
reference to Jakobson 's ana lyses . 
2. Already in h i s 1928 (pp.109f.) H. Dempe had extended Büh le r ' s th ree 
bas ic functions (a f te r the vers ion of 1918) with 'secondary f u n c t i o n s ' , 
and therewith a l s o , r e f e r r i n g to Croce and Vossler , mentioned too the 
a e s t h e t i c funct ion, though without any fur ther development. 
3."The f i r s t of these languages i s t h a t 'about which we s p e a k ' . . . . The 
second i s the language in which we 'speak about ' the f i r s t language, 
and in terms of which we wish, in p a r t i c u l a r , t o cons t ruc t the 
d e f i n i t i o n of t r u t h for the f i r s t language. We s h a l l r e f e r to the 
f i r s t language as the object language, and to the second as the meta­
language." (Tarski , 1944, p .21f . ) 
4 ."Phatic communion - a type of speech in which t i e s of union are 
c rea ted by a mere exchange of w o r d s . . . They f u l f i l a s o c i a l function 
and t h a t i s t h e i r p r i n c i p a l aim, but they are ne i t he r the r e s u l t of 
i n t e l l e c t u a l r e f l e c t i o n , nor do they n e c e s s a r i l y arouse r e f l e c t i o n in 
the l i s t e n e r . . . Phatic communion.. . serves to e s t a b l i s h bonds of 
personal union between people brought toge ther by the mere need of 
companionship and does not serve any purpose of communicating i d e a s . " 
The stock example of pha t i c language i s provided by goss ip : " . . . t h i s 
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atmosphere of sociability...achieved by...the specific feelings which 
form convivial gregariousness, by the give and take of utterances 
which make up ordinary gossip." - "Always the same emphasis of affirm­
ation and consent, mixed perhaps with an incidental disagreement which 
creates the bonds of antipathy." (Malinowski, 192 3, p.314ff.) 
5. Jakobson in a lecture given in Louvain in 1972; cited by Holenstein, 
1975, p.34. 
6. The acceptability of sentences like 'That is beautiful, but it 
doesn't please me' is a favourite topic of linguistic analytic aesthe­
tics: cf. the discussion in Strube, 1980. Incompatible with Jauss' 
aesthetic experience are utterances such as, 'Oui, cela est parfaite­
ment beau, mais il me fait bâllir' (Madame de Longueville); or, 'I 
admit that Raphael is a great painter but I do not like his work; it 
does not move me' (M. Macdonald). - Precisely such a running together 
of the pleasurable and the unpleasurable is characteristic of 'new art': 
'The impression which is made by living art is...rather that of some­
thing hard and strict...than of something elegant and smooth - it 
distinguishes itself sharply from the conventional and from the agree­
able comfortableness of the artistic expression with which one is 
familiar.' (F.X.salda, cited by Mukařovsky, 1936, p.46). A running 
together of this kind is especially typical of those cases where 
beauty is sought for dialectically in something that is ri facie 
ugly. 
7. "Partout on voit des machines qui servent à produire quelque chose 
et qui le produisent admirablement, avec pureté" (Le Corbusier, 1928, 
p.233) . "Architectural functionalism proceeds from the premise that a 
building has a single, precisely delimited function given by the 
purpose for which it is built. Hence Corbusier's well-known comparison 
of a building to a machine, a typically unambiguous product from a 
functional point of view." (Mukařovsky, 1942, p.37). 
8. In industry too monofunctionalism is something infantile, character­
istic of an early phase of industrialisation. Machines are, it is true, 
monofunctional (and with advantage); the energy with which they are 
driven however, and the raw materials which they transform, are both 
distinctively polyfunctional. The failure to take account of this fact 
leads to uneconomic wear and tear which does justice neither to the 
material of the economy nor to its needs. 
9. "...For this reason the same property which makes a building 
beautiful also contributes to its being good (to its bonitas) , and a 
face would also have to have for its purpose no other form than for 
its beauty." This sentence, from Kant's Nachlass (1923, p.628), may 
serve as a guideline for this section and especially as a historical 
support. 
10. Bock (1978, pp.l86ff.).distinguishes a threefold semantic effect 
of context. It works in an integvative way - the context clarifies 
or reveals from the.first the connection between individual parts of 
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the text which, without this additional information, remain unintelli­
gible. It works in  slctive way - the context determines which of 
the possible meanings of a linguistic unity become actualised. It 
operates in such a way as to expand the meaning, activating potential 
connotations which without it would have remained unremarked. An 
example of the integrative effect: 'Franz, enraged, is tearing the 
mirror to pieces.' A mirror is not torn but rather broken into pieces. 
The sensefullness of the connection between 'tearing to pieces' and 
'mirror' is revealed only with the addition of the sentence: 'The 
shreds of paper flew about wildly in the wind', which tells us that we 
have to deal with a London newspaper and not with an article of bathroom 
furniture. The not wholly adequate example, which I use for the 
sake of its brevity, derives from me, and not from Bock. In itself it 
serves as a more suitable example for the selective effect. The con­
text, the verb and the second sentence, indicate which of the possible 
meanings of 'm i r r o r /  i r r o r' is to be selected. Of quite special 
importance for poetics is the third effect, that of extension of mean­
ing. Bock and his co-workers discovered that plurivocity of textual 
passages is most often realised where the context - the relevant 
experiments deal with visual contexts - is also plurivocal. Thus the 
ambiguity of 'Dorfkapelle r (village chapel/village band) was most 
frequently noticed where the accompanying image showed a man by the 
side of the group of musicians and in front of a small country church. 
The different meanings of a term are not, as a rule, equal in value. 
The less common remain latent in the absence of an appropriately stimu­
lating context. The sense-modificatory effects of the changing context 
surrounding a work is the subject matter of the theory of (literary) 
reception {Rezeptionsästhetik) . 
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ALOIS RIEGL: 
THE SYNCHRONIC ANALYSIS OF STYLISTIC TYPES 
Margaret Iversen 
§1. Introduction 
§2. The Dutch Kunstwollen 
§3. The typology of styles 
§4. The symbolic type 
§5. The genre-like type 
§6. The dramatic type 
§7. Conclusion 
§1. Introduction 
Alois Riegl was the most distinguished member of the 
Vienna School of Art History which consisted of several 
generations of professors at the university active from the 
turn of this century. Important nineteenth-century pre­
cursors of the school include Rudolf Eitelberger, founder 
of the Museum for Applied Art and Theodor von Sickel, found­
er of the Institute for Research in Austrian History, both 
of whom engaged in archeological and philological research. 
Later, a number of intellectual currents converged which 
shifted interest towards the visual morphology of art. For 
example, Franz Wickoff's analysis of individual forms is the 
result of his interest in the techniques of connoisseurship 
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d e v i s e d by G i o v a n n i M o r e l l i . 1 R i e g l ' s more p r o f o u n d c o n ­
c e p t i o n of s t y l e i s i n f o r m e d b o t h by H e r b a r t i a n p s y c h o l o g y 
a n d by K a r l S c h n a a s e ' s H e g e l i a n t r e a t m e n t of a r t h i s t o r y . 2 
More r e c e n t l y t h e a d o p t i o n of G e s t a l t p s y c h o l o g y h a s s u s ­
t a i n e d t h e f o r m a l i s t t r a d i t i o n . A n o t h e r of t h e S c h o o l 1 s 
a b i d i n g c o n c e r n s i s w i t h t h e r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of s t y l e s f o r ­
m e r l y r e g a r d e d a s d e g e n e r a t e . W i c k o f f and R i e g l w e r e b o t h 
c o n c e r n e d t o p r o v i d e e a r l y C h r i s t i a n a r t w i t h an a e s t h e t i c 
v a l u e d i f f e r e n t i n k i n d f rom t h e c l a s s i c i d e a l , a n d Max 
D v o ř à k , a n o t h e r i m p o r t a n t f i g u r e i n t h i s t r a d i t i o n , d e v o t e d 
h i m s e l f t o t h e s t u d y of G o t h i c a r t . 3 
R i e g l ' s work i s an u n d e r - v a l u e d c o n t r i b u t i o n t o a r t -
h i s t o r i c a l t h o u g h t w h i c h h a s s u f f e r e d l a m e n t a b l y a t t h e 
h a n d s of p o p u l a r i s e r s a n d a p o l o g i s t s , l i k e Hans S e d l m a y e r 
and W i l h e l m W o r r i n g e r , who h a v e i n t e r p r e t e d h i s t h e o r y i n 
p s y c h o l o g i c a l t e r m s , 4 and f rom c r i t i c s who h a v e t o o o f t e n 
d i s m i s s e d i t a s a r e v i v a l o f H e g e l i a n a e s t h e t i c s , t h a t i s , 
a s a r o m a n t i c v i s i o n of human s p i r i t u a l d e v e l o p m e n t r e f l e c ­
t e d i n t h e h i s t o r y of s t y l e s . E r n s t G o m b r i c h , a p r o d u c t o f 
t h e V i e n n a S c h o o l , l e v e l s t h i s c r i t i c i s m a g a i n s t R i e g l i n 
t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n t o h i s Art and Illusioni 
There i s a touch of genius in the single-mindedness with which 
Riegl t r i e s by one un i t a ry p r i n c i p l e to account for a l l s t y l i s t i c 
changes in a r c h i t e c t u r e , s cu lp tu r e , pa in t ing and p a t t e r n making. 
But t h i s s ingle-mindedness, which he took to be the hallmark of 
a s c i e n t i f i c approach, made him a prey to those p r e - s c i e n t i f i c 
h a b i t s of mind in which un i t a ry p r i n c i p l e s p r o l i f e r a t e , the 
hab i t s of the mythmakers. The ' w i l l - t o - f o r m ' , the Kunstwollen, 
becomes the ghost in the machine, d r iv ing the wheels of a r t i s t i c 
developments according to ' inexorab le l a w s ' . . . . I t i s not 
d i f f i c u l t to see in t h i s p i c t u r e of world h i s t o r y a r e v i v a l of 
those romantic mythologies which found t h e i r climax in Hegel ' s 
philosophy of h i s t o r y . 5 
T h i s c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n o f R i e g l l e a v e s u s w i t h t h e f a l s e 
i m p r e s s i o n t h a t h e , l i k e H e g e l , c o n s i d e r s t h e h i s t o r y of 
a r t a s e v i d e n c e of o u r g r a d u a l a s c e n d e n c y o v e r t h e c o n -
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straints imposed by alien nature and of our self-recognition 
as spiritual beings. 
The concept of the Kunstwollen is certainly to some 
extent vulnerable to this interpretation. Riegl does en­
visage the history of styles, the history of the Kunstwollen, 
as a series of transformations in the way we orga­
nise our perception in art. The Egyptian Kunstwollen, for 
example, is an aesthetic ideal which values a visual clar­
ity and objectivity analogous to the certainty afforded 
by the sense of touch. This 'haptic' or 'objective' ideal 
is set in opposition to the impressionist's 'optic' or 
'subjective' ideal of the world as visually experienced, as 
suspended in the mind of the beholder. 
The haptic and optic ideals are the extreme poles of a 
scheme for a universal history of stylistic development. 
The scheme ultimately derives from Hegel's aesthetics, but 
Riegl excludes two fundamental features of that doctrine: 
Firstly, his theory does not, like Hegel's, hold that the 
history of styles displays progressively higher levels of 
awareness. Hegel sees in the rigid configurations and 
grotesque motifs of Egyptian art signs that external mater­
ial had not yet been spiritualised, that is, transformed 
into an object in which Mind can decipher itself. This 
goal is more fully realised in Classic art, but Hegel 
claims that a higher level of self-recognition is reflected 
in seventeenth-century Dutch paintings. These imitations 
of transient nature and the 'prose of life' display Mind's 
proper recognition that thought can have no adequate sen­
suous embodiment.6 Riegl, on the other hand, admires the 
constructive freedom of archaic ornament and regards nine­
teenth-century Naturalism and Impressionism as too subject-
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ive in character.7 Riegl makes use of Hegel's very subtle 
visual morphology in order to formulate a complex typology 
of equally valid styles. 
Secondly, while Hegel sees style as an index of our general 
spiritual development, Riegl provides the history of art 
with a sense of autonomous development. 
This autonomous history of art is formulated in such a 
way that non-classical styles such as late Roman, Baroque8 
and seventeenth-century Dutch art, are seen to contribute 
to the continuous history of styles. The conviction govern­
ing his early work - that placing a style within a conti­
nuous developmental series, secures for that style aesthetic 
validity - is later supplemented, and even superseded, by a 
procedure which confers aesthetic value by formulating 
self-validating artistic ideals specific to particular 
styles. His last book, Holländische Gruppenporträt,9 is of 
special interest because it represents a shift away from 
universal historical schemes. In it Riegl attends to the 
characteristics and relationships of elements peculiar to 
group portraiture in Holland during the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. 
The theoretical importance of this shift of focus is 
best appreciated when it is compared with contemporaneous 
developments in the field of linguistics.10 Riegl's adjust­
ments to his own early practice resemble those of the lin­
guist Ferdinand de Saussure.11 Saussure, originally an 
historical grammarian, changed the course of linguistics by 
arguing that the primary object of linguistics is not the 
evolution of forms of language, as his predecessors had 
supposed. Instead he understood language as a system of 
interrelated signs in which the value of each element 
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results from the simultaneous presence of the other elem­
ents. The system is available to synchronic analysis which 
determines the relationship of co-existing elements within 
a single linguistic state. Similarly, in Riegl's Holländ-
ische Gruppenporträt, (hereinafter 'HG') the exclusively 
diachronic perspective of his early Stil fragen, is replaced 
by a synchronic procedure which understands a particular 
style as governed by its own purpose, its own grammar or 
principles of design. The method treats individual works 
of art as manifestations of an underlying system or struc­
ture. Art historians' interest in such guiding structures 
need not, as Gombrich fears, lead to 'totalitarian habits 
of mind' and the abolition of the individual. Rather, it 
can be understood as an acknowledgement of a principle 
which in the study of language is a truism: that in order 
for individuals to produce and convey meaning they must 
comply with a system of rules and conventions shared by 
the community. 
§2. The Dutch Kunstwollen 
Riegl's treatment of early sixteenth to mid-seventeenth 
century Dutch group portraiture is so complex that it is 
difficult to make any generalisations prior to an analysis 
of the text. What we have to do is to define the concept 
of the Kunstwollen as it appears in this book, showing how 
it serves as the basis for Riegl's procedure. He divides 
the period into a succession of three stages. The question 
posed at each stage is, 'by what methods has coherence been 
achieved?' The general ideal of coherence is one dependent 
on the imaginative projection of the perceiver, but the 
type and degree of projection varies within the period. 
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The Kunstwollen of the Dutch style is said to be the 
representation of 'attention' (Aufmerksamkeit). The con­
cept has a double use: the engagement of attention is attri­
buted, on the one hand, to depicted figures and, on the 
other, to the spectator. A group portrait represents 
attentive attitudes and also demands these attitudes from 
the spectator. 
Riegl describes attention as a deep concern for the 
world and an attitude which combines both humility and self-
esteem. 
Attention is passive, as it permits itself to be impressed by 
external objects and does not try to subdue them; at the same 
time it is active as it searches for objects without intending 
to make them subservient to inner satisfaction (HG, p.14). 
This relationship of mind to things involves a delicate 
balance: the object remains independent and intact insofar 
as the mind is receptive, yet the subject also retains his 
independence or autonomy - he is free from the constraints 
of appetite and desire and free to direct and focus his 
attention. 
We have said that the Kunstwollen of a stylistic period 
is a particular ideal of coherence. Attention, then, which 
refers to a psychological attitude also refers to a means 
of making a picture cohere. According to this interpret­
ation of Dutch group portraiture, it is the union of the 
figures brought about by their attentiveness, plus the 
imaginative projection and attentiveness of the spectator, 
which renders these paintings coherent. Riegl sets this 
principle of coherence in contrast to the Italian device of 
making action and the will serve as a basis of unity. In 
order to appreciate Dutch art we must recognise that its 
basis of unity is different from the Italian and that in it, 
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emotion and attention play a much greater role than action 
and the will. 
Riegl distinguishes between different modes of attent­
ion. So-called Objective attention1 in early Dutch art 
describes the attitude of isolated figures absorbed in con­
templation and yet united by the transcendent focus of 
their undirected gaze. Later group portraits are united 
by a 'subjective attention' which is an attitude directed 
toward objects which are determined in space and time. 
This distinction is best understood if we recognise that 
Riegl is making use of Schopenhauer's sense of the terms 
'objective' and 'subjective'.12 In Schopenhauer's scheme 
of things, one is exercising a form of objective appercep­
tion when contemplating objects transcending space and time 
- his Platonic Ideas. The engagement of subjectivity, on 
the other hand, involves spontaneously constituting the 
objects of experience (ordinary perception as described by 
Kant) and the expression of feelings and the will. Riegl 
extends this sense of subjectivity to include the specta­
tor's activity of imaginatively completing the picture's 
world. 
Although group portraiture was common in the Netherlands 
during this period, Riegl's exclusive treatment of it seems 
to exaggerate its importance vis-à-vis painting of religi­
ous subjects, genre and landscape. Riegl focuses on group 
portraiture because he thinks that it is the most complete 
expression of the Dutch Kunstwollen: a portrait conveys an 
impression of inward psychic life and personality. The 
artistic problem presented by the Kunstwollen to depict the 
specifically Dutch ideal of inwardness is clear. The psy­
chic attitude of attention involving suppression of the will 
is not one which manifests itself in action but merely in 
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a gaze. This is a difficulty even for single portraits 
but with group portraits the problem is multiplied, for the 
motionless figures must somehow be brought into relation 
with one another. Riegl thinks the central problem con­
fronting the painter of group portraits is that of finding 
a means of uniting the group without diminishing the indi­
vidual inwardness of its members. 
Another essential characteristic of portraiture is the 
way in which depicted figures are presented to a spectator. 
Unlike narrative painting, which depicts action contained 
within the picture space, the portrait figure is actually 
addressed to us. By its very nature,portraiture establish­
es an intimate relationship with the viewer, openly acknow­
ledging his presence. This feature poses another problem 
for group portraiture: how can the individual figures relate 
to the spectator and yet form a coherent group with the re­
maining figures? Riegl recognises this as a problem, but 
also sees that communication both between depicted figures 
and between the depicted figures and the viewing subject 
is part of the solution to the problem of coherence in 
group portraits. He isolates two types of coherence: 
1) internal coherence, which involves the relationship of 
elements within the picture, and 
2) external coherence, which includes and depends upon the 
spectator to complete the scene. According to Riegl's 
theory, it is possible to compensate for the diminished 
internal coherence needed to preserve the quality of por­
trait-likeness, by augmenting it with external coherence, 
making a painting cohere by implicitly including the 
spectator. 
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We said Riegl's theory of art leads him to pick out 
those features of group portraits which produce coherence. 
He generates quite a catalogue of concepts, which include 
matters of content, formal configurations, and treatments 
of light and space. Each of the features is given a value 
in terms of its relative objectivity or subjectivity, i.e. 
some features tend to make a painting appear more self-
enclosed, complete in itself, while others tend to open 
the painting up to the subjective projection of the spec­
tator. For brevity's sake, I will refer to features as 
either 'objectivising' or 'subjectivising'. 
§3. The typology of styles 
What follows is a systematic elucidation of the stylis­
tic types which emerge from Riegl's study of Dutch group 
portraiture. These and their associated descriptive notions 
are organised under two dichotomies - 'Italian' as opposed 
to 'Dutch', and 'objective' as opposed to 'subjective'. 
The first, the national classification, is importantly not 
congruent with the objective/subjective dichotomy. Further­
more, each of the paintings Riegl considers is described in 
terms of (a) its concept (Auffassung) and (b) its compo­
sition. The 'concept' underlying a work of art specifies 
something about its content, and like most of the features 
which Riegl isolates, it is a way of rendering a painting 
coherent. 
Riegl observes a number of different unifying concepts 
at work in Dutch group portraits which in practice some­
times overlap. The unifying concept which unites a multi­
plicity of figures may be (1) the utilisation of symbolic 
attributes which signify common membership in a corporate 
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body, (2) the figures' common participation in some shared 
activity, (3) the representation of a dramatic scene which 
both subordinates the figures to some action or some domi­
nant figure, and also sets the depicted figures in relation 
to the spectator. The different types of Dutch group por­
trait are compared and contrasted with the Italian ideal. 
On Riegl's view, Italian art is fundamentally narrative in 
conception and is, so to speak, acted out on the other side 
of the proscenium arch, while Dutch art deliberately oversteps 
that boundary. 
According to the theory, there are three stages in the 
development of group portraiture which roughly correspond 
to the three concepts listed above. He calls these three 
stages or types the 'Symbolic', the 'Genre-like' (Genve-
mässige), and the 'Dramatic'. Riegl's analysis of these 
types will presently be discussed in some detail. We shall 
see that his understanding of the stages of Dutch artistic 
development hinges on Dutch adaptation of certain features 
of the Italian ideal. 
Riegl nowhere gives us an independent formulation of 
the Italian narrative type, but his frequent references to 
it amount to a description of the High Renaissance ideal. 
This ideal demands a coherence which is internal, complete 
within the pictorial space. It contrives a unity which, 
unlike Dutch art, is independent of the spectator. Sub­
ordination, action, and narrative completeness are the key 
unifying concepts. Instead of co-ordinated, mutual indepen­
dence of depicted figures characteristic of Dutch group por­
traiture, the Italian type represents either a dominant 
figure whose expression of will subordinates the others, or 
an action which equally subordinates the multiplicity of 
figures to a single end, or both of these. In any case 
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what is represented is an explicitly enacted narrative 
which emphasises outward action, rather than inward senti­
ment . 
Riegl observes both objective and subjective tendencies 
in Italian art: it depicts objective reality, but it does 
this in accordance with the subjective conditions of per­
ception, that is, in accordance with the laws of linear per­
spective. 
(Italian art) strives mainly to render the three-dimensional 
spatial appearance of individual things (figures) in confor­
mity to our subjective experience: hence its development of 
linear perspective which adheres to shapes, and of symmetrical, 
triangular composition, which groups the objects together in 
the plane and brings them to a strikingly obvious, objectively 
normal whole (HG, p.23). 
Perceptual clarity is achieved not only by perspective, 
which establishes measurable relationships in space, but 
also by distinctly outlined isolated figures set in a plane-
metric, symmetrical composition. 
It is interesting to observe the kinds of relation which 
hold between the different unifying concepts and composi­
tional features. Riegl's treatment of these relations, 
which overcome problems associated with the form 
and content distinction, seems particularly subtle and 
acute. He appears to hold a theory of ideal types which 
combines 'naturally' correlated pairs of concept and com­
position. For example, the Italian type with its subordi­
nating concept most readily combines with compact, pyramid­
al compositions; Dutch co-ordination calls for planemetric 
composition and vertical axes. More interesting, however, 
is the way Riegl sees these ideal types as decomposed and 
reassembled into hybrid forms. An artist can 'mismatch' a 
pair in order to serve his ends, balancing the subjective 
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valency of the one against the objective valency of an­
other. For example, in The Anatomy of Dr. Tulp, a dis­
solving atmospheric effect is compensated for by a sub­
ordinating conception and pyramidal composition. This 
might be called the theory of compensation - an advance in 
one aspect of painting is balanced by conservatism in 
another, so that the general character and continuity of 
the Kunstwollen is maintained. 
We have seen that the Italian type conflicts with the 
character of portraiture: engagement in action distorts 
features and attracts attention to physical form and move­
ment, rather than to personality, thereby weakening the 
portrayal. But it is also true, and this is a crucial 
point, that Dutch colouristic space, Freiraum, can equally 
be detrimental to portraiture if figures are allowed to 
blur and melt into the atmosphere. Riegl remarks that the 
Dutch tendency toward subjectivity needed a curb in order 
to prevent its degenerating into compositional arbitrari­
ness and that group portraiture provided just such a disci­
plined norm. 
One might say that the Dutch group portrait exerted an 
objectivising and thereby a retarding and conservative 
influence in composition, but that it was generally bene­
ficial and regulating (HG, p.25). 
§4. The symbolic type 
The theoretical framework just outlined is highly com­
plex, yet it seems to have grown out of Riegl's perception 
of individual works of art. His detailed and illuminating 
observations of paintings support the theory without being 
forced or eccentric. This will become apparent in the 
following survey of examples drawn from each type of group 
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portrait. 
One of the early group portraits which Riegl describes 
as Symbolic in conception is Dirck Jacobsz's Militia Com­
pany of 1529.13 The figures stand in two rows, engaging in 
no activity which would connect the work with medieval 
narrative painting. There is little interplay between the 
figures and there is no dominant subordinating figure. How 
then are they brought into relation with one another? What 
makes it a group portrait and not an aggregate of single 
portraits? Riegl claims that the militia men's gestures are 
to be read as having symbolic significance: they point to 
their rifles and their captain or rest a hand on a neigh­
bour's shoulder. The spectator must interpret the meaning 
of these symbols, i.e. that this is a militia company both 
subordinate to a captain and bound by comradeship. The 
painting's coherence is 'external', that is, dependent on 
the spectator to interpret these signs. As though to ack­
nowledge this dependence all but one of the figures look 
out of the picture and one even gestures in the spectator's 
direction. 
On Riegl's view, insofar as the presence of a captain 
provides a dominant figure, the painting betrays traces of 
the Italian conception, but he observes that while the dom­
inant figure in an Italian painting actively subordinates 
the others, the men in Jacobsz's painting subordinate them­
selves to the captain with their pointing gestures. Riegl's 
explanation of the inclusion of a captain in terms of Ital­
ian influence on Dutch art is an example of his unfortunate 
tendency to be over-systematic. The presence of a captain 
in a militia company needs no explanation; how or where he 
is depicted may be stylistically significant. For example 
Jacobsz's captain does not occupy the central position, a 
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fact which argues well for the case that Dutch artists 
were not seeking the type of coherence valued in Italian 
art. 
The quality of attention in early Dutch art is reflec­
ted in the quiet, transcendent, 'objective' gaze of Jac­
obsz's figures. Objective attention, in Riegl's sense, is 
characterised by a lack of personal emotion. The figures, 
detached from immediacy of feeling and external objects, 
stand in motionless vertical postures. Although their pos­
itions seem quite rigid and formal, Jacobsz has avoided 
full face and profile. Instead he paints three-quarter 
profiles with eyes turned directly outward, deflecting the 
direction of the gaze from the direction of the body. 
This position expresses both the will-less self-containment 
of the figures and their receptivity to objective reality 
- the attitude discussed earlier with reference to Schopen­
hauer. 
Riegl indicates what objectivising compositional devices 
are employed in Jacobsz's Militia Company. The wooden bar­
riers and upright postures of the figures effect a compos­
ition crossed by architectonic horizontals and verticals. 
This strict regimentation is combined with unifying devices 
typical of the Italian style - symmetry and a dominant cen­
tre. The figures are locked in a plane inaccessible to the 
spectator. It is thus pictorially expressive of the kind 
of attention which regards its objects as fundamentally 
independent and self-contained. 
Despite its pronounced objective quality, Riegl sees in 
Jacobsz's painting the seeds of a style which, one hundred 
years later, is to surpass the level of subjectivity 
achieved by the Italian High Renaissance. He points to its 
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subjectivising features. The jagged bottom row of heads 
breaks architectonic clarity and highly modelled heads and 
hands protrude from the plane. The painting completely 
lacks perspectival space, but according to Riegl, the 
dark, uniform background is an attempt to represent the 
homogeneity of free space between figures and, as such, it 
prefigures the seventeenth-century Dutch method of repre­
senting space which renders a painting coherent by suspen­
ding the figures in an optically homogeneous atmosphere. 
§5. The genre-like type 
According to Riegl's account of Dutch stylistic develop­
ment, between the years 1580 and 1624 group portraiture 
assimilated genre elements. Since the term 'genre' is 
fraught with confusion we must spell out what force it has 
in Riegl's terminology. He suggests that a change in reli­
gious attitudes was accompanied by a change in the treat­
ment of religious painting. During the sixteenth century, 
particularly in northern Europe, morality came to be con­
sidered an attribute of the individual conscience instead 
of an objective norm. In Holland this change resulted in 
a tendency to represent religious scenes as though person­
ally witnessed by the spectator instead of as alien, objec­
tive events. This 'intimate' representation of historical 
events stripped of grandeur, Riegl calls 'genremässig'  
(genre-like) and he associates it with the tradition of 
paintings of country folk and low life stemming from Breu­
ghel the Elder. 
In this type of painting the focus is turned from the 
objective historical fact or outward event and toward the 
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inward spiritual life of the individuals depicted. Part 
of that inner life is the feeling and emotional exchange 
between people, das Gemüt. Accordingly, while the Kunst­
wollen of the symbolic group portrait is the depiction of 
gefühllose Aufmerksamkeit (attention without feeling), the 
type influenced by genre conceptions seeks to express aufmerksames 
Mitgefühl (attentive sympathy). The qualifying 
adjective 'attentive' is important; it preserves the con­
tinuity between the first and second phases and, at the 
same time, conceptually guards this type of painting 
against confusion with paintings which make the outward, 
physical manifestation of emotional exchange (e.g. lovers 
embracing) the basis of a completely internal coherence. 
One way the Genre-like group portrait coheres, then, is 
by the representation of figures expressing fellow feeling 
through their gestures. It also makes use of the Italian 
devices of centering activity around an event and of making 
figures subordinate to a dominant figure. An important 
feature of the Genre-like type is the special quality of 
this event which forms the basis of its coherence. It is 
not an historical event nor an immediate dramatic event, 
but a typical, oft-repeated happening like a meal or cere­
mony {eine genremässige Randiung). Riegl's stress on the 
recurrent, almost ritualistic nature of the occasion depic­
ted is, I believe, connected with his notions of a develop­
ment within the history of representation towards depiction 
of an immediate, instantaneous moment. While the earlier, 
symbolic type locates both the depiction and the spectator 
outside time, the later, dramatic type determines both of 
these at an immediate moment; the Genre-like type has a 
temporal value between these poles - a generalised time. 
Here we observe typical, exemplary postures which charac­
terise the action. We will want to see exactly what formal-
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visual features of this type give it this curious exemplary 
quality. 
One genre-like group portrait is The Company of Captain 
Dirak Rosencvans14 (1588) by Cornelius Ketel. Riegl notes 
that a new unifying concept is operating which allows, for 
the first time, the representation of full figures. Move­
ment rather than the face alone is expressive, and what is 
expressed is not pure attention but also feeling, which 
permeates the whole body. The fact that each figure holds 
a weapon is significant. In Jacobsz's Militia Company 
only a few weapons are displayed to serve as symbolic attri­
butes signifying the nature of the group ('objective, abso­
lute attributes'). Here weapons are distributed amongst 
the men as if for an actual occasion ('momentary, individual 
attributes1). The chief unifying device, subordination, is 
effected by the prominence of the three figures in command. 
These three form a group which together confronts the spec­
tator. Through the captain's gesture the company is presen­
ted to the spectators thus indicating that full genre-com­
pleteness includes persons outside the picture. The motif 
of presentation, in Riegl's view, is specifically Dutch 
because it is an action whose completion depends upon the 
implied presence of spectators; its coherence is external, 
for the act of presentation consists in making the specta­
tors attentive. Riegl regards the exaggerated mannerist 
postures as expressive of Dutch co-ordination: the men, 
rather than following a uniform impulse emanating from the 
captain's command, preserve a degree of autonomy and inde­
pendence. 
The Genre-like phase of Dutch group portraiture is com-
positionally the most Italianate of the three types. In 
Ketel's picture the full figures, the checker-board floor, 
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and the projections and indentations of the architecture 
behind, clearly indicate an intention to represent tactile, 
three-dimensional forms 'springing out of depth' (HG, p.113). 
Riegl says that the painting is still basically object­
ive in character; meaning that the subject takes his stand­
point from the demands of the object, not vice versa, as 
strict subjectivity would require. For example, the point 
of view is very high, making the more distant figures 
appear to be on a higher plane. From a subjective, eye-
level point of view, the back figures would appear behind, 
not above, the front row. There is no impression of free 
space moving between figures. This is because, like the 
Italian type, emphasis is placed on the figures and shapes 
themselves. Space is represented by perspective construc­
tion, overlapping and foreshortening - all haptic means of 
representing space. 
The painting's stress on physicality damages its por­
trait character, but Riegl believes that a phase of group 
portraiture strongly influenced by Italian concepts and 
compositions was necessary in order to arrive at a more ad­
vanced form of attention and coherence determined in space 
and time. His analysis of Rembrandt's development is 
couched in these terms. Rembrandt, and the third phase 
generally, first tightens internal coherence through sub­
ordination and close grouping and then uses this strong 
base as a springboard for a kind of external coherence 
which sets the depicted figures in an immediate temporal 
and spatial relationship with the spectator. 
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§6. The dramatic type 
Riegl argues that Rembrandt's famous group portraits 
are Dramatic in conception. This means that the figures 
participate in some activity which simultaneously subordi­
nates them into an internally coherent group, and brings 
them into dramatic interplay with the spectator. The spec­
tator is singled out and called upon imaginatively to par­
ticipate in the space, time and action of the dramatic 
event. This new demand on the spectator is announced by 
a depiction which encourages the illusion that the scene 
is immediate and instantaneous. 
In Rembrandt's Night Watch15, 1642, it is impossible to 
tell exactly how many figures are represented, indicating 
how far this painting departs from the traditional norm 
of group portraiture. Its coherence is effected by subordi­
nation - the captain is ordering his lieutenant to have the 
company march out. The captain makes commanding gesture 
and the lieutenant responds, turning his head in the direc­
tion of the captain. The militia men show their subordin­
ation to those in command by preparing for the moment when 
the order will be given. Subordination and the resulting 
internal coherence is made clear not so much by action in 
response to a command, but by the treatment of the company 
as a more or less uniform background against the officers. 
This, in Riegl's view, is the ultimate consequence of the 
principle of subordination - a lack of co-ordination, of 
attention, of personal characterisation, in short, the 
denial of group portraiture. 
Despite the emphasis on action and subordination, Rem­
brandt expresses his fundamentally Dutch Kunstwollen in the 
choice of the moment depicted. He does not paint action 
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itself, but the preparation for it or the psychic intention. 
Action serves to express the men's attentive attitude. 'Die 
Malerei der Aufmerksamkeit', Riegl affirms, is still the 
true artistic end. By depicting intention rather than 
action itself, Rembrandt's painting demands greater imagi­
native projection on the part of the perceiving subject. 
Connection with the spectator is heightened by another, 
new conception: the appearance of forward movement. Riegl 
says that the colouristic handling is the visible expres­
sion of an imminent movement toward the spectator. This 
movement is the master stroke: it transforms subordination 
and internal coherence into a means of creating external 
coherence - the potential thrust of the action is out of 
the canvas toward the viewer. 
The Night Watch is a great step toward the modern ideal 
of art as the subjective experience of accidental, moment­
ary action in space. Rembrandt has taken great pains to 
depict half-completed gestures and includes children 'accidentally' 
dashing through the crowd. The scene is littered 
with the partial, fragmentary and contingent - even a bark­
ing dog. Also, very nearly disregarding the demands of 
portraiture, he has used chiaroscuro to its ultimate effect 
of immersing the figures in vibrating light and circulating 
space. The figures seem arbitrarily scattered, brought 
together only through the consciousness of the beholding 
subject to a purely subjective unity. Nothing, it seems, 
could be further from the haptic ideal of perceptual clar­
ity and freedom from contingency. 
Yet Riegl observes that objectivising features still 
remain. Close analysis of the painting reveals a highly 
organised composition. Rembrandt retains, for instance, 
the plane-adhering and integrating effects of symmetry 
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both in colouring and in formal composition. The dark 
captain in the middle of the composition is flanked by the 
brightly costumed lieutenant to one side, and by the chil­
dren caught in a sunbeam on the other. The company behind 
them is made up of a horizontal middle row with inclined 
wings at either end. 
Riegl speculates interestingly on the different meanings 
of classic symmetry and that symmetry found in Rembrandt's 
art. Classic art, he says, grouped things symmetrically 
because symmetry was thought to be a feature of the essen­
tial, objective nature of things unobscured by perception. 
Rembrandt's conception is the extreme opposite of this: in 
his compositions, symmetry signifies a recognition of the 
presence and the position of the beholding subject. Adher­
ence to the plane, another feature of classic art, would 
seem to be incompatible with Rembrandt's subjectivising 
tendency. Riegl resolves this apparent contradiction by 
distinguishing two types of appearance in the plane: the 
haptic, in which things are seen from a near view arranged 
next to one another in their tangible height and width, and 
the optic, in which things distantly perceived appear in 
the plane even though they are dispersed in different spa­
tial depths. Riegl believes that in the early paintings 
Rembrandt sought to break the haptic plane. Accordingly 
he dispersed figures in depth. Later he realised that this 
resulted in emphasising physicality. He learned that a 
union of figures with free space is only brought about by 
the use of optical symmetry and plane composition. In order 
to create an optic plane, the interval between figures must 
not have the appearance of relief ground, but of freely cir­
culating space. Riegl observes that Rembrandt perfected 
this effect in the last decade of his life with the Syndics. 
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§7. Conclusion 
Throughout this discussion of Holländische Gruppenpor­
trät t I have been concerned to elucidate Riegl's typology 
of style and to demonstrate its descriptive power. The 
concept of the Kunstwollen has been interpreted as a set 
of interlocked variables which specifies matters of content 
and composition. These fundamental elements include methods 
of making a picture coherent, the spectator's relation to 
the depiction, and the organisation of the picture in rela­
tion to space and time. Various stylistic types manifest 
and combine with these elements in different ways. Some 
treatments indicate an artistic ideal which preserves the 
integrity and isolation of the depiction; others indicate 
an ideal which values the spectator's contribution. 
This very general framework need not be limited in its 
application to Dutch group portraiture. It is comprehensive 
enough to provide the basis for a structural description of 
style. Riegl's historiographic theory imposes a restrictive 
pattern of development on the history of art, but at the 
same time it generates a set of descriptive notions which 
are available for the synchronic analysis of stylistic types. 
This is its value. 
Riegl was aware of the paradoxical consequence of his 
theory of artistic development: an increasingly subjective 
conception of the relationship between mind and things even­
tually dissolves into arbitrary chaos, non-art. He per­
ceived signs of this danger in Impressionism and welcomed 
the archaic stylisation of some works exhibited by the 
Vienna Secession.16 In Hegel's view, the ultimate destiny 
of art is its own obsolescence. When Mind finally recog­
nises its own purely spiritual character, art is superseded, 
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becoming discursive thought, philosophy. Riegl, on the 
other hand, insists to the end on the constant conflict 
(Auseinandersetzung) between the subject and things. Com­
plete absorption of the object in subjective consciousness 
means the end of art.17 
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BOLZANO AND THE DARK DOCTRINE: 
AN ESSAY IN AESTHETICS 
Peter McCormick 
§1. Kant and the subjectivisation of aesthetics 
§2. Bolzano and the theory of the beautiful 
§3. Appraising Bolzano's aesthetics 
Bolzano is most widely known for his outstanding work 
in mathematics, philosophy of science, and the philosophy 
of logic.1 In this paper however I want to look sympathet­
ically yet critically at the major feature of his most 
important reflections' on aesthetics, his theory of beauty. 
In order to situate these reflections in the development of 
modern aesthetics and to make their expression more under­
standable, I propose in the first section of the paper to 
review briefly several of the central difficulties in Kant's 
aesthetic. In §2 I will then make use of Bolzano's criti­
cisms of Kant as an initial means of presenting Bolzano's 
own philosophical concerns, before sketching further those 
themes which are peculiar to Bolzano's work alone. Finally 
in . I will suggest critical questions about Bolzano's 
theory which call for further attention on the part of his 
interpreters and also on the part of those interested in a 
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certain strain of post-Kantian aesthetics. 
Although my purposes here remain largely critical ones, 
I have tried to call attention to textual, historical and 
interpretative points in some of the accompanying notes. 
My larger purpose is to suggest in a general way only that 
Bolzano's aesthetics, specifically his investigations into 
the concept of the beautiful, represent more than just an 
important and almost completely overlooked criticism of 
Kant's well-known views; these investigations provide the 
basic link between Kantian aesthetics and the work of the 
later Brentano, Meinong, Husserl, and Ingarden. In short, 
Bolzano's aesthetics include the initial elements of what 
might be called the realist tradition in modern aesthetics. 
§1. Kant and the subjectivisation of aesthetics 
In this section I want to recall in a general way sever­
al of the central difficulties which arise out of Kant's 
analytic of the beautiful in his Critique of Judgment.2 
These difficulties will help us establish the philosophical 
context in which Bolzano's reflections on aesthetics are 
situated. 
There are a number of controversial elements in Kant's 
analysis of the nature of aesthetic judgment.3 
One problem is the ambiguity in Kant's account of judg­
ment as presented in the Third Critique and elsewhere (most 
notably perhaps in the distinction in the First Critique 
between analytic and synthetic) between the act of judging, 
the contents of that act, and a spatio-temporal correlate 
for these contents.4 Although Kant takes great pains in 
his account of aesthetic judgment to draw on the analysis 
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of mental acts which he develops in his previous two cri­
tiques, nowhere does he remove the ambiguities which con­
tinually play around his use of the word 'judgment'. This 
is unfortunate. For unless we can determine, in each of 
the four moments of his analysis of those judgments which 
deal with the beautiful, just which of these different 
senses are preeminent, we continually run the risk of 
either, at one extreme, reading Kant's account as hopeless­
ly psychologistic, or, at the other, of taking Kant's 
account as nothing more than a prelude to some more ade­
quate linguistic treatment of the same matters. Are we, in 
other words, to construe aesthetic judgments as empirical 
events in individual minds, or are we to understand them 
as a species of mental sentence? In the first case any 
claims about universality and necessity would be defini­
tively excluded, while in the second, whatever necessity 
which might at least be claimed, could be argued away by 
those unsympathetic to it as analytic only.5 When we re­
read the Third Critique with this question in mind, then I 
think we must conclude that neither of these interpretations 
does justice to Kant's aims here. His analysis of aesthetic 
judgment, that is, must be taken neither as merely psycho-
logistic nor as merely linguistic. But exactly how we are 
to mediate between these extremes while giving Kant's own 
expressions their proper due is not at first glance obvious. 
For a second, and related difficulty pervades Kant's 
account. Kant, as we may have noticed, is not uninterested 
in developing arguments against opposed interpretations of 
the nature of aesthetic judgments. It is striking that so 
many of these arguments turn on Kant's insistence that 
aesthetic judgments are indeterminate. In other words, as 
reflective judgments aesthetic judgments do not function 
with the help of antecedent concepts.6 This doctrine is 
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central to Kant's treatment of the basically disinterested 
character of aesthetic judgments. The difficulty here of 
course is in trying to account both for the lack of any 
determinate control exercised over aesthetic judgments by 
clear and perspicuous concepts and at the same time for 
the nonetheless somewhat specific nature of aesthetic 
judgment. 
Here once again Kant's way of making his point can be 
importantly confusing. Thus he speaks as if there were no 
conceptual control at all in aesthetic judgment, while still 
recognising in the practice of art the role of what Plato 
construed as exemplary causes. Kant provides us with no 
graduated range of conceptual possibilities to draw on here 
as an effective means for dealing with his puzzling talk. 
We are not sure at places if Kant wants us to think of pre-
conceptual rather than non-conceptual modes of thinking. 
And more specifically in the case of conceptual thought it­
self, Kant allows us here no distinction between concepts 
that are confused rather than clear, complete rather than 
incomplete, justified rather than non-justified, and so on. 
In short, we are left just as in the case of his talk about 
judgments with no more than our own rough approximations to 
Kant's intentions as a way of arguing our felt conviction 
that Kant wants to retain at least some pre-conceptual con­
trol over the contents of aesthetic judgments. Some con­
ceptual control is thus necessary for the well-foundedness 
of aesthetic judgments. But just what kind of control 
remains inexplicit. 
A third difficulty in Kant's account is the link be­
tween the feelings of pleasure and displeasure and the 
nature of aesthetic judgment. For Kant the link is essen­
tial. And of course in holding that there is some sort of 
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relation between pleasure and aesthetic judgment Kant is 
doing no more than following a remarkably consistent pat­
tern in the history of aesthetics. For not only do Plato 
and Aristotle both insist on this connection, although each 
is careful to draw different conclusions from such a con­
junction, Augustine and Aquinas, too, award a central place 
to pleasure in their respective aesthetic theories. The 
problem is, rather, that unlike his classical and medieval 
predecessors in this matter, and most curiously unlike his 
habitual practice with almost all of his other cardinal 
concepts in the Third Critique, Kant takes virtually no 
interest whatsoever in explaining to his readers just what 
he understands by his very varied uses of the word 'pleas­
ure ' . 
This practice once again is seriously disconcerting. 
For one of the cornerstones of Kant's doctrine of aesthetic 
judgment is the idea of disinterested pleasure.7 And it is 
from the well-foundedness of this idea that Kant wants to 
derive, in a loose sense of this logical term, his further 
characterisation of aesthetic judgments as judgments having 
universal import. To make this point Kant even varies the 
usual order of the four moments as he expounds them in the 
First Critique, electing in the Third Critique to begin 
with the moment of quality rather than with that of quantity. 
If, then, we are unclear as to the sense underlying Kant's 
use of the term 'pleasure', we must remain equally if not 
more unclear about the sense of his term 'disinterested 
pleasure'. And if confusion remains on this point, then 
how are we to comprehend the connections which Kant repeat­
edly insists on between disinterested pleasure and univers-
alisability? 
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It is critically important to note that such reflec­
tions are not simply quibbles about a certain inevitable 
degree of obscurity which is characteristically involved in 
attempts to define central philosophical terms. Kant's 
various uses of the word 'pleasure' here - some commentators 
such as Coleman have described at least seven distinct 
senses of the term8 - leave us in a quite peculiarly diffi­
cult situation if we are to assess the validity of his 
arguments for the necessity of the connection between plea­
sure and aesthetic judgments. This defect in Kant's analy­
sis is all the more consequential to the degree that, with­
out such clarification for his defence, even sympathetic 
critics are left with too few resources for resisting the 
conclusion that Kant's insistence on a necessary connection 
is quite simply misplaced. Thus, many would hold that we 
can properly speak of aesthetic judgments not only in those 
cases where feelings of pleasure or displeasure accompany 
such judgments, but just as well in those other cases 
where the putatively beautiful object leaves us either in­
different or with no feelings of pleasure or displeasure 
at all. Consider the indifference and sometimes complete 
and utter lack of feeling that often assails even the care­
ful critic who spends too long of an afternoon in a par­
ticularly outstanding museum. 
This important point is well put in Coleman's comment 
on this topic: 
Like many other objects in the world, a work of art can hold the 
attention without likes or dislikes being summoned to the scene 
...aesthetic judgment is broader than feeling pleasure or dis­
pleasure, judgments of aesthetic mediocrity or indifference are 
no less aesthetic judgments for being concerned with what is 
neither pleasurable nor unpleasurable. Moreover, aesthetic 
judgment is often engaged in discernment or detection just as 
much as in enjoyment and delectation. If one is interested in 
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something - even 'disinterested' in Kant's sense - it does not 
necessarily follow that we must be interested hedonically.9 
How are we to deal with appraisals such as these when Kant 
himself foregoes defining more carefully one of his most 
central terms? 
A fourth difficulty which is raised by Kant's doctrine 
of aesthetic judgment has to do with the provocative account 
he provides of the free play of imagination and understand­
ing. 10 Kant holds that it is precisely the harmony of this 
play of our intellectual faculties which generates the 
feelings of pleasure which are said to be the necessary 
concomitants of aesthetic judgments. We need not here of 
course insist on the easily remedied confusion which Kant's 
habitual talk of faculties involves. Like his predecessors 
and his contemporaries Kant continued to speak of the mind 
in terms of separate faculties regardless of several appar­
ent consequences of his epistemology as to the existence or 
non-existence of such entities. Moreover, in the case of 
aesthetic judgments, Kant never tired of formulating his 
views in terms of the faculty of taste,11 instead of addres­
sing the nature of aesthetic judgment without appeal to any 
such intermediary. We need not follow Kant in these prac­
tices however; when Kant speaks of the faculties of under­
standing, imagination and taste, we need only talk of under­
standing, imagining, or judging something to be beautiful. 
But a difficulty does arise just as soon as we try to 
pin down exactly what it is that Kant means by the 'free 
play' of understanding and imagining and part of this diffi­
culty is related to the earlier problem as to whether or 
not all aesthetic judgments unify their contents in terms 
of concepts, and if so in terms of just what kinds of con­
cepts. For the 'freedom' Kant has in mind here, at least 
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in the case of imaginings, has to do basically with a free­
dom from at least some kinds of clear conceptual constraints. 
But this is not all of the difficulty. For what needs still 
further sorting out is Kant's perspective here. When he 
speaks of 'free play' and 'harmony', does he have in mind 
the aesthetic judgments of artists in the throes of creation 
or audiences in the tangles of artistic appreciation? The 
difference here is important. For it poses little problem 
for Kant's account if we focus our attention on the role 
that exemplarity plays in artistic conception. In fact, 
this case seems to be the central one for Kant. But when 
we turn to the vagaries which accompany the making of aes­
thetic judgments on the part of an individual patron or an 
audience as a whole, then there seems to be little if any 
role for exemplary causes at all. And if we set such 
entities aside, then just which features of the audience's 
experience are relevant to Kant's 'free play of understand­
ing and imagination'? Kant assumes, I think, the relevance 
of his analysis to the case of the artist. But in leaving 
on the margins of his account the appeal to the free play 
of imagination and understanding in the aesthetic judgments 
of an audience, he invites criticism of the universality 
which he claims for this feature. In short, more than just 
artists make aesthetic judgments. And in the case of non-
artists Kant leaves obscure whether there too we can speak 
of a harmony of the faculties generating feelings of pleas­
ure or displeasure in those making aesthetic judgments. 
A fifth and perhaps the most important difficulty with 
Kant's account has to do with his analysis of form.12 Kant 
wants to distinguish between temporal forms which he calls 
'play' and non-temporal (mostly spatial) forms which he 
calls 'figure'. Unlike the immediately perceived features 
of non-temporal form, the features of temporal form require 
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the work of the imagination to produce some kind of synthes­
is for the operation of judgment. Kant takes pains to in­
sist that the aesthetic use of the word 'form' is not 
meant to include 'shape' as such, or even a particular 
'fixed form' such as that which is a necessary feature in 
certain genres of, say, the literary arts such as the sonnet. 
Rather, although each of these may be associated with 
aesthetic forms, what is peculiarly distinctive of aesthet­
ic form is its connection with the individuality of the ob­
ject which as judged as beautiful. For this reason of 
course Kant holds that aesthetic judgments are singular 
even though they are universalisable. A further point 
which needs notice is that Kant does not construe this indi­
vidual form with the help of abstraction from the material 
contents of aesthetic judgment. Aesthetic judgments have 
content and some of this content includes what Kant wants 
to call aesthetic form. This aesthetic form, as Coleman 
has noted, 'arises out of the interplay' of the different 
ways in which the contents of the aesthetic judgment are 
organised, of the varieties, we might say, with which cer­
tain aesthetic constraints within a given medium are inter­
related. 
Kant goes on to distinguish between pure form as opposed 
to mere form. Mere form is linked with Kant's idea of depen­
dent beauty. That is, like dependent beauty, mere form re­
lies upon a concept of what the beautiful thing must be in 
its perfected state. Pure form on the other hand is linked 
with Kant's idea of free beauty. Like free beauty, pure 
form does not involve this dependence on a concept. Again 
this talk of concepts is disconcerting because Kant does not 
make the notion any more specific. The basic problem how­
ever is making sense of what Kant means here by pure form 
or aesthetic form properly speaking. 
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Some have suggested that aesthetic form '...is either 
what the artist imparts by the workings of his own subjec­
tive schematism, or what the perceiver, in aesthetic judg­
ment, recognizes as what would be an expression of his own 
subjective schematism.14 But this interpretation is com­
plicated by the additional problem of sorting out Kant's 
earlier and difficult doctrine of the schematism. 
The basic idea of a schema is the capacity to articulate 
in a temporal mode categories and concepts, a capacity to 
articulate models which include categories and concepts. 
'Although the schemata of sensibility,' Kant writes in the 
First Critique 
first realize the categories, they at the same time restrict 
them, that is, limit them to conditions which lie outside the 
understanding, and are due to sensibility. The schema is, 
properly, only the phenomenon, or sensible concept of an 
object in agreement with the categories.15 
In the 'Analytic of the Sublime' in the Third Critique Kant 
applies this doctrine to the imagination. He holds there 
that the imagination involves a kind of spontaneity which 
is associated with our feelings of pleasure and displeasure.1 
This spontaneity appears to impose an individual form on 
the central contents of the aesthetic judgment. The idea 
then seems to be this: the artist in making aesthetic judg­
ments does so in the light of his own previous experience 
of styles, conventions, traditions, and what not - in short, 
in terms of a schema. It is this standard which the artist 
continually calls on individually when he comes to make par­
ticular judgments about beautiful things. The schema is 
thus a general, partially indeterminate framework or open 
set of regularities which functions as a principle in 
accordance with which aesthetic judgments are made. Such 
an influence on the contents of the aesthetic judgment might 
then be construed as an imposition of form. The form 
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imposed on the contents however is not at all the classical 
correlate of matter in the Aristotelian and later scholast­
ic metaphysics. Rather, it is a subjective schematism to 
which contents of individual aesthetic judgments are spon­
taneously referred through 'free play of the imagination'. 
A similar schematism may be taken as operative in aesthetic 
judgments made by audiences. Such schematism Kant holds to 
be produced by the pure categories when they are subsumed 
under space and time.17 
When we reflect again on at least these five kinds of 
difficulty which threaten the final satisfactoriness of 
Kant's aesthetics in the Critique of Judgment, on the 
difficulties, that is, with such major themes as judgment, 
concept, pleasure, harmony, and form, then I think it not 
unfair to talk of a 'subjectivisation of aesthetics'. The 
subjectivisation of aesthetics in Kant's work is nothing 
more nor less than the preeminence of the form and contents 
of aesthetic judgments over their spatio-temporal corre­
lates. The central theme of early modern aesthetics is not 
the transformation of the theory of beauty into the theory 
of the aesthetic. Nor, either,is it the gradual eclipse of 
the cognitivity of the art-work. The subjectivisation of 
aesthetics calls out for a systematic inquiry into those 
essential ambiguities which Kant leaves finally untouched 
in his account of the nature of aesthetic judgments. I 
want to suggest in this paper that Bolzano's analysis of 
the concept of the beautiful, whatever difficulties it may 
have of its own, is one essential step in carrying through 
such an inquiry. 
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§2. Bolzano and the theory of the beautiful 
With these five difficulties in Kant's discussion of 
the beautiful in the Critique of Judgment in reasonably 
clear view, I want now to turn to Bolzano's aesthetics.18 
My initial purpose here will be to situate Bolzano's own 
discussion of the beautiful in terms of his account of 
Kant.19 Having made this transition, I want then to en­
large upon what he shows' us of his own views in his dis­
cussion of Kant by paying closer attention to what he him­
self has to say about each individual theme. 
Bolzano's most important work on aesthetics is his Uber 
den Begriff des Schönen: Eine philosophische Abhandlung 
which first appeared in Prague in 1843 as a separate publi­
cation and was then reprinted in the Transactions of the 
Royal Bohemian Academy of Sciences in 1845, three years 
before his death at the age of 67.20 This essay of little 
more than a hundred pages made up of 57 sections of unequal 
length can conveniently be divided into roughly six parts: 
an introduction (section 1), an initial characterisation 
of the beautiful (sections 2-13), a formulation of the con­
cept of the beautiful (sections 14-15), consequences and 
corollaries of this formulation (sections 16-18), objec­
tions (sections 19-25), and finally a long historical 
discussion (sections 26-57) which accounts for more than 
half of the essay's length. Bolzano's discussion of Kant 
occurs, as might be expects, at the centre of this lengthy 
historical survey. It consists almost exclusively of an 
exposition of Kant's treatment of the four 'moments' of 
quality, quantity, relation and modality. 
Bolzano begins his discussion on a critical note. For 
he observes that Kant, far from providing us with a single 
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definition of the beautiful as Bolzano himself does in sec­
tion 14, has left us with four definitions. Moreover, each 
of these is supposed to represent the beautiful in terms of 
the respective four categories in which any object whatso­
ever, whether beautiful or otherwise, can be exhaustively 
described. Bolzano is ironic here {'Aus Liebe zu seinen 
Kat e govi en... beschenkte uns Kant.,, ') about the doctrine 
of the categories.21 But he is also plainly dissatisfied 
with several of the proposed definitions for three sub­
stantive reasons. The last three definitions seem, like 
the first, to describe a quality of the beautiful, and 
hence are not clearly separate definitions at all. The 
second definition deals with universality rather than, as 
Kant claims, with 'quantity'. And the third definition 
Bolzano reads as relevant to the 'relation' in only the 
narrowest of senses. Difficulties of this sort lead Bol­
zano to examine each of the four definitions more closely. 
The first definition Bolzano paraphrases from Kant's 
Third Critique as 'the beautiful is what pleases disinter­
estedly',22 and reminds us that what Kant means by 'inter­
est' here is the feeling we associate with the representa­
tion of the existence of an object. In the case of some­
thing beautiful the feeling we have is bound up with the 
representation of the object only and not with the repre­
sentation of its existence. Bolzano however finds this 
account unacceptable. He points out that Kant's use of 
the term 'interest' does not correspond to any of our every­
day uses of the term - which Bolzano goes on to describe: 
When we find something interesting we usually mean (1) 
that the thing merits our attention, or (2) that we can ex­
pect for ourselves some advantage from this thing. But in 
neither sense must we say that when we find something 'inter­
esting' we must find in ourselves some kind of feeling 
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related to the existence of the object. 
Specifically, Bolzano wants to say, when what is at 
issue is a beautiful object, then it is surely false to 
claim that we have no interest in the beautiful when 'inter­
est' is understood in either of its two usual senses. In 
short, Kant's first definition would seem to be persuasive 
only if we are willing to follow him in adopting his pecul­
iar and unusual sense of this term. But not only does Kant 
give us no reasons to make this adoption, his unargued con-
strual of this term seems indeed in some of the centrally 
interesting cases to result in a false account.23 
The second definition Bolzano paraphrases as 'the beau­
tiful is what without concepts pleases generally', which is 
supposed to be a consequence of the first definition.24 
Bolzano carefully cites a number of other texts in order to 
follow, if he can, the precise relation which Kant sees 
between the two definitions.25 But he does not succeed. 
What pleases generally is what pleases everyone, Kant says. 
Bolzano tries to clarify the sense of this 'jedevmann ' 
employed by Kant and concludes that not only God but many 
other persons must be excluded from it. For Kant has in 
mind here every person of a certain level of cultivation. 
Kant's definition thus is too broadly construed and hence, 
Bolzano concludes, the purported general proof of this 
definition must break down because it would have to prove 
too much. 
A more interesting objection is Bolzano's distinction 
between concepts which are required for the effecting of 
certain judgments and concepts of which we are conscious 
when effecting such judgments. Bolzano uses this distinc­
tion to challenge the first reason Kant adduces for his 
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claim that judgments of taste are judgments without con­
cepts, and cites against him both his own repeated remarks 
about the imagination and the understanding in  28 as well 
as his example in  49. The second justification which 
Kant provides for his claim that there is no transition 
from concepts to feelings of desire or lack of desire (B 18), 
Bolzano also finds inadequate. For he cites as a counterexample 
the feelings which arise in someone who becomes 
acquainted with a particular kind of object solely by means 
of theoretical concepts. Thus, since neither justification 
withstands criticism, Bolzano concludes that the second 
definition must also be set aside. 
The third definition is paraphrased as 'the beautiful 
is what seems to us purposeful without our having neverthe­
less a representation of its purpose1.26 Kant holds that 
something beautiful which is the object of a judgment of 
taste cannot have either a subjective or an objective pur­
pose and yet may and must have a form of purposefulness. 
Bolzano rejects this doctrine because he claims that it 
depends, in the end, on two previous contentions which he 
has already rejected, namely that the feeling of beauty has 
to be connected with the representation and not the exist­
ence of an object and that there can be no transition from 
any kind of a concept to a feeling for something beautiful. 
Again however there is a more interesting objection. 
Bolzano holds that Kant's doctrine of a 'form of purpose-
fulness without purpose' involves substantive and not just 
verbal contradictions. Precisely in the many circumlocu­
tions Kant employs to convey this doctrine, the question 
arises as to just how, if there is no purpose, the form of 
purposefulness is to be recognised. For Bolzano 'the percep­
tion of purposefulness...always presupposes perception of a 
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definite purpose.'27 Hence for Bolzano if there is no 
purpose there can be no form of purposefulness. What we 
find in beautiful things, Bolzano holds, is not purpose at 
all, but rules and concepts. When we consider a rose as 
something beautiful, we find a series of regularities which 
leads to our taking a kind of pleasure in the rose which 
we then go on to judge as something beautiful. 
And the final definition Bolzano paraphrases as 'the 
beautiful is what without concepts is recognised nonethe­
less as an object of a necessary feeling of well-being'.28 
Bolzano concurs with Kant's view that the necessity at 
issue here is not an objective necessity so long as the 
judgments of taste under discussion have empirical objects 
(like, for example, this rose). But in those cases where 
the objects at issue are pure concepts (such as, for exam­
ple, virtue), then Bolzano thinks that we cannot get away 
from objective necessity. Moreover, although Bolzano is 
willing to follow Kant in speaking of a distinction among 
objective, theoretical and practical necessity,29 he finds 
Kant's talk of 'exemplary necessity' almost incomprehensible 
as also his talk of certain kinds of universality.30 Most 
interesting perhaps is Bolzano's criticism here that Kant's 
peculiar use of the word 'feeling' indicates clearly that 
he is not talking about feeling at all but about a kind of 
knowing.31 
Now this, or something like it, is the substance of Bol­
zano's critique of Kant. It provides several indications 
of the approach which he himself would follow, but just 
what, then, is the gist of Bolzano's own view? 
Bolzano's aim in his short treatise on the beautiful 
is to provide a clarification, or a definition in the broad 
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sense of the term, for the concept of the beautiful. His 
main concern is to determine whether what we usually call 
the beautiful refers to something simple or to something 
complex. If the latter, then an additional task is that 
of determining which of several conceivable referents is 
the most appropriate one. 
In order to help his readers understand just what is to 
count as a clarification Bolzano sets out four preparatory 
points. He begins by recalling that philosophers often 
change their minds about what they mean by certain key 
words and phrases. What Bolzano himself is aiming at here 
however, objective propositions and truths' and 'objective 
concepts and representations',32 do not allow of any sub­
jective changes in their meanings at all. This contrast 
between objective and subjective is worked out in great 
detail in the first two volumes of Bolzano's Wissenschafts-
lehre to which he here alludes.33 But the point of the dis­
tinction may be seen more succinctly in his example in the 
present text of a contrast between objective concept {Begriff 
an sich) and concept or idea (Begriff oder Vorstel­
lung) . The word 'God' in philosophy, Bolzano claims, sig­
nifies a single objective concept only, even though there 
may well be an indefinite number of individual concepts and 
ideas or presentations of God. In the case of the beauti­
ful then Bolzano's clarification consisted in the attempt 
to formulate the objective concept of the beautiful, the 
unchangeable sense, Bolzano adds (in a reference to the 
practice of his own times, which still retained the school-
book tradition of Leibniz, Baumgarten, Wolff and Kant), 
which is and should be found in university manuals in 
aesthetics. 
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A second feature of what Bolzano calls a clarification 
is the rule that each objective concept is to be provided 
with one definition or clarification only. Not only, then, 
are the same words to be used in the same senses, but above 
all the same objective concepts are not to be defined in 
more than one way. What Bolzano wants to reject are exam­
ples such as I.H.Fichte's definition of the absolute, while 
he wishes to retain examples like the mathematician's defi­
nition of a square.34 
A third point about clarification is the need for a 
certain kind of simplicity. Bolzano concedes that some 
objective concepts may indeed be complex. He insists how­
ever that each complex be clarified in such a way that it 
can be seen just how the complex is built up from the 
connection of simple components. This procedure Bolzano 
thinks not only contributes to clarity but in important 
respects reflects both some of the ways we actually use 
objective concepts and some of the ways this usage has been 
learned. Yet Bolzano is caution here also, for he does 
not want to commit himself to the false view that 
any component which can be found in objects of a concept 
would have to be an actual component of the concept.35 
If the beautiful is an instance of a complex concept, then 
a clarification of the beautiful must include all of the 
components of this complex but not all of the properties 
which its objects have. 
Finally, Bolzano raises the question of just how a 
putative clarification is to be justified and thereby made 
persuasive both for oneself and for others. If the clari­
fication is of a simple objective concept, then the only 
final justification consists in showing the inadequacies 
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of alternative suggestions. If however a complex object­
ive concept is at issue, then both the component parts 
and their relations must be specified and the concept shown 
to be neither too narrow nor too broad. This second case 
Bolzano underlines as much more difficult than the first. 
For finally the justification of a putative clarification 
here is to be found through repeated acts of introspection 
only. Bolzano does not speak explicitly of intuition. But 
he insists on the need for repeated attempts to direct our 
attention to those mental acts which both consist of and 
accompany our thinking of the beautiful. 
When Bolzano proposes, then, to formulate a clarifi-
catory definition of the beautiful, he aims at providing 
one and not several articulations of an objective concept 
which, if complex, must include all and only those compo­
nents and relations which are proper to it alone. 
Once these four preliminary points have been made, Bol­
zano begins his analysis of the beautiful by making several 
exclusions. The beautiful, he holds, is not to be confound­
ed with either the good or the pleasant, or the charming. 
So far as the good is concerned, although many good things 
can rightly be called beautiful, not all beautiful things 
are properly to be called good; they often are called good 
simply on the basis of custom. As regards the pleasant, 
so long as we use the word in its habitual sense as what 
gives rise to pleasurable feelings and therefore refuse 
to follow Kant's usage which Bolzano considers unjustified. 
we can agree that there is a connection between the pleas­
ant and the beautiful. But Bolzano finds an asymmetry 
here: everything beautiful either gives or can give pleasure, 
but not everything pleasureable can be considered beauti­
ful. Some things are rightly judged beautiful, moreover, 
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which do not affect the senses at all. 
As regards the charming, which Bolzano takes as what 
arouses a certain desire in us, a further asymmetry is 
to be found . Again the beautiful turns out to be the 
broader concept in that whilst all beautiful things are 
charming, not all charming things are beautiful. 
Bolzano's comments here are all too brief to be truly 
convincing. But once we recall that the point of these 
exclusions is to allow a more unobstructed view of the 
concept of the beautiful and not to enter into the kind of 
detailed investigation of the peculiar overlaps between 
the beautiful and other, less general concepts already 
carried out by Kant, I think his brevity here is not objec­
tionable. 
Bolzano's next move is to isolate the relevant charac­
teristics of the beautiful. His initial question is not: 
to what features of the object are our thoughts directed 
when we perceive it as beautiful? He is concerned rather 
with the question of how something beautiful brings about a 
feeling of pleasure in the perceiving subject, about the 
kind of considerations going on in the perceiving subject's 
consciousness which result in - as opposed merely to being 
accompanied by - a feeling of pleasure. And the phenomenon 
he settles on is the lightness and rapidity with which cer­
tain thoughts occur, such that we experience no need to 
make ourselves clearly conscious of these thoughts in any 
strictly conceptual manner. Bolzano's point is that con­
sidering something beautiful is accompanied by a sequence 
of thoughts moving so quickly and lightly that we are able 
to follow them through without needing to explicate their 
contents in any fulfilled way as concepts. A contrasting 
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case might be the consideration of a complex mathematical 
proof where the sequence of thoughts must be explicated 
conceptually if the proof is to be grasped at all. In 
both cases there is pleasure, but only in the first case, 
Bolzano holds, are we properly dealing with pleasure in the 
beautiful. Two components of the beautiful can therefore 
be signified as follows: 
We call an object beautiful if its mere consideration provides 
us with pleasure, a consideration which we carry out with such 
a facility that not even in a single case do we need to become 
conscious of its accompanying thoughts.36 
In order to find further components of the beautiful 
Bolzano now returns to the question which he had earlier 
postponed, namely to the question as to precisely what it 
is to which our thoughts might be directed when we find 
ourselves considering something beautiful. Whatever this 
feature or features may be, Bolzano, like Kant, wants to 
hold that our judgment that something is beautiful includes 
a certain kind of claim of universality. Bolzano tries to 
specify in a different way than Kant however just what kind 
of universality is involved here. And he insists on the 
observation that persons differ in their receptivity to 
what is beautiful as a function of their education, their 
powers of understanding, and the relative practice they 
have in exercising these powers. These qualifications he 
holds must be kept in mind if we are to answer the question 
about what our thoughts are directed to in the considera­
tion of something beautiful. 
When we consider something beautiful, Bolzano claims, 
we are involved in asking what kind of thing this something 
is. In other words we are looking for a particular concept 
or a particular representation or a particular rule which 
would allow us to deduce the properties of the thing in 
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question. Since intuitions here are insufficient by them­
selves, the kind of representation that is being sought 
cannot be a simple one but must be complex. When some­
thing is considered as beautiful, then, not just intuition 
but all our intellectual powers must be involved. And as 
remarked earlier, memory, imagination, understanding, judg­
ment, and reason, must be all of them already developed to 
some degree and antecedently exercised on beautiful things. 
Besides the content of our considerations - namely par­
ticular concepts, representations or rules - Bolzano tries 
to specify also the source from which our pleasure in the 
consideration of beautiful things arises. Here Bolzano 
holds that whatever increases our natural powers is per­
ceived as pleasure - whereas whatever decreases these 
powers is perceived as pain. Even our becoming conscious 
of some natural powers is to be considered as pleasure. 
The stronger a particular natural power is, the more pleas­
ure we derive from its increase. The pleasure we derive 
from the consideration of something beautiful, Bolzano con­
tinues, does not arise from its utility but from the acti­
vation of our various natural and especially intellectual 
powers. Something beautiful sets these powers to work in 
such a way that they are neither too little nor too much 
engaged for no not to be able to notice their growth in 
power. What we fell then is the increase in our natural 
intellectual powers. And this feeling brings about pleas­
ure . 
Bolzano is especially careful to support this part of 
his theory as if he were ready to acknowledge just how im­
portant a role his analysis of the source of aesthetic 
pleasure will play in his clarificatory definition of the 
beautiful. Thus, besides providing an interesting descrip-
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tion of how this pleasure process is supposed to work, and 
besides detailing three extended examples which aim to ex­
hibit why we find a spiral, a fable and a riddle beautiful, 
Bolzano offers what he calls two proofs for his view. The 
first37 is simply the assertion that our pleasure in the 
beautiful can be explained on no other general grounds than 
the case he has cited, for there are numberless cases where 
no other explanation can be found. Bolzano challenges us 
to explain his previous examples in an equally satisfying 
way with the help of some other theory than his own. And 
the second proof he offers38 is that the degree of pleasure 
which the consideration of something beautiful allows in­
creases directly in proportion to the demands it makes on 
our intellectual powers. Although each of these 'proofs' 
invites closer attention and although the apparently psy-
chologistic character of parts of his description needs 
examination, nonetheless when placed alongside Bolzano's 
individual formulations and examples they do serve will as 
reinforcements for the well-foundedness of his views. 
With a series of components worked out, and after having 
reassured himself that the synthesis of just these features 
will lead to a concept that is neither too narrow nor too 
broad, Bolzano now moves to formulate his definition of the 
beautiful. His conclusion might be paraphrased as follows: 
a beautiful object is one whose consideration by any person 
with developed intellectual powers results in pleasure. 
The basis of this pleasure is that it be neither too easy 
nor too difficult for such a person - who at the moment of 
perception does not in fact take the trouble to reach con­
ceptual clarity,- once some of the object's properties have 
been grasped, to form such a concept that would eventually 
allow him to work out through further consideration its 
remaining perceptual properties. In the given moment 
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however the readiness of his intellectual powers allows the 
individual to arrive at a 'dark intuition'.39 
This account is of course a highly condensed one. But 
once we recall the earlier reflections which led Bolzano 
to his formulation I think even some of the more obscure 
elements become reasonably clear. 
Bolzano now completes his account with two further 
steps. He first draws certain consequences of his defi­
nition, and then tries to anticipate the objections his 
definition may provoke. I will deal here with the first 
only and leave the second for closer scrutiny in the final 
section of this paper where I raise the question as to just 
how adequate Bolzano's theory is. 
The major consequences, then, are four. This theory is 
said to allow us to account for the fact that we often can­
not express why we find something to be beautiful. For it 
is the very facility and alacrity of our thinking when con­
sidering the beautiful object which in part gives rise to 
the pleasure we experience. Moreover, the theory is also 
said to allow us to account for the fact that it is especi­
ally our two highest senses, of sight and of hearing, that 
provide us with representations of perceptual beauty. For 
the senses of smell and taste are too uniform to allow us 
to observe the workings of a particular rule whose discovery 
sufficiently engages our intellectual powers. A third con­
sequence, Bolzano thinks, is that this theory allows us to 
understand why a beautiful object can bring us pleasure by 
offering aspects of itself which we have not previously 
noticed. For some beautiful things - Bolzano mentions 
paintings and long poems, - require varied, prolonged, and 
repeated consideration if all their relevant parts and 
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relations are to be grasped in an appropriate way. And 
finally, the theory is said to allow us to understand why 
different individuals are responsive to different kinds of 
beautiful things. For an individual's response to beauti­
ful things is a function of the development of his or her 
intellectual powers. 
So much for the major elements of Bolzano's theory of 
the beautiful. 
§3. Appraising Bolzano's aesthetics 
If these are the main lines of Bolzano's investigations 
of the concept of the beautiful, when then are we to make 
of them? I want to look first at the criticism which Bol­
zano himself anticipated of his work, then at the adequacy 
of his own criticisms of Kant, and finally at two general 
features of his theory of the beautiful. 
Bolzano takes some pains to anticipate a number of ob­
jections against his theory and to respond to each in turn. 
Since one of these turns on the topic of the ugly which I 
have not had time to consider in this (abbreviated) consi­
deration of Bolzano's theory, I will deal briefly with the 
remaining six objections only. 
The first objection is that the theory presupposes that 
all beautiful objects are complexes comprising dependent 
parts and their interrelations. But some beautiful objects 
such as a single tone or a colour are simples. Hence the 
theory is too narrowly construed. Bolzano's replies include 
a number of incidental remarks about perception and the 
science of his day. Although, as he points out, whether or 
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not there are simples was a controversial topic for his con­
temporaries, in any case neither a single note nor a colour 
can be taken as without parts. So since the examples fail 
the question remains open whether the theory is in fact too 
broad, as alleged. There is however another issue concealed 
here, to which I shall return later on. 
A second objection is that Bolzano's theory presupposes 
that some complexes are so difficult to grasp that they 
cannot count as beautiful objects. Yet the history of the 
humanities - of, say, classical scholarship - shows that 
some understanding (for example of the proper sense of 
archaic lexical items in Greek epigrammatic poetry) allows 
us finally to perceive this poetry as an instance of some­
thing beautiful and yet may require several generations of 
arduous scholarly work for its realisation. Again, the 
theory seems to be too narrowly construed in taking only 
those objects to be beautiful which can be grasped without 
too much difficulty. Bolzano replies with a distinction 
between those considerations which lead up to an apprehen­
sion of the object as beautiful and those which accompany 
that apprehension. The first indeed, as his favourite 
examples from mathematics show, may require prodigious and 
protracted effort, but the second he insists must be neither 
too facile nor too difficult if the object is to be appre­
hended as beautiful. 
A third objection turns on the claim that Bolzano's 
theory confuses the beautiful with the regular. But al­
though many rule-governed things, such as complicated astro­
nomical clocks, may indeed be beautiful, some beautiful 
things are not regular at all. Again, the theory seems too 
exclusive. Bolzano replies that not every kind of regular­
ity is a condition for beauty but only that kind which can 
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be grasped in an anticipatory way without going through 
with the complete conceptual analysis of the object in 
question. Consequently,the theory does leave room for some 
kinds of beautiful complexes which will, after analysis, 
show themselves finally not to be rule-governed in the 
sense specified. What is necessary is an initial appre­
hension of the possibility of rule-governedness such that 
a person's intellectual powers are sufficiently engaged to 
arouse feelings of pleasure at the idea of their being aug­
mented through continuation of their present activity. 
A related objection holds that Bolzano's theory would 
necessarily construe the beautiful object as the result of 
the rule-governed activity of the artist or creator. Since 
however art must arise out of the free interplay of the 
artist's perceptual, emotional and intellectual powers, Bol­
zano's theory effectively subjects all artistic activity 
to the exaggerated constraints of determined rules. And 
any object which as the result of such activity exhibits 
this determination will displease rather than please. Bol­
zano replies once again with a distinction, this time the 
familiar one between the production of a beautiful object 
and the properties of the object produced. He argues that 
what is at issue in the definition of the beautiful is not 
the first but the second only. Nonetheless he grants that 
however much rule governed activity goes into the produc­
tion of the beautiful object, those norms must not be ex­
hibited as such in the object itself. But this point 
demands a certain caveat. For there must, according to 
Bolzano's theory, be regular relations subsisting among the 
parts of the beautiful object. These regularities however 
must not be manifest in such a way that they detract from 
the perfection of the work as they might well do, for exam­
ple, were one series of rules to be abandoned for another 
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series half way through the completion of a work. This ob­
jection then, although it raises several important issues, 
is basically irrelevant; for what is at issue is now an ob­
ject appears to us, and not, in the end, the related but 
different question as to how the object has been produced. 
A fifth objection focuses on the key terms facility and 
alacrity in Bolzano's theory. Here the claim is that the 
theory leads if not to an absurd at least to an unwelcome 
conclusion to the effect that the more easily and the more 
quickly we grasp the regularities which govern the beauti­
ful object, the more beautiful that object must be. The 
example cited is that of a play: the more easily and quick­
ly we can anticipate its conclusion then, according to the 
theory, the more beautiful the play. But, to stay with this 
example alone, such a consequence is unwelcome just because 
it would privilege the most pedestrian of dramas, say early 
nineteenth century sentimental comedies, and devalue the 
best of our tragedies, such as Sophocles' Oedipus, where 
an unforeseeable turning point is part of the essence of 
the play's success. Bolzano replies with a simple denial 
that this consequence follows from his theory. To the con­
trary, he argues, such a result could not follow from a 
theory which requires above all that a person's intellectual 
powers first be sufficiently engaged. But dramas whose 
opening scene allow us infallibly to predict their outcome 
are insufficiently complicated to allow of the particular 
kinds of pleasure which arise from our considerations of 
beautiful objects. 
Finally, a last objection (given our limitations here) 
is that the concept of the beautiful is too widely employed 
for its definition to include so many elements organised in 
such a complicated way. For it would seem that virtually 
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all human beings employ some kind of a distinction between 
the beautiful and the ugly. Moreover this distinction is 
learned by almost all human beings at an early age. So 
either the beautiful is in fact a simple concept, or it is 
one which is at least less complicated than the definition 
which Bolzano has elaborated so painstakingly must suggest. 
Bolzano replies by conceding that the concept is used by 
almost all persons, but he denies that from this fact alone 
we must conclude that the concept is less complicated than 
his theory makes it out to be. And he cites, in support of 
this denial, the even more widely employed concepts such as 
horse, dog, bird and so on, whose definitions are at least 
as complicated as the concept of beauty. 
These, then, are the objections and the replies which 
Bolzano imagines with regard to his own theory. Before 
commenting on the well-foundedness of these criticisms how­
ever, and upon the adequacy of Bolzano's replies, I want to 
make several points about his criticisms of Kant in the 
light of what we have now seen in some detail about his own 
theory. 
Recall, first, that Bolzano criticises Kant generally 
for offering more than one clarificatory definition of the 
beautiful. We know of course from what Bolzano says at the 
outset of his own treatment of the beautiful that, unlike 
Kant, he aims instead to provide a single account only. 
For the beautiful, as Bolzano would have it, is an instance 
finally of an objective and not of a subjective concept. 
And objective concepts are to be provided with one, not 
several definitions. Now this criticism is perhaps more 
instructive for what it shows us about Bolzano's intentions 
than for what it calls attention to in Kant's own theory. 
In either case however Bolzano is relying here on compii-
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cated discussions of both the nature of concepts and the 
nature of definition to be found in the Wissenschaftslehre . 
But when we reread the appropriate materials there, bearing 
in mind contemporary discussions of such difficult matters, 
it is not self-evident that Bolzano himself has provided 
an ultimately satisfactory account either of the distinction 
between subjective and objective concepts or of the nature 
of definition. So his general criticism of Kant, in the 
absence of a more acceptable account of Bolzano's own assump­
tions, remains inconclusive. 
More specifically, we need to recall Bolzano's critic­
ism of Kant's use of the cardinal term 'interest'. The 
point of that criticism was that Kant's discussion of dis­
interestedness depended on an idiosyncratic use of that 
term for which he nowhere convincingly argued. But Bolzano 
is here using a two-edged sword. I think his criticism of 
Kant on this point is indeed well-founded. But it is a 
criticism that cuts also in the opposite direction. And 
the result is that a further question arises as to just how 
representative Bolzano's use of his own key terms, really is. 
Freshly scrutinising his own definition of the beautiful, 
we quickly find ourselves stumbling on such unfamiliar and 
unexplained terms as 'dark intuition' or, perhaps more im­
portantly, the critical phrase which keeps turning up in 
the objections which Bolzano himself anticipated: 'die Mühe 
des deutlichen Denkens'. I have tried to shed some light 
on both of these terms by using the freedom of paraphrase 
instead of resorting to direct quotation when providing Bol­
zano's formulation of the beautiful. But it must be observ­
ed that the result is not wholly satisfactory, as can be 
noted even by simply rereading the paraphrase itself. For 
with all his insistence on tying down his own technical 
terms and for all his criticism of Kant and others in 
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precisely this respect, Bolzano does not, at least in the 
case of his definition of the beautiful, seem finally to 
have done the job that needed doing. Unlike the first 
criticism then, Bolzano's second criticism of Kant does 
seem well-founded: but it suggests thereby at least one 
serious difficulty with Bolzano's own theory. 
Recall further Bolzano's criticism of Kant's repeated 
references to 'jeder mann ', to 'everyone', in his discussion 
of the judgment of taste and universality. Bolzano's basic 
claim we remember is that Kant cannot mean what he says, 
for what he says does not seem to be true. It is false 
that everyone ought to find beautiful what is correctly 
judged to be beautiful since children and, as Bolzano does 
not but could have added, mentally disturbed persons, are 
not always able to concur and indeed cannot be described as 
persons who should concur. Hence Kant must have meant by 
'everyone' only those individuals who have the full use of 
their natural and especially intellectual powers. And this 
provision of course is just the one which Bolzano builds 
into his own theory. 
But there is some question here whether Bolzano has 
correctly understood Kant on this point. I say 'some ques­
tion' because we need to be careful before ascribing a 
mistake of this kind to such a careful and thoughtful reader 
of Kant as was Bolzano. Kant surely does not mean that 
something which is correctly judged as beautiful will in 
fact always be correctly judged as beautiful by anyone whom­
soever. In fact, then, Kant does make room not just for 
erroneous judgments of taste but also for some persons' 
not being able to concur with proper judgments of taste. 
The point of Bolzano's remarks then should be taken here 
not so much as criticism, but - especially where he talks 
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of 'developed intellectual powers' - as an explication of 
something which Kant had already seen. 
More interesting however than the question as to how 
Brentano's reading of Kant on this point is to be under­
stood, is the question whether Bolzano's insistence in his 
own theory of 'developed intellectual powers' as a pre­
requisite for finding something beautiful does not preclude 
in at least some cogent sense the Kantian requirement of 
universality. The problem, as I see it, is with the ambi­
guity in Bolzano's but not in Kant's use of the term 'deve­
loped'. If Bolzano, with Kant, simply means the proper 
function of all the intellectual powers in the mature 
or potentially mature individual, then the claim of univer­
sality for the correct judgment of taste cannot be rejected 
in principle. If however Bolzano means, as Kant does not, 
not only this first sense of 'developed' but also the addi­
tional sense of mature intellectual powers which have been 
formed, exercised and refined in the various activities 
associated with the knowledge, practice and pursuit of the 
arts, then it is very doubtful whether Bolzano can register 
a claim to universality here at all. On this second sense 
of 'developed', which Bolzano - at least on the evidence of 
his own repeated discussions of how necessary the use and 
exercise of these powers are for finding something to be 
beautiful - would seem to hold, no one except the cultivated 
individual will be able correctly to judge something to be 
beautiful. 
Recall, finally, Bolzano's criticism of Kant's discus­
sion of purposefulness. we remember that according to Kant 
we find purposefulness in the beautiful object, whereas Bol­
zano plainly denies this claim and asserts to the contrary 
that we find not purposefulness but regularities and rule-
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governedness. Bolzano's criticism of Kant's talk of the 
form of purposefulness is cogent. What calls for reflec­
tion however is just what additional reasons there may have 
been, if not these only, for Bolzano's abandonment of a 
quite similar view. For in an 1818 definition of the beau­
tiful as well as in a published academic talk to his stud­
ents discussed by Svoboda, Bolzano himself talked of pur­
posefulness, whereas in his 1843 definition all trace of 
this talk has gone. This is, however, a largely historical 
question and, though interesting in its own right for our 
understanding of the development of Bolzano's philosophical 
views, it need not detain us here. 
Before concluding with a brief general assessment, I 
want to take up two further critical points against the 
background of these questions about the adequacy of Bolzano's 
own theory of the beautiful. 
One general difficulty with Bolzano's theory, I believe, 
arises out of his initial discussion of the four preparatory 
points he wants us to keep in mind when judging his own 
efforts to provide a clarificatory definition of the concept 
of the beautiful. This discussion is of course a particu­
larly interesting one, not only because of its manifest 
opposition to idealism, the then overwhelmingly dominant 
school in German philosophy, but also because of the suc­
cinct form it imposes on several of the key ideas of the 
Wissenschaftslehre of 1837. Thus there is the untimely 
insistence on clarity, the aim itself of trying to articu­
late a definition, and the suggestive but hardly explicated 
contrast between two kinds of concepts, subjective and ob­
jective. Each of these features can be taken to generate 
some critical questions in their own right. But most, if 
not all such questions can be resolved by closer attention 
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to related discussions in the Wissenschaftslehre . 
What does not allow of such a quick resolution however 
is a theme which is found not only in the preparatory dis­
cussion but throughout Bolzano's major exposition of the 
concept of the beautiful and even in his extended and cri­
tical review of other previously propounded theories of the 
beautiful. This theme is the distinction between simples 
and complexes. 
We recall that this distinction lies at the basis of 
Bolzano's insistence that a clarificatory definition of the 
beautiful must be subjected to different evaluatory criteria 
depending on whether the beautiful turns out to be a simple 
or a complex. And ultimately of course Bolzano will hold 
to the second of these possibilities, namely that the con­
cept of the beautiful is the concept of a complex. And we 
recall also Bolzano's appeal to this distinction in a more 
complicated context when he tries to show that one claim 
that his theory is too narrowly construed, - that it cannot 
account for pure tones or pure colours - is mistaken. But 
there is a problem here as indeed the second case suggests. 
And the problem is whether there are any simples at all. 
Bolzano intimates, in his discussion of the colour case, 
that the empirical issues involved here remain open, at 
least for him at the time of writing the treatise in ques­
tion. But whatever importance the empirical issues might 
finally have, the philosophical point that such a distinc­
tion can indeed be made out in some sense remains contro­
versial. And this claim, it should be noted, is not a bare 
assertion but follows from Bolzano's own hesitations. Some 
evidential backing for this hesitation is provided, for 
example, in Bolzano's discussion of André, Hutcheson, and 
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several followers of the Leibniz-Wolff school. There Bol­
zano criticises their various uses of the terms 'manifold' 
and 'unity'. 'Even the simplest object,' Bolzano writes, 
'has an endless set of characteristics...'.40 But then, if 
Bolzano is right on this central point, the question inevi­
tably arises whether there exist any simples at all. If 
Bolzano has a serious doubt about the answer to this ques­
tion, as I think we must assume, then the various and es­
pecially the cardinal uses of the distinction between 
simples and complexes become themselves questionable. 
Since however this very distinction stands at the founda­
tions of Bolzano's theory of the beautiful, final judgment 
on that theory must be reserved until closer scrutiny of 
Bolzano's understanding of just what simples are can clear 
up the present doubts. 
Here, then, is one general difficulty with Bolzano's 
theory: the uncertain ontological status of simples. 
A second general difficulty, I believe, concerns the 
content of a correct judgment of the beautiful. Recall 
that Bolzano is adamant in his criticism of Kant's discus­
sion of purposefulness as the content of the judgment of 
taste. The content of this judgment, Bolzano asserts, is 
rather rule-governedness. He is however careful to add that 
this kind of regularity is not apprehended in the judgment 
of taste with any clarity; rather it is apprehended confus­
edly, or 'darkly'. The problem of course is understanding 
just what it is to which Bolzano is referring in his meta­
phorical talk of dark apprehensions. 
Some help may be found in two places: in the early defi­
nition of the beautiful to which I have already alluded, 
which provides an interesting contrast to Bolzano's defi-
104 STRUCTURE AND GESTALT 
n i t i o n i n t h e p r e s e n t w o r k ; and i n a c r i t i c a l d i s c u s s i o n of 
a s i m i l a r c o n c e p t i n M e n d e l s s o h n ' s Briefe über die Empfind­
ungen . 
B o l z a n o ' s e a r l i e r d e f i n i t i o n of t h e b e a u t i f u l i s t o b e 
f o u n d i n t h e u n p u b l i s h e d n o t e f rom 1818 w h i c h s e r v e d a s 
t h e now l o s t s o u r c e m a t e r i a l f o r t h e e n t r y on ' t h e b e a u t i ­
f u l ' i n t h e 1821 g l o s s a r y , ' B o l z a n o ' s B e g r i f f e 1 8 2 1 ' , now 
a v a i l a b l e a s a l e n g t h y a p p e n d i x t o E. W i n t e r ' s p a p e r , ' D i e 
h i s t o r i s c h e B e d e u t u n g d e r f r ü h b e g r i f f e B o l z a n o s ' 4 1 The 
r e l e v a n t p a s s a g e r e a d s a s f o l l o w s : 
the beau t i fu l objec t i s one whose purposefulness i s of such a 
nature t h a t i t can be recognised even confusedly. This pur ­
posefulness i s o b j e c t i v e . I t i s r e l a t e d t o j u s t what we th ink 
of as what br ings to the fore the same thoughts which possess 
t h i s p u r p o s e f u l n e s s . . . [ b u t ] purposefulness must not be too 
deeply hidden, because otherwise i t would only be recognisable 
through a strenuous r e f l e c t i o n which would r e s u l t in c lea r 
judgments.42 
What s h o u l d be a d d e d h e r e i s a g l o s s f rom B o l z a n o ' s 
e a r l y l e t t e r s on t h e n o t i o n of a c o n f u s e d o r d a r k j u d g m e n t . 
A confused judgment i s one which cannot be r e c a l l e d even a f t e r 
the smal les t i n t e r v a l and which one could no t , even in the very 
moment of making such a judgment, say ' I have i t . ' B r i e f l y , a 
dark judgment i s one which i s not accompanied by the conscious­
ness of having i t . 43 
I n o t h e r w o r d s , t h e j u d g m e n t of t a s t e i s u n c l e a r o r c o n ­
f u s e d i n t h e s e n s e t h a t when t h i s j u d g m e n t i s made no c o n ­
s c i o u s n e s s of h a v i n g made t h e j u d g m e n t i s a l s o p r e s e n t . 
But t h e r e a r e a number of p r o b l e m s w i t h t h i s d a r k d o c ­
t r i n e . We a r e n o t c l e a r , t o b e g i n w i t h , a s t o w h e t h e r o r 
a s t o t h e s e n s e i n w h i c h B o l z a n o , l i k e K a n t , w a n t s t o 
a t t e m p t a c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e fo rm and t h e c o n ­
t e n t s of j u d g m e n t s of t a s t e . F u r t h e r , we a r e n o t c l e a r a s 
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to whether and if so then just how the contents of a judg­
ment of taste require for their completion an accompanying 
act of consciousness, that is, a simultaneous awareness, on 
the part of the individual making a particular judgment of 
taste, that it is indeed just this judgment which is being 
made. And of course what contributes to our uncertainty 
concerning the sense of Bolzano's doctrine here is our lack 
of knowledge as to whether the substitution of rule-govern-
edness in the definition of 1843 for purposefulness in the 
definition of 1818 entails still further changes in what is 
to be understood as a 'confused judgment'. 
If we turn for further help to the second set of mater­
ials, the discussion of Mendelssohn, some clarity does 
emerge, but not quite enough. There Bolzano suggests that 
Mendelssohn, when speaking of the unity of the manifold 
which is apprehended in the judgment of taste, would have 
better served the truth of the matter had he referred to 
'a clearly recognisable unity', rather than to a 'darkly 
recognised' one.44 The suggestion here, then, is that the 
judgment of taste has as its contents not purposefulness 
but the rule-governedness of a unity whose components pre­
cisely in their unity could be grasped in a discursive way 
were one to take the trouble. But since one does not in 
fact assume this task of analysis, the relevant unity in 
its rule-governedness is said to be apprehended confusedly, 
i.e. in a not completely explicated way. 
This kind of talk, although difficult enough, is, I 
think, an improvement over the 1818 doctrine; yet it should 
still fall short of convincing even the most sympathetic of 
Bolzano's readers. For we are back again with the diffi­
culties which confound our attempts to talk of simples. 
The clear assumption in this doctrine of the 'dark judgment' 
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is - as is clearly spelled out in one of Bolzano's own ob­
jections - the view that something beautiful is always a 
complex, a manifold, a rule-governed whole whose regularity 
we apprehend in a confusing but ultimately explicatable way. 
But the spectre keeps coming back of the thought that some 
beautiful things, despite Bolzano's disclaimers, may well 
turn out to be if not simples then certainly not rule-
governed manifolds of just the type his theory must pre­
suppose. And this possibility is not too difficult for us 
to entertain, especially today, given a large amount of 
significant work in the philosophy of science on different 
models of explanation, when we have become almost instinct­
ively chary of unargued assumptions to the effect that talk 
about regularity, or about law-likeness or rule-governedness 
makes sense as it stands. We still, in other words, wrestle 
with just how to reach agreement about what rule-governed­
ness ultimately amounts to. And part of our difficulty is 
not just the familiar one, which Bolzano above all would 
recognise, involved in any attempt to construct what he 
calls an 'objective concept' or, in effect, what would today 
be called a satisfactory account. Part of the difficulty 
rather is with our still obscure but persistent presumptions 
that, just as there may well seem to be things with more 
than one essence, or with no essence at all, so too there 
may well be things which, whilst being ordered in some way, 
cannot yet be characterised as rule-governed. And why 
should not some of these things be the objects of judgments 
of taste? 
Thus despite recourse to additional passages in which 
Bolzano tells us more about these matters I am afraid that 
we must conclude here, as in the case of his talk about 
simples and complexes, that Bolzano's doctrine of the dark 
judgment is itself a dark doctrine. 
BOLZANO AND THE DARK DOCTRINE 107 
I would like to end with the suggestion that Bolzano's 
aesthetics, for all its difficult terms and distinctions, 
represents a different reading of Kant from those which 
have been provided either by analytic philosophers such as 
Beardsley, Dickie, Coleman or Guyer, or by hermeneutic 
philosophers such as Gadamer, Ricoeur, Biemel or Apel. 
On the one hand there is an extraordinarily persistent con­
cern for conceptual clarity, argumentative thoroughness and 
systematic development, qualities often claimed by analytic 
philosophers. And on the other hand there is a reliance on 
a dark doctrine of intuition, apprehension, judgment and 
finally consciousness, which finds certain echoes in her­
meneutic philosophy. In no way do I wish to suggest that 
Bolzano's work is in some way characteristic of the best 
of these two philosophical worlds. Rather, I want to open 
up for more considered discussion the idea that Bolzano's 
reading of Kant, which in many ways generates the peculiar 
features of his aesthetics, is importantly different from 
either of the two dominant current interpretations of what 
is after all the formative period in modern aesthetics: the 
eighteenth century and its watershed in the work of Kant. 
It is this other reading of aesthetic theory, the other 
tradition, if you will, which begins in Bolzano's theory of 
the beautiful and which leads on to further investigations 
to be found in Brentano's posthumous works, in Meinong's 
analyses of emotional presentation, in Husserl's preoccu­
pations with various versions of psychologism, and finally 
in the aesthetics of Roman Ingarden. 
But this is another story, one which both moves beyond 
the limits of and also - it should be plainly said - loses 
some of the philosophical fascination of Bolzano's dark 
doctrine.45 
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§1. Introduction 
In the biography of Kafka's early life by Klaus Wagen-
bach there is reprinted, as an appendix, an official list 
of the members of the final class of the German State Gym­
nasium in the Prager Altstadt for the year 1901.1 Besides 
the name 'Franz Kafka' this very remarkable list contains 
the names of three class-mates, all of whom were admitted 
to the German University in Prague in the same year and re­
mained in close friendship with Kafka in the subsequent 
period, and all of whom distinguished themselves thereafter 
in their respective fields. They were: Hugo Bergmann, who 
went on to make several important contributions to philos­
ophy (it was he who wrote the first substantial book on 
the thought of the great Bohemian philosopher Bernard 
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Bolzano after the latter's work had lain in almost total 
oblivion for several decades); Emil Utitz, a subsequently 
distinguished aesthetician; and Oskar Pollak, a prodigious 
historian of art, who was closest of all the members of 
the class to Kafka (it was Pollak who received and critic­
ised Kafka's earliest literary experiments). 
Kafka himself, of course, studied law (and six years 
later he achieved a doctorate in that subject) - though as 
Bergmann has suggested, law was selected under the pressure 
of financial considerations as a second best choice. Indeed 
we know that Kafka, too, had originally intended to study 
philosophy.2 In fact a certain number of classes in phil­
osophy were compulsory for law students at that time, yet 
it seems clear that we can rule out the suggestion that 
Kafka attended these courses with his friends Bergmann, 
Utitz and Pollak, merely in order to satisfy the university 
regulations. Indeed convincing evidence has been produced 
to show that Kafka, at that time and for a number of years 
afterwards, exhibited a great deal of positive interest in 
philosophy and - what is more important - that the philos­
ophy which he absorbed expressed itself in his literary 
work.3 This was, of course, in combination with many other 
influences, including those deriving from his awareness of 
his own Jewishness, from his experiences in the insurance 
offices where he spent most of his professional life, and 
more generally from his absorption of a wide range of dis­
parate ideas and values in the highly intellectual climate 
of early 20th century Prague. Further all of these influen­
ces are fused together in complex ways to an extent which 
makes it impossible to isolate those of decisive importance 
from those which belonged merely to the background noise of 
Kafka's life. I hope to show, however, that there is at 
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least some historical interest in drawing attention to 
philosophical elements which may have contributed to Kaf­
ka's development, leaving it to the reader to make his own 
decision as to their ultimate importance. 
Before considering these elements in detail it is use­
ful to make some remarks concerning the general nature of 
university education in Germany and Austria at that time, 
Kafka's own experience of which was by no means untypical. 
In his six years at the university he attended courses in 
chemistry, in law and legal history, in the histories of 
art and architecture, in German literature, in economics 
and political theory, in forensic medicine, - and in phil­
osophy. It is not just the relative breadth of a central 
European university education in comparison with its Eng­
lish and American counterparts - something that has con­
tributed to the characteristic cosmopolitanism of European 
cities - which needs to be stressed. There are important 
differences also in the way in which the spectrum of dis­
ciplines was demarcated into subject-units, and in the way 
in which the relationships between these units were culti­
vated institutionally. One absolutely crucial factor was 
the relative dominance, in central Europe, of the discip­
line of law. Thus where economics, for example, was 
associated in most English and Scottish universities with 
the study of philosophy and in America with the study of 
mathematics, in continental universities it was associated 
with Jura. One consequence of affiliations of this kind 
was a highly specific type of conceptual and terminological 
cross-fertilisation e.g. between chemistry and association-
istic psychology, between legal theory and logic, or, par­
ticularly as illustrated in the work of Meinong's Gvazer 
Schule, between economics, value theory and ontology. Such 
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cross-fertilisations have done much to make European phil­
osophy so impenetrable to present-day Anglo-Saxon philos­
ophers . 
The philosophy courses for which Kafka enrolled in his 
first year at the University were as follows: 
Winter Semester 1901/02. Ehrenfels: Praktische Philosophie (4 
hours/week) 
Summer Semester 1902. Ehrenfels: Ästhetik des musikalischen 
Dramas (1 hour/week) 
Summer Semester 1902. Marty: Grundfragen der deskriptiven 
Psychologie (3 hours/week) 
I have provided, in an appendix to this paper, a more 
detailed discussion of Ehrenfels' work. Both he and Marty 
had studied at Vienna under Franz Brentano, a philosopher 
and psychologist heavily influenced by Aristotle and by 
the scholastic tradition. Brentano had a wide influence 
on intellectuals throughout central Europe at that time. 
His students included, besides (briefly) Freud, also Thom­
as Masaryk (subsequently founder and first president of 
the Czechoslovak Republic), Meinong, Husserl, Stumpf and 
Twardowski. He himself was treated very badly by the 
political authorities in Vienna. His students however were 
able to obtain posts in universities elsewhere in Austria 
and to propogate Brentanian philosophy to such an extent 
that it acquired the status of a semi-official philosophy 
of the Empire.5 
The most orthodox Brentanians congregated around Anton 
Marty in Prague. Marty's group, which included other former 
students of Brentano, including Oskar Kraus and Alfred Kas-
til, took up with an almost religious fervour the task of 
developing and disseminating Brentanian doctrines. In par­
ticular, the members of the group had organised a circle 
of devotees which met regularly for 'training' in Brentan-
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ian modes of thought and for philosophical discussion and 
argument. Hugo Bergmann, Emil Utitz and Oskar Pollak were 
all rapidly initiated into this circle by their teacher 
Marty, and they, in their turn, seem to have recruited 
Kafka: there is evidence from several indendendent sources 
testifying to the fact that at least between the years 
1902 and 1906 Kafka frequently attended meetings of what 
was called the 'inner circle of Brentanists', especially 
those sessions which were held in the Café Louvre in the 
Ferdinandstrasse. 
As Utitz describes it, the Louvre circle was a commun­
ity of thinkers 
in a common struggle, who would meet frequently for evenings of 
endless discussion. Franz Brentano, of course, was not himself 
present. But his powerful shadow fell upon every utterance, 
whether this expressed a correct interpretation of his teach­
ings or some objection to them.6 
In the biography of Kafka written by Max Brod, as of 
course in the Diaries which begin only four years later, 
there is no mention of the Louvre evenings, nor is there 
mention of Kafka's having attended philosophy courses given 
by either Ehrenfels or Marty. From Brod's later writings 
however we know that he himself participated in these even­
ings. We can deduce that he began to attend some time 
after Kafka himself, and probably before their close friend­
ship had established itself. But Brod, unlike Kafka, seems 
never properly to have belonged to the 'inner circle' - and 
he was in fact ceremonially excluded from all dealings with 
the group after publishing in a Berlin literary magazine a 
short story which included a caricature of the religious 
Brentanian. He himself has provided a description of his 
expulsion: 
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As I entered the back room of the Café Louvre everybody was 
gathered toge ther in a t a l k a t i v e mood, and a copy of Gegen­
wart which had come out shor t ly before the meeting lay on the 
t a b l e . I had a r r ived with Kafka. I t was Emil Ut i t z who f i r s t 
made the accusa t ion . . .which was debated for some t ime. A s e r i e s 
of d e l i b e r a t i o n s followed, as i f what were taking place were 
something l i k e a s t u d e n t ' s cour t of honour . . . . And I had 
no one who came to my defence, although a l l the p a r t i c i p a n t s 
had by then [October 1905J known me for two yea r s . Suddenly 
one of them took my side - Kafka. Normally he was so qu ie t 
in company, giving the impression of being almost apa the t i c 
. . . - But now Kafka whispered across to m e . . . t h a t i t would be 
bes t i f we both l e f t , and q u i t the Brentano c i r c l e for ever . 
And t h i s we d id . 
- which may w e l l be t r u e i n s o f a r as Brod h imse l f was con-
concerned ; bu t we know t h a t Kafka resumed h i s c o n t a c t s wi th 
t h e Louvre c i r c l e . Two months l a t e r h e , t o g e t h e r w i th 
P o l l a k , U t i t z and, among o t h e r s , Bergmann's m o t h e r - i n - l a w , 
B e r t a F a n t a , s igned a d e d i c a t i o n t o a book on t h e o r e t i c a l 
psychology 8 which was p r e s e n t e d t o Hugo Bergmann ' i n mem­
ory of our common s t r u g g l e s ' on t h e o c c a s i o n of t h e l a t t e r ' s 
b i r t h d a y . 9 
As Neesen, in h i s e x c e l l e n t book on Kafka and Brentano 
has a rgued , 
I t would be inexp l i cab le i f Kafka had, over a long pe r iod , 
at tended meetings of a c i r c l e of phi losophers whose sub jec t -
matter was of no i n t e r e s t to h im. 1 0 
As I hope t o show in what f o l l o w s , no t on ly B r e n t a n i a n p s y ­
chology bu t a l s o B r e n t a n i a n e t h i c s c o n t r i b u t e d a t l e a s t 
something t o d e t e r m i n i n g bo th t h e form and c o n t e n t of 
Kafka ' s l i t e r a r y work. More s p e c i f i c a l l y , I s h a l l a rgue 
(1) t h a t th rough h i s p a r t i c i p a t i o n in t h e Louvre group 
Kafka a c q u i r e d c e r t a i n t e c h n i q u e s which he lped towards t h e 
development of t h e p e c u l i a r mode of p o r t r a y a l of c o n s c i o u s ­
nes s which i s , a s I s h a l l c l a i m , t h e most c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
f e a t u r e of h i s most s u c c e s s f u l l i t e r a r y e x p e r i m e n t s , and 
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(2) t h a t t h e ph i l o sophy u n d e r l y i n g t h i s p r o c e s s of r e p r e ­
s e n t a t i o n of consc ious e x p e r i e n c e i s a v e r s i o n of t h e p h i l ­
osophy of B r e n t a n o . 1 1 
§2. The evidence of inner perception 
To u n d e r s t a n d Kafka ' s view of c o n s c i o u s n e s s - under t h e 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t o be defended h e r e - i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o go 
i n t o some d e t a i l s of B r e n t a n o ' s t h e o r e t i c a l psycho logy , t h e 
most i m p o r t a n t t h e s i s of which, from our p r e s e n t s t a n d p o i n t , 
concerns t h e pr imacy of i n n e r p e r c e p t i o n . Before we can 
s t a t e t h i s t h e s i s i t i s f i r s t of a l l n e c e s s a r y t o fo l low 
Brentano in r e c o g n i s i n g a fundamental d i s t i n c t i o n between 
two s o r t s of phenomena, which he c a l l e d p h y s i c a l and psy ­
c h i c a l phenomena r e s p e c t i v e l y . Examples of p h y s i c a l phen­
omena, Brentano t e l l s u s , 1 2 a r e : 
a colour , a f i gu re , a landscape which I see , a chord which I 
hear , warmth, cold, an odour which I sense , as well as s imi la r 
formations appearing in the imaginat ion. 
P s y c h i c a l or menta l phenomena, in c o n t r a s t , a r e simply our 
menta l a c t s t h e m s e l v e s : 
the hearing of a sound, the seeing of a coloured ob j ec t , f e e l ­
ing warmth or cold , as well as s imi la r s t a t e s of imagination 
. . . t h e th inking of a general concept ( i f such a th ing a c t u a l l y 
does o c c u r ) , . . . e v e r y judgment, every r e c o l l e c t i o n , every 
expec ta t ion , every in fe rence , every convict ion or be l i e f , 
anger, love , h a t e , d e s i r e , ac t of w i l l , i n t e n t i o n , astonishment, 
admirat ion, contempt, and so on. 
Brentano now d i s t i n g u i s h e s i n n e r from o u t e r p e r c e p t i o n s by 
r e f e r e n c e t o t h e i r o b j e c t s : a c t s of i n n e r p e r c e p t i o n a r e 
t h o s e p e r c e p t i o n s which have p s y c h i c a l phenomena as t h e i r 
o b j e c t s , a c t s of o u t e r p e r c e p t i o n t h o s e which have p h y s i c a l 
phenomena. But t h i s l e a v e s u n c l e a r what p r e c i s e l y i t might 
mean t o ' p e r c e i v e ' a psychical phenomenon. Brentano d id no t 
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intend thereby, as we shall make clear below, anything 
like an introspection of one's own inner states of con­
sciousness. He wished, rather, to draw attention to the 
fact that every consciousness is bound up with a self-
consciousness, that a mental event or state which did not 
meet this condition would not be a 'consciousness' at all. 
But it is not as if - as Brentano's terminology of 'inner' 
and 'outer' perception may unfortunately suggest - this 
element of self-consciousness is conceived as an addition­
al act which would exist in the mind somehow alongside the 
original consciousness. It is, rather, a merely abstractly 
distinguishable moment or constituent part of the original 
consciousness, a moment of a type that can of necessity 
exist only as embedded within such a larger, circumcluding 
whole.13 The act-moment of inner perception may best be 
conceived, perhaps, as an act of living through its object 
(the corresponding psychical phenomenon), without any 
transcendent target object of the type which is typically 
possessed by acts of both outer perception and (if these 
exist) of introspection.14 
Brentano's thesis of the primacy of inner perception, 
now, is a claim to the effect that it is inner conscious­
ness alone which can yield certain knowledge, that the 
only objects of which we can have an absolutely secure 
apprehension are psychical phenomena, i.e.,roughly, the 
acts and states of our own consciousness. Of these alone 
can we assert with an absolutely evident knowledge that 
they are in reality as they appear to be in our perceptions 
of them. A consequence of this is that our outer percep­
tions, that is our experiences of physical phenomena, may 
always be deceptive. This thesis represents a form of 
Cartesianism, in that Brentano's arguments for the dubit-
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ability of outer perception rest on the same kind of in­
tuitions as do Descartes' discussions of perceptual illu­
sions in the Meditations, and Brentano's claims for inner 
perception as a source of absolutely secure knowledge 
recall Descartes' arguments in regard to the truths imper­
vious to systematic doubt he believed himself to have iso­
lated. 15 
Thus whilst, when we are perceiving something outside 
us, we cannot know with absolute evidence that the object 
of our perception is as it seems - we could e.g. be hallu­
cinating,- we can know with absolute evidence that this 
and this particular state of consciousness exists, and that 
it is structured in such and such a way. Illusions and 
hallucinations of a kind with which outer perception is indel­
ibly plagued are, Brentano claimed, alien to the world of 
inner perception. 
What he means by this can I think be explained as 
follows: absolute evidence is obtained only if a judgment 
and that which is judged, i.e. for Brentano, that object 
whose existence is affirmed, are somehow united in a single 
whole which is available to consciousness in such a way 
that the correctness of the judgment can be grasped direct­
ly. Our experiences of perceptual illusion tell us that 
such a unity is impossible for judgments of outer percep­
tion. Consider, however, judgments of reflexive self-aware­
ness such as 'I am thinking' or 'I have a visual image of 
a red surface'. Judgmental contents of this sort are, as 
we have seen, merely abstractly isolable moments of more 
inclusive act-wholes (of thinking, having such and such a 
visual image, etc.). Thus the desired kind of unity between 
judgment and that which is judged is here so to speak 
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already to hand: our experiences of psychical phenomena 
are already of themselves experiences having the character 
of absolute evidence. We can be deluded in supposing that 
there is a cat (an object of outer perception) inside a 
room in which we are sitting, but we cannot be deluded in 
supposing that we are undergoing an experience of seeming 
to see a cat (this experience as a whole constituting an 
object of inner perception the existence of which is given 
with absolute evidence in the very experience itself); the 
concept of delusion here can gain no foothold.16 
We are concerned, first of all, with the consequences 
of Brentano's position for our understanding of the exter­
nal world. Note, most importantly, that Brentano himself 
does not deny that the objects of outer perception exist 
outside our consciousness. And nor does he deny that they 
are as they appear to us. He asserts only that we have 
no unconditioned evidence that they do so exist. The 
existence of the external world is reduced to something 
that is merely probable, as compared to the absolute cer­
tainty of the existence of objects of inner perception. 
From this it follows that the external world acquires a 
certain plasticity: Brentano, like Descartes, countenances 
modes of experience in which the external reality projected 
by the conscious subject is blurred or malignantly deformed 
in the light of the standards of correctness assumed in our 
ordinary everyday experience. 
As we shall see in more detail below, it is precisely 
such variant frameworks of experience which are exploited 
in Kafka's novels for the realisation of what we shall 
argue is his larger task of exhibiting, in literary form, 
the characteristic structures of inner perception. 
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§3. The représentation of the self 
When Gregor Samsa wakes up in the morning he doesn't 
just feel like a noxious insect, he is a noxious insect: 
that is to say, everything in his external reality is such 
as to lend support to his belief that this is his new form. 
For the external world (reality), which is normally taken 
for granted, there has been substituted a quite different 
world, having peculiar qualities. At the same time, how­
ever, Kafka/Samsa's inner reality is seen to have hard and 
firm outlines which are normally unnoticed. From the pers­
pective of our accepted standards of reality, of course, 
a cleft threatens to open up in the fabric of Samsa's ex­
perience, due to the fact that the mode of appearance of 
the constituent objects of his outer world (including that 
of his own physical body) does not gear into the reality 
which seems continually to threaten to break through when­
ever he has dealings with what we think of as the outer 
world. This cleft is however prevented from making itself 
felt by continual shifting reinterpretations on Samsa's 
part of the data which comes in. (From the point of view 
of the Brentanian sceptic, now, a cleft of this kind is 
potentially capable of appearing in the experiences of 
every individual; for most of us it is as if the cleft 
were securely and, as we assume, rightly papered over 
once and for all by our adoption of naturalistic assump­
tions concerning external reality. Our adoption of these 
assumptions consists, in effect, in this: that at least 
in principle every datum which emanates from the outer 
world will be given precedence over our inner expectations, 
over connections amongst mental contents whose motivation 
derives exclusively from internal factors.) 
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It is of course extremely difficult to give a clear 
account of the 'cleft' mentioned above, since the charac­
teristic features of the 'real' and of the 'subjective' 
have been switched around. For Brentano it is the inner 
world alone which truly has the character of being real; 
and the outer world, which we normally take as our stan­
dard of reality, has lost all its former claims to abso­
luteness - even though at the same time it is not simply 
denied that it exists. If Kafka's project was to exhibit 
this inner world, to allow its characteristic features 
to show themselves in a literary presentation, then it 
might be thought that he could appeal directly for this 
purpose - leaving out of account, for the moment, his 
association with Brentanian ideas - to some process of 
introspection or direct observation of the inner world of 
'psychical phenomena'. But as we have intimated, the very 
idea of such a process is, within the Brentanian framework, 
a spurious one. Certainly Brentano's use of 'inner perc­
eption' should not be taken to imply any kind of turning 
of the attention to one's own psychic experiences. Obser­
vation or attention, or any other mental processes involv­
ing our deliberately directing our gaze towards an object 
can, of course, arise in the field of outer perception. 
But Brentano argues that direct, attentive self-observation, 
observation of one's own anger, say, or of any other psychic 
phenomenon, is impossible. For of course as soon as our 
attention were turned to such phenomena, as soon as we 
were truly living in the gaze of observation, the original 
phenomena would have disappeared: we would no longer be 
properly angry or afraid, but rather attentive. The 
attempt at introspection thus begins to look very much like 
the attempt of a dog to catch its own tail. Whenever we 
suppose that our own psychic states have become the objects 
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of our a t t e n t i o n - t h a t we have succeeded in t h e a t t emp t 
t o obse rve them d i s c r i m i n a t i v e l y - we a r e , Brentano a r g u e s , 
invo lved in a d e l u s i o n , which d e r i v e s from our having f o o l ­
i s h l y assumed t h a t p sych i c phenomena co r respond t o o b j e c t s 
in t h e same way as do p h y s i c a l phenomena, o b j e c t s which 
w i l l s t and s t i l l , as i t were , as our a t t e n t i o n i s focused 
on them. 
Kafka, t o o , I s u g g e s t , was aware of t h i s i m p o s s i b i l i t y 
of a n o n - d e l u s o r y s e l f - o b s e r v a t i o n . In h i s d i a r y for 9th 
December 1913 we f ind t h e fo l l owing p a s s a g e : 
Hatred of ac t ive i n t r o s p e c t i o n . Explanation of one ' s soul , such 
as yesterday I was so, and for t h i s reason; today I am so, and 
for t h i s reason. I t i s not t r u e , not for t h i s reason and not 
for t h a t reason, and therefore a lso not so and so. To put up with 
oneself calmly, without being p r e c i p i t a t e , to l i v e as one must, 
not to chase one ' s t a i l l i k e a dog. 
And aga in (10th December 1913) 
I t i s never poss ib l e to take note of and evaluate a l l the circum­
stances t h a t inf luence the mood of the moment, are even a t work 
within i t , and f i n a l l y are a t work in the eva lua t ion , hence i t 
i s f a l se to say t h a t I f e l t r e s o l u t e yes te rday , t h a t I am in 
despai r today. Such d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n s only prove t h a t one d e s i r e s 
to inf luence oneself , and, as far removed from oneself as possible, 
hidden behind pre jud ices and f a n t a s i e s , temporar i ly to c rea t e an 
a r t i f i c i a l l i f e , as sometimes someone in the corner of a t avern , 
s u f f i c i e n t l y concealed behind a small g l a s s of whisky, e n t i r e l y 
alone with himself, e n t e r t a i n s himself with nothing but f a l s e , 
unprovable images and dreams. 
Inne r p e r c e p t i o n , t h e n , i s r e s o l u t e l y t o be d i s t i n g u i s h e d 
from any k ind of i n t r o s p e c t i o n . 
To see t h e r e l e v a n c e of t h i s , l e t us r e c a l l B r e n t a n o ' s 
d e f i n i t i o n of i n n e r p e r c e p t i o n as a p e r c e p t i o n of p s y c h i c a l 
phenomena. Such phenomena he demarca tes i n t o t h r e e c l a s s e s 
which a r e seen as e x h a u s t i n g a l l men ta l e x p e r i e n c e : p r e s e n ­
t a t i o n s , judgments , and phenomena of love and h a t e . 1 7 Thus 
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psychical phenomena are either presentations - of land­
scapes, of colour- and tone-Gestalten, and so on - or they 
are judgments - that such and such is the case, - or phenom­
ena of love and hate (a category which includes, for Bren­
tano, all emotions and feelings, including feelings of will) 
- or combinations of these. It is the category of judgments 
that perhaps most clearly illustrates what is involved in 
inner perception. In judging something, e.g. that this 
paper is white, we have before us first of all certain psy­
chical phenomena, the objects of our external perception 
(in this case, the whiteness and feel of the paper); but 
then also we are aware of what is taking place, we are con­
scious - obliquely, as it were - of the judgment itself, 
as a psychical phenomenon, as something which can be more 
or less deliberate, more or less appropriate to its context, 
more or less warranted by the evidence, and so on. Simi­
larly in seeing, directly before us, a table, we are 
conscious, obliquely, of our seeing of the table. And it 
is this oblique consciousness , present in all mental ex­
periences whatsoever, which is what Brentano means by inner 
perception. 
This realisation will indicate to us why a second seem­
ingly tempting short cut to the realisation of a project of 
the sort here ascribed to Kafka has to be dismissed as spu­
rious. This would begin, rightly, with a recognition of 
the impossibility of inner observation of psychic phenomena. 
But it would go on to develop the view that there might 
exist something like a lowest common denominator of exper­
ience, in which only inner perceptual constituents are given 
credence, in which no phenomena emanating from the outer 
world are awarded the kind of evidential weight due only to 
the inner. Kafka's project, from this point of view, would 
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"be seen as the attempt at a literary representation of this 
reduced mode of experience. 
The idea is spurious because inner perceptions are al­
ways of their nature dependent moments of more inclusive 
act-wholes, from which it follows that it is impossible to 
convey the data of inner perception except against the 
background of some cohesive framework of outer perceptions. 
It is solely on the basis of the latter that associated 
psychical phenomena can present or show themselves in any 
intelligible sense of these terms. We could of course 
appeal simply to ordinary experience for such a framework -
but given the established habits and tendencies of mind, 
this would be to abandon the goal of bringing to represen­
tation specifically the data of inner perception. The 
attentions of the reader in such circumstances would 
follow their natural course, would be directed, in effect, 
to the external unfolding of the plot. 
It would seem however that the peculiar forms and struc­
tures of inner consciousness could begin to be made acces­
sible, be brought to representation, if the mind of the 
reader can somehow be deflected from his settled interest 
in that which is unfolding in a represented outer world, 
without however this resulting in its being directed inward­
ly in a futile attempt at introspection. This can be 
achieved, I suggest, if the expected order of the outer 
world is presented matter-of-factly and in a step-by-step 
fashion, but is in some way disrupted. 
The relevance of these remarks will I hope be obvious. 
I believe, indeed, that a strong case could be made to show 
that the peculiar aesthetic unity of Kafka's mature works 
128 STRUCTURE AND GESTALT 
is to a very large extent an unintended consequence of an 
attempt on his part to meet the conditions for partial iso­
lation of inner consciousness by means of techniques of 
disruption of a sort which rest on the Brentanian 'plastic­
ity' mentioned above, that he thereby succeeded, perhaps 
uniquely, in evolving a type of writing which would allow 
the peculiar forms of inner consciousness to be revealed. 
Thus the narrative in his later works is almost completely 
a matter of the portrayal of experience from the point of 
view of the main protagonist, never in such a way as to 
resort to the expression of any kind of active introspection 
on his part, but always in such a way that the structure of 
his inner world is displayed in virtue of some contrast 
with an expected or somehow typical order in external real­
ity, of some breakdown of the expected intermeshing of the 
inner and the outer. The world is depicted in such a way 
that the associated psychical phenomena can show themselves 
as completely and as nakedly as possible. The character of 
dogged literalism of Kafka's writings is a device to catch 
the reader off his guard when the expectations of a natural 
or reasonable order in the external world which it arouses 
are upset.18 The depictions of bare reality which they con­
tain are never superfluous, never introduced e.g. for 
merely ornamental purposes. Nor does Kafka, except to the 
precise extent that this is needed for his specific pur­
pose, take great pains to achieve any particular social 
or psychological realism in his depictions of the outer 
world, especially in regard to his subsidiary protagonists. 
His outward descriptions serve the always predominant end 
of allowing some particular aspect of oblique consciousness 
to show forth. In this sense, then, Kafka can be said to 
have developed a characteristically Brentanian mode of 
representation of the self. 
KAFKA AND BRENTANO 129 
§4. On our 'knowledge of right and wrong 
Brentano's reputation in Austria in the first decades 
of this century, outside the narrow circle of philosophers 
and theoretical psychologists, was principally as an ethic-
ist. His Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis was as familiar 
in Vienna as, say, Moore's Principia Ethica (which it in 
some ways resembles) in Bloomsbury or Cambridge. This 
popularity was certainly at least partly a reflection of 
the fact that Brentano succeeded in that work in capturing 
the tenor of the world view shared by many central European 
intellectuals of his day, and hence it is not surprising 
that we should find echoes of Brentano's ideas in Kafka's 
writings. Once again, however, the possibility of a direct 
influence, through the Louvre circle, should not be under­
estimated. 19 
As already pointed out, three fundamental categories of 
psychical phenomena are recognised by Brentano : presentations, 
judgments, and phenomena of love and hate. Each of our 
everyday actions is accompanied by or is fused together 
with one or more of these phenomena: for example an act of 
beheading may be accompanied by an inner perception on the 
part of the executioner of his presentation of the victim, 
of his disgust, etc. Now it is easily supposed that it is 
to the last of these categories that ethical questions will 
relate. Thus the criteria which have been offered by phil­
osophers in terms of which conduct should be apprehended as 
ethically correct or incorrect have tended to consist in 
assertions to the effect that ethical correctness is to be 
measured in the light of certain considerations pertaining 
to feelings and emotions: that is good which is felt to be 
good, or which is conducive to happiness, or which is 
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desirable, etc. 
Brentano however denied that phenomena of love and hate 
alone could provide a criterion of ethical correctness. In 
order to understand his view on this issue it is necessary 
to return once more to his treatment of evidence. Brentano, 
as we have seen, asserted the possibility of an absolutely 
evident judgment. His argument for this assertion rests, in 
the end, on an underlying belief in the existence of vari­
ations in the quality of evidence in general, and thus also 
in the quality of the mental acts which are the carriers of 
evidence. This belief on Brentano's part is empirical, in 
the sense that it is a product of simple common sense. Con­
sider, for example, in relation to the simplest category 
of psychical phenomena - the category of presentations -
the fact that we can perceive a distant tower more or less 
clearly, and that our perception may have a greater or 
lesser degree of intuitive content, or that we can be aware 
that we remember the face, or the telephone number, of an 
acquaintance with a greater or lesser degree of distinct­
ness; or that we can imagine, say, the future furnished 
state of an empty room with greater or lesser completeness 
and consistency, and so on. In each of these three types 
of presentation there are obvious and undeniable variations 
in quality of the associated evidence. It will be impor­
tant when we move over to the sphere of ethically relevant 
psychical phenomena to note that whilst these variations 
may depend in part upon native ability (good eyesight, for 
example), they may also depend upon acquired habits or 
skills (on various forms of training) which may in their 
turn be encouraged by particular forms of cultural or 
institutional arrangements in society. 
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The possible variations in the quality of evidence are 
equally familiar in the sphere of judgment. Thus we may be 
aware, on the one hand, that a particular belief which we 
have held for many years rests merely on authority or on 
custom, on information inadequately checked, or on an 
emotion or feeling whose grounds have never been explicitly 
thought through. On the other hand we may be aware that a 
belief rests on factual data which we have subjected to the 
most thorough checks, or that it rests on immediate evidence 
(the evidence of inner perception), either directly or via 
deductive steps which themselves rest on immediate evidence. 
The idea of absolute certainty, of the greatest possible 
evidence of a judgment, is obtained by considering, on the 
basis of the examination of all the various axes of vari­
ation in quality of evidence, what kind of judgment would, 
in suitably propitious circumstances, exhibit the maximum 
conceivable evidence along each such axis. 
Brentano wishes to defend the thesis that for a judg­
ment to possess the character of being capable of absolute 
evidence, of being executed with absolute certainty, is 
objective. Again this thesis is 'empirical'(in Brentano's 
sense): there is, he claims, nothing in our ordinary every­
day experience, nor in the experience of the scientist, 
which might reasonably lead us to doubt that such a charac­
ter were something objective. Thus although some of the 
axes of variation which we have considered rest on the 
presence or absence of subjective features (for example 
strength of emotional commitment), this presence or ab­
sence itself is not something subjective in its turn. The 
character of certainty is objective also in that it does 
not rest on the particular distribution of dispositions to 
check one's premisses, to examine arguments, etc., across 
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a given population, nor upon the techniques of theory con­
struction, etc., in existence at any given stage. That a 
judgment has the potentiality for absolute evidence or cer­
tainty is something which pertains to the judgment alone, 
and would remain true even if, as a matter of fact, the 
corresponding acts of insight on the part of judging sub­
jects were never executed. 
Another way of expressing the fact that a judgment has, 
in itself, the capacity of being executed with absolute 
evidence is to say that the judgment is true. For Bren­
tano, of course, the only judgments whose character of 
absolute evidence is capable of being realised by thinking 
subjects such as human beings are judgments relating to 
psychical phenomena - but this need not imply, as we have 
already seen,that these are the only judgments which are 
true 20 
What does all this have to tell us about the standards 
of ethical correctness? Brentano points out, first of all, 
that there is an analogue in the ethical sphere to the 
phenomenon of experienced variations in quality of evidence 
in the judgmental sphere: just as judgments may be executed 
with a greater or lesser concern for attestation, statements 
made with a greater or lesser degree of honesty, etc., so 
phenomena of love and hate, of approval and disapproval, 
may exhibit a greater or lesser degree of clarity and dis­
tinctness, may to a greater or lesser extent be clouded by 
alien or conflicting elements, etc. And thus here too we 
can isolate an analogue to the notion of absolute evidence 
- a notion of an act of love, for example, carried out in 
such a way as to partake of the highest possibly purity, 
immediacy, etc. Whether factually executed acts ever 
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exhibit this character is not here at issue: we are con­
cerned only to establish the coherence of the notion and 
the consistency of the picture of the ethical world which 
it dictates. The ethical analogue of truth, now, is the 
quality of correctness thus determined: those actions are 
ethically correct which rest or which could in principle 
rest on acts of love or of approval partaking of the given 
character of maximal purity. 
The range of actions whose evident character of good­
ness is yielded in an immediate fashion by such a criterion 
of correctness is unfortunately very slight indeed (we are 
confined to examples such as: achieve knowledge of the 
truth, encourage friendliness, bring about the best within 
the widest area you are capable of influencing, etc.). 
There is clearly no possibility of manufacturing anything 
like a pair of ethical spectacles which would enable us to 
grasp immediately the degree of correctness of an action 
in those highly complex circumstances where ethical diffi­
culties normally arise. How, then, is the range of Bren-
tanian ethics to be extended from such simple truisms to 
the level where it can cope with full-blooded ethical 
dilemmas? 
An initial perspective on this question is provided by 
the analogy between truth and correctness. This indicates 
to us that the status of complex ethical problems need be 
no different in principle from that of correspondingly com­
plex factual problems. Thus in the practical world the 
continuous' need for resolution of problems from both 
spheres - as faced by judges, censors, political officials, 
... - has led to the evolution of complex networks of rules 
of thumb on different levels, to the acquisition of habits 
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and skills of varying kinds and to the gradual entrenchment 
of associated customs and conventions in a number of assoc­
iated spheres. The framework of law as a whole itself 
constitutes, from one point of view, a slowly evolving 
instrument for the pragmatic resolution, given prevailing 
boundary-conditions, of ethical or near-ethical dilemmas in 
society. 
What expedients of this sort mask, at least to some 
extent, is that at any given stage in the development of 
our knowledge and understanding there is something like a 
threshold beyond which no apodictically evident resolutions 
of judgments can be achieved. And what applies to the 
sphere of judgment applies also to the sphere of phenomena 
of love and hate. That expedients have here to be accepted 
for practical purposes does not, however, imply that the 
rigorous thinker should not properly consider how the 
threshold might in principle be extended, or, more 
importantly, how in individual cases immediate evidence 
might be substituted for expediency. Here the role of 
judgment in the ethical sphere is absolutely crucial. That 
an action could in principle rest upon acts of love or of 
approval partaking of the character of 'maximal purity' 
signifies, in effect, that even if it is impossible to 
establish any direct link between, say, an act of love and 
a given slice of behaviour, it might still be possible to 
verify the correctness of that behaviour by indirect means, 
namely by chains of (evident) judgments - subject to pre­
cisely the criteria of sufficient attestation, clarity, 
etc., - established above. Now there is an obvious analogy 
between the processes which are involved in establishing 
such chains of evidence - gathering and sorting of data, 
testing of conclusions, passing of judgments, etc., - and 
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the processes of a court of law. Since the former processes 
are turned, within the framework of a Brentanian ethics, 
towards the realm of inner perception, this implies that 
appeal is being made within that framework to what is, in 
effect, something like an inner trial. 
§5. The inner tribunal 
Brentano's ethical views are by no means to be confused 
with the position, equally widespread in his time and also 
involving a certain running together of the ethical and the 
legal, of legal fanaticism. This consisted in the view 
that the practical expedients discussed above, to the ex­
tent that they are legitimately arrived at and securely 
established in society, themselves attain thereby a charac­
ter of maximal ethical correctness. This implies a respect 
for the law and for all genuine authorities for their own 
sakes, and dictates a point of view according to which 
revolutionary convictions of whatever kind appear to be 
immoral.21 
For Brentano, in contrast, the framework of law and 
convention in society was conceived as standing in need of 
an independent, more deeply-rooted justification, resting 
on individual insight (the evidence of inner perception). 
The briefest possible statement of a Brentanian ethics might 
run as follows: given a system of absolute ends (derived 
e.g. from some specific set of religious convictions, or 
from direct evidence relating to phenomena of love and hate) 
ethically correct action is action which is supported by an 
evident judgment to the effect that you yourself in given 
circumstances are fulfilling those ends in what is the most 
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appropriate way. Kafka's ethics also, we shall suggest, 
were in this sense Brentanian. Kafka shares with Brentano 
an overwhelming emphasis on the role of judgment (and 
specifically of evident judgment) in the resolution of 
ethical dilemmas and on the importance of self-knowledge 
for ethically correct action. 
Perhaps the most important thesis implied thereby is 
that only if you know the extent of your physical and 
mental capabilities, and if you apprehend completely the 
extent of your own limitations, and only if you are blessed 
with the patience not to want to break through those limits, 
do you have the possibility of leading a moral life: 
Only in stillness, in the consciousness of one's own 
capacities and possibilities and in patient modesty, 
can one lead a contented life (Neesen, 1972, p.143). 
We find traces in Kafka's Diaries of a view of this 
kind. Consider, for example, the following passage: 
Complete knowledge of oneself. To be able to seize the whole 
of one's abilities like a little ball. To accept the greatest 
decline as something familiar and so still remain elastic 
within it. (8th April 1912) 
Once again, we wish to suggest that Kafka, whether conscious­
ly or not, began with Brentanian ideas or modes of thought 
and took them to extreme conclusions. 
Brentano's own ethical masterpiece, The Origins of our 
Knowledge of Right and Wrong, began as a lecture before 
the Vienna Law Society, and the doctrines it contains were 
in fact formulated as a philosopher's reply to views of the 
jurist Rudolf von Jhering on the nature of the Rechtsgefühl. 
Kafka, as already mentioned, studied law in the University 
of Prague, and frequently had to deal with legal problems 
as part of his job in the Prague Workers' Accident Insurance 
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Office. The concepts of punishment, sentence, judgment, 
trial, guilt, recur over and over again throughout his 
published works. We can now begin to see why both Brentano 
and Kafka should have defended or exploited ethical posi­
tions which rest crucially on a conceptual cross-fertili­
sation of ethics with the discipline of law. Further given 
the view that a criterion for the ethical correctness of an 
action is a judgment apprehended with absolute evidence as 
being true, then the ambiguity of the term 'judgment' as 
between a mental act and a legal process springs immediate­
ly to the eye, implying a further conceptual cross-ferti­
lisation between law, logic and psychology. (Here our open­
ing remarks on the structure of continental university 
curricula should be borne in mind.) 
The ambiguity between judgment as mental act and as 
legal process is indeed exploited by Kafka in The Trial. 
Here a certain set of psychic phenomena - in this case 
Josef K.'s constant need for justification of all his 
actions - are allowed to determine in the manner discussed 
in the sections above a reality of their own, which has 
been, in effect, projected upon or merged with or folded 
into ordinary external reality. K.'s continual trial with­
in himself becomes a real trial in this hybrid 'outside 
world'. But since this world is itself, in part, a fabric 
of delusions, this 'real' trial in the outside world is one 
which can attain its sanction only from the mental acts of 
Josef K. 
Thus at the beginning of The T v i a l we are told that the 
authorities standing in judgment over K. are not there to 
make their inquiries in order to discover guilt, rather 
'as it is stated in the law', they themselves follow in the 
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path of guilt. . is arrested; but it is made clear that 
his arrest should stand in the way of neither his profes­
sion nor of his everyday mode of living. As K. searches 
for the court he has at first no idea where he is supposed 
to go. But then he suddenly remembers the statement that 
the court would 'follow in the path of guilt', and he sees 
that from this 'it immediately followed that the investig­
ation room had to lie at the top of the flight of steps 
that he had chosen by accident'. The court, therefore, is 
there, where K. himself has ordained that it should be. 
And as he is sitting in the court-room he realises that 
the trial itself is a trial only if he recognises it as 
such. Furthermore any kind of defence before the court is 
not actually permitted, but only tolerated - although 
there is some dispute even concerning that. And in general 
the proceedings are not only closed to the public, but also 
to the defendant. For it is not the evidence which is 
actually brought forward in the court that is decisive,but 
that which is passed about in the deliberation rooms, and 
in adjoining corridors. Indeed there is some probability 
that the innocence of the defendant may play some role in 
any acquittal which may actually take place - though an 
acquittal is of course something which rarely happens, and 
it is never to be achieved by somehow influencing the 
judge. When it does happen, however, not only the summons 
and all the other documents of the trial are to be des­
troyed, but also the acquittal and indeed the trial itself 
are to pass completely out of existence. 
In the end k. is told that he himself must come to a 
decision whether or not to recognise the court. 'The court 
doesn't want anything of you. It will admit you if you 
come, and it will set you free if you go.' And as K. is 
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being led to his execution he knows that he himself must 
be his own executioner. Who, then, as K. himself asks, was 
the judge, whom he had never seen, and where was the court, 
at which up to the very end he had never arrived?22 Our 
answer: the judge, the court, and the trial itself are 
projections of K.'s own inner experience, projections from 
the world of inner perception out into the world of exter­
nal affairs. The shaping force behind this projection is 
K.'s conviction that morally correct action demands of 
him that he somehow attain to an absolutely evident judg­
ment. Because he thinks that this is something which he 
can achieve only as the result of some deliberative pro­
cess, a process which would presuppose a whole series of 
investigations and other activities, and because, as he is 
dimly aware, he is himself incapable of realising such a 
process, he brings about a series of events having the 
nature of a complex, obscurely perceived legal trial which 
would do the job for him. 
As Neesen puts it (op.cit.,p.205): 
Since one becomes clear about oneself by means of a judgment, 
and since this judgment must be passed in the centre of the 
self, this self itself becomes a kind of tribunal ... 
Thus 
since the court is inside Josef K. himself, it becomes 
understandable that it need not interrupt the ordinary course 
of his life. And for the same reason the court is everywhere 
where K. searches for it, and also there where he does not 
expect it. 
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It has been impossible, in this brief survey, to pre­
sent more than a sketch of some ideas which might prove 
relevant to the understanding not only of Kafka's works 
and of the interplay between philosophy, psychology and 
literature in central Europe, but also, perhaps most impor­
tantly, of the crucial role played by the law and by the 
study of the law in this period as a determinant of con­
tinually recurring modes of thought. The notion of an 
inner tribunal, in particular, seems to be of the utmost 
importance as a key to the understanding not only of Kafka 
but also of Karl Kraus, of Freud, and even, perhaps, of 
Husserl.23 A full treatment of even this single notion 
would however lead us far too far afield. 
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N o t e s 
1. Cf. Wagenbach, 1958, p.242. 
2. Philosophy is indeed given as Kafka's intended profession in the 
list mentioned above. 
3. This evidence has been assembled most convincingly by Wagenbach, 
op.cit., especially pp.106-14, and by Neesen, 1972. The latter, in 
particular, contains a wealth of detail on the activity of philosophers 
in Prague in Kafka's day. 
4. See my 1978 and the references there given. 
5. An interesting account of the institutional background of Brentanian 
philosophy in particular and of Austrian philosophy in general is 
given in Haller, 1978. 
6. See Utitz, 1954 (cited by Wagenbach, op.cit., p.107). Further 
material on the almost religious devotion of the Prague Brentanists 
to their master is provided by Neesen, op.cit., ch.2. 
7. Brod, 1960, p.260, quoted by Neesen, op.cit., p.28. 
8. The work was Busse, 1903, a study of psychophysics (essentially a 
survey of then-current treatments of the mind-body problem). 
9. Cf. Wagenbach, 1958, p.216 η.426. Berta Fanta had established in 
her home a regular salon for Prague intellectuals frequented by many 
of the members of the Louvre circle. Amongst the guests at the Fanta 
gatherings were not only Kafka, Bergmann, Brod, Oskar Kraus, and 
Ehrenfels, but also Albert Einstein, who was for a time professor of 
physics in Prague, Philipp Frank, another physicist and subsequent 
member of the Vienna circle, and the mathematician Gerhard Kowalewski, 
who has described the Fanta evenings in his autobiography (1950). It 
was not only philosophical issues which were discussed; Brod, in one 
of his writings, tells us that on successive Fanta evenings through 
the winter of one year a certain Herr Hopf, also a professor in Prague 
and a friend of Einstein, gave a course combining an account of 
relativity theory on the one hand with an introduction to Freudian 
psychoanalysis on the other (cf. Wagenbach, op.cit., p.174). 
10. Op.cit., p.34. 
11. Other works on Kafka and European philosophy, for example the works 
by Emrich and Bense, Demetz and Pondrom listed below, almost completely 
ignore the peculiarly Brentanian background in Prague and its quite 
specific relation to Kafka. Emrich and Bense content themselves with 
certain parallels between Kafka's thought and the Heideggerean Funda-
mentalontologie, and Demetz's essay is an interesting but far too 
brief historical account of the peculiar Jewish background of Bohemian 
intellectuals such as Husserl, Freud and Kafka. Even Pondrom, who 
presents some useful parallels between Husserl - otherwise Brentano's 
most important student - and Kafka, centering around the notion of 
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(Note 11. cont.) 
p u t t i n g the world on trial, misses completely Kafka's relation to 
Brentano. 
A much wider issue, not here further discussed, pertains to the 
importance in the works of European intellectuals of the period of 
issues deriving generally from the newly blossoming discipline of 
experimental/theoretical psychology - of which Prague, home, succes­
sively, of Purkinje, Hering, Stumpf, and Ehrenfels, was an important 
centre. Compare, in passing, the entry in Kafka's diary for 21st 
October 1913: 'Ehrenfels' seminar at Weltsch's' with the content of 
Brod and Weltsch, 1913. 
12. Brentano, Psychologie, English ed., p.79f. 
13. The theory of such moments and the associated theory of whole/part 
(dependence/independence) relations in general, which was developed by 
Stumpf and Husserl (both students of Brentano), is presented from a 
number of different points of view in the papers collected together 
in Smith, ed., 1980. 
14. This interpretation of Brentano's theory of inner perception is 
sketched by Küng in his 1978. 
15. Cf. Küng, op.cit. 
16. A useful interpretation of Brentano's arguments here is given by 
Chisholm in his lectures on The First Person, especially his discus­
sions of empirical certainty (which corresponds to what we have here 
called absolute evidence) and of direct attribution (e.g. of our 
seeming to see a cat, etc.). 
17. See ch.6 of Brentano's Psychologie. 
18. Cf. Walser, 1961, e.g. pp.22, 35, etc. 
19. Wagenbach, indeed, sees Brentanian ideas on ethics as constituting 
a quite specific influence on Kafka's later thought: 
The influence of the Brentano circle upon Kafka...can at this 
stage be hardly underestimated, especially as an element in the 
development of his later ethical rigorism founded on a kind of 
judgmental necromancy (U r t e i l s m a g i e ) (op.cit., p.116). 
20. To recognise this one need only note the distinction among judgments 
between being true, i.e. being capable, at least in principle, of being 
executed with absolute evidence, and being realised to be true, i.e. 
being in fact executed with absolute evidence. 
21. Cf. my 1978, especially pp.429ff. 
22. This summary of the events in Der Prozess is derived from Neesen, 
op.cit., p.202. 
23. I am indebted to Erling Eng for what seems to me to be a revealing 
conception of Husserl's 'die Sachen s e l b s t ' as issues of an unending 
trial. 
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Appenxix. Christian von Ehrenfels and the theory of Gestalt 
qualities 
Further light may perhaps be thrown on the Brentanian 
theory of inner perception if we consider briefly the work 
of Kafka's other teacher of philosophy in Prague, Christian 
von Ehrenfels, the titular father of Gestalt psychology. It 
is Ehrenfels' classic paper of 1890 which will particularly 
hold our attention, a profound and highly influential work 
which can be shown to stand in direct line of descent to 
Meinongian object-theory, to the work of Bühler, Selz and 
the later Würzburg school, and both to the Gestalt-psych-
ology proper of Wertheimer, Köhler and Koffka and to the 
Ganzheitspsychologie of Krueger, Volkelt, Wellek and Sander.1 
It also stands in an interesting parallel with the early 
thought of Wittgenstein, especially to his theory of 
S a c h v e r h a l t - c o m b i n a t i o n and to his view of melodies and 
propositions as complex wholes which share a common onto-
logical structure. 
Ehrenfels was not a native of Bohemia, though he held 
a chair in philosophy in the German university in Prague 
for more than thirty years. During this time he played a 
prominent role in Bohemian intellectual life, and his 
thought reveals many of the features characteristic of the 
German Czech (Bolzanian) tradition.2 He distinguished him­
self not only in theoretical psychology, but also as a 
philosopher of mathematics, as a prolific poet and dramatist, 
as an exponent of the Mengerian subjectivist theory of 
value - Ehrenfels was probably the first to apply the notion 
of marginal utility to value theory in general, including 
the theory of ethical value, - as a social and educational 
theorist and sexual ethicist, as a pioneer advocate of 
sexual education for women, of eugenics, of Darwinism 
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and Wagnerianism, and, most notoriously, of polygamy, which 
for a period he believed would offer a means of saving Euro­
pean civilisation from an otherwise inevitable collapse. 
Whilst it will not be possible for us to deal here with these 
aspects of Ehrenfels' thought, it has seemed useful - parti­
cularly in the light of the relative lack of attention to 
Ehrenfels by post-war philosophers and psychologists - to 
append a bibliography of his works insofar as this has 
proved capable of being assembled. 
Ehrenfels' 1890 paper, entitled "On Gestalt Qualities", 
begins with a criticism of the account of melody which had 
been presented by Ernst Mach in his Analyse der Empfindungen 
of 1886. As both Mach and Ehrenfels recognised, a melody is 
not the sum or aggregate of the tones which constitute it, 
since the same melody can be constituted out of quite differ­
ent tones, e.g. when it is transposed from one key to 
another. Mach's suggestion was that the melody itself is a 
direct object of sensation, that we perceive the melody in 
a series of 'sensations of time-form' which accompany our 
sensations of the successive tones. 
But this account fits very inadequately with our exper­
iences in listening to music. It seems that we do not have 
sensations of tones plus melody-sensations, but rather that, 
as the sequence of tone-sensations develops in our conscious­
ness, the melody comes to be apprehended in a way quite 
different from the way in which the individual tones are 
apprehended. The melody, Ehrenfels' concluded, is not an 
object of outer sensation at all. It is, rather, something 
like an inner template or, in his terms, a complex quality 
adhering to the sequence of tone-sensations and experienced 
in an inner perception bound up with these. He argued that 
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such a quality is involved wherever there is the possibi­
lity of variation in sensory elements whilst a correlated 
form or structure can be grasped in inner perception as 
remaining the same. Gestalt qualities exist, then, only 
insofar as the experiences of individuals exhibit conscious­
ly apprehended organisation or articulation of a specific 
type. 
Perhaps the simplest means of conveying the nature of 
these peculiar entities distinguished by Ehrenfels is to 
consider in turn the various types of Gestalt quality which 
he acknowledged. Melodies themselves are clearly temporal 
Gestalt qualities. Qualities of this type are associated 
also with temporally unfolding processes of other types, 
such as reddenings or coolings. As in the case of melodies, 
so also in these examples the existence of the correlated 
quality rests, according to Ehrenfels, on the possibility 
of our grasping through internal perception a certain struc­
ture embodied in a sequence of (outer) perceptual exper­
iences: the act of inner perception in which the quality is 
as it were ambulando grasped can be regarded as an act of 
higher order in relation to the latter. 
It is perhaps important to stress this characteristic 
feature of the perception of Gestalten, that it involves no 
additional deliberate act on the part of the perceiving 
subject but takes place rather automatically . As in the 
work of Brentano, so also here, the act of inner perception 
is merely a determinately formed part or moment of a more 
inclusive perceptual experience. Thus, as Ehrenfels noted, 
'a Gestalt quality is presented simultaneously with its 
founding elements without there being any activity directed 
specifically towards it' (1890, p.288). 
148 STRUCTURE AND GESTALT 
Besides these examples there are also non-temporal 
Gestalt qualities, for example: shapes. The shape of a 
square is a purely spatial Gestalt quality experienced in 
(or as a dependent moment of) our sensations of the lines 
and points which constitute it; the Mona Lisa smile is an 
example of a spatial quality founded on our sensations of 
certain pigment-elements in combination. Flavours were 
regarded by Ehrenfels as non-temporal Gestalten founded on 
perceptions of food-taste-elements in combination. These 
and Ehrenfels' many similar examples suggest a relationship 
between his concept of Gestalt quality and the Aristotelian 
concept of individual accident, something which once more 
calls to mind the profound influence of Aristotle and the 
scholastics upon Brentano and his followers. 
Ehrenfels also pointed to examples of mixed Gestalt 
qualities such as, for example, the qualities associated 
with Wagnerian operas, scientific experiments, and military 
drills. The Imperial procession held every year in Vienna 
on Corpus Christi day is the realisation of a mixed Gestalt 
constructed in a highly precise way from a complex sequence 
of interreticulated saluting- and marching-Gestalten, music­
al sound-Gestalten, horse-,coach- and flag-display-Gestalten, 
and so on. This example points in an obvious way to two 
further distinctions, that between relatively simple quali­
ties, such as individual melodies or individual clinical 
symptoms, and relatively complex qualities built up from 
these (symphonies and diseases or diagnoses), and that 
between what might be called 'free' and 'bound' Gestalten, 
i.e. between those qualities which can be realised, in 
principle, at any place and time (for example melodies, 
colour-arrays, etc.), and qualities whose realisation is 
tied to a specific concrete individual (e.g. the city of 
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Vienna) or moment in time (as e.g. in the case of the 
funeral of the Kaiser Franz Josef). 
It will already be clear that the concept of Gestalt 
quality has an extremely general application. It was in 
fact conceived by Ehrenfels as an indispensable tool for 
the understanding of any kind of apprehended form or arti­
culation in complexes of experience, whether these be 
experiences of objects or of events and processes unfolding 
in time, and whether through a single sense or through a 
number of senses. The phenomenon of language, in particul­
ar, he conceived as being founded upon a totality of 
perceptual (visual and aural) complexes exhibiting Gestalt 
structure. This is because any linguistic complex can of 
course be recognised as the same even though the printed 
or phonic material on which it is founded should change in 
successive uses or utterances. Complexes of spatial or 
aural material ave linguistic , Ehrenfels would argue, in 
virtue of the possession by the associated sequences of 
sensations of Gestalt qualities of particular kinds. (It 
would be interesting to compare with this account the use 
of the concept of inneve Spvachform by Ehrenfels' colleague 
in Prague, Anton Marty.)3 This theory, as we shall see, 
has a number of quite specific consequences for our under­
standing of the nature of the typical objects of human 
experience and thus also of the experienced world which 
these objects together constitute. It is a truism that the 
latter, i.e.the world as experienced, is structured in 
certain·ways, not only by the physiological properties of 
human sense-organs but also by our language, beliefs, 
expectations, skills, etc. Ehrenfels himself succeeded only 
partially in determining the nature of the structuring pro­
cesses which are involved, for he continued to assume, in 
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line with the dominant psychological elementarism of his 
day, that the perception of a Gestalt quality must in every 
case rest on the perception of a set or complex of indepen­
dent elements (separable sensory pieces: for example the 
separate notes of a melody, or the separate constituent 
lines and points of a geometrical figure; cf. op.cit., pp. 
262f). Only with the work of Wertheimer, Köhler and 
Koffka was it recognised that in many areas of our exper­
ience we perceive structured wholes for which the notion of 
founding element is out of place, wholes which are epist-
emologically prior to any set of elements which may be 
distinguished abstractly within them. 
One step towards this contextualist view was made by 
the Munich psychologist Cornelius. In an important gener­
alisation of Ehrenfels1 theory,4 Cornelius pointed out that 
certain kinds of feelings and emotional phenomena can be 
recognised as satisfying Ehrenfels1 criteria for Gestalt­
hood. Thus returning, for the moment, to the examples of 
temporal process Gestalten (such as reddenings or coolings) 
which, as we saw, are typically founded upon a series of 
outer perceptions of successive colour-states of an external 
object, we can ask what holds of the case in which the 
object undergoing a given temporal process is the perceiving 
subject himself, as, say, in the experience of an embarrassed 
blushing or in a becoming-red-with-anger? These are, clearly, 
examples of temporal Gestalt qualities, but they do not,as 
in the case of a reddening of the setting sun, rest on any 
complex of outer perceptions. They rest rather on complexes 
of both inner and outer perceptions entangled with each 
other in multifarious ways and only abstractly resolvable 
into elements. (Such a complex will normally include certain 
perceptions of physiological changes of state in the subject 
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involved, which are outer perceptions in Brentano's sense, 
even though they are of course literally directed inwardly, 
i.e. towards the bodily interior of the subject.) 
This points to the existence both of phenomena which 
exhibit a purely 'external' organisation and also of pheno­
mena which possess a two-fold (both internal and external) 
Gestalt structure. Consider, to take another example, the 
phenomenon of saluting. This can be seen to be associated 
with two distinct types of Gestalt quality, the first ex­
perienced by the saluter himself in a complex inner percep­
tion founded upon his outer-perceptual awareness of his own 
bodily movements, bound up together with inner perceptions 
of associated volitions, feelings of respect or of resent­
ment, etc., and the second experienced by an observer in 
a complex inner perception founded upon his exclusively 
outer sensations of the movements of the saluter. Typi­
cally of course such distinct groups of qualities will have 
become fused or merged together in various ways in tandem 
with our advancing familiarity with both sets of phenomena 
as occurring in regular association and with the entrench­
ment of our assumption of their intrinsic and intelligible 
correlation. A result of such fusion - which will have its 
correlates in the physiological organisation of the per­
ceiving subject5 - is that we do not experience two distinct 
Gestalten (an 'inner' and 'outer' saluting, for example); 
rather, we experience the world itself as containing one 
saluting-Gestalt, independently of our (inner or outer, 
first- or third-person) mode of access to it. Hence it is 
as though concrete experiential material were fused together 
into abstract units of various kinds, and it is these 
abstract units which can be seen to form much of the data 
of our experience. 
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By far the most important example of such fusion is of 
course that which occurs in the linguistic sphere. Linguist­
ic units exhibit on a number of levels a double or multiple 
aspect, resting on a variety of systems of fusion which it 
is the business of the linguist to determine.6 Thus, to 
take the simplest possible example: we can experience a 
given packet of concrete sound material, ink-distributions, 
thinking events, and even silent mouth movements, as one 
and the same word or sentence. 
There are however many other spheres in which we bypass 
that which is concrete in our experience of concrete objects 
and events and perceive, instead, meaningful abstract 
structures of specific types. The same basic theoretical 
model was indeed used by Ehrenfels in the development of 
his theory of ethical and economic value, in his writings 
on aesthetics, and in his many works in the field of what 
would today be called sociobiology. 
The picture of the experiential world which he presents, 
a world of concreta which have become, as it were, fused 
together to form abstract units or abstract features in 
experience, is determined further in having a stratified 
structure. This can be made clear as follows. We have seen 
that inner perceptions of Gestalt qualities can be directed 
not only towards complexes of outer perceptions (as e.g. in 
the case of the perception of a melody), but also towards 
complexes some or all of whose constituents are inner per­
ceptions. Such complexes of inner perceptions of Gestalt 
qualities may now themselves serve as the basis for further 
inner perceptions of Gestalt qualities of a higher order. 
Thus for example the Gestalt qualities which are possessed 
by e.g. our articulation of individual units of language 
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can yield Gestalt qualities of their own, as when two 
sentences are grasped as having a common grammatical or 
logical form, or when two ordered sequences of sentence 
units share an identical poetic form (they may both be 
sonnets, for example). That is to say, there are not only 
Gestalt qualities of the first ovder, founded upon sequen­
ces of relatively unarticulated sensation-elements (as 
melodies, say, are founded upon sequences of tone-sensations); 
there are also Gestalt qualities of second ovdev founded 
upon perceptions of first order qualities; qualities of 
third order founded upon perceptions of second order qual­
ities; and so on, as far as our powers of recognition of 
form can be extended. Thus, for example, the classical 
sonata form may be a second order quality founded upon our 
perceptions of the melodies, polyphonic interrelationships, 
etc., of which individual sonatas are constituted. The 
distinction of orders should not however be confused with 
that between relatively simple and relatively complex qual­
ities. For the opposition between simple and complex can 
be made also amongst higher order qualities: classical sym­
phonic form, for example, may perhaps be conceived as a 
complex second order quality built up from simpler second 
order qualities such as the rondo, minuet, sonata form, etc. 
The world of inner perception, then, at least as Ehren-
fels conceived it, exhibits an architectural structure no 
less complex than the world of outer perception. Of course 
the most serious flaw in Ehrenfels' work arises precisely 
here: it seems counter-intuitive to suppose that the sen­
sory elements of experience are the exclusive objects of 
outer perception and that in the cases where we seem to 
perceive, outwardly, a structured whole, we are in fact 
perceiving in inner perception a quality of some specific 
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complex of elements. This issue could only be raised, how­
ever, and the associated theoretical refinements developed, 
particularly by members of the Grazer Schule and by Stumpf 
and his associates, as a result of Ehrenfels' pioneering 
work. 
Notes 
1. In this regard it is useful to note how many post-Herbartian psycho­
logists had tackled the problems of language hand in hand with 
investigations in the psychology of music. For a more detailed account 
of Ehrenfels's influence see W. Witte, "Zur Geschichte des psycholog­
ischen Ganzheits- und Gestaltbegriffes", Studium Generale, 5, 1952, 
455-64. 
2. See the biographical material in F. Weinhandl, ed., Gestalthaftes 
Sehen, Ergebnisse und Aufgaben der Morphologies Zum hundertjährigen 
Geburtstag von Christian von Ehrenfels_, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche 
Buchgesellschaft, 1960, and part 4 of W. Johnston,The Austrian Mind, 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972, especially the section 
on Ehrenfels himself, pp.302-7. 
3. Cf. especially Marty's Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemein­
en Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie, Halle: Niemeyer, 1908. 
4. A summary is presented in Cornelius' "Über Gestaltqualitäten", Zeit­
schrift für Psychologie, 22, 1900, 101-21. 
5. A useful account of this correlation and of its development through 
time with the cumulation of experiences is provided by Hayek, particu­
larly in his "Rules, Perception and Intelligibility", Studies in Phil­
osophy, Politics and Economics, London: Routledge, 1967, esp.pp.46f. 
6. For an application of the theory of Gestalt qualities to problems 
in the theory of language see chs.4, 5 and 6 of Roman Ingarden's The 
Literary Work of Art, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973 
(original German edition, 1931). 
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Towards a Bibliography of Christian von Ehrenfels 
Of Ehrenfels' vast output it is probably fair to say 
that only his work in theoretical psychology and in subject-
ivist value theory is of lasting value.1 The latter, in 
particular, is of interest because it represents an attempt 
by a student of Carl Menger, founder of the Austrian school 
of economics, to generalise Austrian economic value theory 
into a philosophical theory of value-phenomena in general. 
In regard to Ehrenfels' works on racial morphology - consider 
for example the series of articles published in the Archiv 
für Rassen- und Gesellschaftsbiologie2- - there is little 
that can here sensibly be said. It is true, certainly, that 
like so many eugenicists of his day, Ehrenfels had a high 
regard for 'Jewish' genes, an opinion which he acknowledged 
in public.3 Ehrenfels' reputation, like that of other 
thinkers of the period, has suffered unreasonably by assoc­
iation with thinkers of inferior intellect who enjoyed so 
immense a political influence in the subsequent decades. 
Certainly it is true that in his case, and perhaps also in 
that of others,4 a number of important scientific contri­
butions have been allowed for too long to lay fallow. 
1. The most important of these have been signified in the bibliography 
which follows by an asterisk. 
2. This periodical was co-founded by the ethnologist Richard Thurnwald, 
another student of Menger with impeccable liberal credentials. 
3. The following passage from Kafka's diary for 4th February 1912 may be 
of some interest: 
Amusing scene when Professor Ehrenfels, who grows more and more 
handsome and who - with his bald head sharply outlined against the 
light in a curve that is puffed out at the top, has hands pressed 
together, with his full voice, which he modulates like a musical 
instrument, and a confident smile at the meeting - declares himself 
in favour of mixed races. 
4. One might mention the works of Burkamp, Linke, Selz and Grelling. 
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(Compiled with the assistance of Dr. Reinhard Fabian of the University 
of Graz who bears no responsibility for any errors it may contain.) 
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§ 1 . I n t r o d u c t i o n 
§2. B r e n t a n o ' s views on psychology 
§ 3 . F r e u d ' s views on psychology 
§4. Bren tano ' s views on e t h i c s 
§5 . F r e u d ' s views on e t h i c s 
§6. A comparison of Freud and Brentano on e t h i c s 
§ 1 . Introduction 
There i s very l i t t l e t o say about any d i r e c t i n f l u e n c e 
between Brentano and Freud . Freud as a medica l s t u d e n t 
a t t e n d e d two c o u r s e s on ph i lo sophy g iven by Brentano bu t in 
t h e index t o h i s c o l l e c t e d works t h e r e i s only one p a s s i n g 
r e f e r e n c e t o him. Freud though t t h a t ph i l o sophy i n s o f a r as 
i t was no t s c i e n t i f i c in h i s s ense was n e u r o t i c , f o r i t 
c l i n g s 
to the i l lusion of being able to present a picture of the uni­
verse which i s without gaps and is coherent . . . and i t goes astray 
in i t s method by over-estimating the epistemological value of 
our logical operations and by accepting other sources of knowledge 
such as intui t ion. (Freud, 1940, pp.l60f.) 
A f a v o u r i t e q u o t a t i o n of h i s about t h e p h i l o s o p h e r was 
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H e i n e ' s d e r i s i v e comment: 
Mit seinen Nachtmützen and Schlafrockfetzen Stopft er d ie 
Lüchen des Weltenbaus. 
As was characteristic of Freud, his more magisterial remarks 
were reserved for subjects he knew and cared little about. 
There is no evidence that he studied any philosophy with 
care. 
Similarly Brentano had very little interest in Freud. 
He mentions him only in passing in his discussion of the 
possibility of an unconscious consciousness (Brentano 1874, 
p.105) and concludes that this notion is incoherent. 
There is little doubt that Brentano found Freud's manner, 
particularly his elbowing his way to the top in scientific 
matters, antipathetic. For Freud treated psycho-analysis 
as a cause - he always used the expression 'die Sache' for 
it. Brentano on the other hand hindered the development 
of a Brentanian school in Vienna as he felt that truth in 
philosophy and science is not the possession of any man or 
alliance of men and is not likely to be furthered by 
pressure groups. 
However Brentano and Freud were contemporaries in 
the Austro-Hungarian empire and both spent much of their 
lives in Vienna. The roots of their thought was in the 
German psychologism of Herbart, Helmholtz and Fechner which 
was prevalent at that time in Europe. This trend of 
thought opposed idealism and metaphysics of the Hegelian 
variety, basing itself on scientific thought and method 
which it saw as fundamentally empirical. It asserted that 
experience possessed a double aspect. It faced internally 
giving rise to psychological experience and externally in 
the ordinary sense. To the first kind of experience was 
ascribed a superiority in virtue of both its immediacy and 
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its certainty in relation to the second. Consequently it 
was regarded as having not only a greater illuminating 
power but even provided a foundation for the physical 
sciences which were seen as sciences of external experience, 
which is mediate and indirect. Accordingly, psychology 
was regarded as the science of the elementary concepts of 
all the sciences. It was therefore qualified to enlighten 
the whole domain of knowledge and to constitute in 
particular the core of a new logic and ethics. 
I propose therefore first to examine Brentano's and 
Freud's views on the nature and methods of psychology, 
especially their views on the role of observation, 
description and language, and then in the second half of 
the paper I will discuss how they tried to develop an 
empirical ethic which had, as they thought, no metaphysical 
foundation but was rather based on psychology. 
§2. Brentano'rs views on psychology 
Brentano defined psychology as the science of the soul 
By 'soul' here, he meant a substance which has sensations 
such as perceptual and fantasy images, acts of memory, 
acts of hope or fear, desire or aversion. And by substance 
he understood an entity in which other things subsist but 
which does not subsist in anything itself: the ultimate 
subject. (Brentano 1874, p.5). We discover the properties 
and laws of our souls immediately by means of inner 
perception and we infer by analogy that these properties 
and laws exist in others. 
This psychological knowledge has a high theoretical 
value because the phenomena of inner perception are given 
to us just as they are in themselves: as they appear to 
be, so they are in reality. It is by inner perception that 
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we learn what a thought or a judgment is and it clarifies 
the basic concepts of psychology. 
Inner perception must be clearly differentiated from 
introspection, or inner observation. Inner perception can 
never become inner observation, for we can never focus our 
attention upon an object of inner perception as to do so 
would change the object. To observe one's own anger, for 
example, is to change it. Furthermore, inner perception 
has the distinguishing characteristic of being immediately 
and infallibly self-evident which of course inner or outer 
observation is not. 
Thus the observation of external physical phenomena 
offers us a basis for our knowledge of nature but at the 
same time it can become a means of attaining knowledge of 
the mind via the inner perceptions which are bound up with 
it, i.e. via the oblique presentation of the activity which 
is actually present in us. 
We can observe the sounds we hear but we cannot observe 
our hearing of the sounds; the latter can only be apprehend­
ed concomitantly, in the hearing of sounds. Indeed every 
mental act is accompanied by a concomitant cognition which 
refers to it in this oblique manner: every mental act has 
two objects, a primary and a secondary one. The act of 
hearing has as its primary object the sound and for its 
secondary object, itself; and it is this latter object which 
is internally perceived. 
The truths of inner perception are a priori in character 
and Brentano, according to Kraus (Brentano, 1874, p.370), 
pointed out later in his life that they are not about matters 
of fact; they are 'vérités de r a i s o n ' rather than 'vérités 
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de fait'. Thus they have no existential import because, 
like all a priori judgments, i.e. judgments whose truth is 
evident from the very concepts involved, they are negative. 
To put it another way, truths derived from inner per­
ception, such as that consciousness is a unity and that 
nothing is an object of desire which is not an object of 
presentation, are grammatical remarks. They are a coherent 
set of grammatical prescriptions relevant to talk about 
mental activity. Of themselves they are not descriptive of 
any internal entity - the mind. So they cannot be verified 
empirically; but they do yet guide our thinking. For the 
form of articulation displays the formal features of mental 
activity without in fact describing them. We get at these 
truths by close attention to the logic of talking rather 
than by observation and induction. 
Finally I should point out that Brentano distinguished 
descriptive psychology, which I have been discussing here, 
from genetic psychology. The latter is concerned with the 
laws according to which psychological phenomena come into 
being and pass away, so it depends on observations and is 
basically inductive in uncovering the causal laws governing 
mental phenomena. Its method therefore is that of the 
natural sciences, in contrast to descriptive psychology 
which arrives at general truth directly 'at one stroke and 
without hesitation'. 
Brentano thought that psychology had very great theoret­
ical and practical significance. Thus the phenomena of inner 
perception are given in themselves with completely adequate 
evidence, which is not so of the phenomena of the natural 
sciences. He felt that psychological phenomena 'are incom­
parably more beautiful and sublime' than physical phenomena. 
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He held that from the practical point of view psychology 
contains the roots of aesthetics and of logic. It provides 
the scientific basis for a theory of education, both of 
the individual and of society; ethics and politics also 
stem from it. The use of psychology is 'the fundamental 
condition of human progress in precisely those things whichr 
above all, constitute human dignity.' It is the 'science 
of the future...the science to which,in the future, other 
sciences will be of service and to which they will be sub­
ordinate in their practical application.' Even that is 
not enough, for Brentano goes on to say that 'the question 
concerning the hope of a hereafter and our participation in 
a more perfect state of the world falls to psychology.' 
§3. Freud's views on psychology 
Freud had a no less elevated view of psychology, espec­
ially his own version of it - psychoanalysis. This was to 
serve as the most scientific basis for curing neurosis and 
for understanding and sometimes curing psychosis and many 
psycho-somatic diseases. It was to provide a fundamental 
critique of philosophy, ethics, logic, religion, aesthetics, 
and anthropology. In his own words, 
I perceived ever more clearly that the events of human history, 
the interaction between human nature, cultural development and 
the precipitates of primeval experiences (the most prominent 
example of which is religion) are no more than a reflection of 
the dynamic conflicts between the ego, the id and the super-ego, 
which psycho-analysis studies in the individual - are the very 
same processes repeated upon a wider stage. (Freud,1925,p.72.) 
Psychoanalysis showed, Freud thought, that religion is but 
an illusion and philosophy a paranoid delusional system. 
Logic is but obedience to the biological rules for the 
passage of thought - 'the existence of biological rules of 
this kind can in fact be proved from the feeling of 
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unpleasure at logical faults' (Freud, 1895, p.386). A very 
odd remark to make, I might say, as I have never noticed 
that people are miserable when they make logical mistakes 
and logicians are not notable for being particularly happy. 
Freud was careful to point out that psycho-analysis does 
not provide us with a Weltanschauung, which he defined as 
an intellectual construction which solves all the problems 
of our existence on the basis of one overriding hypothesis 
(Freud, 1933, p.158). But he did claim for psycho-analysis 
a special right to speak for the scientific Weltanschauung, 
which he thought was concerned simply with investigating and 
establishing facts. Its endeavour was to arrive at corres­
pondence with reality, that is with what exists outside us 
and independently of us. It works by observation, now at 
one point and now at another. It puts forward conjectures, 
constructs hypotheses until the scattered findings fit them­
selves together. He never saw that this was but one view 
of scientific activity. He did not appreciate that science 
is not just concerned with facts but with systems of con­
cepts which may redefine what a fact is. Good science asks 
new questions of nature which requires an extension of 
language to answer them and so our notion of the universe 
is widened. Thus the general theory of relativity showed 
that the belief in the absolute independence of space, time 
and motion is false and it required many refinements in 
mathematics to express this. Science not only needs ob­
servation and experiment which give data that have to be 
interpreted, but it needs also logic and mathematics which 
give new possible ways of representing what we find in 
nature. 
Freud never appreciated the role of logic and mathemat­
ics in science, and this had serious consequences on both 
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h i s t h e o r y and h i s p r a c t i c e . S c i e n c e , F r e u d t h o u g h t , 
a s s e r t s t h a t the re are no sources of knowledge of the universe 
other than the i n t e l l e c t u a l working-over of ca re fu l ly s c r u t i n ­
ized observat ions (Freud, 1933, p . 1 5 9 ) . 
This formed t h e b a s i s of p s y c h o - a n a l y s i s , r eemphas i sed by 
Freud on many o c c a s i o n s . The p a t i e n t had t o obse rve him­
s e l f t o o , f o r in a n a l y s i s t h e p a t i e n t 'must r e l a t e e v e r y ­
t h i n g t h a t h i s s e l f - o b s e r v a t i o n can d e t e c t ' (Freud, 1912, 
p . 1 1 5 ) . He must obse rve and r e p o r t h i s t h o u g h t s w i t h o u t 
r e s e r v a t i o n in a spon taneous manner. 
Freud b e l i e v e d in what he c a l l e d endopsychic p e r c e p t i o n , 
t h a t i s t o s a y , a k ind of p e r c e p t i o n which g i v e s i n d u b i t a b l e 
knowledge of o b j e c t s and t h e i r r e l a t i o n s in t h e mind. He 
never d i f f e r e n t i a t e d between i n n e r p e r c e p t i o n and i n n e r ob­
s e r v a t i o n ( i n t r o s p e c t i o n ) as Brentano d i d , a f a i l u r e having 
many consequences . I t l ed him t o b e l i e v e t h a t t h e mind had 
c o n t e n t s which could be o b s e r v e d . Thus in d i s c u s s i n g myths 
he s a y s , 
The obscure recogni t ion (the endopsychic pe rcep t ion , as i t were) 
of psychica l f ac to r s and r e l a t i o n s in the unconscious i s mirrored -
i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o express i t in o ther terms, and here the a n a l ­
ogy with paranoia must come to our a id - in the cons t ruc t ion of 
a super -na tu ra l r e a l i t y , which i s des t ined t o be changed back 
once more by science i n t o the psychology of the unconscious. One 
could venture to explain in t h i s way the myths of parad ise and 
the f a l l of man, of God, of good and e v i l , of immortal i ty , and 
so on, and to transform metaphysics i n t o meta-psychology. (Freud, 
1901, p .258.) 
Thus wi th one t w i s t of h i s hand, l i k e a c u n j u r o r , he t a k e s 
most of p h i l o s o p h y , e t h i c s and r e l i g i o n and p u t s i t i n t o 
t h e h a t of p s y c h o - a n a l y s i s . Freud i f n o t h i n g e l s e was a 
mas te r r h e t o r i c i a n . 
F r e u d ' s f a i l u r e t o d i f f e r e n t i a t e between p e r c e p t i o n 
and o b s e r v a t i o n led him t o b e l i e v e not only t h a t me taphys i c s 
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deals with observable objects somewhere 'outside' the mind, 
but also that the contents of the mind must likewise be 
located in some place: inside the head. Now, as Wittgen­
stein remarked, 
One of the most dangerous ideas for a philosopher is, oddly 
enough, that we think with or in our heads. The idea of 
thinking as a process in the head, in a completely enclosed 
space, gives him something occult. (Wittgenstein, 1967, para.605f.) 
Wittgenstein goes on to show that this leads to the belief 
that we have a prosthetic organ of thought which is so to 
speak in our heads. Freud called this organ of thought the 
psychical apparatus: 
We assume that mental life is the function of an apparatus to 
which we ascribe the characteristics of being extended in space 
and of being made up of several portions (Freud, 1940, p.145). 
This is the central concept of Freudian metapsychology 
which concerns itself with discussing the arrangement and 
parts of this apparatus, the temporal order in which it 
works and the transformations of energy which it undergoes. 
He was of course clear that this apparatus was a fiction 
or a myth, but he was never clear as to what this myth 
represented and why his myths were scientific and rational 
whereas all other myths were in his opinion irrational and 
signs of superstition. 
Freud was, I want to claim, fundamentally confused as 
to the nature of theory in science. He did not realise that 
there is no such thing as a pure observation. There is a 
vast amount of psychological evidence to show that what we 
perceive depends partly on our past history, the society 
we live in and so on. And this is even more true of scien­
tific observations. Take Duhem's description of an experi­
ment in physics: 
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Go i n t o the l abora to ry , draw near t h i s t ab l e crowded with so 
much a p p a r a t u s . . . . An observer plunges the m e t a l l i c stem of 
a rod, mounted with rubber, i n t o small ho les ; the i ron o s c i l ­
l a t e s and, by means of the mirror t i e d to i t , sends a beam of 
l i g h t over a c e l l u l o i d r u l e r , a n d the observer follows the move­
ment of the l i g h t beam on i t . There, no doubt, you have an 
exper iment . . . . Now ask the p h y s i c i s t what he i s doing. I s he 
going to answer, ' I am studying the o s c i l l a t i o n of the piece of 
i ron carrying the m i r r o r ' ? No, he w i l l t e l l you t h a t he i s 
measuring the e l e c t r i c a l r e s i s t e n c e of a c o i l . If you are 
as tonished and ask him what meaning these words have, and what 
r e l a t i o n they have to the phenomena he has perceived and which 
you have a t the same time perceived, he w i l l reply t h a t your 
quest ion would requ i re some very long exp lana t ions , and he w i l l 
recommend t h a t you take a course in e l e c t r i c i t y (Duhem, 1914, 
p.145) . 
The upshot of which i s t h a t we must l e a r n some p h y s i c s 
be fo re we can see what a p h y s i c i s t s e e s . Obse rva t i on in a 
s c i e n c e depends on t h e t h e o r y of t h a t s c i e n c e . Even non-
s c i e n t i f i c s e l f - o b s e r v a t i o n depends on t h e s o c i e t y and on 
t h e e x p e c t a t i o n s of t h e o b s e r v e r , e t c . 
F u r t h e r m o r e , s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r y i s concerned w i th know­
l e d g e , t h a t i s knowledge of t h e o b j e c t s t h a t belong t o t h e 
world of n a t u r e , o b j e c t s which e x i s t and a c t i n d e p e n d e n t l y 
of us and of our t h o u g h t s . This knowledge i t seeks t o f i x 
in s t a t e m e n t s which a r e t r u e or f a l s e . 
Now myths or models a r e no t i n t e n d e d t o be a s e r i e s of 
s t a t e m e n t s c o n t a i n i n g judgments which a r e t r u e or f a l s e . 
The p o i n t of them i s t h a t they a r e cop i e s of t h e d i s p o s i t i o n 
of r e l e v a n t e l ements in t h e o r i g i n a l . Thus they can be s a i d 
t o be l i k e or u n l i k e t h e i r o r i g i n a l , r e l e v a n t or i r r e l e v a n t , 
but no t t r u e or f a l s e : t hey a r e s t i l l o b j e c t s and no t j u d g ­
ments . T h e o r e t i c a l s t a t e m e n t s in s c i e n c e on t h e o t h e r hand 
do not s t and for a n y t h i n g a t a l l . They do no t r e p r e s e n t bu t 
r a t h e r s t a t e what i s t h e c a s e . They may not c o n t a i n a s s e r ­
t i o n s , convey d e s c r i p t i o n s and g ive a c c o u n t s , bu t none of 
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this depends on their possessing some property in common 
with that which the statement is about. Nothing in the 
equation E ~ mc2 resembles anything in the material world. 
So theoretical statements differ from myths and pictures 
in that they are judgments rather than objects reflecting 
the physical world. 
But Freud never saw this. He was firmly wedded to a 
representative view of language, and so in his theoretical 
work he personifies the mind with ego, id and superego and 
discusses how they act on one another without ever getting 
down to stating what a person is, or what an action is, or 
what is the nature of rule following and where can this go 
wrong, etc. His metapsychology is a series of objectifi-
cations consisting partly of a number of diagrams of what 
goes on in therapy and partly a drama, written to be read 
outside the consulting room, to represent what goes on 
inside it. It loses its meaning in the objectifications of 
the discourse and so invites innumerable interpretations. 
He was in fact subject to one of the most deeply rooted 
prejudices of our culture. As Rota puts it: 
Physical objects (such as chairs, tables, stars and so forth) 
have the same "degree" of reality as ideal objects (such as 
prices, poems, values, emotions, Riemann surfaces, subatomic 
particles, and so forth). Nevertheless, the naive prejudice 
that physical objects are somehow more 'real' than ideal 
objects remains one of the most deeply rooted of Western culture. 
(Rota, 1973.) 
Freud never fully took into account that emotions, 
values and persons are what Rota calls ideal objects, and 
which it would be perhaps more appropriate to call (after 
Husserl) concrete or bound idealities . They can be thought 
about in different ways and from different points of view 
because they are not dependent on our thoughts for their 
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existence, and nor are our thoughts about them in any sense 
arbitrary. When we think about the structure of an emotion, 
for example, we are constrained by the nature of the object 
to direct our attention and thought to it in an appropriate 
way, any old thought will not do. Just as in the perception 
of real objects, so also here, we can distinguish various 
degrees of evidence in our perception of or awareness of 
the objects in question. And in certain circumstances we 
may find ourselves enriched by insight which is guided by 
evidence rather than blind compulsion (Brentano, 1930). 
Freud, because he did not understand the objective 
character of scientific thought, was forced to distort the 
place of evidence in science. If someone disagreed with him 
he could write: 
None, however, but physicians who practise psychoanalysis can 
have any access whatever to this sphere of knowledge or any 
possibility of forming a judgment that is uninfluenced by 
their own dislikes and prejudices (Freud, 1920, Preface). 
If his opponent had been analysed and had practised yet 
still disagreed then he was either excommunicated or taken 
to have regressed to neurotic thinking. To Freud a correct 
judgment is simply a judgment dependent on a certain tech­
nique, the technique compels one to believe, whereas in 
science a judgment is true if no evident judgment about the 
same object could contradict it. In other words judgment 
and its truth is a matter of greater or lesser degree of 
insight, rather than of blind compulsion (Brentano, 1930). 
Freud's theories represent what went on between him and 
his patients, they enable us to 'see' what went on, they 
are pictures, aids to understanding. If an analyst dis­
agrees with Freud's theories it usually means that some­
thing different goes on between him and his patients than 
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went on between Freud and his. But if he puts forward his 
views in language like Freud, then this language, although 
containing different theoretical views, will merely reflect 
a different practice. It would not tell us what was the 
case. 
A scientific theory, on the other hand, states or seeks 
to state what is the case. It is not merely a copy or 
reflection of some preconceived original. It refers to an 
object and seeks to characterise it as it is. This charac­
terisation is not once and for all. However as we progress 
in our knowledge of the object it gets more into focus and 
becomes more precise. Our characterisations of it become 
more complex as we use what may be radically different 
techniques of observation and as people develop ever more 
refined theories about it, guided by the cumulating evi­
dence. Our gradually increasing knowledge of micro-organisms 
and of the field of numbers are two examples. A properly 
scientific theoretical language enables us to do this, 
whereas a language which is merely a reflection of a 
practice binds us to the practice and blinds us to the 
object of the practice. 
Freud's attachment to a representative theoretical lan­
guage blinds him to the existence of concrete idealities of 
the type mentioned above; he is forced to pre-conceive 
emotions, conflicts, and so on, as being spatio-temporal 
events of peculiar sorts, which are,like other events 
involving material objects, located in some p l a c e : for 
example in the head, or in the psyche. 
The same non-scientific presuppositions can be seen 
at work in Freud's discussion of superstition (1901, pp. 
258f). He says there that whilst, on the one hand, the 
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superstitious person knows nothing of the motivation of 
his chance actions and believes in psychical accidental 
events, on the other hand he ascribes to external chance 
happenings a meaning which he sees as becoming manifest in 
real events. On this basis he then proceeds to elaborate 
various mysterious forces, omens, ghosts, occult powers, 
etc., which he conceives as occurring in the real world 
in order to explain this meaning. 
Freud, who considered himself to be rational and scien­
tific, takes the exactly contrary view, believing that an 
unintentional chance manifestation of his own mental acti­
vity disclosed something hidden, 'though it is something 
that belongs to my mental life (not to external reality)' 
(Freud, 1901, p.257). He of course believed in the uni­
versal application of' determinism to both physical and 
mental events, a truth which he took to lie at the found­
ation of psycho-analysis. 
It seems clear that Freud and the superstitious person 
are both equally irrational, for neither sees the part 
that logic plays in our life. They are both victims of 
the picture that the laws of logic are somehow inexorable, 
as if logic was something like a machine which is somehow 
an all-pervading ethereal mechanism (Wittgenstein, 1978, pp. 
113-42). In the case of the superstitious person this 
machine would be an entity somewhere occult in the external 
world, while in Freud's view it is an occult entity some­
where in the mind, i.e. in the unconscious. They confuse 
necessity which is studied by logic with causal powers 
which exist in the real world and are studied by the meth­
ods of the natural sciences. Language about things is 
confused with the things language refers to. Everything 
has a cause but that does not imply that things are ruled 
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by logical necessity. Neither sees that we cannot think 
illogically - which of course does not mean that we are 
somehow causally compelled to think logically. Logical 
investigation enables us to see what thought is. As Bren­
tano pointed out, it is of the essence of thought that it 
should be a thought of something. An illogical thought 
cannot have this relation to anything and so cannot be a 
thought. So a parapraxis does not express any thought but 
is a condition in which the person has slipped into a mere­
ly passive state and so has become subject to the purely 
associative forces of language. But by getting people to 
free associate after a parapraxis may enable them to start 
thinking again and so recover from the slip and perhaps 
obtain insight into thought and their lack of potency in 
thinking through matters which are distressing to them. 
Freud has to elaborate various occult mechanisms in the 
mind because he, like the superstitious person, was unable 
to see that intentional inexistence, the reference to some­
thing as an object, is a distinguishing characteristic of 
all mental phenomena. So when he came to study concrete 
idealities such as emotions, complexes and parapraxes he 
merely used empirical methods instead of also paying close 
attention to the logic of thought and action. 
Freud's inability to understand the abstract nature of 
thought is also shown in his discussion of religion and in 
his general inability to understand sublimation. He says 
with heavy irony 
How enviable to those of us who are poor in faith, do those 
enquirers seem who are convinced of the existence of a Supreme 
Being (Freud, 1939, p.122). 
He goes on in this vein throwing scorn on the superstition 
of religion. In fact it is Freud himself who is ignorant. 
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A Jew, Christian, Hindu or Buddhist who believed in the 
existence of a Supreme Being would not be true to his 
faith. For as many theologians have pointed out, God is 
not an object which is greater, more powerful, etc., than 
any other object. He is not an object at all. When God 
said 'I am that I am' to Moses (Exodus 3.14) the whole 
point is that He did not name himself or define Himself 
because Moses saw that God is not an object. 'I am that 
I am' in Hebrew is a name derived from the verb 'to be', 
which signifies existence. The whole secret of the phrase 
consists in the repetition in a predicative position of 
the word indicative of existence. So it states that the 
subject is identical with the predicate. This makes it 
clear that He is existent not through existence. He is not 
a being that exists. So God is the existent that is the 
existent, or the necessarily existent. A being endowed 
with intellect cannot but accept the truth of this demonst­
ration. It is not a matter of proof or belief. (Maimonedes, 
1963, p.l54f.) The ancient Jews were forbidden to give 
God a name to stop people falling into the idolatry of 
thinking He was an object that could be believed in, named, 
and called upon. But Freud never confronts this way of 
thinking and can say only that religion is at best merely 
a historical truth, that is a true memory of what was 
believed in the past. But it is not what he called a 
material truth which to Freud is essentially a present true 
perception of a thing, this being the only other truth he 
recognised. Freud's thought here is more primitive than 
that of Moses. 
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§4. Brentano 's views on ethics 
I have shown so far that both Brentano and Freud put 
a very high value on psychology. Brentano however had a 
much clearer notion of the nature of scientific theory. 
Freud's theorising was so bound up with his practice that 
he was never free to see the place of evidence and abstrac­
tion in science. As he was blind to the crucial role of 
logic in science, his theoretical language tended to lose 
its meaning in the objectifications of the discourse so 
becoming wide open to innumerable interpretations. We will 
now turn to what Brentano called practical philosophy to 
see what the theoretician and practical man made of it. 
Brentano sought to found ethics on empirical psychology; 
'experience alone is my teacher' (Brentano, 1874, XV) he 
wrote. He wished, like Freud, to avoid metaphysics and 
speculation. 
When Brentano spoke of the origin of moral knowledge he 
did not concern himself with explanations of its emergence, 
i.e. with providing a geneology of morals which would be 
based on genetic psychology. He tried rather to discover 
the authoritative source of this knowledge which would lie, 
he argued, in descriptive psychology. This source he felt 
would be taught be nature itself, and so be independent of 
ecclesiastical, political and every other kind of social 
authority. So moral knowledge would be as incontestably 
certain and universally valid for all thinking beings as, 
say, the Pythagorean theorem (Brentano, 1889,pp.3-6). 
The natural sanctions for morality should not be depen­
dent on any external or internal 'will' or on any feeling 
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of compulsion or hope for reward or fear of retaliation. 
Morality he saw as being based on a natural superiority 
which is intrinsic to it just as correct reasoning is in­
trinsically superior to prejudice and muddled reasoning. 
Belief in this intrinsic superiority is an ethical motive 
and knowledge of it is the correct ethical motive and the 
sanction which gives validity to the moral law (Brentano, 
1889, p.11). 
Now what is this superior end which he should strive 
after? What is this good which is the best among the ends 
that are attainable? To find it we must turn to descrip­
tive psychology, for our concept of the good has its 
origin in certain intuitive presentations having psycho­
logical content. 
Every psychic act has a reference to an intentional 
object which is not part of its act. There are three ways 
of being directed upon this object - having it present to 
oneself, judging it, and making an emotional valuation of 
it. It is to this last way that we must look for the 
source of morality. Emotions involve love or hate, incli­
nation or disinclination, which may arise from the mere 
thought of an object but also from the beliefs that we may 
have concerning it. Of these two opposing types of feel­
ing, such as love or hate, in every instance one· or other 
of them is correct and the other incorrect. It is this 
that gives us the source of the good and the bad. For the 
good is that which is worthy of love and we call a thing 
good when the love directed upon it is correct (Brentano, 
1889, p.18). 
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But how are we to know that a thing is good? We know 
when we have evidence that it is good. Thus love or hate 
may be instinctive or habitual, here evidence plays no 
part and so we would not know if the object was good or 
bad. But some feelings are experienced as being correct 
because it would make no sense not to judge them so. Thus 
a person who prefers knowledge with joy to knowledge with­
out joy prefers correctly, for it would be perverse to 
prefer knowledge without joy. 
Now we must ask how we know that one thing is better 
than another, for there are many goods. We derive our 
insights about better, Brentano claims, from acts of pre­
ferring that are experienced as being correct. Thus we 
prefer joy with knowledge rather than joy alone or know­
ledge alone, because of our experiences of preference for 
joy and knowledge and the evidence of inner perception 
bound up therewith. 
The principles of ethics can therefore, according to 
Brentano, be reduced to cognitions of feelings. But he 
stressed that these feelings must not be blind emotions 
or instinctive reactions; they must rather be feelings 
experienced with insight as being correct. The ultimate 
source of our knowledge of good is made up of inner per­
ceptions of acts of love and preference which are experi­
enced as being correct and may be directed either upon 
individual instances or upon universals (as when we know, 
for example, that joy as such, or knowledge as such, is 
good). 
Brentano was very aware that ethics is a practical 
discipline and that its doctrines aim at winning favour. It 
investigates human character and concerns itself, in 
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particular, with what constitutes a good or bad character; 
it seeks to establish how to act rightly in spite of weak 
moral insight and thus it is concerned with moral guidance. 
Another of its objects is social relations and the place 
and value of friendship, of love, and so on. Indeed he bel­
ieved that a fully developed ethics can absorb the entire 
philosophy of law and the state (Brentano, 1952, p.8). 
But what were the details of Brentano's advice on moral 
questions? These were somewhat disappointing for he never 
brought his theory of evidence and of intentionality to 
bear on practical moral questions. He thought mastery of 
the will over the life of instincts was simply a matter of 
driving certain thoughts out of our mind when we are in a 
state of temptation, while at the same time stirrung up and 
retaining others that foster the good (Brentano, 1952, p. 
343). Thus practice, training and example are the mainsprings 
with which we acquire virtue. We should act in 
moral questions like a skillful general who avoids 
those battles we may lose and ... face the enemy, temptation, 
only when we are certain of success (Brentano, 1952, p.348). 
He recommended that we should be alone from time to time, 
read ethical works and poetry of lofty moral content. We 
should lead an orderly life. Idleness is a morass that 
should be strictly avoided. He thought the example of 
Maximillian II of Bavaria should be followed who made a 
note of a particular virtue each day so that he could prac­
tice it (Brentano, 1952, p.348). 
§5. Freud's views on ethics 
Freud did not recognise that he was doing ethics and had 
little interest in or knowledge of the classical texts of 
this discipline. He thought that all that was important in 
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ethics was absorbed by psycho-analysis which, he believed, 
threw a clear light on the origin of human imperfection and 
failings. As was usual with Freud, he falsified any tradi­
tional teaching which did not fit into his scheme of things. 
He assumed that the classical teachings on ethics were sim­
ply systems of doctrines to be blindly followed,rather than 
ways of thinking through to the grounds of ethics. So he 
could ask, rhetorically, which of the countless ethical 
systems should be accepted, and concluded that none should 
be. All are insecure except for the relative certainty of 
psycho-analysis which is based on science (Freud, 1922, 
p.269). Unfortunately this dream of Freud's that psychoanalysis 
would provide a monolithic,sure foundation for 
ethics proved short-lived for there are now countless differ­
ent psychotherapies all claiming to be based'on science, and 
the psycho-analytic movement itself has split into many 
groups. So we are still forced to think through to the 
basis of ethics for ourselves. 
It is wish fulfilment, Freud claimed, that lies at the 
basis of ethics,and wishes were to him solely a matter of 
psychology. Thus 
One thing only do I know for certain and that is that man's 
judgments of value follow directly his wishes for happiness 
- that, accordingly, they are an attempt to support his 
illusions with arguments (Freud, 1923, p.145). 
The roots of conscience and guilt were thought by Freud to 
be revealed by his psychological methods. He defined con­
science as 'the internal perception of the rejection of a 
particular wish operating within us' and guilt as 'the per­
ception of the internal condemnation of an act by which we 
have carried out a particular wish' (Freud, 1913, p.68). 
He generalised these findings to religion and morality 
which he thought had been acquired phylogenetically out of 
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the father complex. Moral restraint in the individual was 
obtained through the process of mastering the Oedipus com­
plex which requires renunciation of instinctual wishes. The 
male sex has taken the lead, he believed, in these moral 
acquisitions,and then transmitted them to women by cross-
inheritance (Freud, 1923, p.37). 
All these remarks, which are basic to psycho-analysis, 
were thought by Freud to be based on unprejudiced obser­
vation. Thus for example he held that wishes were processes 
in the mind that could be observed by him and by his col­
leagues. He did not realise he was not observing but 
rather working within a framework of pre-given definitions 
of civilised behaviour which suggested certain ways of look­
ing at the development of religion and morality. Thus in 
our culture it is a definition of civilised behaviour to 
say that it is not instinct driven. The judgment as to 
whether a piece of behaviour is instinct driven or not re­
quires intimate knowledge of the norms of our culture. 
Observation of the mind or knowledge of psychology will not 
suffice. 
Freud himself made many moral judgments but he never 
questioned their basis. Indeed he thought morality is a 
repressing force and that the super-ego - the centre for 
morality in his scheme - is cruel, and needs to become 
impersonal for good mental health. He talked of the lower 
part of mental life, the instinctual part, as being more 
primitive than the ideal part, which he regarded as being 
somehow the highest in the human mind. He thought perver­
sions were wrong and needed to be cured, because - as he 
held, - they were manifestations of sexual instincts which, 
having become freed from the primacy of the genitals, were 
in pursuit of pleasure on their own account, as in the 
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early days of libido development. Greed, envy, covetousness, 
violent aggression, were all thought of by him to be essen­
tially undesirable. In all these statements ethical judg­
ment is implied but Freud never acknowledged this and 
claimed his judgments were made simply on the basis of 
scientific observation. 
He saw traditional ethics as being purely a matter of 
making demands. Thus he thought that the command 'Love thy 
neighbour as thyself' was absurd as it was impossible to 
fulfil, and makes an enormous inflation of love. This sort 
of ethics he thought has nothing to offer except the narci­
ssistic satisfaction of being able to think oneself better 
than others (Freud, 1920, p.143). He seems not to have 
heard of Jesus' criticism of Pharisaism. He had no notion 
of happiness in fulfilling the law, to him law was necessary 
but always oppressive and demanding. 
In his practice, on the other hand, he took what can be 
recognised as a very definite ethical stance. The patient 
in analysis was obliged to be as candid as he could be. The 
analyst must have an open mind as free from presuppositions 
as possible. He must have no theoretical interest in the 
case while treatment is proceeding, as that might distort 
his unconscious which should be like a receptive organ tuned 
into the unconscious of the patient. And he thought that 
the patient must learn above all from personal experience, 
and he was thus discouraged from reading books on psychoanalysis 
and was not to be given tasks such as exercises to 
follow that might make him better, as thinking things over 
or concentrating the attention could solve none of the 
riddles of neurosis. Analysts were enjoined to be tolerant 
of their patient's weaknesses and to be content to win back 
some degree of capacity for work and enjoyment (Freud,1912, 
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p.115). 
§6. A comparison of Brentano and Freud on ethics 
Both Brentano and Freud thought that the basis of 
ethics lay in psychology, in the sense that you have to 
look into the psyche to find it there and describe it. For 
example Brentano thought the concept of the good had its 
origin 'in certain intuitive presentations having psycho­
logical content' (Brentano, 1889, p.14). Rightness is an 
existent in the mind, which can be known. 
As already stated Freud based ethics on the wish which 
was, he thought, a process of the mind. He thought the good 
was that which we wish to take into ourselves and the bad 
that which we wish to reject. All morality he regarded as 
being based on external coercion, i.e. on situations in 
which we are forced, under the threat of loss of love, to 
stop taking the good into ourselves and instead obey social 
and cultural authorities. Having done so we internalise 
these authorities which then punish us if we disobey them. 
So morality is at root an imposition, according to Freud, 
and he speculated on how much of this imposition mankind 
can bear. 
Freud's psychologistic notions of ethics are based on 
his confusions as to the nature of wishes. He thought 
wishes were processes in the mind and so to account for 
morality he had to manufacture various agencies and proces­
ses in the mind which somehow took in or rejected prohibi­
tions and laws coming from the outside world. Wishes in 
fact cannot be understood by psychology alone, for they are 
neither inside nor outside the mind. Their logic is extreme 
ly subtle; they must be differentiated from hopes, desires, 
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demands, yearnings and longings; and one must be familiar 
with the social and cultural world of the person wishing 
in order to understand the reality-basis of their wish. 
Neurotics, rather than having a disease of the mind, lack 
insightful knowledge, knowledge guided by evidence, into 
the logic of their wishes and desires. 
Neither Brentano nor Freud acknowledged that we can 
experience the goodness of things as when we can see the 
goodness of an act of genuine love. For Brentano what is 
experienced is not the goodness of things but only the 
rightness of our judgments about goodness. For Freud good­
ness is a wish fulfilment, at root a delusion. Our search 
for it is determined by the psychical apparatus which is a 
homeostatic mechanism keeping the internal energy of the 
organism as low as possible. So goodness for the individual 
is purely an internal matter, rather than knowledge of 
the world. He never distinguished goodness from goods. 
This belief that values are mere subjective phenomena, a 
matter for psychology, leads to the reduction of values to 
the feelings we experience in the presence of goods. Thus 
there is a widespread illusion today that if you have a 
good feeling then the object that gives you that good feel­
ing is of value. 
However a moral act does not have goodness for its con­
tent. A morally good act, such as a spontaneous act of 
love, is one which is directed towards an intended value -
the loved one himself is seen to be of value. Goodness is 
not a content of an act but is carried by an act when the 
latter is directed to a value. If you feel joy it may make 
you feel good to feel it, but the value is in the joy not 
in the feeling good about the joy. A martyr being burned 
at the stake may feel joy and be good but he will not feel 
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good. 
When goodness is seen as the content of an act it 
becomes idealised and so pursued as something to be grasped 
by thought, it being a representation somewhere 'in the mind' 
But as it is not a representation it is inaccessible to 
grasping by thought. In fact it is thoughtless to try and 
grasp it. So the individual ends up in despair as to him, 
if goodness is not in the mind, it is nowhere. Much of 
Freud reads like the work of a man who was in despair over 
the ideal, for he never distinguished between the intention­
al object of desire and the external object referred to, 
which is objective and has value but is not in or of the 
mind. 
Freud had a totally inadequate notion of the place of 
evidence in science. He believed that evidence in science 
is simply a function of what the knower has come to be. The 
evidence for psycho-analysis, for example, being determined 
by the application of psycho-analytic techniques. It depends 
simply on the experience of psycho-analysts who use these 
techniques. But scientific theory is not solely dependent 
on techniques and experience. Theory is crucial in science 
for theory enables us to refer to objects which are indepen­
dent of our thoughts and techniques. The objects science 
seeks knowledge of belong to the world of nature which 
exists and acts independently of us and of our thoughts, 
whereas experiences and techniques depend on us and so are 
inseparably a part of the social activity of science. 
Theory enables us to see through these experiences to the 
autonomous objects of the knowledge they produce. Thus many 
different techniques are used to tell us of the existence 
of bacteria - but we know that bacteria are autonomous ob­
jects and would exist even if there were no men in the 
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world. It is scientific theory that enables us to state 
this knowledge. Similarly scientific knowledge of the mind 
cannot depend on any particular series of thoughts or tech­
niques which compel us to believe. To follow Freud's notion 
of evidence would be to fall victim to the belief in the 
omnipotence of thought. 
Another consequence of Freud's inability to understand 
that evidence in seeing is a 'free seeing' and not a deter­
mination of the knower, is that he saw rationality and 
ethics as being a curtailment of the person. He did not 
see that renunciation of instinctual identifications might 
enable new concepts to be acquired so that greater know­
ledge of the world may develop. Thus he thought that women, 
children and 'primitive' people are less moral than men, 
adults and 'civilised' people, because he thought that they 
could not control themselves so well. But control is only 
curtailment if the subject experiences himself as a deter­
minate subject. If the world is lawful (science depends on 
this assumption) and ethics is knowledge of the laws per­
taining to value, then the acquisition of knowledge of these 
laws by means of insight based on evidence can only be an 
enrichment as the subject freely sees these laws, whereas 
a life propelled by instinct is an impoverished life, one 
in which the subject is totally determined by drives. 
In spite of the poverty of Freud's theorising and his 
false notion of evidence, his practice depended on an impli­
cit theory of self-evidence. Thus it was evident to him 
and to his patients that ordinary human happiness is better 
than depression or manic excitement. It was evident that 
it is better to be free of envy and greed. He spent a lot 
of time in analysis showing patients through evidence what 
these states are,for people are not usually clear as to 
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exactly what it means to suffer from depression, envy or 
manic excitement. This is why Freud called his method 
analysis, for if a person has evidence that he is envious 
and has evidence as to exactly what object his envy intends, 
then he will choose not to be envious; there is no need to 
tell him what to do. It is because this evidence is re­
quired that analysis may take a long time. But Freud had 
no theory which threw light on why it is better to be free 
of envy and so his theories are open to the charge of being 
ideologically biased. 
Freud and Brentano differed profoundly in their atti­
tude to consciousness. Freud had a dogmatic attitude to it. 
Consciousness, he held, was an unexplained given, 
a fact without parallel, which defies all explanation or des­
cription .... Nevertheless,if anyone speaks of consciousness 
we know immediately and from our most personal experience what 
is meant by it (Freud, 1940). 
It is nothing but 
a sense organ for the perception of psychical qual­
ities (Freud, 1900). 
It is associated with verbal images and gives them a qual­
ity which is the specific mark of consciousness. We cannot 
retrace the devious course of Freud's thoughts about con­
sciousness here. But his ideas about it grew from his empir­
ical notion of experience and were an unexamined dogma of 
his system. So, to account for the phenomena he came across 
in his clinical work he was forced to bring in the dogma of 
the unconscious, where everything happened which could not 
be explained by his notion of consciousness. 
To Brentano consciousness was anything but simple. Even 
in the simplest mental state a double object is immanently 
present - that is to say we have something as our primary 
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object and at the same time the active subject is present 
indirectly. He was well aware that this notion was not an 
empirical matter depending on experience, but a matter of 
the logical analysis of experience and as such an extremely 
subtle notion. In fact one could say that Husserl's phenomenology 
(Husserl was a pupil of Brentano) was an attempt 
to explicate the notion of intentionality. 
However he seemed to forget all this in his practical 
philosophy where he only gave advice to people. He did not 
see the enormous importance of intentionality and evidence 
in practical ethics. For persons involved in neurotic and 
ethical conflicts have false notions of evidence and so 
also of what is real. This has the effect of blinding the 
subject to evidence coming from outside his field of con­
sciousness, since evidence is of value only to the extent 
that it shows itself via inner evidence. Giving advice 
and moral homilies is of little use as they will be inter­
preted by the subject in terms of those representations coordinated 
with his consciousness which he takes to be real. 
It was Freud's insight into this problem that forced him 
to develop his method of treatment and his notion of the 
unconscious. To transform the person one must, so to speak, 
slip past his consciousness. 
Neither Brentano nor Freud adequately tackled the prob­
lem of authority which is crucial to ethics. They both 
tried to trace it to its source which for them was in the 
mind. Authority is linked with power and power is not a 
content situated in any place - as is indicated by its ety­
mology: dynamie, potentia, pouvoir: to be able. Power in 
ethics is a potency and potency cannot be described or observed. 
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Freud's realisation of the crucial importance of sexual­
ity in ethics was an attempt to understand the workings of 
authority and power, but he had inadequate intellectual 
tools to do the job properly. Sexuality can never be com­
pletely understood by individual psychology since here the 
reality of the other person is crucial. Insight into the 
referent of an act enables us to differentiate, for example, 
between whether an act of sexual intercourse is masturba-
tory or an act of loving the other person, and this requires 
close attention to the logic of the act rather than obser­
vation of the contents of the mind. Furthermore, as power 
is a potency which is not observable or describable, so 
the evidence for its presence cannot be inductive. We need 
a concept such as Wittgenstein's non-inductive evidence (or 
criterion) to guide us here. 
Brentano and Freud thought deeply about psychology and 
ethics. They failed to get to the root of the problem 
because they were crippled in different ways by their empir­
ical philosophy. This is best demonstrated by their inade­
quate notion of the relation of theory to practice, a ques­
tion which is crucial to ethics and which empiricism fails 
to comprehend. 
Freud's theories are a map or maze which reflects the 
neurotic world. They have immense suggestive power but are 
open to innumerable interpretations. So readers of Freud 
tend to become enmeshed in his theories, usually clinging 
to one interpretation of his work which can only be main­
tained against other interpretations by asserting a dogmatic 
authority. Scientific theory however is not suggestive in 
this manner but turns people away from the language it is 
written in to new ways of thinking about the world. 
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Brentano is especially disappointing in his divorce of 
theory from practice since he had a deep knowledge of 
ancient Greek thought which had not been guilty of such a 
split. Much of his psychology is a development of his in­
sight into the pivotal position of the nous poiētikos (ac­
tive intellect) in Aristotle's psychology (cf. Brentano, 
1867). The nous poiētikos is the moving principle of 
thought, an unconscious active power associated with pleas­
ure which enables potentially intelligible images to become 
actually intelligible. But Brentano never freed this notion 
sufficiently from a faculty psychology, and so he could not 
see its pivotal position in practical ethics. To Aristotle 
on the other hand the nous poiētikos was the basis for the 
capacity to act theoretically i.e. to act in such a way as 
to attend to something whilst forgetting one's own purposes. 
It is to share and be involved in what one is attending to, 
and so understand its nature, as opposed to any merely sub­
jective attitude or empty application of a technique. Some 
such notion as this lies at the root of the Freudian 'tech­
nique', however, of listening to the patient with the un­
conscious. But Freud, being an empiricist, thought the 
analyst must forget his theoretical interests in his prac­
tice, where to Aristotle to listen in such a way, without 
personal interests, is precisely to act theoretically. The 
empiricist sees theory as merely a tool of construction, a 
means of gathering experience together in a unified way, as 
we construct theories so one theory succeeds another and 
has validity only until further experience and so new inter­
ests make us change our mind. The classical theoria, on 
the other hand, was the highest manner of being human, a 
transcending of subjective interests, and so was able to 
furnish the foundation of ethics. 
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THE OPTIMUM VELOCITY OF APPROACH: 
SOME REFLECTIONS ON KAFKA'S TRIAL1 
R. J. Kavanagh 
The most useful commentators on Kafka have established 
a number of recurrent constructions and motifs in his works:2 
the depiction of character as function; the peculiar accom-
paniers of the protagonist (Delamarche and Robinson in 
America, K's 'assistants' in The Castle - though these have 
no fully developed counterparts in The Trial; superficially 
Josef K. is the most independent of all three protagonists); 
the role of dress; that peculiar lack of efficacy which has 
led Beissner to declare that the real theme of Kafka's works 
is that of the 'abortive arrival and the missed goal' (in 
The Trial, Chapter II, Josef K. arrives at a hearing, but 
misunderstands its nature and in the following chapter 
returns in order to attend a further hearing, and presumably 
to put matters right, only to find that no hearing is being 
held that day) 3, or, more generally, the peculiar treatment 
of time and space in all his mature writings. The purpose 
of this essentially brief paper is to explore some aspects 
of the description of motion within the text of Kafka's 
Trial, of the peculiar deformations in the coordinate 
structure of space and time which this reveals, in the hope 
that this might assist the understanding of K's experiences 
and of the gradual changes which is undergone by K. in the 
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course of that work. 
In The Trial, as opposed to the other two novels, we 
know exactly the time span covered, for we are told pre­
cisely that K. is arrested on the morning of his thirtieth 
birthday and that he is executed late on the eve of his 
thirty-first. And yet if we leave aside the invariably 
brief direct or inferred references to the passage of time, 
we find that the text deals explicitly and apparently in 
great detail, even when we take into account the 'fragments1, 
with not much more than a combined total of thirty hours in 
all. This treatment of time introduces one of the many im­
balances or deformations into the text. As far as time is 
concerned the reader becomes simultaneously aware of 
detailed reporting of the passage of time - we note frequent 
references to quite specific clock time - while also being 
uneasily aware of the vast gaps in the flow of time des­
cribed. 
The treatment of space, whereby for instance the same 
area can appear both large and small, introduces yet another 
imbalance into the text. At the first hearing in Chapter 
II the room appears so small that the 'audience' is crammed 
in right up to the ceiling so tightly that cushions are 
needed to protect the head, but the same room seems vast in 
the next chapter. The 'small' lumber room in Chapter V can 
yet still accommodate K., the two warders, the whipper as 
well as the lumber, and still give the whipper plenty of 
elbow-room for his work. While in America corridors appear 
to grow in length as the novel proceeds and hotels sprout 
life-shafts and storeys, in The Trial this device is refined 
to allow 'known' space to suddenly reveal hidden recesses: 
the lumber-room, again, the previously unobserved side-
chapel in the cathedral from which the chaplain addresses 
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K., or the unseen court official in the dark corner of 
Lawyer Huld's room, the door behind Titorelli's bed leading 
to the Court buildings. (In The Judgment we recall that 
the nightdress worn by Georg Bendemann's father appears 
suddenly to sprout pockets, hitherto unsuspected recesses, 
just as the father himself appears suddenly to possess un­
suspected strength and resources.) 
These observed recurrent motifs can be traced back to 
the peculiar narrative perspective created by Kafka: the 
text, while ostensibly an objective, simple, third person 
narrative, is in fact rigorously subjective - the anonymous 
narrator observes only what, in this case, Josef K. observes. 
There are however a number of important breaks in this pers­
pective, in which the reader is afforded also a view of 
Josef K. from the outside.4 That many readers are not at 
first aware, or not fully aware, of this, introduces yet 
another deformation into the text. 
The apparently obdurate and relentless concreteness with 
which the text appears to unfold, the grim absoluteness with 
which the events unfold exclusively around K. himself, have 
made this text, above all others, a hunting ground for Sun­
day interpreters - one hesitates before adding one's pebble 
to the pile. Whether philosophical, theological, psycho­
logical or political, interpretations and commentaries can 
be divided into two significant classes: those which accept 
the first sentence of the novel - and there is no argument 
about the position of that in the text - at face value, and 
those which do not. To insist that Josef K. is innocent 
does lead to rather different conclusions about, amongst 
other things, the nature of the text, than does the insis­
tence that K. is, or might be, guilty of something or other. 
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The order of experience undergone by Josef K. within 
the text is also the subject of some commentary among com­
mentators: for some the whole is dreamlike, nightmarish, 
others see these experiences, encounters and so forth given 
in the text as events which, for all their peculiarities, 
are external to Josef K. 
As reader, it is necessary at first to take the net­
works of events in the text as they come. Only later does 
it become possible to decide whether all, or a significant 
proportion of the events are products of K.'s imaginings, 
whether the text, for all its detail and apparent concrete-
ness, is transparent and so forces us to interpret events 
in certain ways in order to make sense of them. 
At first glance there are certain differences between 
the various experiences undergone by K. For example, near­
ly one third of Chapter VII, the longest in the novel, is 
devoted to an apparently exhaustive and critical account 
of the endeavours of the Lawyer Huld. Yet, as we discover, 
this is a mere reverie of K.'s: he has dreamt two hours 
away (p.95). Here it is the very absence of motion that is 
stressed, for as K. daydreams at his desk, important clients 
of the bank are waiting in line outside, only to be comp­
letely abandoned as K. rushes off to see the artist Titor-
elli - all this at a time when K. begins to fear for his 
standing in the bank. Here the law of diminishing returns, 
so apparent in K.'s activities, is made clear; for as he 
daydreams he neither gets any work done, nor does he make 
any advance with his case. The exchanges with the manu­
facturer and the artist in this chapter, or with Frau Gru­
bach and Fräulein Bürstner in the first chapter, with Fräu­
lein Montag in the fourth, or even with the Italian busin­
essman and the chaplain in the ninth seem concrete enough 
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when compared with much of the material in Chapter V, The 
Whipper. What is common to all these episodes, however 
they may be interpreted, is K.'s clear concern for his 
image, a concern underpinned by the description of motion. 
Indeed the description of motion is used by Kafka as a pre­
cise, though frequently unobtrusive cueing device giving 
assistance to the reader in his understanding of the beha­
viour of K., of K.'s thinking. 
From the above it may be clear that Kafka has at call 
a range of identifiable narrative strategies which induce 
in the reader an impression of imbalance within the text, 
make the reader aware of certain disproportions if not con­
tradictions within the text and, because of the overall 
narrative mode, these imbalances are seen to be ultimately 
localised in Josef K.'s thoughts and perceptions. But 
there are problems when we try to describe his thinking and 
modes of perception, and some progress must be made with 
these before we turn to such concepts as 'concern for image' 
and similar matters. 
K.'s thinking is portrayed as hierarchic: we see him 
overbearing towards those he considers as inferiors. We 
see him overbearing towards the three bank clerks - he 
snatches a letter from one in a haughty manner and then 
accepts as his due the salute of the bank porter (p.172) -
overbearing towards his mother (p.l70ff.), towards Frau 
Grubach, Fräulein Bürstner - the little typist who'won't 
resist him long' and upon whom he falls 'like a thirsty 
animal' - and above all towards Rudi Block. In this last 
case, in particular, the description of motion reveals K.'s 
mental attitude with striking clarity: K. treats Block 
like some sort of errant hen, shooing him about, dragging 
him along by his braces, quizzing him, until the precise 
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moment when he discovers that the despised Block, whom he 
has 'proved' knows nothing at all, may have some informa­
tion which could be of use to him. At that point K.'s 
movements and physical attitude towards Block undergo a 
profound and sudden change. 
Another, related aspect of this passage turns on the 
fact that K.'s initial appraisal of Block is based on the 
negative opinion he forms when he compares his own fine 
apparel with the poor dress of Block. And yet Block, like 
Bendemann's father, reveals hidden resources. As regards 
dress - an important issue in the text from the first few 
sentences onwards - it might be noted that K.'s most persi­
stent complaint about the Court right up to the penultimate 
paragraph of the novel is that he never appears to gain 
access to the higher Court levels, with the strong impli­
cation that the lower officials are beneath him, yet the 
one complaint he makes against the Court which can 
be substantiated - one regarding dress - is punished sev­
erely by the Court: the two warders in Chapter I, denounced 
by him in Chapter II for attempting to make off with his 
finery, are flogged for this in Chapter V. 
But K.'s attitudes to those above him are markedly 
different from context to context. He is very much aware 
that at the comparatively early age of thirty he had al­
ready reached the third highest position in the bank. His 
'enemy' the Deputy Manager, receives far more deferential 
treatment than, say, Block, or indeed many of his clients, 
just as the petitioners in Chapter III (he has not noticed 
that Block was amongst them) are viewed by K.quite differ­
ently to the Court Attendant with his splendid uniform in 
the same chapter and the prison chaplain in the ninth. 
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We a r e f r e q u e n t l y a l lowed t o obse rve K. j udg ing o t h e r s , 
bu t h i s powers of judgment a r e no l e s s f r e q u e n t l y d e p i c t e d 
as f a u l t y . Here t h e theme of t h e a b o r t i v e a r r i v a l and t h e 
missed g o a l , t h e theme of ' h idden r e c e s s e s ' a r e i l l u s t r a t e d 
bo th in ex tended pa s sages and in s h o r t p h r a s e s . We f r e ­
q u e n t l y encoun te r such c o n s t r u c t i o n s as 'K. l o o k e d . . . a n d 
s a w . . . ' : he f a i l s t o r e c o g n i s e a t f i r s t t h e t h r e e bank 
c l e r k s in t h e room on t h e morning of h i s a r r e s t , h i s 
a s sessment of t h e make-up of t h e aud ience a t t h e f i r s t 
h e a r i n g p r o v e s , on c l o s e r i n s p e c t i o n , t o be i n c o r r e c t . 
The ' o r d i n a r y ' lumber-room, when he looks c l o s e r t u r n s ou t 
t o be q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from what he e x p e c t e d , t h e c a r e f u l l y 
p lanned meet ing wi th t h e I t a l i a n a l s o t a k e s one un fo r seen 
t u r n , t h e n a n o t h e r , and then y e t a n o t h e r . This f a i l u r e , t o 
pu t i t c r u d e l y , t o ' s e e f a r e n o u g h ' , t h e s imple mot i f of 
t h e h idden r e c e s s , u n d e r l i n e s t h e g e n e r a l tendency of Jo se f 
K. t o f i nd h imse l f in s i t u a t i o n s where i t becomes n e c e s ­
s a ry for him t o t a k e i n t o account a d d i t i o n a l and unexpec ted 
f a c t o r s . A c l e a r g l o s s on K . ' s powers of judgment i s t o 
be found in one of t h e d e l e t e d p a s s a g e s : 
Before the house a so ld i e r moved to and fro with the regu la r and 
heavy pace of a s en t ry . So the re was now a p a t r o l posted a t the 
house. K. had to lean r i g h t out to see the s o l d i e r , s ince the 
l a t t e r was moving close to the wall of the house. 'Hallo t h e r e ' , 
he ca l l ed to him, but not so loud as for the so ld i e r to have 
been able to hear him. But soon i t t r a n s p i r e d t h a t the so ld i e r 
was only wait ing for a servant g i r l who had gone in to the inn 
opposi te for beer and now appeared in the l i g h t - f i l l e d door. 
K. posed himself the ques t ion as to whether he had only bel ieved 
in passing t h a t the sent ry had been assigned to him; he could 
not answer t h i s ques t ion . 
Whether or not t h e s e e v e n t s a r e r e a l in t h e s ense t h a t they 
i n c l u d e s p e c i f i c o c c u r r e n c e s o u t s i d e of K . ' s own i n n e r ex­
p e r i e n c e or whether they a r e merely co lou red in by h i s 
i m a g i n a t i o n , they do have t h i s in common: t h e p e r s i s t e n t l y 
d e p i c t e d f a u l t y n a t u r e of K . ' s c a p a c i t y fo r c o r r e c t j u d g -
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ment and appraisal of situations does tend to undermine the 
credibility of his contention of innocence - given that 
there are also clear indications of some form of guilty 
conscience at work. 
Throughout the first section of the opening chapter, K. 
is frequently distracted from his 'purpose'. The mention 
of the old woman opposite, who in the first sentences of 
the novel is said to peer at K. 'with a curiosity unusual 
even for her', and who appears no less than three further 
times in the same section, seems out of place until we 
read in the Appendices that K. had promised to visit his 
ageing mother every year on his birthday, and has not done 
so now for a number of years.6 
Descriptions of motion serve to undermine the position 
maintained by K., indeed are often used to contradict that 
position. In the first chapter we can read this fairly 
straightforward-sounding sentence: 'In the adjoining room, 
which K. entered more slowly than he intended, everything 
looked almost exactly the same as on the evening before' 
(p.8). The passage continues to gloss the 'almost the same' 
in the manner indicated above to include unexpected differ­
ences, but the subordinate clauses referring specifically 
to the type of motion involved, 'which K. entered more 
slowly than he intended', have odd implications: we have 
here the proposition that there is for K. an (unspecified) 
optimum velocity of approach for entering rooms containing 
situations of which he can have no possible knowledge. 
This passage has been referred to as a F e h l l e i s t u n g 7 on the 
part of K., a sort of Freudian slide, but to look on it 
merely as such may distract us from the importance attached 
by K. to the effect of his entrance. These clauses con­
stitute an important cueing device, for what they imply is 
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borne out subsequently in the text: the very importance 
attached by K. to his mode of entry and - throughout this 
opening section - precisely to his entry into an unknown 
situation - he is prepared to show that he is a sport if 
the whole affair turns out to be a birthday joke, or, if 
needs be, to do the opposite, to treat the matter as an 
entirely serious affair - prevents him from coming to 
sensible terms with the situation, for his intent to show 
that he is in control, familiar with the unfamiliar, pre­
cludes the logical possibility of asking the most simple 
of questions about the reasons for his arrest. K. prides 
himself on being prepared for any eventuality (his 'calm, 
analytic powers of reason'), but is constantly surprised 
by 'hidden recesses', yet at the same time refuses to act 
surprised. This show of familiarity with the unknown inev­
itably cuts him off from knowledge. (That the same sub­
clauses also imply an unwillingness to face the situation 
he is 'determined' to face is another matter.) Kafka 
leaves us in no doubt that K. is posing, the clue once 
again is given by a description of motion: once on his 
own, K. throws himself on his bed, has two swift bracers, 
quickly closes the drinks cabinet and resumes the staid 
pose. 
Similarly in Chapter IX - though by this stage of the 
novel the self-assertive and self-assured pose has under­
gone at least some modification - we come to the passage 
which follows the chaplain's call: 
'Josef .!' 
K. faltered and gazed at the ground in front of him. For 
the moment he was still free, he could still continue forwards 
and make good his escape through one of the three small, dark 
wooden doors which were in front of him. That would just 
signify that he had not understood, or while he had under­
stood, he intended to pay the matter no attention. But were 
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he to turn around, he was tied down, for then he would have 
made the admission that he had understood really, that he was 
the person addressed, and that he was willing to comply. Had 
the priest called out once more, K. would certainly have left, 
but since all remained silent, for as long as he waited, still 
he turned his head a little, for he wanted to see what the 
priest was now doing (pp.152-3). 
So K. risks an eye. Here, as in the opening scenes, 
calculation of the image he presents becomes more pressing 
than attempts to discover the actuality of the situation -
a position underlined a little further on when the priest 
asks him what he intends to do next in his case: 
'I wish to seek additional help', said Κ., and lifted his 
head to see how the priest judged it.9 
The concern with how his remarks are going down rather than 
with the attempt to understand his true position is made 
clear through the description of motion, and it is just 
this concern which causes the exchange as a whole to be 
inconclusive - just as a concern for his standing in the 
bank causes him to slam shut the lumber-room door and beat 
on it with his fists when bank employees approach in 
Chapter V, rather than to reflect upon events. 
At the beginning of the work overt and implied descrip­
tions of movement tend to convey the impression of purpose­
ful and independent action on the part of K. In the first 
chapter we frequently find such verbs as 'leapt', 'hurried', 
'ran', 'sprang', but we also see K. smoothing his hair and 
adjusting his cuffs in front of the examiner despite K.'s 
'disdain' for him. More importantly the handshake not 
given by the examiner - a gesture that would have restored 
K.'s standing - becomes of great importance within the 
first transformation of the morning session in the exchange 
with Frau Grubach (though the bank clerks behave 'correct­
ly' 1 0), and the second transformation for the benefit of 
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Fräulein Bürstner has . moving tables and chairs - less 
obstinate items than human beings - to prove to her (?) 
his central importance in the events of the morning. 
And yet the attraction of the Court undermines such 
'purposeful' and 'independent' action: within the Court 
buildings in Chapter III he is, literally, unable to stand. 
More subtly, we frequently observe that with precisely 
those persons towards whom K. has decided to adopt a very 
independent and standoffish line, for instance in the 
interview with Fräulein Montag, the l a t t e r part of the 
interview with Rudi Block, in the exchanges with Titorelli 
(before he weakens again at the mention of the proximity 
of the Court), we see K., for all his intentions of taking 
an independent line, standing back, etc., entering into 
a physical duet of motion with the other party. The init­
ial pose is forgotten. No longer do we read 'K. did this 
or that', but instead 'both sat down...both drew closer'. 
This is particularly marked in the final chapter where 
indeed the two separate parties, K. and the executioners 
come to form one physical unit. 
The attraction exerted by figures of authority, despite 
K.'s implied claims to independence and of rejection of 
that authority, is perhaps clearest in the ninth chapter 
when K. is beckoned closer by the chaplain whom he had a 
few moments before been set to elude: 
since everything could now take place openly, he ran - this he 
did both out of curiosity and in order to cut short the affair 
- with long flying strides towards the pulpit (p.153). 
As often before, the inserted clauses lend 'plausibility' 
to the obvious volte face, and predictably K. and the 
chaplain are soon to be seen walking up and down together. 
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The apparent independence of Josef K., the thrusting 
bank official who can scoff at the Court, who can shout 
'You blackguards...you can keep all your interrogations' 
and rush off down the stairs at the end of the second chap­
ter, is rather revealingly glossed by his re-appearance in 
the same rooms in the following chapter. In this way a 
fairly consistent pattern of attraction, rejection and 
acquiescence in the relationship between K. and others, 
and, because of the involvement of all in Court affairs, 
ultimately with the Court, is built up in the text, and 
the outcome, the eventual acquiescence, is made clear in 
the final chapter, which in turn consists almost entirely 
of descriptions of motion. 
In this chapter there are, as has been frequently noted, 
clear breaks in the narrative perspective: the two gentle­
men who are to accompany K. are seen by the reader in the 
street outside before being seen by K. who is in the pro­
cess of carefully dressing himself. As this trio makes 
its way towards the place of K.'s execution, the pattern 
of attraction, rejection and acquiescence is made exception­
ally clear - indeed at some stages K.'s behaviour is remi­
niscent of that of the person in the old music-hall joke 
who decided to make the driver of the breakdown truck earn 
his money by keeping the car brakes firmly on all the way 
to the garage (we read '"I'll go no further', said K. as a 
test...but K. resisted... . 'The gentlemen will have their 
work cut out'", and revealingly the text continues without 
pause "but at the same time he had a mental image of flies 
tearing themselves apart to escape the fly-paper" (p.163)). 
Yet K. quite specifically prevents a policeman from inter­
vening: 
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One [policeman] with a bushy moustache, h i s hand on the haf t 
of h i s sabre , s t rode up as i f d e l i b e r a t e l y qu i t e near to the 
not unsuspicious group. The gentlemen f a l t e r e d , the policeman 
appeared to be about to open h i s mouth, then K. dragged the 
gentlemen forward with fo rce . He f requent ly turned round 
caut ious ly to check whether the policeman might not be follow­
ing; but when they had put a corner between them and the p o l i c e ­
man, K. began to run, and the gentlemen, desp i t e t h e i r shor tness 
of b rea th had to run with him too (p .164) . 
This s t o p - g o c y c l e i s r e p e a t e d a number of t imes over in 
t h e s e f i n a l p a g e s , mainly th rough t h e f i f t y or so i n d i c a t ­
i o n s of movement i nc luded in t h e t e x t , and in t h e end, d e s ­
p i t e K . ' s ' r e s i s t a n c e ' , i t i s h i s a c q u i e s c e n c e which d e t e r ­
mines t h e outcome of t h e s i t u a t i o n . Even h e r e however i t 
i s s t i l l concern fo r image which supe rcedes as t h e now 
d i s r o b e d K. i s about t o d i e : 
'Like a d o g ! ' , he sa id , i t was as i f the shame should o u t l i v e 
him (p .165) . 
Large ly th rough d e s c r i p t i o n s of motion K. 's professed 
i n d i f f e r e n c e t o t h e Court i s r e v e a l e d as a k ind of d e f i a n c e , 
which e i t h e r g i v e s way t o or r e v e a l s a t t r a c t i o n and e v e n t ­
u a l a c q u i e s c e n c e - one r e c a l l s t h e independen t s t and t h a t 
g i v e s way t o t h e due t of mot ion . As t h e novel p roceeds t h e 
a t t empts by K. t o b lock out t h o u g h t s of t h e Court become 
l e s s s u c c e s s f u l . While i n t h e second c h a p t e r we can r e a d : 
In the end, though he s t i l l climbed the s t a i r s and in h i s 
thoughts toyed with a memory of what the warder Willem had 
sa id , t h a t the Court was a t t r a c t e d by g u i l t , from which i t 
n e c e s s a r i l y followed t h a t the examination room must l i e a t the 
head of those s t a i r s which K. chose a t random (p .31) , 
t h e d i s c r e p a n c y between h i s image of s e l f and t h e r e a l i t y 
of h i s s i t u a t i o n , as t h e beg inn ing of t h e seven th c h a p t e r 
i n t i m a t e s and t h e f i r s t pa rag raph of t h e n i n t h c o n f i r m s , 
becomes i n c r e a s i n g l y d i f f i c u l t fo r him t o o v e r l o o k . But 
wh i l e J o s e f K. may i n i t i a l l y be a b l e t o overlook t h i s 
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discrepancy, we as readers are consistently given descrip­
tions of motion in such a way that we in most cases see K.'s 
overt intentions or projections contradicted, and, import­
antly, these descriptions are narrated from a position out­
side Josef Κ., and so do not in that sense form an integral 
part of those lengthy stretches of the novel where the 
information is rigorously filtered through the (self-cen­
sored) perceptions of K. The descriptions of motion, then, 
allow us to discover the discrepancy, the imbalance between 
K.'s professed attitudes towards events and these events 
themselves. This is, of course, not the only method used 
by Kafka. Those sections in direct speech, the crucial 
exchanges in Chapter I, Chapter VII (with Titorelli) and 
Chapter IX allow us to reach objective conclusions as well, 
but it is these constant cues and pointers which, when over­
looked, give the text its peculiar warp. The recurrent 
problem of K., formulated in the opening chapter - 'not 
that it had ever been his habit to learn from experience' 
(p.9) - and all that implies under the circumstances, 
including his death, together with his concern for his 
image which prevents precisely that learning process, become 
placed in an objective context in which it becomes possible 
for us as readers to reach those conclusions so strongly 
resisted by Josef K. himself. In short, what he is un­
willing to admit is revealed through the description of 
motion. 
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to be the director of the bank. In her estimation he would 
not sink, no matter how much his image had otherwise been 
dented. 
THE PRODUCTION OF IDEAS: 
NOTES ON AUSTRIAN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 
FROM BOLZANO TO WITTGENSTEIN 
Barry Smith 
§1. The internal front 
§2. Bernard Bolzano: logic and the theory of science 
§3. On nationalities of a higher order 
§4. The movement of human capital 
The present paper takes the form of a series of sketches 
of 19th century Austrian political and intellectual history, 
allied with a number of reflections of a more general nature 
which it is hoped will contribute to our understanding of 
some of the peculiar characteristics of Austrian thought, 
particularly Austrian philosophy and economics, in the 
period in question. This concern with historical background 
should not be taken to imply sympathy with any view which 
would relativise the truth of a doctrine or the validity of 
an argument to the context within which it is produced. The 
suggestion is simply that it may be impossible to grasp, say, 
a philosophical theory which originated within an alien culture, 
without some understanding of that culture and of the forces 
within it which may have contributed to the development of 
the theory. All too often the temptation is simply to ig­
nore this background in the belief that one may thereby 
produce an unprejudiced (context-free) understanding of the 
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theory in question, where what is obtained is often merely 
an interpretation, within the framework of one's own expec­
tations, from which all but the barest trace of the original 
doctrine has been lost. This may - as, notoriously, in the 
case of Anglo-Saxon interpretations of the later Wittgen­
stein - lead to the development of a prestigious body of 
theory; but the task remains, in all such cases, to compare 
interpretation with original, and this leads back to histor­
ical investigations of the type attempted here. 
§1. The internal front 
As is by now well-understood, the citizen of a German 
state in Metternich's day inhabited a world bearing little 
resemblance to the scientifically conceived universe of the 
present day. He would feel himself subservient to a system 
of forces emanating from God, and permeating the world 
through God's chosen Emperor, Elector or Prince. He would 
take for granted a web of absolute limitations upon his 
freedom of thought and action, set by custom, by common 
opinion, and by the scaffolding of law,1 and this would 
determine his experience of the natural world as of a closed, 
finite whole. The citizen would conceive himself and would 
be conceived by those set in authority over him as having a 
proper business and a proper place and station within this 
whole, beyond which he was not expected, nor indeed allowed, 
to tread.2 Thus the prince alone was the locus of political 
authority; the people, either collectively or as individuals, 
played no role in the political life of the state. There 
was no suggestion that the citizen may properly seek to 
influence his ruler, for example, or that the ruler ought 
properly to seek the opinions of his citizens. 
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The rights of the citizen were exhausted, in effect, in 
this, that he was allowed to be the subject of the prince 
(though this, too, was a right which might at any time be 
rescinded and the individual banished from the state). 
Perhaps the most convincing depiction of a world ex­
perienced as subject to this scaffolding of law is contained 
in Kleist's novel Michael Kohlhaas. Kleist reveals how 
deeply embedded was the assumption that the prince, as the 
representative of God on earth, was an intrinsically 
adequate guarantor of justice, that injustice in the society 
could therefore ensue only from errors of his agents, which 
could be rectified - if they could be rectified - without 
question, upon petition to the prince. Apparent injustices 
which could not be righted in this manner thereby proved 
themselves to be not injustices at all, but higher forms of 
justice, constituent elements of a larger plan, unintellig­
ible to the citizen and therefore not, on any account, sub-
jectable to question or criticism. 
This state of resignation of the members of a society 
will not, of course, withstand all forms of behaviour on 
the part of their ruler. It calls, rather, for the conscious 
or unconscious adoption on his part of a quite specific form 
of conservatism, constructed around the idea of preserving 
this system of expectations. It demands, for example, the 
taking of measures against the growth in influence of 
liberal elements whose views would tend to call into quest­
ion the edifice of relations of trust within the society, 
and it calls forth also political opposition to new ideas, 
to scholarship, and to science, all of which might under­
mine the world upon which the edifice is built. It would 
not be too much of an over-simplification to say that, 
largely thanks to the political skills of his chancellor 
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Metternich, the Emperor of Austria, still at that time 
the most powerful of all the German princes, was able 
to impose this kind of conservatism upon much of Europe for 
a period of three decades leading up to 1848. Specifically, 
the Empire was able to exert pressure upon the principali­
ties of ausserösterreichïsches Deutschland3 in order to 
gain their support for a policy which consisted, in effect, 
in the holding in place of everything on the map of Europe 
as it then stood, and particularly of the preservation of 
the patchwork of small German principalities which was 
believed to constitute an artificial check upon the expan­
sion of any islands of liberal (or messianical or nation­
alistic) sentiment which might come to be established. 
This constituted the external aspect of the Metternich-
system - imposed jointly by Austria and Prussia upon each 
other and upon the remaining German states. The internal 
policy of the system was based upon the principle of estab­
lishing at all levels within the society what were called 
internal fronts against the growth of radicalism. Here it 
is not our purpose to reach a judgment concerning the 
rights or wrongs of this policy. Certainly it now seems, 
in retrospect, that Germany may have profited from the 
early growth of liberalism which Metternich perhaps prevent­
ed, since this might have enabled democratic institutions 
within that country to have become entrenched sufficiently 
to withstand the rise of fascism a century later. But what 
might safely have been risked within the German states, 
where all citizens shared a common language and a common 
background of traditions and institutions, might well have 
led to disaster in Austria, where the continually pressing 
need of those in authority was simply to hold together 
within the Empire a mixture of peoples at different stages 
of development and having conflicting interests and trad-
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itions. 
In practice, the internal policy of the Metternich-
system consisted in the imposition of an elaborate system 
of controls of all public gatherings and associations, 
censorship of the press and of the mails, regulation of 
aliens, of travel, of place of residence, and so on. One 
predictable consequence of these overt controls was that 
such political groups as continued to exist were driven 
underground, and were constrained, where normal forms of 
political persuasion had been made impossible, to turn to 
subversion. After 1848 this was met by the authorities 
by the formation of new, political arms of the police, and 
the Empire came to be criss-crossed at all levels with a 
system of spies, granted powers which included blackmail, 
torture and assassination. Again, the granting of such 
powers expressed a deep-seated view of the relation between 
the Emperor and his peoples as something comparable to the 
relation between the father of a large family and his chil­
dren: the father who may find it necessary, in times of 
need, to take measures for the protection of his children 
which might to them seem extraordinary. Thus arms of the 
police were established also with the task of preserving 
public health (Hygeinepolizei) and morals (Sittenpolizei). 
In some states the police took upon themselves the task of 
maintaining emergency food-depots as a means of preventing 
uprisings which might be fomented by shortages of food.4 
There was established an extremely complicated system of 
passports and registration of domicile, responsibility for 
which was exercised by the Passpolizei, and this enabled 
the authorities - again in their role as fathers of the 
people - to determine the precise whereabouts of any citi­
zen at any time. (Those same authorities prided themselves 
upon the fact that no one could get lost within the Empire.) 
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A not incidental benefit of the fact that all journeys and 
all changes of address were subject to official approval and 
registration was that it became possible for politically 
suspect individuals to be isolated from those centres of 
population where they might do most damage. 
To the members of such a family, accustomed at every 
turn to feel the protective hand of their paternal Emperor, 
the opponent of the state appears as something inexplicable. 
And not being capable of understanding the mentality which 
might lead certain types of individuals under certain circ­
umstances to agitate or rebel, the authorities find it 
sufficient to conceive all such individuals indiscriminately 
as 'destructive elements' - and allow themselves to recog­
nise no distinctions between those among them who were 
motivated by say liberalism or nationalism, and those motiv­
ated merely by some petty local or personal grievance. All 
such individuals were conceived in their totality as some­
thing partaking of the nature of a cancerous growth, against 
which all measures on the part of the civil and political 
police seemed justified. 
But not only were the people shielded in this way from 
dissident or eccentric individuals. A ring of protection 
was constructed to shield them also from new ideas. Metter-
nich's system involved not only the censorship of the press, 
but made room also for a policy of nurturing established and 
accepted opinions through a network of state information 
bureaux. Censorship was applied further in the arts, parti­
cularly the theatre, and there arose in response a tendency 
for artists to revert to classical forms, to that which had 
been tried and tested.5 But this ring of protection was 
applied with most serious effect to the universities, for 
even there, because of the danger of infection, new ideas 
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were to be prevented from taking root. 
The principles of such Protektion were expressed by 
Franz I in an address to the professors of the newly founded 
University of Laibach: 
Be faithful to the old, for this is also the good. It is not 
scholars that I require, but honest, rightly-formed citizens. 
Whoever serves me must teach as I command; whoever cannot do 
this, or comes with new ideas, can go - or I will see that he 
is removed. 
Regulation of the universities was exercised in practice 
by administrators sponsored by the political police, and 
specifically by the use of officially approved textbooks 
or manuals, usually neither original nor scholarly, which 
presented their content within a framework designed pri­
marily to draw out its practical (ethical) consequences. 
By various means, including the employment of spies among 
the students, it was ensured that individual teachers 
adhered rigidly to the content of the textbooks which had 
been prescribed. Not even the rapidly evolving natural 
sciences served as seedbeds of dissent, as had been the 
case in other parts of Europe. The majority of students 
were in any event engaged in the study of law, or of some 
related discipline, in preparation for an almost inevitable 
career in the imperial civil service. 
The predictable result of all of this, of course, was a 
virtual stagnation of intellectual activity in the Empire. 
Almost no achievement of note in the pure sciences was pro­
duced in any Austrian university until Carl Menger's Grund­
sätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre, which initiated new and 
important ideas in the field of economic theory. This was 
published in 1871, by which time many of the residual 
effects of absolutistic control of the universities had 
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been allowed to disappear. It should not however be assumed 
that the controls adopted are to be universally condemned. 
They enabled Austrian universities to withstand successively 
the Kantian, Hegelian, and various derivative metaphysical 
systems which had done so much damage to generations of 
students in German universities outside the Empire. 
Austria, indeed, served in many respects as the last 
intellectual outpost of the Latin renaissance tradition.6 
She was thus able to preserve the insights and assumptions 
of classical and scholastic philosophers (particularly of 
Aristotle - whose works formed a significant part of the 
curriculum of the Austrian classical Gymnasien - and of the 
Spanish scholastics7) and - I want to claim - this contri­
buted greatly to the fertility of her thinkers in the sub­
sequent decades. It is impossible, for example, to under­
stand Menger's work, and to comprehend the nature of the 
opposition between Austrian economic theory and historicist 
economics as then practised in Germany, except by reference 
to the system of Aristotelian-scholastic assumptions which 
permeated the intellectual life of the Empire in the period.8 
§2. Bernard Bolzano : Logic and the theory of science 
The ideas of the preceding section are well-illustrated 
by the case of Bernard Bolzano (1781-1848), another Austrian 
thinker profoundly influenced by Aristotelian modes of 
thought and perhaps the most brilliant philosopher to have 
been produced by the Empire as a whole.9 Bolzano made 
important contributions not only to philosophy, to theology 
and social theory, but was responsible also for significant 
insights in logic and the foundations of mathematics. Much 
of his work, however, consisted of largely ephemeral 
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contributions to the various religious and theological dis­
putes pervading central Europe at that time. Despite the 
relative security of Prague, where Imperial surveillance 
was less effective and taken less seriously than in the 
capital of the Empire, Bolzano found himself the victim of 
frequent attacks from both the political and religious 
establishments, the suspicion of the authorities having 
been encouraged, for example, by his refusal to use an 
officially recommended textbook in his courses, and by the 
fact that he served as the spokesman for the more liberal 
wing in religious disputes. He was finally discredited 
officially by being blamed for student unrest which had 
broken out in a local theological seminary. He was dismis­
sed from his chair by Emperor Franz in 1819 and in the re­
maining thirty years of his life he never again held a 
teaching position. 
During this period Bolzano developed the philosophical 
ontology which is presented in his Wissensohaftslehre (1837), 
virtually the only major scientific achievement of the 
Metternich era in Austria. This work, although it partakes 
of many of the characteristics of the Austrian university 
textbook in the sense of §1. above,- including a pedantic 
concern for the correction of previous views on each of the 
topics discussed, an encyclopedic (Aristotelian) format, 
and an evident lack of concern for either stylistic sophis­
tication or conceptual profundity for their own sakes - was 
far from constituting a typical representative of its 
species. It was much more itself the record of a scientific 
investigation of the concept textbook and a disquisition on 
the construction of textbooks and therefore also on the 
recognition and demarcation (by mortal man) of bodies of 
(eternal) scientific truths. Hence the central thesis of 
the work is the necessity of distinguishing between the 
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transient realm of human knowledge, of thoughts, impressions, 
and artefacts of language, and a further realm, consisting 
of eternal abstract intelligibilia, which Bolzano called 
'propositions in themselves', 'theories in themselves', 
'truths in themselves', 'falsehoods in themselves', and so on. 
Propositions in themselves, for example, represent the ob­
jective, intelligible content of actual and possible indi­
vidual sentence-using acts (acts of judgment). Theories in 
themselves represent the objectively delineated totalities 
of propositions in themselves which would correspond to 
correctly constructed textbooks. Each entity in itself is 
held to exist (have being) outside both space and time, - and 
absolutely independently of whether it is understood, recog­
nised, acknowledged, or grasped in any way by any thinking 
subject. (Indeed Bolzano stressed that his originality in 
relation to 'platonist' thinkers who had preceded him con­
sisted in the fact that whilst they had all of them regarded 
'universals', or 'ideas', or 'forms' as standing in a rela­
tion of dependence upon or of necessary accessibility to 
our thinking (of) them, he himself had affirmed the existence 
of an absolute gulf between the realm of concrete thinking 
acts and the objective totality of intelligibilia which he 
conceived himself to have discovered. 
What, now, can be said about the historical origins of 
Bolzano's ontology? Present-day thinkers may find it diffi­
cult to conceive the effects which a threatened collapse of 
one's nation, or of one's religion, may have on the range of 
theories and arguments which might seem meaningful or impor­
tant. The fact that the associated ideas of national and 
religious consciousness are so unfamiliar to and are regarded 
so unsympathetically by modern intellectuals may hold them 
back from a complete understanding of a thinker whose work 
has been coloured, even in part, by the existence of such a 
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threat. Even in the case of Bolzano, I would argue, we have 
an example of a philosopher whose recognition of the 
religious and political instability of the society in which 
he lived, and of the impossibility of shoring up that 
society by means of practical reforms, determined his 
thought in a way which contributed to his conception of an 
idealised alternative world, freed of the possibility of 
conflict and of decay, a world which would serve as a sub­
stitute for the hitherto unquestioned Catholic intellectual 
world-picture the crumbling apart of which he and his con­
temporaries were beginning to experience through the schisms 
of the period.10 What is remarkable in Bolzano's case is 
that in developing this ontology he succeeded in establishing 
the foundations of a theory of logic which brought together 
very many highly original and fruitful insights, some of 
which have only recently, with the development of mathematica." 
logic, been recognised for their true worth. 
§3. On nationalities of a higher ovder 
During the second half of the 19th century each of the 
four great German cities of central Europe (Vienna, Prague, 
Buda and Pest) experienced a severe decline in the political 
dominance of its middle-class German and German-speaking 
Jewish populations. The culture and intellectual effects of 
this decline in the case of Vienna have been well-documented 
by Schorske,11 Johnston,12 and others,13 who have demonstra­
ted how, especially after the loss of their political power 
through abrupt re-establishment of authoritarian rule in the 
second half of the century, there arose a tendency amongst 
members of the Viennese middle classes to turn to literary, 
artistic and related fields, effectively in order to fill 
the resulting psychological and economic gap in their lives. 
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The German middle classes of Budapest and Prague however 
suffered no such sudden loss of power. They experienced 
rather a steady increase in the political activity of the 
various more or less anti-German communities about them, 
and a gradual recognition of the need to come to terms with 
these communities. 
In Hungary this gave rise to an unparalleled merging or 
melting away of all that had been peculiarly German into the 
Magyar background. This submission of one culture to an­
other - quite distinct from the more familiar phenomenon of 
an individual immigrant adopting the culture of a host coun­
try - is of much psychological and historical interest; 
indeed it might seem to offer a model, if only it could be 
repeated at will, for the solution of one particularly 
intransigent type of political problem. Of course the con­
ditions which made it possible were by no means simple in 
character, and certainly not of the kind which can be arti­
ficially re-created. The success of Magyarisation depended 
first of all upon the guileless and single-minded resolution 
of the Hungarians themselves that it should be brought about, 
a resolution which expressed itself at all levels within the 
society, and even determined the strategy adopted by Hungary 
in its contribution to the formation of the Imperial foreign 
policy. It depended upon the readiness of the more chauvini-
stically German Germans to emigrate, even at the expense of 
abandoning ties and privileges acquired in Hungary; and it 
depended further upon the willingness of those who remained 
to fall into line, to accommodate themselves to the process 
of Magyarisation (which typically involved the adoption of 
both a Hungarian name and of the Hungarian language, at least 
for public use). This may in some cases have reflected a 
certain conformist strain in the German character, but it 
reflected also a desire on the part of many Germans to hold 
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on to status and possessions and to a familiar environment 
even at the cost of their national identity. Finally other, 
apparently quite independent factors also played a role: 
for instance the desire of some Austrians in Hungary -
particularly after the 1914-18 war - to make a personal 
gesture of contempt for German (that is, in this context, 
particularly Prussian) ways.14 
The German-speaking communities of Bohemia and Moravia 
exhibited a quite different reaction to the withering away 
of their political power and administrative responsibility. 
Far from bringing about the submission of one culture to 
another, as in Hungary, there took place amongst the Czechs 
a peculiar splitting of cultures, poignantly expressed in 
the splitting of the University of Prague into independent 
Czech and German faculties in 1880. For with the growth in 
number and authority of the Slavs around them, the Germans in 
Prague seem to have adopted a peculiar cultural seige 
mentality and to have embarked upon a deliberate attempt at 
intellectual and cultural self-preservation.15 This led 
to the creation of a uniquely fertile intellectual environ­
ment within which a number of important philosophers, social 
theorists and writers found a home.16 
As already stated, our assumption is that it is sometimes 
necessary to consider a philosophy and its social and cultural 
background as more or less inseparable components (moments) 
of a single whole, that at least in some cases the two are, 
in the terminology of the phenomenologist, co-realising 
correlates. From this point of view the issues before us 
suffer complications of a special kind in comparison with 
what would be involved in an investigation of the philosophy 
or letters of, say, England or Russia, each of which is in 
an important sense both politically and culturally self-
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sufficient. For the German-Bohemian community stood in an 
obvious relation of dependence upon the wider Austro-Hungar-
ian culture, which was in its turn at least partially 
dependent upon the culture of the German Reich. Thus the 
German-Bohemian community was, so to speak, a nationality of a 
higher order in relation to both Austria and Germany. 
Parallel complications are created also by the existence 
within each of these societies of more or less self-contained 
communities of Jews, who constituted a different kind of 
higher order national grouping (or system of such groupings) 
in the central Europe of the later 19th century. As we 
shall see, one important mechanism in the establishment and 
consolidation of political and cultural dependence-relations 
amongst national groupings turns upon the emigration from 
one region to another. In this regard it is interesting to 
note how many of the most important Bohemian and Moravian 
emigrants to Austria and Germany - among them Zimmermann, 
Husserl, Mahler, Böhm-Bawerk, Kraus, Freud, Loos, Kelsen, 
and Schumpeter - were Jews. It is unfortunately impossible 
to provide here even the briefest account of all the many 
conflicting religious, political, cultural and historical 
factors which led to the peculiar status of the Jew, and 
particularly of the Jewish liberal intellectual, in Europe 
at that time.17 We shall however claim that considerations 
such as those which follow apply no less to Jewish than to 
other communities of the period. 
§4. The movement of human capital 
Dependence-relations between nationalities and other 
groupings, whereby the politics and culture of one community 
is wholly or partly determined by another, are not, of 
THE PRODUCTION OF IDEAS 225 
course, exclusive to Austria-Hungary. Indeed it would be 
possible to formulate certain principles pertaining to the 
correlation between political and economic subservience and 
cultural dependence amongst national groupings which would 
rest, in the end, upon the principles governing the formation 
of markets in human and intellectual capital in developed 
societies.18 Here we can do no more than sketch one or 
two of these principles and provide some indications as to 
how a complete account may be developed. We note, first of 
all, the existence of a network of motivations on the part 
of the individual members of such groupings which are, in 
the most general sense, economic in character. Individuals 
of talent tend, it seems clear, to be drawn to particular 
centres of high income and of concentration of population, 
simply because it is there that the tools and services of 
the artist or thinker - libraries and publishing houses, 
universities and galleries, newspapers and newspaper offices, 
theatres and concert halls, coffee houses and restaurants -
are most readily accessible, and where his potential mentors 
and competitors, in the form of other artists and thinkers 
speaking an intelligible language, are to be found.19 This 
clearly serves to create a wide gulf between cosmopolitan 
centres and their surrounding areas, but it serves also to 
create conditions within which an order of ranking may come 
to be established amongst the centres themselves (and, 
derivatively, amongst the national groupings which they may 
represent). 
The existence of such an order of ranking in Europe at 
the turn of the century is well-illustrated by the rise of 
Mahler up the hierarchy of his profession, from his first 
conductor's post in Bad Hall, through Laibach, Olmütz, 
Kassel, Prague, Leipzig, Budapest, Hamburg and Vienna, to 
his final winters in New York. The primary mechanism in 
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the creation of hierarchies of this kind is clearly the 
ability of larger and more prosperous centres to bid away 
talent from their smaller and less prosperous neighbours. 
This brings about a range of secondary effects, as potential 
audiences, students, disciples and other associated hangers-
on of such talent are attracted in its wake. A complex 
network of systems of concentric circles of influence is 
thereby established: Berlin, for example, predominates 
over other Prussian centres; Vienna predominates over Prague, 
which predominates in turn over Budweiß and Brünn. And 
whilst there are perhaps no strongly felt cultural dominance 
relations between,say, Berlin and Vienna, it can yet be said 
that Germany as a whole predominates over Austria as a whole, 
as Great Britain, say, predominates over Ireland and its 
other Imperial Dominions. 
One powerful precondition for an intellectual dominance 
relation between centres is a common language (a precond­
ition which, for obvious reasons, has less force in the 
visual arts; consider the position of Paris as a training 
and marketing centre for painters in respect to, say, the 
towns and cities of Spain and the Netherlands). Yet in 
some cases a community of language may be established 
artificially: compare the use of Latin, and subsequently 
German (now also Russian?) amongst Hungarian writers, and 
the virtual disappearance, to the benefit of English, of 
Gaelic and Welsh as literary languages. Since transaction 
costs amongst intellectuals are at a minimum when all the 
workers in a given field accept and understand a common 
language, there is a powerful tendency - at least in periods 
of relative peace, when the relevant processes are not 
hindered by other, divisive forces - towards the dominance 
of a single language in all intellectual centres. (Again 
Latin, which has of course until very recently remained the 
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official language of the Church, is an obvious example; 
compare also the role of German in the field of psycho-
pathology, and of English, increasingly,in all remaining 
disciplines.) 
A second precondition for such a relation is the 
possibility of more or less free movement of human capital 
between the centres in question. Thus dominance relations 
are established almost automatically between the cities of 
a single state, even of a multi-national state such as the 
Habsburg Empire. They will however be established only 
imperfectly, if at all, where freedom of movement across 
frontiers is impeded. Thus Switzerland has almost certainly 
cut herself off from the main currents of intellectual and 
artistic life of Europe by the rigid restrictions which 
she has imposed upon the employment of aliens within her 
borders. 
What, then, can be concluded concerning the standards 
of intellectual and artistic production in the more domin­
ant centres (that is, in the centres where both monetary 
and psychic incomes are relatively high)? Would it be 
correct to assume that there intellectual product is in all 
respects of a higher quality than in subservient centres? 
A moment's reflection upon certain obvious examples will 
show that this is not the case. Once again there are 
economic forces at work which will give rise, in the course 
of time, to a certain characteristic conformism in the 
former and to a high degree of innovation and experiment 
- accompanied by a large amount of noise20 - in the latter. 
An interesting comparison can be made with the oppo­
sition between mature and immature industries in the sphere 
of production of material goods. Mature industries are 
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characterised by high incomes and low profits, as special­
ists - who have reasons of their own for resisting non-
trivial innovations in their respective fields - compete 
against each other in the production of well-entrenched 
ranges of goods of high surface brilliance which have 
evolved to the point where they are in fundamental respects 
identical. Immature industries, in contrast, are charac­
terised by high risk, and thus also by high profits and 
losses, since they consist in the production by highly 
inventive or eccentric individuals of new and unfamiliar 
goods, often lacking in outward refinement. Many of these 
goods will prove unmarketable; some few, however, will 
serve to determine the mature industries of the future. 
Putting this distinction to work in the sphere of 
intellectual and artistic production we can say that the 
associated communities and institutions in the relatively 
dominant regions - say England in relation to Ireland or 
Australia; Germany in relation to Austria or Denmark; 
Austria in relation to Bohemia or Slovenia - will tend to 
take on more of the characteristics of mature industries 
than will their counterparts in the more subservient 
regions.21 Individuals and publishing houses in the latter 
will tend to take more risks, to exhibit greater extremes 
of quality, and to place greater weight upon what, in the 
material sphere, would be called advertising. And the best 
such individuals may experience the pressure to migrate to 
the (relatively conformist and relatively secure)centres of 
high income, where their talents can, within certain limits, 
be more fruitfully employed. 
Thus a Joyce, or a Wilde, or a Shaw, is unthinkable as . 
a wholly English phenomenon. And we can perhaps begin to 
understand some of the reasons for the apparently cyclical 
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development of philosophy,22 and for the production in the 
great German universities of a homogeneous range of grandi­
ose metaphysical systems. We can begin also to see why 
such a high proportion of the artistic and intellectual 
innovations produced within the German-speaking world -
both for the good and for the bad - should have had their 
origin in Austria, and not least in the peripheral cities 
of the Empire. And we can understand also why Austria 
should have gained the not wholly deserved reputation of 
having culpably mistreated her most distinguished sons -
by allowing them to leave for more congenial or more prest­
igious climes, and by failing (through lack of appropriate 
specialists of her own) to recognise their greatness until 
this has been pointed out by others. 
Notes 
1. Cf. Marcie, 1968, and Smith, 1978. 
2. In a future paper I hope to show in detail how this frame of mind 
came gradually to be transformed into the exaggerated passion for the 
law which is characteristic of the work of Kafka or of Kraus. Provis­
ionally it might be said that this transformation reflects the passage 
from a time in which a faith in the God-given order of the world is 
generally shared by all the members of a society, to a time when only 
the barest remnants of such a faith are possessed by certain isolated 
individuals. 
3. There are Turkish drinking songs still to be heard in the bars of 
Istambul lamenting the loss of Sicily to the Italians. A mental 
shift from the cartographical provincialism of the late 20th century 
of almost equal magnitude is needed in order to understand this con­
cept of 'extra-Austrian Germany'. For whilst Austria (i.e., crudely, 
the German-dominated regions of the Habsburg Empire) was not strictly 
speaking a German principality, it could yet look back to common 
ethnic, cultural and of course linguistic origins with the principal­
ities, something which was exploited politically by the Pan-German 
movement in Austria in the half-century leading up to Hitler's Anschluss. 
The idea of a peculiarly Austrian culture or literary tradition was 
vehemently rejected by Kraus, for example, and it is only comparatively 
recently that the arguments for the existence of such a culture, as of 
a distinctively Austrian philosophy, psychology, or economics, could 
coherently and disinterestedly be assembled. 
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4. The idea of a universal state welfare or dole however gained little 
foothold in Habsburg Austria, where it would have been regarded as 
alien to the principles of Christian charity. It is interesting how 
many of the institutional proposals put forward by Hayek, for example 
in his 1979, recall features of Habsburg society. His suggestions for 
state provision for the improvident as an insurance policy against 
revolution springs to mind, as - somewhat more trivially - does his 
proposal for the establishment of 'associations of contemporaries', 
which surely derives from his experiences of the Geistkreise so 
common in pre-War Austria. 
5. This tendency is discernible even in those, such as Grillparzer, 
who were willing to risk conflict with the censor. 
6. A list of law professors at the University of Vienna in the 16th 
century given by Marcic includes, for example, a certain Michael 
O'Lynch (op.cit.,p.122). 
7. See the useful survey by Rothbard, 1976, and also Marcie, op.cit.* 
It is useful to note also that the works of Pufendorf were extensively 
used as textbooks in the Austrian universities. The issues discussed 
here are somewhat complicated by the Thun reforms of the Austrian law 
faculties after 1848. It nevertheless remains true that the ontologi-
cal (as distinct from ethical) framework presupposed within Austrian 
and even German jurisprudential writings in the period up to 1930 has 
predominantly Aristotelian features. See e.g. Engisch, 1953, esp. 
ch.5, and also the remarks in Smith and Mulligan, 1980. 
8. Cf. e.g. Hutchinson, 1973, but note the criticisms in Bostaph, 1978. 
Austrians themselves have characteristically underestimated the impor­
tance of this Aristotelian background - since of course having shared 
in it themselves they take so many of its elements for granted. Thus 
Hayek reports (in conversation with the author) that he had initially 
reacted with ridicule to the suggestion that Menger's thought exhibited 
certain features of Aristotelianism. 
9. Here, and elsewhere, I am indebted to Johnston's book (1972) for 
providing the starting point of my reflections. 
10. Cf. also Nyiri, 1974, for a further development of this interpret­
ation. 
11. See his 1960/61 and 1966/67. 
12. Op.cit. 
13. See especially Nyiri, op.cit., and also his 1976. 
14. A number of interesting comments on these issues are to be found 
in the (unpublished) memoirs of Aurei Kolnai. See also the paper 
by Kolnai published in the present volume. 
15. Thus in 1900 the Germans in Prague, who by then constituted as 
little as 7.5% of the population, retained for their own exclusive 
use several secondary schools, a university and technical college, two 
theatres, a concert hall, two daily newspapers, and a number of clubs. 
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16. Besides Kafka and Brod and the various groups of writers with whom 
they associated, and besides the various groups of (largely Brentanist) 
philosophers to be found in Prague (discussed in my paper on Kafka and 
Brentano in this volume), such important thinkers as Stumpf, E. Hering, 
Mauthner, Mach and Einstein had also made a home there, as well as, 
somewhat later, a number of linguists around R. Jakobson (cf. Holen­
stein, 1976 and 1979), and important economists such as Zuckerkandl 
and Engländer. The continued fertility of the German Czech community 
after the fall of the Empire was undoubtedly enouraged by the liberality 
of Masaryk, the first president of the Republic and himself a student of 
Brentano and former colleague of Husserl. The latter was indeed 
offered a brief refuge in Prague towards the end of his life (cf. 
Patocka, 1976) . 
17. Cf. ch.l of Johnston, op.cit. 
18. On the economics of human capital see e.g. the work of G. Becker 
and a number of the essays in Alchian 1977. 'Economics', here, should 
be understood in a highly general sense, embracing not only all that 
pertains to monetary income and capital (commercial economics), but 
also all forms of psychic income and capital; see McKenzie and Tullock, 
1978. 
19. Hayek has shown convincingly, e.g. in his 1978, that there is an 
important sense in which competition in the market is a knowledge-
discovering process. His arguments apply no less, of course, to the 
market in ideas. 
20. Under 'noise' we are thinking particularly of the antics of 
certain Freudians, and of the lesser members of the Vienna Circle, 
especially Neurath. 
21. The opposition between 'mature' and 'immature' applied to groups 
of scientific workers will recall the distinction between 'normal' and 
'revolutionary' science put forward by Kuhn. Unfortunately he and his 
followers have drawn illegitimate conclusions as to the (truth-) con­
tent of theories from premisses which relate, in effect, only to their 
manner of production. 
22. Cf. Brentano, 1895. 
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PHILOSOPHY AND NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS 
IN AUSTRIA AND HUNGARY, 1848-1918: 
A COMPARATIVE SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL SKETCH* 
J. C. Nyíri 
If one prefers to use the word 'philosophy' in that 
all-embracing sense which includes any kind of reasoned 
discourse not properly scientific - the sense in which we 
say that every man has his own philosophy, or that scienti-
ic theories are bound to rest on some extra-scientific, i.e. 
philosophical, presuppositions, or that political acts 
should be guided by an over-all political philosophy, -
then of course philosophy is not confined to particular 
cultures, countries or historical periods. There exists, 
however, a more restricted usage with respect to this term, 
the explication of which re-presents philosophy as a speci­
fic striving for a total and coherent world-view in the face 
of antinomic social-historical circumstances, a striving 
that will of necessity lead to conceptual contradictions 
and to continuous attempts to overcome the latter by yet 
again novel conceptual constructs. This is the sense in 
which Hegel used the term when he said that "estrangement 
is the source of the need for philosophy", or, more specically, 
that 
when the power of unification disappears from the life of man and 
oppositions have lost their living interrelation and mutual correl­
ation and have acquired self-sufficiency, there arises the need 
for philosophy.1 
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Philosophy in this sense is by no means an ever-present 
element in intellectual history. It was, in particular, 
conspicuously absent from Hungarian ways of thinking at 
the very time when cultural links between Hungary and Aust­
ria were very close indeed, and the Austrians' inclination 
for philosophy became quite pronounced. 
The aphilosophical character of the Hungarian mind has 
often been explained by reference to the Hungarian language 3 
i.e. by reference to the fact that in Hungarian nominalisa-
tion - the forming of abstract nominal constructs out of 
verbal expressions - is far less natural than in, say, 
ancient Greek or German, and that, as a result, Hungarian 
is less suited for expressing abstractions, and more suited 
for suggesting images, than the Greek or German languages 
are.2 It can be shown, however, that even when writing in 
German, and deeply entangled in historico-political para­
doxes, Hungarian authors preferred political or legal theory 
to philosophy - as was the case e.g. with Baron József 
Eötvös. The Hungarian intellectuals' persistent interest 
in politics has in fact, in what has been the most widely 
accepted explanation of the problem, been viewed as the 
reason for their aversion to philosophy. The Hungarians 
are, according to this explanation, a people who success­
fully tilled their land and defended it against enemies for 
many centuries, thereby developing a particularly strong 
sense of reality as well as a highly developed political 
talent. Naturally, then, they are not attracted to abstract, 
metaphysical speculation. 
Now although this explanation certainly points in the 
right - namely socio-historical - direction, it is not, as 
it stands, sufficient. For although Hungary is indeed a 
politically-minded nation, this nation's interest in 
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politics has more often been inspired by political defeats 
than by political successes; its sense of reality becoming 
noticeable almost only during certain sobering intervals 
between long periods of dominance by political illusions. 
That is to say, the passion for politics as a reflection 
of political powerlessness more often led to a belief in 
historico-political fictions than to the minute investiga­
tion of existing realities. As far as their sense of real­
ity went, Hungarian intellectuals in the 19th and early 
20th century might well have developed any amount of phil­
osophy. Philosophy in the sense here used is, however, a 
characteristically middle-class ideology. It is the member 
of the middle class, the bourgeois, who, having freed him­
self from his origins and from all natural bonds, eventually 
finds himself face to face with a reality that has become 
wholly alien and impenetrable to him: finds himself in a 
situation where fundamental questions as to man's place in 
the world press themselves upon him. Philosophy, as Hegel 
said, begins only where 
the individual for himself knows himself as individual, as some­
thing general, something essential, which as individual has 
infinite value, or where the subject has attained the conscious­
ness of personality, that is, wants to have validity simply for 
himself.3 
In Hungary however a bourgeois middle class did not 
really emerge until the last decades of the 19th century, 
and even after having emerged, it shared the world-view 
of the nobility. The development of the German-Austrian 
middle class, too, was a retarded and incomplete one, and 
quite a few curious features of Austrian philosophy can be 
related to this historical fact. By the 1850's however 
there certainly existed a German-Austrian bourgeoisie, 
whilst in Hungary it was the middle nobility, the nobiles 
bene possessionati, who in fact came to perform some of 
the economic, cultural and political tasks traditionally 
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p e r f o r m e d by t h e tiers etat. As G e o r g e B a r a n y p u t s i t , i n 
Hungary 
from the t h i r d decade of the n ine teen th century , the n o b i l i t y 
began to play the r o l e of the ' t h i r d e s t a t e ' s ince a western-
type bourgeois ie e i t h e r was e n t i r e l y absent or was lacking in 
soc ia l p r e s t i g e and too weak numerical ly and economically to 
give leadersh ip to the modernization of na t i ona l l i f e . To be 
su re , the most p rogress ive elements of the n o b i l i t y endeavoured 
to s t rengthen the middle c l a s s e s , and the l a t t e r cont r ibu ted to 
the wes te rn iza t ion of Hungarian soc ie ty and p o l i t i c a l l i f e . Yet 
the dominant ro l e of the n o b i l i t y , unchallenged before 1848 and 
v o l u n t a r i l y accepted before 1867, l e f t a l a s t i n g imprint upon 
the development of a Magyar i n t e l l i g e n t s i a . . . . 
Indeed , i t was t h e middle n o b i l i t y which in Hungary became 
t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e predominant n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y 
m i d d l e - c l a s s i d e o l o g y , liberalism. In t h e second h a l f of 
t h e c e n t u r y l i b e r a l i s m , as i s w e l l known, underwent s e v e r e 
c r i s e s bo th i n A u s t r i a and in Hungary. But w h i l s t i n Aus t ­
r i a , as a r e s u l t o f , o r in tandem wi th t h e s e c r i s e s , some 
most f a n t a s t i c p h i l o s o p h i e s emerged, s i m i l a r developments 
d id no t occur i n Hungary. L i b e r a l n o b i l i t y , qua n o b i l i t y , 
t h e r e b y of n e c e s s i t y p r e s e r v e d , even w h i l s t i t s l i b e r a l 
wor ld -v iew d i s i n t e g r a t e d , t h e c o n s c i o u s n e s s of be long ing t o 
a c l a s s of h i s t o r i c a l c o n t i n u i t y and cohe rence ; of be long ing 
t o , indeed forming, t h e Hungarian nation,5 and t h u s p o s s e s s ­
ing an unques t ioned s t a n d a r d by which t o i n t e r p r e t and 
judge t h e wor ld . 
Across t h e L e i t h a , t h e A u s t r i a n middle c l a s s had of 
course t o face c i r c u m s t a n c e s e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t from t h e 
s o c i o - p s y c h o l o g i c a l p o i n t of v iew. At a t ime when in West­
e rn Europe n a t i o n a l s t a t e s se rved as t h e n a t u r a l framework 
fo r c a p i t a l i s t economic development and fo r t h e e s t a b l i s h ­
ment of bou rgeo i s m i d d l e - c l a s s p a t t e r n s of l i f e , and in 
E a s t e r n Europe t h e ideal of a n a t i o n a l s t a t e r e i g n e d 
supreme ( n a t i o n a l i s m in f a c t t a k i n g over some of t h e 
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s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l f u n c t i o n s of r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f ) , A u s t r i a 
was s t i l l a m u l t i n a t i o n a l s t a t e , d e m a n d i n g of i t s c i t i z e n s 
a n a t i o n a l d y n a s t i c l o y a l t i e s . I t h a s o f t e n b e e n p o i n t e d 
o u t t h a t A u s t r i a n s , a t l e a s t t h o s e o u t s i d e t h e a r i s t o c r a c y , 
t h e h i g h e r b u r e a u c r a c y , and p e r h a p s - i n t h e p r e - 1 8 4 8 e r a -
t h e J e w r y , 6 w e r e c o n s t a n t l y s u b j e c t t o a k i n d of n a t i o n a l 
i d e n t i t y - c r i s i s . 1806 was p e r h a p s t h e y e a r when t h e p r o b ­
l e m a t i c n a t u r e of b e i n g an A u s t r o - G e r m a n f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e 
became c l e a r l y f e l t , when t h e E m p o r e r F r a n z had t o r e n o u n c e 
t h e Holy Roman t h r o n e - an a c t t o w h i c h t h e A u s t r i a n p o e t 
J o s e f W e i n h e b e r i n r e t r o s p e c t r i g h t l y a t t a c h e s s y m b o l i c 
s i g n i f i c a n c e . W e i n h e b e r c o m p l a i n s o f t h e f a c t t h a t i n h i m ­
s e l f he c o n s t a n t l y h a s t o e x p e r i e n c e t h e t e n s i o n b e t w e e n 
two l a n g u a g e s , V i e n n e s e and High German , 
and t h a t along with t h i s the f ac t t h a t Viennese has l o s t i t s 
claim to l i n g u i s t i c (and therefore a l so to factual) harmony i s 
a cont inual subl iminal gr ievousness . I t l o s t t h i s claim 
a l ready as long ago as around 1800, when the German c l a s s i c i s t s , 
from Lessing onwards, determined the v i c t o r y of High German. 
The ges ture of renuncia t ion of the Roman Imperial successions 
which was made by Kaiser Franz i s nothing other than the 
v i s i b l e , i f a l so unintended, expression of the fac t t h a t the 
Imperial d i a l e c t s e t about res igning i t s e l f t o the s t a t u s of 
a t r i b a l p a t o i s . 7 
Of t h e f i r s t decades fo l l owing 1806, t h e poe t and drama­
t i s t Gvillparzer can be r ega rded as t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e 
l i t e r a r y f i g u r e . 8 He was pe rhaps t h e f i r s t i m p o r t a n t r e p r e ­
s e n t a t i v e of t h a t p e c u l i a r A u s t r i a n t r a d i t i o n a l i s m fo r 
which t h e s ense of uprootedness was , a t t h e same t i m e , so 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c . In h i s b r i l l i a n t e s s ay " G r i l l p a r z e r ' s 
Vienna" J . P . S t e r n indeed a rgues t h a t Viennese t r a d i t i o n a l ­
ism (and who can t e l l , w r i t e s S t e r n , where Vienna ends and 
A u s t r i a b e g i n s 9 ) i s bu t a consequence of u p r o o t e d n e s s , of 
t h e absence or t h e c o n f l i c t of t r a d i t i o n s . Of t h e c h a r a c t e r ­
i s t i c Viennese n o s t a l g i a fo r bygone t i m e s , S t e r n shows t h a t 
i t i n v a r i a b l y seems t o have been d i r e c t e d towards t h e recent 
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past; it was, in other words, related not so much to a 
specific period of past history, but rather to the lack of 
direction which was experienced by each generation in suc­
cession. Grillparzer's epigram: "Deutschland ist weniger, 
als es meint - Österreich ist mehr, als es scheint", ex­
pressed, perhaps, loyalty and confidence; but, more than 
that, it expressed also a sense of uncertainty as to what 
Austria's position in the world really was. In earlier 
centuries Austria had been said to be the bastion defending 
Europe against the Turks, as well as the bulwark of Catholi­
cism against the Protestants. By the 1800's of course both 
of these missions had become history. In the century of 
laissez-faire capitalism, constitutionalism, individualism, 
and nationalism, Austria - a mercantilist, absolutist, 
feudal, multinational state - could definitely be viewed 
as being in need of justification. The question as to what 
the mission or "idea" of the Austrian Empire was, became a 
persistent one. 
Somewhere in this state,- wrote Musil in 1913 - there must lie a 
a secret, an idea. But it is not to be identified. It is not the 
idea of the state, not the dynastic idea, not the idea of a 
cultural symbiosis of different peoples (Austria could be a 
world experiment). The whole thing is in fact probably nothing 
but motion created by the lack of any driving idea, like the 
reeling of a cyclist who is not moving forwards.11 
A lasting interpretation of Austria's mission was given in 
1848 by the Czech politician and historian Frantisek Palacky, 
who declared that, were it not for the Habsburg Empire, 
minor Central European nations would be defenseless against 
both German and Russian aggression.12 This view was, in 
essence, shared also by the Hungarian politician and writer 
Zsigmond Kerneny, who regarded it as Austria's mission to 
preserve the balance of power in Europe as well as to medi­
ate between West and East: a mission in which, as Kerneny 
saw it, Hungary of course would have to play a crucial role.1 
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This was also, incidentally, the view generally taken by 
the British press in and after 1867. Austria's mission, 
according to the British in this period, was to preserve 
and promote civilization in the countries adjacent to the 
Danube and to secure that territory as a part of European 
civilization. The cohesion of the provinces was seen to 
be in the interests of Europe since in the absence of a 
central power and severed from one another the parts of the 
Empire would be drawn into the orbit of Russia. And it was 
widely believed in the British press that in Austria-Hung­
ary the Hungarians would have to assume the decisive, con­
solidating role.14 No wonder, then, that although the idea 
of Austria as mediating between western culture and eastern 
backwardness gradually became, as it were, a semi-official 
one, German-Austrians were not really happy with it. In 
1848 even the possibility of joining national Germany was, 
hesitatingly, considered. "The poor, dear Austrians!" 
wrote the dramatist Friedrich Hebbel, a North German who 
found a second home in Vienna, "The poor, dear Austrians: 
they are scheming now about how they can unify themselves 
with Germany without unifying themselves with Germany!"15 
The national identity crisis of the German-Austrians 
became particularly acute from 1866, when Austria was ex­
cluded from the German Bund, and took on tragicomic dimensions 
in 1867, from which time there was lacking even a feasible 
nominal definition of the non-Hungarian part of the dual 
monarchy. No one has given a better characterization of 
this situation than Robert Musil, in his The Man Without 
Qualities r in a passage which I cannot resist but to quote 
at length: 
Austria-Hungary was, writes Musil, "kaiserlich-königlich (Imperial-
Royal) and it was kaiserlich und königlich (Imperial and Royal); one of 
the two abbreviations, k.k. or k.u.k., applied to every thing and 
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person, but esoteric lore was nevertheless required in order to 
be sure of distinguishing which institutions and persons were to 
be referred to as k.k. and which as ... On paper it called 
itself the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy; in speaking, however, one 
referred to it as Austria, that is to say, it was known by a 
name that it had, as a State, solemnly renounced by oath, while 
preserving it in all matters of sentiment, as a sign that feelings 
are just as important as constitutional law and that regulations 
are not the really serious thing in life. By its constitution 
it was liberal, but its system of government was clerical. The 
system of government was clerical, but the general attitude to 
life was liberal. Before the law all citizens were equal, but 
not everyone, of course, was a citizen. There was a parliament, 
which made such vigorous use of its liberty that it was usually 
kept shut; but there was also an emergency powers act by means 
of which it was possible to manage without Parliament, and every 
time when everyone was just beginning to rejoice in absolutism, 
the Crown decreed that there must now again be a return to par­
liamentary government. Many such things happened in this State, 
and among them were those national struggles that justifiably 
aroused Europe's curiosity and are today completely misrepresented. 
Indeed they are, as Musil himself suggests at another place 
in the book. Nowadays, e.g., 
people talk as if nationalism were exclusively the invention of 
armaments manufacturers. But it would be worth looking for a 
rather broader explanation, and to this [Austria-Hungary] made 
an important contribution. The inhabitants of this Imperial 
and Royal Imperial-Royal Dual Monarchy found themselves confronted 
with a difficult problem. They were supposed to feel themselves 
to be Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian patriots but at the 
same time also as Royal Hungarian or Imperial-Royal Austrian 
ones. Their not incomprehensible slogan, in the face of such 
difficulties, was 'United we stand!' In other words, viribus 
unitis. But for this the Austrians needed to make a far stronger 
stand than the Hungarians. For the Hungarians were first and last 
only Hungarians, and counted only incidentally, among people who 
did not understand their language, as also Austro-Hungarians. The 
Austrians,on the other hand, were primarily nothing at all, and 
in the view of those in power were supposed to feel themselves 
equally Austro-Hungarians and Austrian-Hungarians - for there 
was not even a proper word for it. And there was no such thing 
as Austria, either. The two parts, Hungary and Austria, matched 
each other like a red-white-and-green jacket and black-and-yellow 
trousers. The jacket was an article in its own right; but the 
trousers were the remains of a no longer existent black-and-yellow 
suit, the jacket of which had been unpicked in the year 1867. The 
Austrian trousers since then were officially known as 'the kingdoms 
PHILOSOPHY AND NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS 243 
and lands represented in the Council of the Imperial Realm', 
which n a t u r a l l y meant nothing a t a l l , being a name made up of 
names; for these kingdoms, for ins tance the e n t i r e l y Shakespearean 
kingdoms of Lodomeria and I l l y r i a , no longer ex i s ted e i t h e r and 
had not yet ex is ted even a t the time when the re was s t i l l a whole 
black-and-yel low s u i t in ex i s t ence . And so i f one asked an 
Austr ian what he was, he n a t u r a l l y could not answer: ' I am from 
the non-ex i s ten t kingdoms and lands represented in the Council 
of the Imperial r ea lm. ' I f only for t h i s reason, he p re fe r red 
to say: ' I 'm a Pole , a Czech, an I t a l i a n , a F r i u l i a n , a Ladin, 
a Slovene, a Croat , a Serb, a Slovak, a Ruthenian, or a Wallach-
i a n . ' And t h a t was na t iona l i sm, so c a l l e d . . . . Since the ea r th 
has ex i s ted no being has ever died for want of a name. All the 
same, t h i s i s what happened to the Austr ian and Hungarian Austro-
Hungarian Dual Monarchy: i t per ished of i t s own u n u t t e r a b i l i t y . 1 7 
Twice, d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d he re d i s c u s s e d , t h e r e a r o s e 
c o n d i t i o n s in Hungary under which t h e need fo r an a b s t r a c t 
s o l u t i o n of c o n c r e t e h i s t o r i c a l pa radoxes made i t s e l f f e l t 
in a d e f i n i t i v e way: in t h e decade beg inn ing w i th 1848, and 
i n 1905 and the immedia te ly fo l lowing y e a r s . And indeed 
both i n t h e 1850's and i n t h e y e a r s a f t e r 1905 impor t an t 
t h e o r e t i c a l works were composed in which t h e s e pa radoxes 
were q u i t e c l e a r l y r e f l e c t e d - w i t h o u t , however, be ing 
p r e s e n t e d i n a p h i l o s o p h i c a l g u i s e . 
Between 1850 and 1853 t h e major p o l i t i c a l and l i t e r a r y 
e s s a y s of Baron Zsigmond Kêmny a p p e a r e d . The two volumes 
of J ó z s e f E ö t v ö s ' A tizenkilencedik szazad uralkodó eszrnei-
nek befolyása az álladalomra (The i n f l u e n c e of t h e p r e v a i l ­
ing i d e a s of t h e 19th c e n t u r y upon t h e s t a t e ) were p u b l i s h e d 
in 1851 and 1854. And Imre Madách's The Tragedy of Man, a 
d r a m a t i c poem t h a t e x h i b i t s s t r i k i n g c o n c e p t u a l p a r a l l e l s 
t o E ö t v ö s ' book, was w r i t t e n in 1859/60 . What t h e s e works 
a l l had i n common was t h a t they no t merely e x p r e s s e d t h e 
d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t t h e l i b e r a l n o b i l i t y had t o e x p e r i e n c e 
du r ing and a f t e r t h e 1848/49 r e v o l u t i o n and war of l i b e r -
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ation, but in fact reflected, in the light of those recent 
historical experiences, the inherent antimonies of Hungar­
ian liberalism.18 Liberalism invariably had to face, in the 
19th century, the problem of socialism: it stood for poli­
tical equality, but had to repudiate the most vociferously 
advanced set of demands for the realisation of its social 
preconditions. It stood also for capitalist progress: but 
it could not fail to take notice of the less attractive 
sides of that progress. These problems were not unknown to 
Hungarian liberals, especially since their liberalism was 
(or after 1848 became) a rather conservative one. In a 
series of articles written in the early 1850's, Zsigmond 
Kemény could, e.g., take over long passages (without naming 
the source) from Engels' Die Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in 
England: the socialist theoretician and the conservative-
liberal aristocrat were in agreement as far as the ill-
effects of industrial capitalism were concerned. 
Hungarian liberalism, however, had its own special pro­
blems too. Since the non-Hungarian nationalities of the 
Kingdom of Hungary in fact outnumbered the Hungarian popu­
lation, and since the anti-Hungarian sentiments of the 
nationalities became obvious during 1848/49, the political 
emancipation of the masses was felt to present a danger to 
Hungarian supremacy in Hungary. Here the antinomies of 
liberalism and the antinomy of independence met up with 
each other. A Hungary independent of Austria could not, 
according to the general view of the post-1848 era, remain 
a Hungarian state; and could, perhaps, not remain an inde­
pendent state at all, since it would become defenseless 
against Tsarist imperialism. In Kernény's writings, accordingly, 
the Ausgleich or Compromise with Austria is clearly 
foreshadowed. And his arguments are political, certainly 
not philosophical ones. Indeed he ridicules, in true con-
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servative fashion, the typical philosophical approaches to 
matters practical. Baron József Eötvös, too, displayed in 
his magnum opus a definite aversion to philosophy. In this 
work the "prevailing ideas" were not examined in an abstract 
manner; it was their historical and popular meaning and 
influence that Eötvös investigated. The ideas of liberty, 
equality, and nationalism were shown to mutually exclude 
each other - not, however, in any purely logical sense, 
but in the minds of people. Eötvös' point of view was, one 
could say, political and sociological, rather than philos­
ophical. The constructs of speculative philosophy, in par­
ticular of German philosophy, were alien to him - even if 
he happened to write his book in German.19 "Instead of 
philosophising about the opinion of the people in general", 
one should rather, he suggests, "turn one's attention to 
the desires and prospects of the individuals out of which 
'the people' are constituted."20 It will then turn out, for 
example, that the striving for absolute freedom exists only 
in philosophical speculations - and in the minds of those 
who belong in a mental asylum.21 
Madach held similar views. "There hardly is a mad idea", 
he wrote in his notes, "which has not been at some time ad­
vanced as a philosophical theory." And another remark: 
"Metaphysics is the poetry of those things we know nothing 
about." This formula in fact appears in the text of the 
Tragedy, too. Adam, in the role of Kepler, says in the 
second Prague scene: 
Philosophy is just the poetry 
Of all those things we cannot understand. 
But it is still the gentlest part of science 
Because it muses quietly, alone, 
Inside its kingdom well adorned by nightmares.22 
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The Tragedy is very often characterised as a "philosophical 
poem". This is however a misleading characterisation. There 
are no philosophical arguments in the work; the conflict of 
ideas displayed in it is not an immediate one, it is, rather, 
a conflict mediated through the representation of human 
destinies and historical processes. If there are arguments 
at all, they are psychological and sociological ones. 
Madách was not interested in the internal relations holding 
within the world of ideas; he was, however, very much 
interested in the connections between this world and the 
real one.23 And, most of all, he was interested in the real 
historico-political world itself. The poetic values of the 
Tragedy are not perhaps everywhere evident; but Madach's 
political speeches always fascinate. Indeed it was a 
speech he delivered in 1861, before the newly elected Nat­
ional Assembly, which made the celebrated poet Arany read 
the manuscript of the Tragedy and recommend its publication. 
There is, in these political speeches, no sign of an anti­
nomical world-view, they are, rather, permeated by the un-
shakeable and unambiguous national consciousness of the 
Hungarian nobility. The cultural and linguistic rights of 
the non-Hungarian nationalities in Hungary were viewed by 
Madách merely as one obvious aspect of the individualist-
liberal rights the Hungarian nation stood for anyway; he 
could conceive, within the borders of the Kingdom of Hun­
gary, of one political nation only - the Hungarian. Although 
he had to realise that the situation of the nation was a 
thoroughly paradoxical one, in the mind of Madách, and in 
the mind of the Hungarian nobility and emerging bourgeoisie 
in general,24 national consciousness was, at that time, 
still powerful enough to suppress all cosmic doubt, all 
philosophical uncertainties. 
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After 1867, with the Compromise achieved, the predominance 
of this self-confident national consciousness became over­
whelming, not only rendering philosophy superfluous, but 
also rendering impossible, as it were, the emergence of 
any adequate political or social theory.25 In his book The 
Magyars , published 1869, the British writer A.J.Patterson 
pointed out that "in Hungary, religion, like everything 
else, is tinctured with politics. ... Hungary is the 
country above all others in which politics have the great­
est influence on daily life, and are the most general topic 
of conversation. ... Nay, in that political and unscientif­
ic country, a grammarian or a philologist does not feel at 
ease until he either edits a political newspaper or obtains 
a seat in the Diet."26 Although a period of dynamic econom­
ical development, the era after the Compromise certainly 
wasn't one of "national rebirth"27; it was, rather, an era 
of illusionary nationalism, moral decline, emigration and 
suicide. And it wasn't until the political crisis in 1905/ 
06 - the electoral triumph of the so-called National Parties 
and their subsequent secret compromise with the Crown28-
that the illusionary streaks in Hungarian national conscious­
ness became obvious. Even then, however, only a small 
minority took notice of them and experienced thereby a kind 
of national identity crisis, which led them to attempt to 
find a new and once more valid meaning for the word Hungar­
ian. Two prominent members of this minority were Endre Ady, 
Hungary's foremost poet of the time - and the young Georg 
Lukács. 
Ady's New Verses, a book of poems in which for the 
first time his characteristic language and symbols appear, 
were published in 1906 and were, for the greater part, writ­
ten in 1905 - actually under the influence of current poli­
tical events. 1906 is the year, too, in which Lukács began 
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to write his History of the Modern Drama, 2 3 whilst the 
essays collected together as The Soul and the Forms were 
composed between 1907 and 1909.30 These works of Lukács 
were not independent of current political developments, 
either; they, too, reflected a loss of ideals, and a longing 
for undoubted norms. But they also reflected the fundament­
al impact the New Verses had on Lukács. "Ady's poems" - he 
said in an interview published in 1967 - "meant Hungary for 
me at that time."31 Those poems, indeed, did mean Hungary: 
they expressed whatever important historical experiences 
the Hungarians, noble and plebeian, have accumulated over 
the centuries.32 In particular, they expressed the Hungar­
ian's transitory and paradoxical situation between feudal­
ist-traditionalist nationalism (Ady's symbol of which is 
the East) and liberal capitalism (the West) at a time when 
the world-wide faith in liberalism was definitely on the 
wane. Ady's response to the East-West antinomy was, of 
course, a poetic, not a conceptual one; the language and 
the symbols of his poems amalgamated, as it were, long-past 
history and modern experiences, providing thereby the 
emotional foundations for a possible new Hungarian iden­
tity. Lukács however, in the essays of The Soul and the 
Forms - some of the arguments of which show striking paral­
lels to those in Lukács' studies on Ady - definitely strove 
for a conceptual, philosophical solution of the traditional­
ism/liberalism (or East/West) identity crisis. The crisis 
of a particular form of life he experienced as a universal 
problem of forms and of life in general. As Margarete Susman 
expressed it in her review of the German edition of the 
essays : 
The desparate tragedy of the modern soul, after a goal whose 
content has ceased to exist to it, runs unexpressed through 
this book.33 
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What Lukács in one of t h e e s s a y s s a i d of t h e A u s t r i a n 
Rudolf Kassner , namely t h a t he yea rn s " for c e r t a i n t y , fo r 
s t a n d a r d s , for t h e dogma"34, cou ld j u s t as w e l l be p r e d i ­
c a t e d of t h e a u t h o r of The Soul and the Forms h imse l f . 
This was t h e book of a " P l a t o n i s t " - a term used by 
Lukács as synonymous w i t h , on t h e one hand, " m y s t i c " , and, 
on t h e o t h e r hand, " c r i t i c " and " e s s a y i s t " . 3 5 The concep t 
" e s s a y i s t " Lukács de f i ned by c o n t r a s t i n g i t w i th t h e con­
c e p t " p o e t " : 
Poetry rece ives i t s p r o f i l e , i t s form, from des t i ny , and form 
appears in i t exc lus ive ly as des t iny ; in the wr i t i ngs of the 
e s s a y i s t form i t s e l f becomes des t iny , becomes a p r i n c i p l e for 
the shaping of des t iny . 3 6 
The p o e t , t h a t i s , r e f l e c t s t h e forms of a g iven p a t t e r n of 
l i f e , w h i l s t t h e e s s a y i s t or P l a t o n i s t s t r i v e s t o c r e a t e , 
ex nihilo as i t we re , a form of life f o r h imse l f . 
Only the form can produce the genuine r e s o l u t i o n . Only in the 
f o r m . . . w i l l music and neces s i t y come of every a n t i t h e s i s , of 
every tendency.37 
L i f e i n Lukács ' Budapest could ve ry w e l l s e rve as an 
example for one l a c k i n g e s s e n t i a l b i n d i n g forms; bu t Vienna, 
of c o u r s e , was an even more s t r i k i n g example. The world 
of " t h e Viennese a e s t h e t e s " appea r s on t h e pages of The 
Soul and the Forms as t h e ve ry world Lukács r e j e c t s , w i t h ­
o u t , however, be ing a b l e t o e scape from i t . 
Everything swi r l s about; everything i s poss ib l e and nothing i s 
c e r t a i n ; everything flows in to everything e l s e : dream and l i f e , 
d e s i r e and r e a l i t y , fear and t r u t h , the r iddance of pa ins with 
l i e s and the brave withstanding of sadnesses . What i s t he re 
t h a t remains? What i s secure in t h i s l i f e ? Where i s the p o i n t , 
however bare and deso la te and far removed from any kind of 
beauty or r i c h e s , where a man may put down secure roots? Where 
i s t h e r e something which does not f a l l to p ieces between the 
f ingers of he who would l i f t i t out of the formless mass of l i f e 
and hold on to i t , even i f only for a matter of minutes? Where 
i s the d iv id ing l i ne between dream and r e a l i t y , se l f and world, 
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deeper substance and fleeting impression? ... This is the world 
of the Viennese aesthete: the world of universal enjoyment and of 
being able to hold fast to nothing, where reality and dream flow 
into each other, and where those dreams which might be forced 
upon life are violently suppressed, the realm of Schnitzler and 
Hofmannsthal.38 
The Soul and the Forms, then, reflected in a philosoph­
ical guise some main problems inherent in early twentieth-
century Hungarian life. It was however a German, indeed an 
Austrian guise, rather than Hungarian. Although originally 
written in Hungarian, the essays of this volume did not at 
all have a Hungarian ring for Lukács' contemporaries: even 
the language sounded German, and not only the concepts 
used, but also the syntax. The book had very little influ­
ence in Hungary; it remained, as it were, an isolated ex­
periment. Lukács' other book however, the History of the 
Modern Drama - written, incidentally, in a much more accept­
able Hungarian, - was very well received. The History, of 
course, was not a work in philosophy. Exhibiting a defin­
itely historical and sociological point of view it was, 
rather, a study on philosophy; or, more generally, on 
bourgeois culture. 
In Austria during the time 1848-1918 there were two 
periods in which the interest in (often a love-hate relation­
ship with) philosophy was intense: the 1870's and the 
immediate pre-war decades. Subsequent to 1848 the need for 
philosophy does not seem to have been very great, and from 
the mid-1850's it was practically non-existent. The defeat 
of the revolution was not really experienced as a disaster 
by the Viennese middle class, whose liberalism had been 
(and for quite a time remained) a kind of Josephinism 
rather than some more radical doctrine.39 The economical 
opportunities and prospects of the German-Austrians were, 
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i n t h e 1 8 5 0 ' s , n o t a t a l l b a d , and from 1 8 6 1 , w i t h t h e 
i s s u e of t h e s o - c a l l e d F e b r u a r y P a t e n t , t h e i r p o l i t i c a l 
p o w e r s , t o o , i n c r e a s e d s u b s t a n t i a l l y . 4 0 And a l t h o u g h t h e y 
n a t u r a l l y d i s l i k e d t h e d u a l i s t s o l u t i o n , t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t 
of t h e Bürgerministerium, i t s e l f a r e s u l t of t h e C o m p r o m i s e , 
was we lcomed w i t h g r e a t and l a s t i n g e n t h u s i a s m . Wi th t h e i r 
r i s e t o p o w e r , h o w e v e r , t h e German A u s t r i a n s i n e v i t a b l y 
e m b a r k e d on a r o u t e w h i c h s o o n p r o v e d d i s a s t r o u s f o r t h e m . 
I n d e e d , a s M a c a r t n e y w r i t e s , t h e F e b r u a r y P a t e n t i t s e l f , 
in e s t a b l i s h i n g in Aust r ia for the f i r s t time a genuine (if 
l imited) Parl iamentary system, marked the f i r s t s tage in the 
downward path of i t s Germans. For once the p r i n c i p l e had been 
e s t ab l i shed t h a t the d e s t i n i e s of Aus t r ia lay in the hands of 
i t s peoples , i t s Germans had to take t h e i r p lace among those 
peoples , and i t would be impossible for them to keep i t i n d e f i ­
n i t e l y a p r iv i l eged one. I t was the L i b e r a l s ' t ragedy t h a t 
t h e i r decl ine and u l t imate f a l l were due to the developments 
which they had themselves done much to br ing about.41 
The economic c r i s i s in 1873 was pe rhaps t h e f i r s t major 
s t a g e in t h e p r o c e s s of d e c l i n e of t h e l i b e r a l s . The p a r a ­
doxes i n h e r e n t in A u s t r i a n c a p i t a l i s m however, t h e c o - e x i ­
s t e n c e of p r e - c a p i t a l i s t and c a p i t a l i s t e c o n o m i c - p o l i t i c a l 
p a t t e r n s , as w e l l as t h e m i d d l e - c l a s s contempt f o r , and 
f e a r of, t h e demands of t h e lower c l a s s e s were , as e a r l y as 
1871 , t o some e x t e n t r e f l e c t e d in Carl Menger ' s Grundsätze der 
Volkswirtschaftslehre. The c r i s i s i t s e l f was a t l e a s t p a r t ­
ly r e s p o n s i b l e for t h e s o c i a l i s t views which t h e members of 
t h e Leseverein der deutschen Studenten Wiens began t o p r o ­
f e s s . The Leseverein c o n s i s t e d of young men q u i t e a few of 
whom l a t e r became prominent a n t i l i b e r a l p o l i t i c i a n s and who, 
in t h e cou r se of t h e i r Leseverein a c t i v i t i e s were among t h e 
f i r s t t o i n t r o d u c e t h e c u l t of Wagner and N i e t z s c h e t o Aus­
t r i a . 4 2 I t was above a l l a German n a t i o n a l i s t a s s o c i a t i o n , 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of a decade i n which, under t h e r u l e of t h e 
l i b e r a l s , t h e n a t i o n a l i t i e s q u e s t i o n became a major p o l i t i c ­
a l i s s u e i n A u s t r i a . Not every peop le or group however came 
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t o h a v e a w e l l - d e f i n e d n a t i o n a l p rogramme i n t h e 1 8 7 0 ' s : 
some a m o n g s t t hem came t o h a v e , o r t o b e r e p r e s e n t e d m e r e l y 
b y s u b s t i t u t e s i n t h e f o r m of p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h e o r i e s . Thus 
t h e f o r m i d a b l e d i f f i c u l t i e s i n h e r e n t i n t h e s i t u a t i o n of 
t h e G a l i c i a n Jew w i t h P o l i s h n a t i o n a l i s t s y m p a t h i e s w e r e 
r e f l e c t e d p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y i n t h e a r g u m e n t s of Ludwik Gum-
p l o w i c z ' s Rasse und Staat ( 1 8 7 5 ) , w h i l s t t h e a n t i n o m i e s of 
Czech n a t i o n a l i s m , f o r m e r l y e x p r e s s e d i n t h e p o l i t i c a l and 
h i s t o r i c a l t h e o r i e s of P a l a c k y , now found an e x p r e s s i o n i n 
T . G . M a s a r y k ' s p h i l o s o p h i c a l - a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l work Der Selbst­
mord als sociale Massenerscheinung der modernen Civilisation, 
t h e f i r s t v e r s i o n of which was completed in 1878. And t h e 
a n x i e t y and, somet imes, i d e n t i t y - c r i s i s of t h e Germans of 
Bohemia can perhaps be seen as hav ing been r e p r e s e n t e d in 
E r n s t Mach's Analyse der Empfindungen (1886) . 
In t h e 1880's and 1890 ' s t h e p o l i t i c a l and i d e o l o g i c a l 
d e f e a t of t h e German l i b e r a l s , foreshadowed by t h e e v e n t s 
of t h e 1 8 7 0 ' s , became a b s o l u t e . As Schorske exp re s sed i t : 
Austr ian soc ie ty f a i l ed to r e s p e c t . . . t h e l i b e r a l co-ord ina tes of 
order and p rog res s . During the l a s t quar te r of the n ine teen th 
century, the program which the l i b e r a l s had devised aga ins t the 
upper c l a s se s occasioned the explosion of the lower. . . . The new 
a n t i l i b e r a l mass movements - Czech na t iona l i sm, Pan-Germanism, 
Chr i s t i an Social ism, Social Democracy, and Zionism - rose from 
below to chal lenge the t r u s t e e s h i p of the educated middle c l a s s , 
to paralyze i t s p o l i t i c a l system, and to undermine i t s confidence 
in the r a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of h i s t o r y . 4 4 
This l o s s of conf idence i s c e r t a i n l y r e f l e c t e d , on t h e 
one hand, i n t h e arguments of fin-de-siècle A u s t r i a n P l a t o -
n i s m or l o g i c a l o b j e c t i v i s m - as can be s e e n , s ay , from t h e 
w r i t i n g s of A lex ius Meinong. But F reud ian p s y c h o a n a l y s i s , 
t h e image of man as guided by i r r a t i o n a l p s y c h i c f o r c e s , i s 
no t independen t of t h e s e developments e i t h e r . In h i s 
f a s c i n a t i n g paper " P o l i t i c s and P a t r i c i d e " Schorske s u g g e s t s 
t h a t "Freud gave h i s f e l l ow l i b e r a l s an a h i s t o r i c a l t h e o r y 
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of man t h a t c o u l d make b e a r a b l e a p o l i t i c a l w o r l d s p u n o u t 
of o r b i t a n d b e y o n d c o n t r o l . " 1 4 6 T h i s t h e o r y p r o v e d t h a t 
l i b e r a l p o l i t i c s c o u l d n o t p o s s i b l y h a v e t r i u m p h e d , s i n c e 
t h e y w e r e b a s e d on a f a l s e a n t h r o p o l o g y . I n an e s s a y 
w r i t t e n i n 1917, F r e u d - i n a b s o l u t e ha rmony w i t h v i e w s p u t 
f o r w a r d a s e a r l y a s 1899 i n h i s Traumdeutung - s a i d t h a t 
the human being, even when of a lowly s t a t u s in the outs ide world 
f ee l s himself sovereign in h i s own soul . . . But the two-fold 
recogni t ion , t h a t the l i f e of sexual d r ives in ourse lves i s not 
fu l ly t o be brought under c o n t r o l , and t h a t psychic processes are 
as such unconscious and only access ib le to and capable of coming 
under the dominion of the se l f only through an incomplete and 
u n r e l i a b l e pe rcep t ion , becomes equivalent to the a s s e r t i o n t h a t 
the ego is not master in his own housed.4 7 
This e s say was o r i g i n a l l y w r i t t e n fo r t he Hungarian 
j o u r n a l Nyugat, and i t i s pe rhaps i n t e r e s t i n g t o p o i n t ou t 
t he c o n t r a s t between F r e u d ' s views and t h o s e of h i s Hungar­
ian p u p i l and f r i e n d Sandor F e r e n c z i . Although F e r e n c z i , 
i n t h e p re -war p e r i o d a t l e a s t , was g e n e r a l l y r ega rded as 
one of t h e most o r thodox F r e u d i a n s , i n some r e s p e c t s h i s 
a t t i t u d e t o p s y c h o a n a l y s i s from t h e ve ry b e g i n n i n g d i f f e r e d 
markedly from t h a t of F reud . For F e r e n c z i , i n t r a - p s y c h i c 
dynamic f o r c e s were n o t a t a l l i ndependen t from i n t e r - p s y ­
c h i c o n e s ; t h e r e always was a touch of s o c i a l psychology in 
h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , and p s y c h o a n a l y s i s he has always r e ­
garded as a means fo r changing s o c i e t y . 
I f s y s t e m a t i c d i f f e r e n c e s between F r e u d ' s views and 
t h o s e of F e r e n c z i ve ry c l e a r l y r e f l e c t e d t h e d i f f e r e n c e 
between t h e commitments of t h e A u s t r i a n and Hungarian middle 
c l a s s e s a t t h e t u r n of t h e c e n t u r y , t h e d i f f e r e n c e s between 
F r e u d ' s d e p e r s o n a l i s i n g t h e o r i e s and Al f red A d l e r ' s f a n t a s t i c 
" i n d i v i d u a l psychology" r e p r e s e n t t h e changes in p o l i t i c a l 
a tmosphere of A u s t r i a by t h e e a r l y 1 9 0 0 ' s , i . e . w i t h t h e 
r e t u r n t o a b s o l u t i s m . P a r l i a m e n t a r y o b s t r u c t i o n and p o l i ­
t i c a l r i o t s were pu t t o an end by a b s o l u t i s t means; and t h e 
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German and J e w i s h l i b e r a l m i d d l e c l a s s r e j o i c e d i n t h e 
d e f e a t of i d e a l s i t h a d w o r s h i p p e d f o r t h e l a s t f o r t y y e a r s . 
A f a l s e s e n s e of s e c u r i t y p r e v a i l e d , a g e n e r a l a t m o s p h e r e 
of h i s t o r i c a l d i s h o n e s t y ; f a l s i t i e s w e r e h a n d l e d a s t r u t h s , 
and w o r d s i n v a r i a b l y m e a n t s o m e t h i n g d i f f e r e n t - i f , t h a t i s , 
t h e y s t i l l had a m e a n i n g a t a l l . As t h e y e a r s I am now 
r e f e r r i n g t o w e r e f o r m a t i v e o n e s i n t h e l i f e of a u t h o r s of 
s u c h p a r a m o u n t i m p o r t a n c e a s Kafka a n d W i t t g e n s t e i n , i t 
s eems t h a t i t m i g h t b e a p p r o p r i a t e t o d w e l l a l i t t l e l o n g e r 
upon t h i s a t m o s p h e r e . 
The p e r i o d b e f o r e t h e w a r , w r i t e s Hannah A r e n d t , 
has been adequately descr ibed as a 'Golden Age of Secu r i t y ' because 
only a few who l ived in i t f e l t the inheren t weakness of an ou t ­
moded p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e which, desp i t e a l l prophecies of imminent 
doom, continued to function in spurious splendor and with i n e x p l i c ­
ab le , monotonous s tubbornness . . . . The Jews were more deluded by 
the appearance of the golden age of s ecu r i t y than any other 
sec t ion of the European peoples . Antisemitism seemed to be a 
th ing of the p a s t . . . 4 8 
The p h r a s e "Golden Age of S e c u r i t y " was co ined by S t e fan 
Zweig - in h i s n o s t a l g i c au tob iog raphy 4 9 t h e o b j e c t i v i t y of 
which has o f t en been q u e s t i o n e d . 5 0 Even Macar tney , who, 
r i g h t l y of c o u r s e , p o i n t s ou t t h a t " i t would be q u i t e e r r o ­
neous t o suppose t h e g e n e r a l l i f e of t h e Monarchy d u r i n g 
t h e s e y e a r s as overshadowed by a sense of impending and 
i n e l u c t a b l e doom", r e g a r d s i t as be ing easy " to f i nd Cassan­
d ra c r i e s enough in t h e d i a r i e s and co r respondence of men in 
a p o s i t i o n t o see below t h e s u r f a c e of t h i n g s . " 5 1 This e r a 
of p r e m o n i t i o n s , f acades and f a l s i t i e s was , of c o u r s e , t h e 
e r a of Hofmanns tha l ' s C h a n d o s - l e t t e r and t h e e r a of Kar l 
Kraus ; i t formed, a l s o , t h e s o c i o - h i s t o r i c background of 
t h e Tractatus and of Kafka ' s l i t e r a r y e x p e r i m e n t s . 5 2 The 
s t r i k i n g and i m p o r t a n t p a r a l l e l s between Kafka and W i t t g e n ­
s t e i n c a n n o t , of c o u r s e , be d i s c u s s e d he re in any d e t a i l , 5 3 
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but I would like to mention some of them. Kafka and Wittgen­
stein were both Zwangstypen, with rigorous standards of 
cleanliness and rigorous moral standards, standards that 
were reflected in their striving for linguistic purity, 
and, eventually, for silence (the only available language, 
the language of their time appearing as impure and immoral). 
Both were, in a manner not easy to explicate, deeply reli­
gious (they believed that, even if immorality reigns 
supreme, there still are moral standards), without, however, 
having faith in God. What Wittgenstein said in the Tracta-
tus, that "God does not reveal himself in the world", is 
certainly true of the world depicted by Kafka. 
Notes 
* The present sketch is an attempt to convey the general outlook of, 
and summarise the main theses put forward in my forthcoming book, Aus­
tria and Hungary 1848-1918. Essays in the History of Philosophy (in 
Hungarian). That book is very much indebted to some outstanding 
English and American presentations of the subject, and one of my chief 
aims in preparing the present sketch was to give expression to this 
indebtedness. Hence the relatively large number of quotations and 
references. Works from which I profited fundamentally are: Laszlo 
Mátrai, "Kulturhistorische Folgen der Auflösung der Österreichisch-
Ungarischen Monarchie", Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, 
14, 1968; W.M.Johnston, The Austrian Mind, Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1973; and the studies of Carl E. Schorske: "Politics 
and the Psyche in fin-de-siėcle Vienna: Schnitzler and Hofmannsthal", 
American Historical Review, July 1961; "Politics in a New Key: An Aus­
trian Triptych", Journal of Modern History, December 1967; "The Trans­
formation of the Garden: Ideal and Society in Austrian Literature", 
American Historical Review, July 1967; "Politics and Patricide in 
Freud's Interpretation of Drearns", American Historical Review, April 
1973. 
1. Differenz des Fichteschen und Schelling schen Systems der Philosophie. 
See e.g. G.W.F.Hegel, Werke in zwanzig Bänden, vol.2, Frankfurt/M.: 
Suhrkamp, 1970, pp.20, 22. 
2. This is the view stated by e.g. Sándor Karácsony, in his A magyar 
é s z j á r á s (The Hungarian Way of Thinking), Budapest, 1939, pp.l20ff., or 
in his A könyvek lelke (The Genius of Books), Budapest, 1941, pp.66,71f. 
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Similar observations can be found in a profound work by the essayist 
and poet Mihály Babits, "A magyar jellemröl" (On Hungarian Character), 
in Gyula Szekfü, ed., Mi a magyar? Budapest, 1939, p.53. 
3. G.W.F.Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie /'Ein­
leitung'" ; see e.g. vol.18 of the Suhrkamp edition cited above, p.116. 
4. George Barany, "Hungary: From Aristocratic to Proletarian National­
ism", in P.F.Sugar and i.J.Lederer, eds., Nationalism in Eastern Europe, 
Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1969, p.263. The 
thesis that in Hungary the middle nobility played the role of the third 
estate was originally elaborated by Gyula Szekfü, in his Három nemzedék, 
(Three Generations), Budapest, 1920. 
5. For an explanation of the identity of the noble class and the natio 
(gens) Eungarica see e.g. Barany, op.cit., p.261, also Macartney, The 
Habsburg Empire, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968, p.288. 
6. "By freeing the Jews - writes A.J.P.Taylor - Joseph II. called into 
existence the most loyal of Austrians. The Jews alone were not troub­
led by the conflict between dynastic and national claims - they were 
Austrians without reserve." {The Habsburg Monarchy 1809-1918, London: 
Hamish Hamilton, 1948, p.17). Or, as Hannah Arendt put it, "as the 
Jews in nation-states had differed from all classes of society through 
their special relationship to the state, so they differed from all 
other nationalities in Austria through their special relationship to 
the Hapsburg monarchy." (The Origins of Totalitarianism, Cleveland and 
New York: The World Publishing Company, 1958, p.42). "The Jews - writes 
Carl E. Schorske further - were the 'state-people' par excellence in 
Austria. They did not constitute a nationality ... The emperor and the 
liberal system offered status to the Jews without demanding nationality; 
they became the supranational people of the multinational state ... 
Their fortunes rose and fell with those of the liberal, cosmopolitan 
state." ("Politics in a New Key", Journal of Modern History, 39, 1967, 
p.353.) 
7. Josef Weinheber, Sämtliche Werke, vol.5, Salzburg: Müller, 1956, p. 
199. 
8. "Er sei kein Deutscher, sagte er einmal", wrote Ernst Fischer of 
Grillparzer, "sondern ein Österreicher, genauer ein Niederösterreicher 
und alles in allem ein Wiener. Das war weit mehr als der Ausdruck 
eines beschränkten Lokalpatriotismus, das war das Ergebnis eines unab­
lässigen Ringens mit der österreichischen Problematik." Ernst Fischer, 
Von Grillparzer zu Kafka, Vienna: Globus, 1962, p.16. 
9. J.P.Stern, "Das Wien Grillparzers," Wort in der Zeit, vol.9, 1963, 
p.45, 
10. "Der Traditionalismus der Wiener ist oft erwähnt worden. Laudatores 
tempi acti: Wiener Dichter und geistig Schaffende - und auch die ein­
fachen Leute in Wien - sind wohlbekannt für ihre Gewohnheit, die weit 
stärker entwickelt ist als bei dem Rest der Menschheit, dass sie im 
Gedenken eines goldenen Zeitalters leben, das für sie in mehr oder 
PHILOSOPHY AND NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS 257 
weniger naher Vergangenheit liegt. Für Grillparzer hatte in seinem 
Alter die Welt, in der Beethoven gelebt hatte, eine Einfachheit und 
Reinheit, nach der er umsonst unter seinen Zeitgenossen Ausschau hielt. 
Bauernfeld, sein Freund und Biograph, sehnt sich in gleicher Weise 
nach dem Alt-Wien Grillparzers in den vierziger Jahren und ebenso 
geht es ein wenig später Ferdinand Kürnberger und Ludwig Speidel, die 
so könnte man sagen, geradezu eine Genre geschaffen haben - das 
Wiener Feuilleton -, um ihrer Sehnsucht entsprechend Ausdruck verleihen 
zu können. Sogar der ätzende Ton von Karl Kraus sänftigt sich zu 
lyrischem Schwelgen, wenn er von den 'heiteren achtziger Jahren' 
spricht. Ebenso geht es Josef Weinheber, wenn er sich an das alte 
Ottakring, seinen Heimatbezirk, in den neunziger Jahren erinnert..." 
Ibid., p.47. 
11. Robert Musil, "Politik in Österreich", in his Tagebücher, Aphorismen 
Essays und Reden, Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1955, p.590. 
12. See e.g. Joseph F. Zacek, "Nationalism in Czechoslovakia", in 
Nationalism in Eastern Europe, p.182. See also Macartney, The Habsburg 
Empire, pp.352f. Palacky's 1848 position was, in essence, retained in 
his Österreichs Staatsidee, Prague, 1866. 
13. Kemény's position is best formulated in his Még g szô a forra-
dalom utân, 1851. 
14. See Tibor Frank, The British Image of Hungary 1865/1870, Budapest, 
1976, pp.237f. 
15. Cited by Ernst Fischer, op.cit., p.18. 
16. Robert Musil, The Man Without Qualities, trans, by Eithne Wilkins 
and Ernst Kaiser. First Book, ch.8. 
17. Op.cit., First Book, ch.98. - There is a similar passage in ch.42 
of the First Book, where Musil characterises the "östereichisch-ungar-
ische Staatsgefühl". "This sense of Austro-Hungarian nationhood", he 
writes, "was an entity so strangely formed that it seems almost futile 
to try to explain it to anyone who has not experienced it himself. It 
did not consist of an Austrian and a Hungarian part that, as one might 
imagine, combined to form a unity, but of a whole and a part, namely 
of a Hungarian and an Austro-Hungarian sense of nationhood; and the 
latter was at home in Austria, whereby the Austrian sense of nation­
hood actually became homeless. The Austrian himself was only to be 
found in Hungary, and there as an object of dislike; at home he called 
himself a citizen of the kingdoms and realms of the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy as represented in the Imperial Council, which means the same 
as an Austrian plus a Hungarian minus this Hungarian, and he did this 
not, as one might imagine, with enthusiasm, but for the sake of an 
idea that he detested, for he could not endure the Hungarians any 
more than they could endure him, which made the whole connection more 
involved than ever. As a result, many people simply called themselves 
Czechs, Poles, Slovenes or Germans..." 
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18. The relevant Hungarian-language bibliographical information is 
given in my paper "Forradalom utan. Kemény, Eötvös és Madách", 
Val'osag' April 1978. 
19. Actually he wished to create the impression that the German text 
was a translation. See the forewords to volumes one and two of the 
German edition, Der Einfluss der herrschenden Ideen des 19. Jahrhunderts 
auf den Staat, Vienna, 1851, and Leipzig, 1854. That the German text 
is in fact the original one can however be conclusively shown, even by 
merely philological means. The Hungarian text is poorer, less arti­
culated than the German one. There is, for example, the sentence 
according to which "eine Gesellschaft, wo man, um sie in einer 
gedachten Form neu aufzurichten, allen Kitt, welcher die einzelnen 
Theile zusammenhielt, aufgelöst, wo man Alles, was zu gross schien, 
verkleinert, und was sich zu fest gezeigt und nicht in jede Lage fügen 
wollte, zerschlagen hat, kann durch eine Form allein eben so wenig 
Festigkeit gewinnen, als eine Masse Schutt, ob man sie nun als Kegel 
oder Pyramide aufgehäuft, dem Sturme und Regen nicht zu widerstehen 
vermag" (vol.1, p.244). From the Hungarian version of this sentence 
the crucial word "gedachte" (in einer gedachten Form) is missing. 
20. Vol.2, p.33. 
21. Ibid., p.274. 
22. Translation by Joseph Grosz, Portland, Oregan, 1966. 
23. "Az aesthetica és a társadalom viszonyos befolyása" (The inter­
connections between aesthetics and society) is the title of a talk he 
gave in 1862. 
24. The suggestion that Hungarian nationalism somehow provided a 
psychological defense against cosmic-philosophical doubt, is well 
illustrated by what W.O.McCagg writes about the assimilated Hungarian 
Jew Mór Ballagi: "Ballagi's Magyar nationalism is interesting to us 
because it bore such an obvious relation to his participation in the 
secularized, nationalistic culture of modern Western Europe. The 
eighteenth-century Enlightenment struck down the medieval religious 
and social barriers which could have kept Ballagi from exploring on 
the frontiers of modern knowledge, emancipating his intellect. And 
his Magyar nationalism in a sense served the function of imposing 
new limits upon his intellectual wanderings. It would be venturesome 
to define too narrowly how in particular nationalism served this 
function. We might speculate that he felt the intellectual horizons 
of the West were too broad, and from some sort of loneliness in the 
great world of Europe sought to find a new 'home' in a Magyar 
national community." McCagg, Jewish Nobles and Geniuses in Modern 
Hungary, East European Monographs III, East European Quarterly, 1972, 
p.81. 
25. Cf. the following passage from Macartney: "The salient difference 
between the political workings of Austria and Hungary for a generation 
after 1867 was that while in the former the Dualist system achieved in 
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1867 was, after some initial hesitation, generally accepted as an un­
palatable but unalterable fact of life, this was not the case in Hun­
gary. ...it never occurred to the Hungarians, whose entire political 
history had consisted of a series of periodical re-statements of their 
relationship to their Monarch, that this one was to be regarded as 
sacrosanct and immutable. If satisfactory to them, it should be main­
tained; if it proved unsatisfactory, they were as a nation neither 
legally nor morally bound to refrain from trying to get it amended. And 
the effect of the inveterate traditional national assumption (which had 
some historical justification) that all Hungary's problems were governed, 
in greater or less degree, by her relationship with her king, was that 
this question of the maintenance or revision of the Compromise - the 
'issue of public law', as it was called, was from the first the central 
theme of her entire political life. ... It was entirely natural that 
[in the Parliament of 1S67] the Deputies' minds should still have been 
filled with the great Issue, and as natural that, almost without 
exception, they should have taken up the traditional attitude which 
invested it not only with the primacy over all other problems, but 
with governance of them... If this development was natural, it was 
none the less profoundly unfortunate for Hungary, particularly as it 
proved self-perpetuating. It meant that precious energies were wasted 
in barren wrangling over the Issue which ought to have been devoted 
to constructive work...". The Habsburg Empire, pp.687f. 
26. Cited by Tibor Frank, The British Image of Hungary 1865/1870, p.181. 
27. As, for example, Franz Alexander, the Hungarian-born American 
psychoanalyst would describe it in his The Western Mind in Transition, 
New York: Random House, 1960, p.42. Alexander's father was a prominent 
philosophy professor in f i n - d e - s i è c l e Hungary, and his son writes that 
his father's generation, "and the next one, grew up in an atmosphere in 
which creativity and intellectual and artistic accomplishments were 
publicly and officially held in the highest esteem." Ibid.,pp.43f. This 
however presents a misleading picture. Although it is true that, as 
McCagg writes, "membership of the Academy of Sciences was one of the 
highest honours to which a Hungarian of the Ausgleich Era could aspire, 
and particularly in Jewish families, where this Magyar respect for 
education mingled with Jewish traditions, at least one son in every 
family was usually encouraged to pursue an intellectual career" (op. 
cit., p.212), still scientific or literary achievements were invariably 
judged by the standards of a shallow, narrow-minded nationalism. Franz 
Alexander's father himself joined, in 1894, the chorus of those who 
condemned certain novel experiments in Hungarian literary life merely 
on the grounds that those experiments were found to be not sufficiently 
Hungarian. 
28. See e.g. Macartney, op.cit.,pp.761-65. 
29. Lukács György, A modern dràma feöjlôdèsênek törtênete, 2 vols., 
Budapest: Franklin, 1911. 
30. Namely the essays which then made up the Hungarian edition, A 
lélek és a formàk, Budapest: Franklin, 1910. The German edition, Die 
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Seele und die Formen, Berlin, 1911, contains two further essays, both 
written in 1910. 
31. Bibliographical details are given in my paper, "Ady es Lukács", 
V ilàgossag, February, 1978. 
32. See the interpretation given by Lee Congdon, "Endre Ady's Summons 
to National Regeneration in Hungary, 1900-1919", The Slavic Review, 
vol.33, 1974, pp.305,3o7f. 
33. Frankfurter Zeitung, September 5th, 1912. 
34. See p.53 of the German edition. 
35. For the synonymity of the four terms see e.g. pp.4,13 of the 
German edition. The 'Platonist' and the 'critic' are, again, taken 
as identical on p.46 of the same edition. 
36. Ibid., p.16. 
37. Ibid., p.50. 
38. Ibid., pp.233ff. 
39. See e.g. William J.McGrath, Dionysian Art and Populist Politics in 
Austria, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1974, p.9f. 
See also Macartney, op.cit., pp.301ff. -Two works which, in the 
early 1850's, did something to express in philosophical form a dissat­
isfaction with historical-empirical reality were Eduard Hanslick's 
Vom Musikalisch-Schönen (1854), and R. Zimmermann's Philosophische 
Propädeutik (1852), of which the second edition (1860), incidentally, 
had much less philosophical depth than the first. 
40. "Als im Jahre 1861 die Februarverfassung proklamiert wurde, war die 
ganze Jugend in einer fast begeisterten Stimmung" - wrote E. von Plener, 
the Liberal leader of the 1880's and 1890's, in his memoirs, - "Alle 
die grossen Schwierigkeiten, die sich auf ungarischer Seite gegen die 
Februarverfassung aufstürmten und später zu ihrer teilweisen Aufhebung 
führten, beachtete man in dem ersten enthusiastischen Stadium gar nicht 
oder schätzte sie gering. Man sah eben nicht weit über den Wiener 
Horizont hinaus und war wenigstens für den Augenblick glücklich, den 
alten Absolutismus überwunden zu haben. So viele Enttäuschungen auch 
später über die liberale Generation der achtziger Jahre hereinbrachen, 
so darf man ihren idealen Schwung und ihre patriotische Begeisterung 
nicht zu gering schätzen. Der alte doktrinäre Liberalismus, der sich 
in der praktischen Politik allerdings später als ziemlich unfruchtbar 
erwies, hatte in seinen Jugendjahren einen unzweifelhaft edeln Antrieb. 
Die Befreiung der allgemeinen geistigen und wirtschaftlichen Entwick­
lung von einer engherzigen, kleinlichen Bevormundung, die Anerkennung 
der Rechte des Individuums gegenüber bureaukratischer Willkür und un­
gerechtfertigter Strenge bleiben unter allen Umständen wertvolle öffent­
liche Güter." E. von Plener, Erinnerungen, vol.l, Stuttgart und Leipzig, 
1911, pp.l5f. 
41. Macartney, op.cit., p.521. 
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42. See W.J.McGrath, Wagneriani sm in Austria, Ann Arbor: University 
Microfilms, 1967. See also McGrath's book Dionysian Art and Populist 
Polities in Austria, referred to above. 
43. Bibliographical details are given in my papers "Nemzettudat mind 
filozófia Ciszlajtániában. Gumplowicz es Masaryk", Világosság, October 
1976, and "Az impresszionizmus osztrák filozófiája. Mach es Mauthner", 
Valôsâg, February 1977. 
44. Schorske, "Politics in a New Key", p.344. To quote another rele­
vant passage by Schorske, this time from his "The Transformation of 
the Garden": "In the 1890's the anti-Liberal movements paralyzed the 
state and extruded the Liberals from the positions of power they had 
acquired only three decades before. The position of the Liberal haute 
bourgeoisie thus became paradoxical indeed. Even as its wealth increased, 
its political power fell away. Its pre-eminence in the professional 
and cultural life of the Empire remained basically unchallenged while 
it became politically impotent. Thus the Viennese upper middle class 
became one which, even more than the Emperor it so loyally served, 
reigned though it could not rule. A sense of superiority and a sense 
of impotence became oddly commingled. The products of the new aesthetic 
movement reflect the ambiguous compound formed of these elements. ... 
the Austrian aesthetes were alienated not from their class, but with 
it from a society that defeated its expectations and rejected its 
values." (pp.l304f.) 
45. I have tried to put forward some experiments to this effect in my 
paper "Beim Sternenlicht der Nichtexistierenden", Inquiry, 17, 1974. 
46. In: American Historical Review, 1973, p.347. 
47. See e.g. Gesammelte Werke XII, London: Imago, 1947, pp.8,11. 
48. Op.cit., pp.50f. 
49. The relevant passage reads: "Wenn ich versuche, für die Zeit vor dem 
ersten Weltkrieg, in der ich aufgewachsen bin, eine handliche Formel zu 
finden, so hoffe ich am prägnantesten zu sein, wenn ich sage: es war 
das goldene Zeitalter der Sicherheit. Alles in unserer fast tausend­
jährigen österreichischen Monarchie schien auf Dauer gegründet und der 
Staat selbst der oberste Garant dieser Beständigkeit. ... Alles stand 
in diesem weiten Reiche fest und unverrückbar an seiner Stelle und an 
der höchsten der greise Kaiser; aber sollte er sterben, so wusste man 
(oder meinte man), würde ein anderer kommen und nichts sich ändern in 
der wohlberechneten Ordnung. Niemand glaubte an Kriege, an Revolutionen 
und Umstürze. Alles Radikale, alles Gewaltsame schien bereits unmöglich 
in einem Zeitalter der Vernunft." Die Welt von Gestern, Stockholm: Ber-
mann-Fischer, 1943, pp.l6f. 
50. "Nicht wenige Autoren dieses Raumes [Austria-Hungary] haben in den 
Jahren vor 1914, wenn auch auf ganz verschiedene Weise, die Hintergründ­
ig- und Doppelbödigkeit ihrer Umwelt erlebt und die trügerischen Fassaden 
dieses Zeitalters der Sicherheit durchschaut. Auch Stefan Zweig gehört 
zu ihnen, den allerdings sein humanistischer Optimismus an tiefergehen­
den Analysen gehindert hat." Introductory essay by Gerhard Fritsch in 
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the volume Finale und Auftakt. Wien 1898-1914, Salzburg: Müller, 1964, 
p .10 . 
51. Op.cit., p.754. 
52. The Austrian social-historical background of and relevant ethical 
motifs in Wittgenstein's Tractatus are dealt with extensively in the 
book of Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin. I have put forward some 
tentative ideas concerning the same subject in my paper "Das unglück­
liche Leben des Ludwig Wittgenstein", in Zeitschrift für philosophische 
Forschung, 26, 1972. 
53. That there are, indeed, such parallels was pointed out by Erich 
Heller as early as 1959 in his paper "Ludwig Wittgenstein. Unphiloso­
phische Betrachtungen", Merkur, 1959, repr. in Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
Schriften. Beiheft, Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1960. In a short essay 
published in 1967 in K.T.Fann, ed., Wittgenstein. The Man and his 
Philosophy, New York: Dell, Heller again refers to them: "Wittgenstein 
belonged to that astonishing generation of minds who, with all their 
differences, bear yet a common stamp: the indefinable but unmistakable 
mark of the end of the Austrian monarchy. It happened once before that 
the dissolution of a great Empire brought forth men possessed of extra­
ordinary spiritual energies; and at that time too, when the days of 
Rome were numbered, these men were largely Jews." The Austrian 
Monarchy was "a place where the confusion of decline and fall filled 
the elect with the desire to lift the world into a sphere of eternal 
clarity. 'Only this could given me happiness' - it is an entry in 
Franz Kafka's diary." (pp.65f.) 
THERAPEUTIC NIHILISM: 
HOW NOT TO WRITE ABOUT OTTO WEININGER 
Allan Janik 
1. My thesis is that William Johnston's notion of thera­
peutic nihilism is a cloud of confusion condensed into a 
drop of rhetoric, that it obfuscates precisely those things 
that an intellectual history of Austria ought to illuminate, 
the most inaccessible and uniquely Austrian figures he 
treats in The Austrian Mind.1 I shall argue (1) that this 
confusion is rooted in Johnston's incoherent development of 
the term, (2) that it refers to a set of dubious presuppos­
itions concerning rationality, and I shall attempt to show 
(3) how these dubious presuppositions lead him to distort 
his subject,by examining the specific case of Otto Weininger. 
I have chosen Weininger as my test case because he, accord­
ing to Johnston, 'epitomized' therapeutic nihilism (162), 
but also because he is so central to the intellectual life 
of fin de siècle Austria - indeed, Weininger is such a 
focal point in the cultural life of Alt Wien that I am sur­
prised that no one has yet written a book called Weininger rs  
Vienna. 
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1.1 The f i r s t p r o b l e m w i t h J o h n s t o n ' s n o t i o n of t h e r a ­
p e u t i c n i h i l i s m i s t h a t , w h i l e i t i s a b s o l u t e l y c e n t r a l t o 
h i s e x p o s i t i o n and a n a l y s i s , he n o w h e r e p r o v i d e s u s w i t h a 
s u s t a i n e d a c c o u n t of p r e c i s e l y w h a t he t a k e s t h e t e r m t o 
s i g n i f y . We c a n o b t a i n a p r e l i m i n a r y i d e a of w h a t i t s i g ­
n i f i e s by e x a m i n i n g w h a t i s m e a n t when i t i s s a i d of K a r l 
K r a u s t h a t i f 
Weininger embodied the ne plus ultra of the rapeu t i c n ih i l i sm, 
Kraus f e l l not far behind. While censuring f e u i l l e t o n i s t s for 
cons t ruc t ing a e s t h e t i c p a r a d i s e s , he himself took refuge in a 
f o r t r e s s of so l ips i sm. What pained him was not to see other 
people suffer but to witness how the press exploi ted i t . . . 
|_HeJ de l igh ted in discomfi t ing v ic t ims by mimicking the b e s t i a l 
in them. Among medical men, t he rapeu t i c n ih i l i sm o r i g i n a l l y 
meant f a i t h in the heal ing powers of na ture ; i l l n e s s should be 
l e f t to run i t s course l e s t an ignorant physic ian wreak more 
harm than good. The renegade Jews Kraus and Weininger disdained 
such f a i t h in the r ecupera t ive force of na tu re ; no lapse of time 
could r ed res s the abuses for which they bera ted t h e i r contem­
p o r a r i e s (206) . 
I t i s worth n o t i n g t h a t t h i s pas sage occur s on p.206 of 
The A u s t r i a n Mind. J ohns ton does no t manage t o ge t around 
t o d i s c u s s i n g t h e t e r m ' s o r i g i n a l medica l c o n n o t a t i o n u n t i l 
p .203 - bu t t h i s does no t p r e v e n t him from i n t r o d u c i n g t h e 
term as e a r l y as p . 7 1 . I t should be e v i d e n t from t h e p a s ­
sage c i t e d t h a t i d e n t i f y i n g Kraus as a t h e r a p e u t i c n i h i l i s t 
a l s o e n t a i l s e v a l u a t i n g both h i s p e r s o n a l i t y and h i s work 
by means of an e x p r e s s i o n which i s e x p l i c i t l y m e t a p h o r i c a l . 
F u r t h e r , Johns ton i m p l i e s t h a t t h e r o o t e x p r e s s i o n has a 
p o s i t i v e sense a t l e a s t some of t h e t i m e . However, when we 
t u r n t o h i s e x p o s i t i o n of t h e development of t h e r a p e u t i c 
n i h i l i s m a t t h e Medical School of t h e U n i v e r s i t y of Vienna, 
we d i s c o v e r t h a t Johns ton does indeed a s s e r t t h a t t h e r e 
a r e both l e g i t i m a t e and i l l i c i t medica l a p p l i c a t i o n s of t h e 
te rm; however, t h e r e i s no t a l i t t l e vagueness about h i s 
c r i t e r i a for making such a d i s t i n c t i o n . His c o n c e p t u a l 
d i f f i c u l t i e s begin t h e r e . Hence i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o begin 
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by examining his account of the medical meaning of the 
term in some detail. 
1.2 Originally, the term designated 'systematic refusal to 
prescribe remedies for fear of perpetuating quack cures' 
(71). Concretely, it signified a decided preference among 
the faculty of the medical school for pathological anatomy 
in place of therapy. The medical scientist most closely 
associated with the practice, Carl von Rokitansky, is 
praised by Johnston for developing pathological anatomy 
into 'the first reliable tool of diagnosis to supplant 
Hippocrates' "doctrine of signs"1 (224). Johnston thus 
recognises that therapeutic nihilism played a crucial role 
in the development of nineteenth century medicine and 
helped to make Vienna in the phrase of Rudolf Virchow 
(which Johnston endorses) 'the Mecca of Medicine' (227). 
The pejorative sense of the term originated with the abuses 
which arose from the excessive and exclusive proccupation 
with pathology to the exclusion of therapy. In these cir­
cumstances, Johnston asserts, there emerged from the prac­
tice a twofold problem. First, there was a growing ten­
dency on the part of Rokitansky's students, especially a 
certain Josef Dietl, to distort 'skepticism towards nos­
trums into the doctrine that to do nothing must be the best 
treatment' (225) at a point in time when genuine cures were 
becoming available. This led, Johnston argues, to the 
second, more important, consequence of the therapeutic 
nihilist approach to healing: callous disregard for suffer­
ing patients to the point of criminal neglect (228). It 
is important for Johnston that well-documented faith in 
the exclusive healing powers of nature co-existed with 
equally well-documented abuses of patients, so important 
that he neglects to document the causal link he claims to 
have existed between them (I am not claiming that he cannot 
266 STRUCTURE AND GESTALT 
do so, but merely asserting that he has not). 
1.3 Hence, the first point at which we ought to call John­
ston's analysis of therapeutic nihilism into question is 
when he claims that there was a necessary connection be­
tween: 
(1) refusal to prescribe remedies on the basis of 
faith in nature's healing powers, 
(2) its illicit extension, 
and 
(3) its implication for the treatment of patients in 
the form of, say, abysmal training procedures for 
nurses. 
Once more, I am not claiming that Johnston cannot document 
these connections but asserting that he has not, and that 
the price for not doing so renders the metaphorical exten­
sion of the concept of therapeutic nihilism all but unin­
telligible. The unintelligibility follows from the fact 
that the criteria he has given us for distinguishing its 
legitimate from its illicit employment are hopelessly 
vague. In short, he has failed to tell us how much thera­
peutic nihilism is,in medical practice, too much. He has 
failed to draw the line between criminal neglect and sound 
medical practice unambiguously, a line, it must be empha­
sised, which he clearly recognises must be drawn. Without 
such precise criteria the term can only obfuscate the cul­
tural phenomena to which he chooses to transfer it. 
1.4 A second set of doubts about the aptness of employing 
the term therapeutic nihilism to characterise thinkers like 
Wittgenstein, Kelsen and Weininger or writers such as Kraus 
or Zweig, follows from the fact that it is not a term that 
they used to describe themselves. Indeed, there is no evi­
dence that any of them knew that such a medical practice 
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existed, let alone associated themselves with it. Why, 
then, is it appropriate for describing them? Is there some 
actual connection between the practice of therapeutic nihil­
ism in the medical school and a peculiar kind of social 
criticism or is this an expression which Johnston has pro­
jected onto the figures I have mentioned? He does not tell 
us. In the crucial passage he says only this: 
Outside the Medical Faculty a conviction that no remedy could 
relieve suffering or forestall decline infected such thinkers 
as Karl Kraus, Otto Weininger, and Albert Ehrenstein. They 
preserved therapeutic nihilism as a major trend in Viennese 
thought long after it waned at the Medical Faculty (71, my 
italics). 
Thus, Johnston explicates a metaphor by yet another meta­
phor, that of 'infection'. This seems to imply that thera­
peutic nihilism was an attitude which could in some sense 
be transmitted, but there is not even a hint in The Austrian 
Mind of precisely how the alleged infection spread. In fact, 
Johnston says nothing more about the issue. Consequently, 
it is difficult to see how he has done anything but explain 
the obscure by the yet more obscure. In order to discover 
the cognitive content of the term we have to hunt through 
all 402 pages of his text, piecing together as we go to ob­
tain something like a comprehensive picture of just what it 
means for someone to be a therapeutic nihilist. I shall 
try to form such a composite from his disparate allegations. 
1.5 Weininger is the therapeutic nihilist par excellence 
because he scorns the study of society and politics but 
equally because he declines to commit himself to life (162). 
Apropos of Weininger and Karl Polanyi, Johnston claims that 
therapeutic nihilism is a 'cause of a proclivity to suicide' 
(180) - Weininger, it will be remembered, took his own life 
in October 1903. This proclivity to suicide is taken to be 
directly related to the view that there are no solutions to 
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the problems which beset us. Oskar Kokoschka is doubly a 
therapeutic nihilist, for he acquiesces in the 'dry rot of 
Western civilization' (147) without prescribing cures for 
the malaise, either as a painter or as a playwright. Hans 
Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law, with its injunction that 
judges must refrain from interpreting the law, incorporates 
therapeutic nihilism because Kelsen insists that law cannot 
recognise norms beyond itself (98). Richard Wahle's more 
traditional version of nihilism incorporating cynical dia­
tribes against reason itself is another therapeutic nihil­
ism (201-203). Even Johnston's hero, Sigmund Freud, suc­
cumbs to a 'limited' therapeutic nihilism in the end, by 
positing a 'death wish' in terms of which 'nature inscrut­
ably condemns some beings to destruction' (248). Kraus, 
Loos, Kokoschka, Wittgenstein and Schoenberg are therapeut­
ic nihilists because they endorse a conservative 'counterrevolutionary' 
movement in the arts (213). In terms of the 
psychoanalytic theory Johnston so esteems, thinkers prone 
to therapeutic nihilism appear to have an underdeveloped 
ego, for they tend to oscillate between idealistic fan­
tasies and despair. Therapeutic nihilists tend to be 
relentless exponents of dualistic accounts of the way 
things are, as well as having a nostalgia for Biedermeier 
values. In short therapeutic nihilism can refer to any of 
the following: 
- the substantial claims entailed by a theory (which is 
often dualistic), 
- personal psychological dispositions, 
- a type of ethically motivated social criticism, which 
generally is rooted in an unfavourable contrast between 
the current state of society and some earlier period, 
- an intellectual's failure to place the study of soc­
iety and politics at the head of his list of priorities. 
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Throughout this analysis Johnston never questions whether 
there is a discrepancy between what a writer or thinker 
claims to be doing and what he is actually doing: Johnston 
is content to take therapeutic nihilists at their word. 
The concept comes into focus a bit more sharply if we con­
trast those who have been 'infected' with therapeutic nihil­
ism with their psychically healthy counterparts. Chief 
among the sane and sound intellectuals in Johnston's ver­
sion of Austrian cultural history are: 
- the pacifist Berta von Suttner, 
- the feminist Rosa Mayreder, 
- the anti-clerical social reformer Josef Popper-Lynkeus, 
- the founder of modern Zionism Theodor von Herz1, 
- the positivist ideologue Otto Neurath. 
Generalising superficially from this list it would seem 
that the opposite of therapeutic nihilism is advocacy of 
liberal social reforms, a sort of 'realistic' idealism 
against which theories, personalities and attitudes can 
all be judged. Healthy intellectuals have a psychological 
disposition to produce scientific theories which are sound 
by current standards (or are at least recognisable forerunners 
of currently held views), with a view to the con­
structive criticism of society and politics. In short we 
obtain a picture of intellectual life and of the role of 
the intellectual in society not radically different from 
that of classical nineteenth century liberalism inasmuch 
as it emphasises individual freedom and progress through 
the growth of scientific knowledge - but tempered by a dose 
of Freudian psychoanalysis. These are certainly laudable 
values in themselves and doubtless provide sound criteria 
for judging the rationality of Anglo-Saxon intellectuals, 
but I doubt whether they do anything but obscure our assess­
ment of intellectuals in a society in which the institutional 
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prerequisites for a genuine political liberalism have 
existed only since the end of World War Two. I take the 
fallacies in Johnston's work to be rooted in his doctri­
naire Liberalism. Unless I am mistaken, Johnston is mere­
ly following Otto Neurath's suggestions about how to ex­
plain away metaphysical beliefs in the Vienna Circle's 
manifesto, "The Scientific Conception of the World".2 It 
is at least certain that both Neurath and Johnston fall 
into the same error about rationality. It is to this 
important topic that we must now turn. 
2. At this point I must make it very clear that I have no 
argument with political liberalism. I endorse it as the 
least evil alternative among the alternatives with which 
we are confronted. My argument is with a naive application 
of political liberalism to the data of intellectual history 
in a doctrinaire fashion. My claim is that some historians 
- including William Johnston - have been systematically 
blinded by their belief in liberalism's ultimate truth, 
that they have failed to distance themselves sufficiently 
from their own beliefs to be in a position to appreciate 
how differing beliefs in the figures they study could come 
into existence in the first place. I must emphasise that 
I do not consider this phenomenon interesting as a personal 
failing of Johnston's but rather as it is implicit in a 
widely held concept of rationality which has been part and 
parcel of liberalism since Locke. I am referring to the 
identification of rational belief with true belief. This 
dubious identification can become grounds for making the 
covert assumption that the present state of knowledge has 
normative value in assessing rationality, that those 
beliefs which are currently taken to be normal are the very 
substance of rationality. On the account that I am criti-
THERAPEUTIC NIHILISM 271 
cising here, to reject the contemporary view of something 
or other or its legitimate precursor is to be 'anti-modern' 
and consequently irrational. Because contemporary scienti­
fic knowledge is taken to have a normative value, its open-
textured character is on the one hand obscured, with the 
consequence that on the other hand radical conceptual 
change becomes difficult, if not impossible, to conceive 
of as having taken place in the past. At this point, there­
fore, I must spell out the philosophical issue at stake here, 
so that I can turn to a concrete instance which will illus­
trate how Johnston has been misled by his misconceived 
notion of rationality. 
2.1 It must be clear from the outset that whole constella­
tions of assumptions, webs of beliefs, are involved when we 
turn to the discussion of rationality. Two issues in parti­
cular emerge as central to the confusions surrounding the 
doctrinaire liberal approach to intellectual historiography, 
the aforementioned problem of rationality and the question 
as to the relativity of truth. Classical liberalism maintains 
that experience is the sole criterion for determining whether 
beliefs are true or false. Classical liberalism also claims 
to endorse Hume's position that experience is always fallible. 
We can always be mistaken about matters of fact. It follows 
from this that we must respect opinions contrary to our own 
because we can never be absolutely certain that our own 
views are correct. However, it is not clear from the rejec­
tion of the notion of absolute truth which of two possible 
counter-claims should be made. Should we assert that all 
claims are equally valid (providing they are founded on evi­
dence) , or that some claims are stronger than others because 
they appeal to the right kind of evidence (assuming for the 
moment that each of the proponents of these views agrees on 
what constitutes a valid argument). The strong claim 
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embodied in the former view is that the rejection of abso­
lutism entails the rejection of all criteria except the 
general injunction that substantive meaning must be tied to 
sensible experience as the Vienna circle insisted. The 
second, weaker claim is that we do not have to reject all 
appeals to criteria because the criteria to which we appeal 
are not 'absolute'. If we accept the former view, a belief 
will be rational if it is verifiable according to sensible 
experience. Claims which are not subject to such verifi­
cation will be rejected as metaphysical or superstitious. 
This account of rationality, however, will become strained 
when there is more than one account of the phenomenon in 
question which is subject to verification. At that point 
the weaker claim, the one I would endorse, becomes more 
plausible, for it is clear that we require rules for dis­
criminating between different kinds of verifiable statement 
in addition to the principle of verification alone. 
2.2 The weaker response to absolutism holds that claims 
are not relative to an hypostatised notion of 'experience' 
but to the criteria (i.e. the institutions) which make us 
regard certain procedures for making claims as more author­
itative than others. Rationality, on this weaker view, is 
less a matter of what we believe than it is of how we 
believe, of how we conduct ourselves intellectually. To 
put the matter in another way: on the second account we 
will not be inclined to evaluate the rationality of an indi­
vidual merely upon the substance of his claims, but we shall 
be more concerned with the specific sorts of evidence he 
produces for his claims and the rules and procedures which 
establish that evidence as being of the appropriate type and 
thus above all we shall be concerned with his reactions when 
confronted with counter-examples. We will determine that a 
person is rational when he is prepared to consider seriously 
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public knowledge that runs counter to his beliefs and to 
modify his beliefs accordingly. He will be irrational when 
he ignores or redescribes evidence that runs counter to his 
claims or consciously entertains a formal contradiction in 
his thinking. Thus we shall be suspicious, say, of the 
Marxist who tells us that it is our bourgeois mentality 
which leads us to question the inevitability of political 
revolution in advanced industrial society. In sum, to 
distinguish rational from irrational beliefs on this ac­
count will entail being able to give an account of how the 
individual (or group) in question responded when confronted 
with evidence that appears to falsify his view. Our account 
of intellectual history will differ depending upon which 
view of rationality we endorse. 
2.3 If we assume that to be rational is to hold true be­
liefs about the universe and society, there will be one dra­
matic event (radical conceptual change) in the history of 
ideas corresponding to the moment of enlightenment in a 
particular area of study: the appearance of a Copernicus 
in astronomy, of a Locke in political theory or of a Hume 
in epistemology, who dispels the conceptual monstrosities 
of millenia of metaphysical speculation and thereby opens 
the door to progress after centuries of stagnation. This 
intellectual history is very much a history with heros 
and villains. The heros pave the way to the big breakthrough 
and form the links between the great discovery and 
today's science. These histories are entirely concerned 
with internal criticism and have the flavour of Biblical 
geneologies about them. We are all familiar with, say, 
histories of philosophy which tell us that Descartes begat 
Spinoza who begat Leibniz,and Locke begat Berkely who begat 
Hume - Kant being the result of miscegenation between Leib­
niz and Hume with Christian Wolff as midwife - until finally 
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Quine begat Kripke and all was light. I do not think that 
any one will have much trouble recognising this phenomenon. 
I do not wish to denigrate the innumerable scholars who have 
done much serious and profound work in the history of ideas 
by producing such histories. I only wish to point out that 
this is only one aspect of the historiography that proceeds 
from the equation of true belief with rational belief. The 
view that rational belief is to be identified with currently 
held scientific theories engenders another historical pro­
ject which entails writing the history or, better, the sub-
history, of the opposition to scientific enlightenment. 
Let us examine how this comes about. 
2.4 The linear progressive account of the history of ideas 
has two important implications neither of which is usually 
recognised explicitly by its proponents. The first is the 
paradox that a contemporary student of, say, physics, is 
somehow 'more rational' than an Aristotle. This is true 
despite the fact that Aristotle was the greatest physicist 
of his day, because Aristotle held views that physical 
theory has long discarded. To be sure, only a very few 
people would be satisfied with the point just made as it 
is here stated. Nevertheless, it is implicit in the view 
that rationality is primarily an adjectival quality which 
modifies theories as opposed to an adverbial modifier des­
cribing human actions or procedures. Franz Steiner has 
shown how it was that just such an equation of rational 
belief with what was once taken to be true belief undermined 
the foundations of classical social anthropology in 
the work of Sir James Frazer and Robertson-Smith.3 The 
second consequence of holding such a view is the necessity 
to posit a kind of reflex sub-intellectual history, which 
is the history of the opposition to enlightenment. George 
Mosse's work on the crisis of German ideology is an example 
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of the sort of sub-intellectual history I have in mind.4 
Mosse, whose assumptions by and large are identical to 
Johnston's, has raised interesting and important questions 
as well as drawn our attention to figures and problems that 
have been otherwise ignored; however, this should not blind 
us to the fact that Mosse's work, like Johnston's, raises 
more issues than it resolves. In both Johnston and Mosse 
there is an assumption that strict demarcation between 
science and pseudo-science is always possible - as assump­
tion that has been seriously challenged in the wake of 
Kuhn's work in the philosophy and history of science - as 
well as an assumption that any ethically motivated critic­
ism of modern society can be dismissed simply on the grounds 
that it is 'anti-modern'. I find this approach to intel­
lectual history disturbing because it seems to entail first 
locating a thinker's proper sphere, i.e. deciding whether 
he is to be discussed seriously or explained away on the 
basis of the substance of his views rather than on the 
basis of his reasoning. There are several dangers lurking 
in the underbrush of this approach. First is the precip­
itous bifurcation of intellectual life: it seems all too 
easy by their methods to classify and therefore to evaluate 
on the basis of a superficial interpretation. Granted that 
we may want to endorse a dual methodology for dealing with 
rational and irrational thinkers, we must avoid making that 
discrimination a mere result of classification. The second 
problem with this approach to rationality is that it would 
seem to make rationality the prerogative of an elite of 
liberal, (academic?) scientists. The third difficulty with 
this position is that it would appear to forget that all 
claims to knowledge - even our own - are fallible. However, 
the most disastrous effect of this approach to the history 
of ideas is that the resulting history is almost guaranteed 
to leave a certain segment of the intellectual development 
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of a culture less than intelligible, as such it would seem 
to be incompatible with the goal at which the intellectual 
historian aims, intelligibility. When we judge a thinker 
solely by reference to his political views or by reference 
to his role or that of his type of thought in political 
developments without examining the reasoning that went into 
his views, then there is so little chance of obtaining any 
genuine understanding of those views that come to be iden­
tified as 'anti-modernist' that we are constrained to adopt 
the hypothesis that the segment of intellectual life to 
which he belonged was, in some sense or other, sick. In 
short, I suggest that this danger is present from the out­
set because it is covertly entailed by the historian's abso­
lute presuppositions. It is for this reason that their 
histories appear to have such a strong moralistic tone, one 
which is curiously akin to that which they condemn in the 
'anti-modernist'. 
2.5 At this point it is fair to expect from myself an 
alternative to Johnston's methodology. Recent developments 
in the historiography of the natural sciences in the wake 
of the philosophical analyses of thinkers such as Kuhn, 
Toulmin, and Lakatos,5 to name but a few of the most promi­
nent, suggest a more solidly based approach. Despite their 
differences these thinkers share the view that the mere 
fact that a mode of thinking has become discredited by no 
means indicates that it is uninteresting to examine the 
reasoning that went into developing it. This is because the 
question of rationality is more a question of whether a 
theory could possibly be rationally advanced, given the 
state of knowledge, scientific procedures, etc., at that 
time, than it is of the theory's truth. If we are to under­
stand science , we must understand how scientists actually 
operate with concepts. The obverse of this will be a con-
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textual analysis of how the theories of scientists in 
previous eras, working with paradigms that differ from those 
currently accepted, were either in a position to recognise 
and meet legitimate objections to their views or not. In 
short, on this view 'rational' will be an analogous expres­
sion which will apply to the evaluation of both conduct 
and theories with the primary reference being to the former, 
while it will apply to theories in a secondary sense. To 
speak of a theory as 'rational', then, will signify that 
the theory has been formulated with the anticipation of 
eventual criticism. 
2.6 Increasingly, contemporary philosophers of science have 
come to admit that science cannot be understood apart from 
its history. Close scrutiny of that history however, re­
veals that the history of the physical sciences is as much 
the story of shifts in the standards by which theories and 
discoveries are assessed as it is the story of discoveries 
and theories themselves. The notion that there are timeless 
criteria shared by thinkers as different as Descartes and 
Carnap is incompatible with the actual development of the 
natural sciences. Criteria do not exist in nature, as it 
were, but are the property of a community. The history of 
science is thus very much the history of scientific commun­
ities and their projects. It is the account of the assump­
tions these communities share regarding, say, what counts 
as a good explanation and of how these assumptions change. 
Unlike the Cartesian model of scientific knowledge, the 
most striking feature of this concept of knowing is the 
centrality of the concept of radical conceptual change. The 
implication of this notion of science that is vitally impor­
tamt for intellectual history generally is the idea that 
the contemporary state of knowledge is the result of radi­
cal conceptual changes which are such that they make 
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contingent whether or not we are able to understand past 
scientific activity or the science of another culture. An 
important part of the history of science is thus preoccu­
pied with establishing painstakingly just how scientific 
criteria develop. I am suggesting, then, that it will 
always be a contingent matter whether historians are able 
to grasp precisely what a thinker in another society at 
another time claims, that this makes the distinction bet­
ween intellectual history and sub-intellectual history 
questionable and that this has in fact been the cause of 
serious distortions in William Johnston's work in Austrian 
intellectual history. 
3. I propose to illustrate precisely how Johnston's assump­
tions have led him to distort the thinkers he brands as 
therapeutic nihilists by examining his treatment of Weinin-
ger's Geschlecht und Charakter. 6 My claim is that John­
ston's doctrinaire liberalism and the faulty view of 
rationality it incorporates leads him to overlook explicit 
statements in Weininger which run counter to Johnston's 
interpretation and that it systematically prevents him from 
asking precisely those questions which would enable him to 
obtain a more accurate assessment of the project to which 
Weininger's work is devoted. This is because his assump­
tions preclude examining Weininger's reasoning, his claims, 
the grounds upon which they are alleged to rest and the 
conceptual framework in which those grounds are taken to 
be the appropriate type of evidence for establishing the 
soundness of the sort of claims that Weininger wants to 
make (the complexity of Weininger's work makes it imposs­
ible, in an article of this length, for me to do anything 
beyond sketching how Johnston ought to have approached 
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Weininger). Unless I am mistaken, analysis will reveal 
that Johnston has made assuptions which lead him to an un-
historical reading of Geschlecht mid Charakter, a reading 
which obscures its chief hypothesis and thereby renders 
critical judgment impossible. 
3.1 Nothing I have said up to this point should be taken 
to imply that Weininger's book is easy to fathom: on the 
contrary, it is on the face of it one of the most bizarre 
and outrageous philosophical books ever written - so much 
so that the editor of Kantstudien published a disclaimer, 
along with the advertisement Weininger submitted to them 
for the book, stating that the publication of the advertise­
ment in no way constituted an endorsement of the book.7 
A superficial reading of the book quickly reveals why it 
was an instant succes de scandale. Consider the following 
claims made therein: 
- women are exclusively and entirely sexual, men alone 
are rational (106) 
- woman's physiology makes her constitutionally incap­
able of abstract thought and thus of intellectual in­
sight, moral action and artistic creativity (122), 
- all women are either prostitutes or overly possessive 
mothers. The former are completely selfless, the latter 
completely selfish. Both are essentially faithless but 
the prostitute is the more estimable (232), 
- women are too low on the moral scale to be classified 
as criminals (303), 
- it is only women who are happy (376) , 
- women - like children, imbeciles and criminals -
should have no voice in human affairs (450), 
- love and understanding are mutually incompatible (451), 
- what is true of women is also true of Jews (408), 
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- politics is essentially feminine because the tribune 
of the people must prostitute himself before them (294-
95), 
and the final paradox: 
- in the end the argument of Geschlecht und Charakter 
turns against men. 
Confronted with these bare claims I think we would all be 
inclined to conclude that the author of the book in ques­
tion was some kind of a nut. Nor would we be likely to be 
surprised to discover that its Jewish author committed 
suicide six months after it appeared (dramatically, by 
renting a room in the house where Beethoven died and there 
shooting himself). To reason thus is certainly understand­
able, unfortunately it is also fallacious. But to say some­
thing like that is to put myself into a position where 
people will take me to be a nut too, so I must hastily 
spell out just what I want to argue regarding this bizarre 
book. 
- Firstly, I want to insist that it must be evaluated 
by reference to the state of biological science, psy­
chology and humanistic social reform circa 1903. 
- Secondly, I want to assert that a close reading of 
the text reveals a strong dialectical element in Wei­
ninger's thinking which actually renders his conclusion 
that the argument turns against men less paradoxical 
than it appears at first glance. 
- Thirdly, I want to detach Weininger's book from the 
fact of his suicide as virtually none of his numerous 
enemies (and his friends as well) have done. 
Let me begin with the third point. 
3.2 Johnston assumes that Weininger's bizarre theory and 
his bizarre behaviour (suicide) are indissolubly linked. 
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Apart from having an ad hominem character, this approach 
to Weininger tends to become vacuously circular in that 
Weininger's bizarre behaviour then becomes evidence for 
explaining away the bizarre theory (remember that thera­
peutic nihilism is among other things a 'disposition to 
suicide1). Johnston appears to be oblivious both to the 
general philosophical difficulties surrounding ascriptions 
of intention and also to the specific problems we encounter 
when we try to ascribe motives to suicides.8 For Johnston 
it is sufficient to explain Weininger's 'diatribe against 
women and Jews' (159) in terms of 'disappointed Oedipal 
feelings' (159) and Jewish self hatred (Weininger, it will 
be remembered, was one of Theodor Lessing's models in 
developing that concept9). I have two reasons for rejec­
ting these psychohistorical explanations. First, they can 
be only as reliable as the theory upon which they rest. 
The claims to scientific legitimacy of that theory are 
meagre, to say the least.10 Secondly, even if I were dis­
posed to accept Freudian explanations, I would remain scep­
tical about our capacity to produce a sound psychoanalytic­
al account of Weininger because the validity of such accounts, 
as Freud himself always insisted, rests upon minutely 
detailed biographical, preferably autobiographical, infor­
mation of a sort that is in scant supply in Weininger's 
case. Apart from a few letters, the biographical data we 
have concerning Weininger is principally highly speculative, 
equally biassed accounts of friends and detractors. Because 
Johnston does find psychoanalytic considerations convincing 
in Weininger's case, he is more concerned with discussing 
Freud's claim that Weininger stole the idea of human bi-
sexuality from him than he is with establishing the context 
in which Weininger developed his ideas. Apart from ignor­
ing Freud's own neurotic tendencies in the face of challen­
ges to his originality and status, Johnston fails to recog-
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n i s e t h a t t o t a k e s u c h a c l a i m s e r i o u s l y he i s o b l i g e d t o 
e x p l a i n why W e i n i n g e r ' s v i e w s differ f rom F r e u d ' s i n p r e ­
c i s e l y t h e way t h a t t h e y d o . So much f o r J o h n s t o n ' s a c ­
c o u n t of W e i n i n g e r ' s p e r s o n a l i t y , now l e t u s t u r n t o h i s 
a c c o u n t o f W e i n i n g e r ' s t h e o r i e s . 
3 . 3 The f o l l o w i n g p a s s a g e i s v i r t u a l l y h i s e n t i r e e x p o s i ­
t i o n of t h e ma in t h e s i s of Geschlecht und Charakter : 
In Geschlecht und Charakter, Weininger d i s t o r t e d a useful 
t h e s i s in to monomania. He pos tu la t ed t h a t a l l human behaviour 
can be explained in terms of male and female protoplasm c o n s t i ­
t u t i n g each person. Contending t h a t every c e l l of every organ­
ism possesses s e x u a l i t y , he coined severa l terms to des ignate 
var ious types of protoplasm. Idioplasm i s sexual ly und i f f e r ­
e n t i a t e d , arrhenoplasm i s male protoplasm, while thelyplasm 
i s female c e l l u l a r t i s s u e . Using a lgebra i c formulas, he 
demonstrated how varying propor t ions of arrhenoplasm and t h e l y ­
plasm could e luc ida t e such top ics as the psychology of genius , 
physiognomy, theory of memory, p r o s t i t u t i o n , ant i -Semit ism 
and theory of race (159-60). 
The a n t i - f e m i n i s m t h a t Johns ton p e r c e i v e s in t h i s t h e o r y 
l e a d s him t o a s s e r t : 
Weininger ranks as one of the most p e t u l a n t of misogynis t s . 
He simply equated s exua l i t y with woman, who contaminates man 
in the paroxysm of orgasm. He diagnosed h y s t e r i a as a malady 
pecu l i a r to woman, caused by c o n f l i c t between her exc lus ive ly 
sexual na ture and the idea l of c h a s t i t y which men f o i s t upon 
her (160). 
In p roduc ing such a t h e o r y , Johns ton c o n c l u d e s , Weininger 
so withdrew in to contemplation of the human predicament t h a t 
he forsook a l l d e s i r e to remedy i t (162). 
Now I must make i t a b s o l u t e l y c l e a r t h a t t h e r e i s no q u e s ­
t i o n in my mind t h a t W e i n i n g e r ' s views a r e whol ly u n t e n a b l e 
t o d a y , bu t t h a t i n no way i m p l i e s t h a t t hey were u n t e n a b l e 
t h e n . As I have ment ioned , t h e c o n f i n e s of a b r i e f paper 
a r e such t h a t I could no t hope t o p r o v i d e t h e nuanced 
account of W e i n i n g e r ' s work which would b r i n g ou t t h e mani-
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fold deficiencies in Johnston's presentation of it; rather, 
I shall try to indicate how an awareness of the context in 
which Weininger was writing and the reasoning that went into 
the theory of plasms would lead one to quite a different 
assessment of Weininger. 
3.4 The task of reconstructing the context in which Wein­
inger was operating is not as difficult as it might seem at 
first glance. This is because Weininger appended 135 pages 
of notes and references to Geschlecht und Charakter. However, 
like Lukács 60 years earlier,11 Johnston merely considers 
the 'impressive area of authorities' (160) cited in the 
book as showing off on Weininger's part. In ignoring 
Weininger's sources Johnston differs widely from the Prof­
essor to whom Weininger submitted his dissertation, from 
which Geschlecht und Charakter was developed, Friedrich 
Jodl. In Jodl's otherwise critical evaluation of the 
dissertation Jodl wrote, 
It merits recognition that the author endeavoured to assemble 
abundant data from biology, psychology and pathology, as well 
as manifold observations from the most different areas of life 
and wide reading in aid of establishing his hypothesis aptly 
and acutely. The examiner is convinced that this hypothesis, 
whether verifiable or not, will allow us to see much that is 
now known in a new light and to notice many things hitherto 
unobserved.12 
Incidentally, this statement does not altogether square with 
Johnston's description of Jodl as finding Weininger's dis­
sertation to 'abound in extravagances and crudities' (159). 
Had Johnston looked into these sources what might he have 
found? Two things, I think: first, that Weininger's under­
taking, however disreputable by today's standards, was con­
ceived in conjunction with one of the leading programmes for 
social reform of the era and thus in no sense a 'forsaking' 
of society; and secondly, that the theory of plasms could 
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clearly be construed as a scientific 'bold conjecture'. 
3.5 Even a cursory glance at Weininger's notes and refer­
ences indicates that he was heavily indebted for his data 
about women to a work called La Donna Delinquente e La 
Prostituta by Cesare Lombrose, Professor of Forensic Medi­
cine at Turin and father of modern criminology.13 Lombroso's 
programme involved reforming penal codes and improvement of 
conditions in prisons with a view to the prevention of reci­
divism. He based his position on arguments drawn from con­
temporary biology, namely that one could identify degener­
ation in terms of physical characteristics. He argued that 
the psycho-physicalist principle much appealed to in con­
temporary psychology implied that deviant minds and abnor­
mal bodies were two sides of the same coin. By producing 
accurate measurements of bodies, especially of the skull, 
he hoped to produce a statistical profile of normalcy and 
deviance represented on a bell-shaped curve with geniuses 
on one side of normalcy and criminals on the other. More 
precisely, he hoped to be able to distinguish congenital 
deviance, for which individuals were not responsible and 
from which they could not be rehabilitated, from environ­
mentally induced deviance, which could be rehabilitated. 
His aim was to set up two distinct prison systems so that 
non-congenital deviants would not acquire permanent disposi­
tions to crime from the congenitally criminal. Not a little 
of the 'empirical data' upon which Weininger based his reas­
oning is to be found in Lombroso's study of the female 
offender. For example two ideas which were to recur as 
central themes in Geschlecht und Charakter, namely that 
women are generally less sensitive to perceptual stimuli 
and the notion that women are more prone to lying than men 
(for which he advances eight causes) are already central 
themes in Lombroso's work. In fact most of the things that 
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we find obnoxious and repugnant in Geschlecht und Charakter 
today, can be found in La Donna Delincuente. Though Lom­
broso' s status among scientists was on the wane at the time 
Weininger was writing, his reputation as a 'bleeding heart' 
liberal was intact. The legal profession was not about to 
countenance a major reduction in the total number of crimes. 
Weininger's concern for establishing hereditary foundations 
for prostitution have to be read as part and parcel of the 
same efforts to change society's moralistic attitudes. In­
cidentally, just as establishing that some criminals were 
congenitally so was central to Lombroso's programme - and 
to the programme for educating society at large about 
sexuality conceived by Havelock Ellis as an extension of 
Lombroso's work14 - the notion that homosexuality was in 
some sense congenital was equally central to the programme 
for the decriminalisation of homosexuality of the "Wissen­
schaftlich-Humanitären Komitee" of Magnus Hirschfeld in 
Berlin (despite its basic disagreements with Lombroso). 
Weininger's references indicate that he was very familiar 
with the work of Ellis and Hirschfeld. In the light of the 
well-known police and press harassment of homosexuals and 
prostitutes in Weininger's Vienna, it is difficult to see 
how Weininger was 'forsaking' society in undertaking a 
Kantian critique of Lombroso's positivist theory of crime.15 
His theory of plasms, which Weininger admitted was specula­
tive but nonetheless scientific for being so, must be seen 
as a contribution to explaining the biological basis of 
crime. 
3.6 An examination of the references relating to Weinin­
ger ' s postulating the theory of the male and female plasms 
with an eye to the state of science circa 1902 is revealing 
indeed.16 In order to justify his procedure Weininger cites 
a parallel situation in the recent history of botany where 
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a significant breakthrough towards understanding the here­
dity of plants was made by Carl Wilhelm von Naegli und 
Hugo DeVries on the basis of a theory of idioplasm.17 The 
latter is thus not, as Johnston claims, a coinage of Wein­
inger ' s . Actually, the notion of idioplasm played a role 
in the discovery of chromatin. To appreciate the signifi­
cance of Weininger's reasoning we have to bear in mind that 
he was writing in what Loren Eisley termed a 'confused 
intellectual climate' in which the younger generation of 
biologists 'were opposed by the confused and incoherent 
situation which they had inherited from their dead master 
[Darwin]' . 18 This was the time when the biogenetic law, the 
notion of transmission of acquired characteristics and all 
sorts of curious notions about the nature of the gene were 
still current. Actually, Weininger was attempting to for­
mulate a theory which would account for the mechanism, the 
bio-chemistry, of heredity in a pre-Mendelian context. For 
the purposes of assessing the rationality of Weininger's 
claims it is noteworthy that in the same passage where 
Weininger explains his reasoning in postulating the plasmas 
he also identifies August Weissmann as the source of the 
strongest arguments against his position as well as the 
works he takes to be a rebuttal of Weissmann's position. 
There can be little doubt that he clearly recognised that 
there was another approach to genetics than the one he en­
dorsed. I take this to imply that the theory of plasms 
was indeed a 'bold conjecture' in the best Popperian fash­
ion, one that was refuted not long after his death. 
Indeed, it is noteworthy that the generally hostile review 
Gesohlecht und Charakter received in Hirschfeld's Jahrbuch 
für sexuelle Zwischenstufen mentions that this side of 
Weininger's thought represents a variation on a more or 
less standard theme in Hirschfeld and Möbius, the heredi­
tary foundation of homosexuality. Certainly, Hirschfeld's 
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reviewer, who found plenty to object to in the book, saw 
nothing objectionable in the theory of plasms.19 What is 
most astonishing is not that Weininger's view should have 
been refuted, but rather that nearly every aspect of the 
scientific side of his work should have become thoroughly 
suspect within a very short time after his death, from Sir 
Charles Goring's refutation of Lombroso's programme for 
criminology to Wilhelm Johannsen's determination of the 
true relation between genotype and phenotype.20 It was not 
merely that single propositions were called into question 
but Weininger's data, his principles of reasoning and the 
research programmes in which Weininger was working fell 
into disrepute almost immediately after his death. Thus, 
one could accuse Weininger of being precipitously specula­
tive but not of being unscientific in his own time. Indeed 
even his penchant for speculation had a precedent in contem­
porary medicine. Professor Kassowitz of the Vienna medical 
faculty, whom he erroneously cites as having provided con­
clusive refutation of Weissmann's theory of the inviolabi­
lity of the germ plasm, made theoretical speculation into 
a cornerstone of his approach to medical science. It is 
very significant that Erna Lesky in her monumental history 
of the Vienna Medical School should describe Kassowitz as 
a subtle and brilliant speculator and critic of contempor­
ary medicine whose works, distinguished by the quality of 
his reasoning, have been almost totally neglected because 
the substance of his opinions was nearly always wrong.21 
I shall conclude briefly by showing how this bold conject­
ure fits into Weininger's metaphysical scheme. 
3.7 For Weininger individual humans are neither wholly 
masculine nor wholly feminine but are distributed across a 
continuous spectrum (rather than Lombroso's bell curve). 
Empirical data alone will not generate this spectrum, it 
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m u s t b e constructed. The d i a l e c t i c a l e l e m e n t i n W e i n i n g e r 
f o l l o w s f rom t h e f a c t t h a t Man a n d Woman a r e ideal types: 
Knowledge of male and female by means of a r i g h t cons t ruc t ion 
of the i dea l man and the idea l woman, using the word idea l in 
the sense of t y p i c a l , excluding judgment as t o va lue . When 
these types have been recognised and b u i l t up we sha l l be in 
a p o s i t i o n to consider ind iv idua l cases and t h e i r ana lys i s as 
mixtures in d i f f e r en t p ropor t ions w i l l be ne i t he r d i f f i c u l t 
nor f r u i t l e s s (12). 
The i m p l i e s t h a t a l l of t h e shocking t h i n g s I mentioned 
e a r l i e r about t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of men and women must be 
d r a s t i c a l l y q u a l i f i e d fo r t h e r e a r e e lements of each in all 
of us. Th is i s because W e i n i n g e r ' s Neo-Kant ian methodology 
p roceeds from t h e assumpt ion t h a t t h e r e i s a d i a l e c t i c a l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between exp lanans and explanandum, i n d i v i d u a l s 
and t y p e s . He i n s i s t s t h a t t h e s e t y p e s a r e n o t t o be con­
s t r u e d as r e i f i c a t i o n s or as e x i s t e n t be ings ( i . e . P l a t o n i c 
i d e a s ) : 
Acceptance of these schemata in no way involves p o s i t i n g meta­
phys ica l e n t i t i e s bes ide or above the world of exper ience . 
On the cont ra ry , t h e i r cons t ruc t ion i s necessary h e u r i s t i c a l l y 
for a de sc r i p t i on of the world which w i l l be as complete as 
poss ib l e (12). 
In f a c t , Weininger i s p r o c e e d i n g from t h e Kant ian p r i n c i p l e 
t h a t e x p e r i e n c e cannot r e v e a l a n y t h i n g about n a t u r e t o us 
u n t i l we a r e in a p o s i t i o n t o s i t i n judgment upon i t , i . e . 
u n t i l we have developed r i g o r o u s methods f o r q u e s t i o n i n g . 
The c o n s t r u c t i o n of i d e a l t y p e s as l i m i t i n g c a s e s w i l l t h u s 
be employed t o r e s o l v e a n a t o m i c a l , p s y c h o l o g i c a l and e t h i c ­
a l d i f f e r e n c e s between i n d i v i d u a l s . The t h e o r y of plasms 
i s t h e p h y s i o l o g i c a l b a s i s which e x p l a i n s t h e d i f f e r e n c e s 
between i n d i v i d u a l s , t h e t h e o r y of t y p e s a l lows us t o p e r ­
c e i v e t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h o s e d i f f e r e n c e s . Thus, a sum­
mary of W e i n i n g e r ' s views on t h e s e p o i n t s would look some­
t h i n g l i k e t h i s : 
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(1) the individual is never to be identified with the 
type, it is never Man or Woman - thus Weininger is 
hardly a relentless dualist; 
(2) the individual is always a man or a woman, clearly 
male or female; 
however, 
(3) the individual is always intermediate between the 
types, participating in the characteristics of each, 
something both language and anatomy conceals; 
(4) thus, even the individual does not know its own 
sexuality directly - we have no privileged access to 
our own sexuality; 
(5) we all contain residual elements of our opposite 
numbers within us; 
which explains, 
(6) how we can become enigmatic to ourselves, i.e. how 
our own behaviour can become incomprehensible to us. 
Thus Weininger wants to be in a position not only to explain 
the hereditary foundation of 'deviant behaviour', but also 
to explain why deviant behaviour should be obscure to the 
'deviant' himself. Once more, it is difficult to perceive 
how this is 'forsaking society'. 
4. Georges Canguilhem has written in his classic study The 
Normal and the Pathological that historians of science ig­
nore the general intellectual atmosphere of the culture they 
write about at their peril.22 Unless I am mistaken The Aus­
trian Mind indicates that the converse of that statement 
is no less profound a truth: historians of ideas ignore the 
history of science at their peril also. Because Johnston 
has made no effort to set Weininger into the context of 
science as it was at the turn of the century, he has failed 
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to scratch the surface of Weininger's thought. This fail­
ure is principally a failure of his conceptual apparatus. 
It is not merely that Johnston has erred in his presentation 
of Weininger but, given the muddle that is !therapeutic 
nihilism', he could not but distort Weininger and the whole 
of one of the main currents of Austrian thought. 
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PHILOSOPHY, ANImALITY AND JUSTICE: 
KLEIST, KAFKA, WEININGER AND WITTGENSTEIN 
Kevin Mulligan 
The twenty-five years before and after 1900 display a 
marked turn of attention in the philosophy, literature and 
art of Austria and Germany towards the mechanics of repres­
entation. Clearest examples of this are provided, perhaps, 
by the Logical Investigations of Husserl on the one hand, 
and by Hofmannsthal's Chandosbrief on the other. But the 
same is true even of a work such as Weininger's Geschlecht 
und Charakter in which very traditional philosophical 
oppositions appear in explicitly sexual (and characterolog-
ical) terms, and of Freud's Traumdeutung, an account of the 
limits and role of language-like mechanisms in the life of 
the mind. Even Musil's dissertation under Husserl's teach­
er Stumpf on Mach's theory of sensation belongs here, and 
further examples could be multiplied without limit. 
In the present paper, in order to minimise the risk of 
uninformative generalities, I shall focus on texts of Husserl, 
Wittgenstein and Kafka,1 and on two topics only: animality 
and justice, in order to bring out a little noticed shared 
feature of these texts and to demonstrate the radical break 
effected through them. 
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Although the turn towards representation in literature 
and other arts in this period is familiar and has been 
well-documented, the academic philosophy of central Europe 
at this time still remains relatively little known and 
understood.2 It is not realised, for example, the extent to 
which Husserl's Logical Investigations represent an impor­
tant shift in the sort of problems philosophers had hitherto 
been interested in. Husserl here sets out for the first 
time and in great detail the idea that the world, thinking 
and language are all articulated and have a (logical and 
ontological) structure. This idea finds its most forceful 
expression in the importance accorded to the distinction 
between sense and nonsense and in Husserl's discussion of 
what is, perhaps, that rare thing, a philosophical disco­
very, the concept of Sachverhalt, of the state of affairs 
(the hanging-together of objects or things3). What Husserl 
argued was that the access we have to structure in the 
world is typically access through sentences to states of 
affairs.4 Thus what we desire, or hope for, or strive to 
bring about, what makes our beliefs true or false, are 
states of affairs - never simply objects. Twenty years 
later Wittgenstein was to give powerful expression to the 
way this discovery breaks with the traditional view of the 
world as made up of subjects and objects in the magnificent 
opening lines of the Tractatus: 
1. The world is all that is the case. 
1.1 The world is the totality of facts, not of things. 
Identifying the new turn in academic philosophy of 
which the discovery of Sachverhalte is a symptom involves 
reducing the complexity of a large body of writings to a 
common denominator. But it is not difficult to see how the 
unity of a new field of problems breaks with the importance 
traditionally accorded to subjects, objects, concepts and 
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ideas or presentations. If knowledge is propositional, is 
knowledge of Sachverhalte , then objects are objects of 
knowledge only insofar as Sachverhalte in which they figure 
are known. And if this is the case then the traditional 
conception of cognition as a relation between an object 
and a subject (in which the former is present to the latter) 
has to be rejected. In Husserl's early philosophy subjects, 
objects, and concepts, disappear altogether, and the appear­
ance of the ('metaphysical') subject at 5.63 in the Tractat-
us is a very untraditional one indeed. 
Both in the writings of the early phenomenologists and 
in Wittgenstein's works the idea emerges that the opposition 
between subject and object, or between concept and intuition 
in their systematic traditional deployment are sustained by 
a whole series of other, more or less hidden philosophemes 
of a lower order. Once these are brought to light, then 
they are seen to lack all philosophical basis. We can 
distinguish very easily three such lower order philosophemes, 
which have by no means lost their attractiveness to phil­
osophers even today: 
(1) The distinction, drawn from social and political 
discourse, between theory and practice. Subjects, it is 
alleged, have ideas or theories, and then put these into 
practice by producing or transforming o b j e c t s . Or, in a 
slightly more sophisticated version: practice and the 
production of theory go on simultaneously, they can modify 
each other. The relations between the two terms can be 
complicated in very many ways but it remains the case, on 
the traditional view, that we can meaningfully apply the 
exclusive disjunction theory/practice to any segment of 
the social world. What we identify as theory will be 
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subjective or the property of subjects; what we identify 
as practice will be production of, or transformation of, 
objects. 
(2) The complex of ideas associated in particular with 
the production of texts but capable of more general appli­
cation across the whole sphere of social action: the notion 
that an author has ideas which are expressed in texts, and 
that reading is some kind of access to the author's ideas. 
Closely related is the view that literary texts or other 
artistic products express a message or content. Psycholo-
g i s m can be regarded as a particularly crude form of this 
notion applied to logic (cf. the Prolegomena to Husserl's 
Logical Investigations). 
(3) The conception of power as something which either 
involves subjects bringing other subjects to have certain 
beliefs (and this can be spelled out in terms of rational 
persuasion, ideology and false consciousness or even myth­
ically as involving some sort of social contract), or 
involves subjects constraining other subjects - who thereby 
become objects - by means of force, violence, or physical 
restriction or control. This opposition in its turn comes 
in very many different shapes and sizes: history itself 
can be considered as the subject guiding both poles; or 
humanity can be considered as subject, history as object, 
and so on. 
These three oppositions, some of which are taken up 
again below, suffice perhaps to bring out the resources of 
representationalism in traditional philosophy. And so I 
suggest as working hypothesis that a measure of any break 
with this tradition will be the extent to which these 
oppositions, or the associated philosophemes, are avoided. 
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The commitment to the subject-object dichotomy is often 
aligned with two other major obsessions: the distinctions 
between inner and outer, and between what is deep or pro­
found and what is superficial or on the surface. Wittgen­
stein's lengthy underminings of these oppositions in his 
later writings are well-known: those of Husserl, less so.6 
A formula which brings out the approach shared by Wittgen­
stein and the early Husserl might be: concentrate on what 
is external and on the surface; and do not let the diffi­
culty of seeing this clearly lead you to invoke a spurious 
depth or interiority. 
The above oppositions functioned to provide example-
domains for the successive systems of German idealism and, 
though to a lesser extent, for the subsequently predominant 
varieties of positivism, psychologism and naturalism. 
This historical picture of a break with traditional 
philosophy made by Husserl and Wittgenstein runs the risk of 
making a traditional mistake: that of assuming that a group 
of texts can embody or express, more or less imperfectly, 
a 'current of thought'. But what might look like a unified 
picture is in fact much more complex. For example Husserl's 
penetrating descriptive analyses in the Philosophy of Arith­
metic , in the Logical Investigations and in his work on the 
structure of our consciousness of time soon gave way, after 
the first decade of the century, to a curious reaffirmation 
on his part of various traditional philosophical positions. 
This retreat from what was novel in his work was certain of 
success within German academic philosophy, not least because 
it was able to make use of the earlier results but in such 
a way as to reinforce the power of traditional philosophical 
discourse. This route was not taken by all of Husserl's 
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early readers. There is an important body of work by 
German and Austrian philosophers (particularly Reinach and 
the Munich school) which takes seriously Husserl's injunc­
tion to describe ontologicai structure and the workings of 
representation and to avoid the sterile dichotomies of 
idealism/realism, subject/object, etc. 
It is difficult, too, but no less important, to avoid 
describing what was new in Austro-German philosophy after 
the turn of the century in purely philosophical terms. 
Important because it is part and parcel of much traditional 
philosophy to believe that its philosophical 'expression' 
in some way represents or captures also the truth of liter­
ary or musical movements. That there is no such all-
embracing view is one of the insights of the critique of 
traditional philosophy and the new emphasis on ground-level 
description and clarification. 
What follows, then, is an attempt to show by reference 
to two examples how concerns distinguishable in one area, 
academic philosophy, are shared by literary texts, to locate 
these concerns in and between the two series of texts, to 
show how they overlap. The series of texts in which animal-
ity is discussed is: Weininger's Tierpsychologie from his 
posthumous über die letzten Dinge, Kafka's animal stories, 
and some remarks of Wittgenstein in his Notebooks 1914-16. 
The series of texts on justice is: Wittgenstein's Tractatus, 
Kafka's Trial, and - a favourite of Wittgenstein's7- Kleist's 
Michael Kohlhaas . In each series one text represents an 
intermediate position between traditional concerns and 
those texts of Wittgenstein and Kafka which mark a defin­
itive break with the tradition. Half-way house in the 
series of animal texts is Weininger's Tierpsychologie, in 
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t h e s e r i e s of t e x t s on j u s t i c e , Michael Kohlhaas, 
W e i n i n g e r ' s Tierpsychologie forms a s e c t i o n of t h e 
c h a p t e r e n t i t l e d "Metaphys ic s" 8 of t h e ex t remely i n f l u e n t i a l 
posthumous c o l l e c t i o n über die letzten D i n g e . The f u l l 
t i t l e of t h e r e l e v a n t s e c t i o n i s : "Con ta in ing t h e i d e a of 
a u n i v e r s a l symbolism, animal psychology (with a f a i r l y 
comple te psychology of t h e c r i m i n a l , e t c . ) " . E x p l a i n i n g 
h i s n o t i o n of a u n i v e r s a l symbolism Weininger w r i t e s : 
. . .wha t I am concerned with i s not the whole but the meaning of 
every ind iv idua l th ing in the whole. What the sea, i r on , the 
a n t , the Chinese mean, the idea they represent, t h a t i s what 
I want to s e t ou t . 
T h i s e n t e r p r i s e 
i s to span the whole world, to d i sc lose the deeper sense of 
t h i n g s . . . The fundamental thought and presuppos i t ion of the 
book, the b a s i s on which everything t h a t follows r e s t s , i s the 
theory of man as a microcosm. [Cf. Tractatus 5 .63, Notebooks, 
p.847 Since man has a r e l a t i o n to a l l th ings in the world so 
must a l l th ings in the world a l ready be somehow presen t in man. . . 
The system of the world i s i d e n t i c a l with the system of man. 
Nature i s t o be i n t e r p r e t e d by means of p s y c h o l o g i c a l 
c a t e g o r i e s , e v e r y t h i n g in i t i s t o be a symbol of t h e 
l a t t e r : 
To every form of ex is tence in nature the re corresponds a 
human c h a r a c t e r i s t i c . 
These programmatic remarks j u s t i f y i n on ly one r e s p e c t 
Weininger's claim to originality, his claim to do for psychic 
phenomena what Kant did for physical phenomena. To 
draw p a r a l l e l s wi th contemporaneous t e x t s of D i l t h e y would 
be m i s l e a d i n g because of t h e p e c u l i a r l y pure form of t he 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l i s m which Weininger d e f e n d s . In t h e remarks 
I have quoted t h e r e i s t h e c l a s s i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n between 
man and t h e wor ld . E v e r y t h i n g , every o b j e c t , in t h e world 
e x p r e s s e s someth ing , has a meaning, a meaning which i s 
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human (a meaning for man). 
What Weininger then goes on to say about the meanings 
of dogs, horses, plants merely confirms this. "The dog 
acts as though he felt his own lack of value". The loyalty 
of a dog is a symbol of the slave. Weininger brings the 
good news, for some of us, that dogs only bark at those 
with dog-like natures. People who can't be 'shaken off' 
have the eyes and faces of dogs. Fear of dogs is far more 
common than, say, fear of horses, because dogs symbolise 
criminality. 
Plants symbolise only types of women: roses, tulips, 
lilies. But amongst men, suggests Weininger, plants cor­
respond to neurasthenia. He continues in this vein for 
several pages, isolating correspondences in a world which 
literally drips with meaning: 
The mountain is the symbol of the giant. The river is the self 
as time. The sea is the self as space... /"but7 the deep sea is 
crime... 
In a letter to Moore, Wittgenstein, perhaps trying to 
justify his high opinion of and interest in Weininger's 
Geschlecht und Charakter, suggests putting the negation 
sign before Weininger's text.9 It is tempting to read too 
much into this suggestion. For Wittgenstein, like Husserl 
and Frege before him, had been impressed by the important 
fact that whether a proposition is affirmed or negated, 
something remains unaffected, the sense of the proposition. 
And where negation does not function like this we have some­
thing which is countersensical but may for all that be 
important. 
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It is however more profitable to turn to what Wittgen­
stein says about animal behaviour in the Notebooks. Both 
in the Tractatus and later, Wittgenstein thoroughly under­
mines the view that the world consists of objects and sub­
jects which are the sources of thoughts, desires, acts of 
will and so on. Rather: the world, thought and language 
are all structured, and perhaps the most that can be said 
is that there are certain parallelisms of structure between 
the three. Access to the world is only to the world as 
structured, and the very fact of access is itself struc­
tured. Because the world is structured objects occur only 
in states of affairs. And because the access is structured 
it is not the property of any subject, whether individual 
or collective. Talk about subjects is really talk about 
features of the structures of the world or of the struc­
tures of language. So there are subjects and objects: but 
they have to be understood in terms of what is neither 
subject nor object: ontologicai, logical and grammatical 
structure. 
In the Notebooks Wittgenstein still experiences the 
need to discuss certain positions and questions which, from 
the Tractatus on, he no longer needs to pose. He discusses 
the problem of solipsism and the possibility of a universal 
mind, as well as one of the most sophisticated traditional 
answers to the question as to the relation of subject (mind) 
to object (body): psychophysical parallelism. 
Now is it true (following the psycho-physical conception) that 
my character is expressed only in the build of my body or brain 
and not equally in the build of the whole of the rest of the 
world? 
This contains a salient point. 
This parallelism, then, really exists between my spirit, i.e. 
spirit, and the world. 
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Only remember t h a t the s p i r i t of the snake, of the l i o n , i s 
your s p i r i t . For i t i s only from yoursel f t h a t you are 
acquainted with s p i r i t a t a l l . 
Now of course the quest ion i s why I have given a snake j u s t 
t h i s s p i r i t . 
And the answer to t h i s can only l i e in the psycho-physical 
p a r a l l e l i s m : I f I were to look l i k e the snake and to do what 
i t does then I should be such-and-such. 
The same with the e lephant , with the f l y , with the wasp. 
But the ques t ion a r i s e s whether even he re , my body i s not 
on the same l eve l with t h a t of the wasp and of the snake (and 
sure ly i t i s so ) , so t h a t I have ne i t he r in fe r red from t h a t of 
the wasp to mine nor from mine to t h a t of the wasp. 
I s t h i s the so lu t ion of the puzzle of why men have always 
bel ieved t h a t the re was one s p i r i t common to the whole world? 
And in t h a t case i t would, of course , a l so be common to 
l i f e l e s s th ings t o o . 1 0 
In t h e Tractatus and l a t e r t h e n o t i o n of p s y c h o p h y s i c a l 
p a r a l l e l i s m cannot even g e t off t h e ground because t h e b a s i c 
c a t e g o r i e s a r e - as a l s o i n H u s s e r l ' s c a s e - n e i t h e r what 
i s p h y s i c a l nor what i s p s y c h i c a l bu t o b j e c t i v e s t a t e s of 
a f f a i r s . N e v e r t h e l e s s what i s s t r i k i n g about t h i s q u o t a ­
t i o n i s t h a t , i n germ a t l e a s t , t h e i dea i s p r e s e n t t h a t 
what i s fundamental i s a c t i o n , b e h a v i o u r , s i g n s and t h e 
d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e s e . I t i s on t h e b a s i s of t h e s e t h a t 
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n s between humans and an imals a r e made, 
(cf. P h i l o s o p h i c a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n e s § 357). Animals and 
humans a r e not g iven s t r a i g h t off , as they had been for 
Weininger who, g iven h i s b a s i c terms - s u b j e c t s (men) and 
o b j e c t s ( n a t u r e , a n i m a l s , women. . . ) - can then e a s i l y 
proceed t o d i s c o v e r asymmet r ica l co r r e spondences between 
them (a means, s y m b o l i s e s , or e x p r e s s e s b). 
Kafka ' s animal s t o r i e s - in p a r t i c u l a r The Metamorphosis, 
Report for an Academy, Jackals and Arabs and the Researches 
of a Dog - t a k e t h i s even f u r t h e r , in two r e s p e c t s . 
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First, in all these stories, what we have is a con­
tinuum of actions and behaviour within which we can pick 
out human behaviour, animal behaviour and combinations of 
these; for example: what humans impose on animals and the 
possibilities animality opens to humans. The very term 
"metamorphosis" {Verwandlung) indicates that we are dealing 
with a continuum. In some stories, such as the Researches 
of a Dogr we are presented with animals which have human 
characteristics and others which are more purely animal. 
The second and more concrete respect in which we find 
Kafka's animal stories breaking with assumptions of the 
sort still capable of being made by Weininger is a thematic 
characteristic of these stories which has been much dis­
cussed. We find in The Metamorphosis , for example, that 
the process of becoming an animal functions as a way of 
relativising, putting into perspective, even fleeing from 
pervasive systems of representations of humans by which 
Kafka had been obsessed: particularly family and bureau­
cracy. Gregory qua son, his relation to his father, to the 
threatening director, - these are all things Gregory qua 
animal flees.11 But the link with the system of human 
representations in the form of an attachment to the 
portrait of the woman in furs remains and spells the failure 
of his flight. 
Kleist's Michael Kohlhaas provides all the basic vocab­
ulary of justice. Michael Kohlhaas is a well-to-do christ­
ian, father, family man and merchant who is completely at 
home in the society in which he lives. Slowly but surely 
he becomes enraged by injustices committed against him by 
those above him in the legal and social order. All his 
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attempts to gain a legal redress are thwarted and so, with 
the help of a large band he has gathered together, he 
embarks on a war against the state which after much 
destruction is eventually almost successful. In the end 
he gains justice, but at the price of his own execution -
something he willingly accepts. Legal and social order is 
restored. This is the story, but it is at the same time 
a gross distortion of what happens in the story. For what 
is most striking about Kleist's work is the way in which a 
series of different conceptions of justice interpenetrate 
the text: justice in the form of an absolutist state; jus­
tice as divinely guaranteed; justice as a pact or contract 
freely entered into by the Bürger-, natural justice as some­
thing to be won by the people or a part of the people; 
superstitious and enlightenment views of justice; justice 
as what must be done whatever the price; political justice. 
Kohlhaas circulates amongst these different conceptions, 
establishing connections and oppositions between them. 
What repeats itself throughout the story is Kohlhaas' 
hypochondriacal obsession with justice and with experiencing 
punishment and reward in and on his own person in reflection 
of his belief that das Gesetz ist das Höchste. There is 
also a persistent refusal within the story to let any one 
conception of justice emerge triumphant. Kleist even 
manages to relativise Kohlhaas' final acceptance of the 
justice of his execution: this execution comes about only 
because the Elector of Saxony infringes the amnesty that 
he had himself declared. 
In view of the complexity of the theme of justice (e.g. 
of just reward and punishment) in Kafka and in Wittgenstein12 
it is as well to introduce some key shared distinctions. 
There is first of all the notion of law or norm which can 
be considered narrowly in its legal form or, more widely, 
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as a moral and cultural function (things are forbidden and 
commanded in society on many different levels and in many 
different ways). Secondly, the objects of these laws will 
have their own positive and negative characteristics: the 
objects are for example conceived of as morally good or bad, 
socially desirable or undesirable, divinely ordained or con­
demned, and so on. Finally, there are associated with 
laws the oppositions between applying and complying with or 
breaking and disobeying them; between judging correctly and 
incorrectly (the correct or incorrect verdict of, for 
example, a criminal trial); and the notions of punishment 
and reward, guilt and innocence. 
Now given these distinctions we can see that it is 
possible to pose a very traditional question to which many 
answers can be given: does a law command or prohibit some­
thing on the basis of some characteristic of the object of 
the law? Is a certain course of action prohibited by law 
because of some respect in which the action is negative, 
bad, undesirable, or whatever? The question can be turned 
round: is an object good, bad, desirable, etc. not because 
of anything intrinsic to the object or to its penumbra of 
consequences, but simply because it falls (happens to fall) 
within the orbit of the law13? 
The first and most striking feature shared by Wittgen­
stein and Kafka is the refusal in their texts to let this 
traditional question arise, in any of its forms, and hence 
also the undermining of the possibility of embracing any 
one of the traditional answers to it, of embracing any 
dichotomy between law and its objects on the basis of which 
e.g. a measure of justice could be derived. 
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Readers of the Trial are often tempted to assume that 
these questions are indeed posed and answered; that in the 
Trial and elsewhere the object of the law (of justice) -
what is commanded or forbidden - is explicitly posed as 
missing, and hence that the message of the book is that the 
law is fundamentally irrational, that the idea of justice 
is an elaborate sham, etc. And on this basis there have 
been erected the various readings of Kafka's world as 
tragic, pathetic, allegorical, absurd, etc. 
But this involves a very simple confusion. The fact 
that something is not present in a text - in this case the 
object of the law - is of course not at all equivalent to 
an assertion in the text that this something is missing or 
absent. If John tells Mary the time he is not thereby 
telling her that he loves her but nor is he telling her 
that he does not love her. 
It is interesting to note that what leads to such read­
ings is often the pressure of precisely the traditional 
conceptual resources identified above: the conviction that 
authors express a meaning in a text about the objects 
represented in the text and that the text communicates the 
author's message to other subjects. 
One of the main implications of the Tractatus is that 
representations of justice, propositions about laws and 
their objects belong to that which cannot or should not be 
said. Justice, right and wrong, are what show themselves, 
particularly when we explore how justice works or functions, 
or simply live justly. Wittgenstein in his later works was 
to explore variants on the idea that it is descriptions of 
function and use which show what cannot be represented. And 
so thoroughly did he come to hold this view that, in order 
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to dispel the idea that the propositions of the Traotatus 
were about something, had an object, he declared them to 
be countersensical - which is not to say that they have no 
use. 
The Trial, The Castle, The Frison Colony and The Wall 
of China all explore the working of justice. But not one 
of these texts contains any explicit statement about jus­
tice, and it is possible to read such statements into them 
only by ignoring the fundamental distinction between what 
the texts say and what their structure shows and explores. 
Hence allegorical readings of The Castle, for example, in 
which K. is depicted as a soul anxious to do God's will 
but who cannot find out what this is. Descriptions of 
Kafka's worlds in terms of alienation invoke the same 
resources. What is. supposed to be alienated is always a 
subject, part of which has been made into an object by, 
say, the evils of bureaucracy. The subject has become a 
stranger to himself - or is only potentially not a stranger 
to himself, and so on. 
In order to see how Wittgenstein and Kafka concur in 
showing how the distinction between laws and their objects 
need never get off the ground it is necessary to go into a 
second, shared novel convergence between them which has al­
ready been mentioned: the thoroughly worked-out avoidance 
of what might be called second-order discourse. This in 
its turn will lead on to the treatment by Kafka and Wittgen­
stein of the third traditional component of the machinery 
of justice: the distinction between guilt and innocence, 
punishment and reward. 
In the Traotatus Wittgenstein puts forward the view that 
the structures of what is said and thought must be so 
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different from that which falls within the domain about 
which we think and speak that they could not be brought 
within this domain: they belong irreducibly to the category 
of what shows itself; second-order discourse is excluded. 
This category of what shows itself comprises also what is 
ethical and, presumably, what is normative in general. Now 
the absence of any position, critique or standpoint which 
would unify the different series of descriptions in, say, 
the T r ia l , is just this same absence of second-order dis­
course. Allegorical interpretations of Kafka consist, in 
effect, in attempts to open up a dimension of second-order 
discourse within his works. And substantive claims about 
justice, or about ethics, representations and adjudications 
of the relation between ethical activity and social or legal 
goings-on and events in the world constitute equally 
illegitimate attempts to open up such a dimension in the 
social world itself. All such attempts are examples of 
what Wittgenstein called transzendentales G e s c h w ä t z , 1 4 i.e. 
of what is both counter-sensical and trivial. But not every­
thing which is counter-sensical is trivial, is such as to 
make no difference. There are also things in this category 
which are profound: Weininger's work might be a candidate. 
The difference is presumably also something which shows itself 
and cannot be said. 
For the author of the Tractatus canonic (meaningful) 
discourse is guaranteed by the existence of formal (struc­
tural) correspondences between the well-formed formulae of 
a language on the one hand, and connections between simple 
objects on the other. The simple objects must exist, says 
Wittgenstein, though they are not the objects we normally 
think we are dealing with. Where, then, does this leave 
ethical, normative or law-invoking activity? How is the 
discourse which this involves capable of being made canonic? 
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Wittgenstein says: 
There must indeed be some kind of ethical reward and punishment 
but they must reside in the action itself. 
(And it is also clear that the reward must be something pleasant 
and the punishment something unpleasant.)15 
Michael Kohlhaas, and the officer at the end of In the 
Frison Colony illustrate very vividly how punishment can be 
seen as necessarily involved in the action with which 
normative discourse is bound up. If this were the extent 
of Kafka's treatment of justice and punishment it would 
mean that Kafka had broken with the traditional closely-
meshed connection between law, its objects and guilt and 
punishment only to the extent of emphasising the non-
expressibility of the connection between a law and its 
objects. Whether Kafka (or Wittgenstein) goes beyond this 
to put in question the traditional roles of guilt and inno­
cence, punishment and reward is a matter which would require 
detailed investigation. Here I want only to point to one 
possible line of argument. There is a controversial textual 
suggestion that the Trial should not end with K.'s execution. 
Might not the execution be a dream sequence which should be 
placed in the body of the text? If this were the case, if 
punishment is not the message of the Trial, then Brod's 
remark that, according to Kafka, the novel is really inter­
minable, would appear in a new light. Culpability would 
truly have been eliminated as an object of the propositions 
of the text; its elimination would not merely be one of K.'s 
intentions. 
Wittgenstein's Tractarian commitment to the necessity 
of punishment and reward as part of the internal make up of 
ethical and normative action may also - we can speculate -
have given way to a different view. The later Wittgenstein 
came to realize that the demand for simple objects in the 
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Tractatus had been just that, a demand, one which was in­
compatible with the need for description. Might not a simi­
lar criticism apply to the Tractarian variety of punishment 
and reward? 
What Kafka, Wittgenstein and Husserl share is a desire 
to get as clear a view as possible of the workings of the 
world, of the ways things hang together. One obstacle to 
this is the easy confusion of methods of representation and 
the workings of the world - a confusion which is only made 
worse when the former make themselves felt through deeply-
rooted conceptual presuppositions. The confusion can be 
avoided only when we recognise that methods of represent­
ation have their own ways of working which in turn require 
description, and thereby recognise also the extent to which 
they cloud our picture of the way things work. 
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AUREL KOLNAI 
Prefatory Note 
The final paper in the volume forms part of the Nach-
lass of the philosopher Aurei Kolnai (Ί900-1973). It was 
not intended by Kolnai for publication and I am grateful to 
Mrs E. Kolnai for her patient assistance in the preparation 
of the manuscript for this volume and for her permission to 
allow its publication. I have deleted a number of inciden­
tal passages in which arguments are initiated by Kolnai 
without being brought to a conclusion, and I have made 
occasional minor stylistic alterations in what remains. I 
believe, however, that the result coincides to a large 
extent with what would have been Kolnai's intentions. 
Born in Budapest, Kolnai studied in Vienna under Hein­
rich Gomperz Karl Bühler, Moritz Schlick and Felix Kauf­
mann. He also enjoyed a period of study in Freiburg under 
Husserl and Martin Honecker. His writings are characterised 
by a unique fusion of phenomenological method with a 
passionate concern for political and moral issues. This 
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gave rise, at one extreme, to a book on the philosophy of 
Nazism, The War Against the West,1 published in 1938, and, 
at the other extreme, to a series of articles written in 
the last period of his life for an Anglo-Saxon philosophical 
public (after Kolnai had himself settled in England) on prob­
lems in analytical moral philosophy. These articles have 
now been collected together in a volume entitled Ethics, 
Value and Reality,2 which also contains a bibliography of 
Kolnai's writings and a biographical note. 
The present paper, although written towards the end of 
Kolnai's life, bears witness to the influence upon him of 
the ideas of the Ganzheits-theorists in Vienna in the '20s 
and '30s against which he had reacted so strongly. The 
essence of the Ganzheit doctrine of integrative holism as 
this was applied to the theory of political order is cap­
tured in the following passage by the Catholic Nazi Schmaus, 
quoted by Kolnai in his The War Against the West: 
In Liberal society, men did not stand by one another in an 
existential community: they were so many individuals, equal, 
of equal rights, and self-subsistent, who - rather like stones 
in a heap, not like members of a living body - formed unions 
by free decision and contract.3 
The extent of Kolnai's reaction against this prejudice of 
collectivism, but the extent also to which he possessed a 
deep understanding of its roots, are clearly revealed in 
the essay which follows. 
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IDENTITY AND DIVISION 
AS A FUNDAMENTAL THEME OF POLITICS 
Aurei Kolnai 
§1. The articulation of society 
§2. Political life interpreted on the supposition of 
identities established by interests 
§3. The interpretation of politics in terms of shared 
ways of life 
§4. Identity and Division as a theme in its own right 
§5. Conclusion: a note on conservative libertarianism 
§1. The articulation of society 
Society is composed of constituent parts; first of 
individuals, and secondly of sub-societies (sometimes called 
'groups', 'collectives', 'communities', etc.). This con­
stitutes our most elementary knowledge of society, but two 
further, still quite elementary considerations immediately 
spring to mind. Society is far from being a wholly deter­
minate or univocal concept. When we speak of society we do 
not normally mean the totality of mankind at a given time. 
But still less do we mean just any small and local plurality 
of people united by some particular bond of kinship, commun­
ity or purpose: say a family in the narrowest or even in a 
broader sense (of 'gens'), or the population of a town or a 
318 STRUCTURE AND GESTALT 
county, or an association, or a social microcosm such as a 
university class or a grammar-school form. Very possibly 
we mean what, at least in the conceptual language of Western 
Europe (including America), would be described as a 'nation­
al society', that is to say a society defined in terms of 
or by reference to a sovereign nation state, coinciding 
more or less exactly with an area of common language and 
(though even less exactly) with an area where there exists 
a certain community of interests. Our intention normally 
relates to such a society in contradistinction to the 
governmental and administrative apparatus which predomin­
ates in the area involved (the state proper), and perhaps 
also it ignores the 'natural' substratum of the country in 
question, that is, its particular geographical features and 
the range of its extra-human material contents and fittings 
at any given time. But by society we may also mean a soc­
ial medium stretching beyond the limits of a single nation, 
e.g. 'European society' or 'Islamic society' or North Amer­
ican' or 'Spanish American society'. On the other hand it 
makes sense too to speak of, say, South Italian or Catalan 
or, in the American context, of Mid-Western or New England 
or Southern society. 
Thus we see how indeterminate a society is: it not only 
consists of parts but has itself something virtually part­
like about it, as if it might coalesce into a larger whole 
with other societies, whereas in relation to the individual 
(and to its other more definite constituent groups or insti­
tutions) it somehow represents 'mankind' tout court, though 
without ever actually denoting it. 
The division of society into constituent parts, however 
well-grounded in contours of objective reality which are 
independent of the classifier's whims, fancies, choices, 
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etc., it may be, is yet inevitably subject to a measure of 
arbitrariness. A society consists of functional, e.g. of 
professional, vocational or corporate groups, or again of 
'classes' (which doesn't mean quite the same thing); but 
it also consists of denominational groups, and of groups 
characterised by a similarity of outlook (again not quite 
the same thing); it consists of two sexes, and of age 
groups (however these may be divided); and in some cases at 
least it embraces also different racial strains, whatever 
that may mean exactly. The possibe points of view according 
to which a pattern of division could be sketched are cer­
tainly not enumerable in any exhaustive way. More import­
antly, we cannot establish in any precise and definitive 
fashion a hierarchy of these points of view. All such 
attempts, e.g. Marxist, religious, or racialist, involve a 
forced and arbitrary interpretation on the part of the 
alleged student of society reflecting his own pragmatic 
bias or system of biases. 
Thus in fact society is not only composed of various 
parts - it is composed of various parts in a multiplicity 
of ways; and consequently its component parts cannot but 
overlap. In other words, it consists ultimately of individ­
uals, but only in the sense that it divides into a multi­
tude of individuals across several social subdivisions, 
such that it comprehends the same individual over and over 
again in line with his various social affiliations, - some 
of them factual, natural and 'statistical', some of them 
largely or wholly a result of voluntary choice. 
But if society and every social group is a collection 
of individuals, every individual is, on the other hand, a 
collection of societies, or at any rate of sub-societies, 
in that he embodies a multiplicity of social aspects or 
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categories. Consider, as an example, some typical inhabi­
tant of a Rhenish industrian city around 1910: he is a 
subject of the German Reich and more particularly of the 
Kingdom of Prussia; he is a factory hand; he is a Roman 
Catholic; he is a member of one of the Catholic trade 
unions; he is a regular voter for the Centre Party; he is 
a father of a family; he is a wine-drinker; he is probably 
a firm believer in marital fidelity and a fairly consistent 
offender against it in Carnival time but not otherwise 
(whatever else he may be besides). 
To apply a crude mathematical consideration, out of a 
tiny society of, say, ten persons, no fewer than 1012 
groups can be formed (not counting, of course, either the 
single persons themselves,or the ten-person society as a 
whole, or the empty set). Most of the abstract classes 
that in pure formal logic can be formed out of the members 
of a society are of course irrelevant, lacking all cohesion, 
operative reality or significance. For sociological and 
political purposes there are many more individuals than 
significant collectives. Yet no individual is linked to 
society through one hierarchy of bonds alone, nor at all 
times (not even throughout his adult life) through the same 
constant hierarchy of categories and allegiances. 
This means that the articulation of society is subject 
to change, and that in a stricter and more salient sense 
than merely as conditioned by the constant change in the 
identity of the individuals that compose it which is occa­
sioned by the fact that we are all slaves to the obnoxious 
habits of being born and (often after a period of matura­
tion and decay) of dying off. Even within the limits of 
a roughly identical stock of individuals processes of 
social re-articulation take place, and the continuous 
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renewal of the stock of individuals which actually occurs, 
though a potent factor, is by no means the only source or 
the unequivocal and automatic determinant of those pro­
cesses of re-articulation. The identity of social 'parts' 
or 'groups', of significant social 'forces' and thus, I 
wish to say, of the themes predominant in a social medium, 
reveals an inconstancy and fluctuation over and above the 
variation in the identity of the component persons; and 
this is a fact of the highest importance for our understand­
ing of the existence and nature of politics which has 
almost certainly not so far been appreciated to the extent 
which it deserves. For our original, naive consciousness 
of social and political phenomena tends to overestimate 
the persistence of social forces - of cohesions and anta­
gonisms within society - and the permanence, not of their 
respective positions and of their comparative strengths 
and weaknesses, but of their basic schemata of articulation. 
It is easier to conceive, or easier at any rate to inter­
pret the world in terms of the waxing and waning of the 
selfsame, classic antagonistic forces, than in terms of 
changing alignments, no matter how manifest these may be. 
This is rooted, I think, in the conditioning of our 
socio-political thought by pragmatic preoccupations: the 
more solid and immutable we allow the issues and the inter­
ests with which we have to deal to appear, the stronger 
will be our feeling of certitude of being somehow able to 
further our purposes and avert dangers. But even on the 
purely intellectual level we derive a reassuring sense of 
orientation from a conception of society, and of its correl­
ated issues and interests, in conformity with a fixed model 
of individual identities. And thus we are tempted to personify 
countries and nationalities, currents of thought, 
religions and ideologies, collectives proper and collective 
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states of mind - a simplification akin to the pathetic 
fallacy. By the same token, we tend crudely to solidify in 
our imagination the adherence of individuals to unequivocal 
and definitive 'camps1 or 'causes', and thus our very taste 
for personification tends to dim our awareness of individual 
personality, personal choice and autonomy. 
A remark seems necessary on the absolute identity of 
the individual which is here presupposed, as contrasted to 
the hazier, more elusive and more problematic network of 
collective solidarities, natural and selective affinities, 
loyalties and antagonisms in which it is enmeshed. This 
'absolute' identity is in some sense still a relative one; 
the individual himself embodies a manifold of appetites, 
strivings, purposes, concerns, tastes and beliefs, largely 
interlaced and convergent, but to an equally great extent 
also related to one another only loosely and contingently 
or indeed mutually competing and clashing as a consequence 
of his inconsistent beliefs and principles. And this is so, 
in part, precisely in virtue of the social origins and con­
stitutive dependence of the individual mind, and also of 
the social effects and social references inextricably invol­
ved in its working. 
In one clearly definable sense the individual does never­
theless mark a point of absolute identity: mortal as he is, 
develop and decay (and reproduce) as he may, he can neither 
fuse with others into one new individual, nor split into 
several new individuals; his limits and distinctness are 
clear-cut. Howsoever I may look upon myself from outside, 
criticise myself, break a habit or abandon a policy and 
adopt another, etc., I cannot relinquish the intimate govern­
ment of my own self and assume instead that of some other 
self or selves. And whilst my interests too may undergo a 
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great deal of change, I cannot turn away from and cease to 
administer my interests as such. It would be absurd to 
deny that highly important and fascinating problems cluster 
around the theme of individual identity; yet it is not 
capable of being called in question as are all collective 
identities, nor are we capable of suspending our attitude 
of belief in it. Thus there have existed widespread beliefs 
(whether true or not) about the survival or immortality of 
the human self, but no similar beliefs about an analogous 
survival, in heaven or hell, or in whatever transmundane 
place, of extinct states of nations, of vanished religions 
or institutions, or of the original constituents of communi­
ties that once emerged from the union of these and today 
display a unitary identity and might one day split again 
along quite different lines. 
Gladstone unquestionably died in 1898 and Bismarck in 
the same year - they are 'quite dead' as British legal lan­
guage once had it - though much of their work survives. But 
did the Austrian Empire die in 1918 in a similarly unequivo­
cal sense? The 'successor states' left by the Empire were 
its surviving parts rather than its products or progeny. 
Some of them fused with this or that neighbouring country, 
some of them retaining the name 'Austria', dying in its turn 
(i.e. being absorbed, in this case) in 1938 and being recalled 
to life seven years later. We may speak, with all necessary 
reservations, of an ontological priority of individuals, and 
discern in collectives of all kinds an aspect of mere things 
made by men, deprived of ultimate autonomy of being in spite 
of their larger scale and generally longer life. There 
attaches to them something of the blurred outline and also 
something of the blunted 'immortality' characteristic of 
lifeless matter, even though at the same time they embody 
crucial aspects of the life of mankind. 
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§2. Political life interpreted on the supposition of 
identities established by interests 
Politics means, putting it in crude outline, social and 
institutional self-regulation, in particular with reference 
to relationships of authority and obedience or of super-
ordination and subordination existing within the framework 
of a state or a medium of states, and centred on or expres­
sed through or culminating in controversial issues; the 
struggles about such issues; and the agreements reached or 
striven for with a view to their solution. Political acts 
and processes - wars, civil commotions, elections, party 
campaigns, choices of one course of action as against an­
other, decisions about problems of distribution, rights, 
privileges, prohibitions, etc., - are, it seems, necessarily 
agonistic. They are at the same time however equally neces­
sarily set in a reconciliatory perspective, in a common 
teleology of peace. 
The non-controversial pursuit of common aims as such, 
something requiring the solution of technical problems only, 
falls short of politics, pertaining rather to the level of 
administration. Enmity, hostility or antagonism pure and 
simple fall short of politics, whether issuing in mutual 
avoidance of contact or in the practice of mutual extermin­
ation (something like the war of each against all, or at any 
rate a striving, say between two alien tribes, for complete 
mutual displacement or annihilation), and even mere enslave­
ment and exploitation is still a marginally non-political 
relation. Politics, in other words, belongs to a mode of 
contact between distinct wills that is characterisable as 
a tension kept in or directed to the establishment of a more 
or less acceptable balance. Its key concept is controversy, 
ranging from discussion and intrinsic persuasion through 
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negotiation and the show of force, to brutal conflict still 
somehow aimed at compromise and the finding of a modus 
vivendi. 
This oversimplified, annoyingly incomplete and mislead-
ingly linear description ought to suffice for our present 
purposes. I will now proceed to what seems to me the most 
elementary form of a more profound, more tangible inter­
pretation, namely the conception of politics as a gamelike 
interplay of distinct and mutually competing interests. 
In the concept of interest, which is not quite so simple 
and evident a concept as we might take it to be, the empha­
sis is on the purely self-regarding intention underlying a 
given pursuit. To buy cheap and to sell dear (supposing 
other things, i.e. the goods in question, to be equal) is 
the classic paradigm of interest-inspired behaviour, as is 
the aim of ensuring, whether by physical superiority, suc­
cessful litigation or other means, that I and not he, or we 
and not they, should possess a disputed good or complex of 
goods or ground or territory or access to a market. Our 
objection to the other fellow, to our rival antagonist, 
relates not to his character or qualities or to his object­
ive significance, but rather precisely to his 'otherness', 
his alienness, his distinctness from and non-identity with 
ourselves. 
Clearly distinctness among given opposing parties is of 
itself not enough to engender actual opposition, even of 
the mildest kind. Some quite special circumstances, e.g. 
the desire on both sides for control over the same object, 
or for a title to it, is required in order to conjure up the 
flame of strife out of the cinder of mere separateness. But 
opposition may develop round the core of any distinctness, 
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and we are inclined to find this wholly natural. The most 
familiar examples are erotic jealousy, competition between 
independent producers or sellers of the same kinds of goods, 
rivalry between centres of power whose ranges of activity 
border on or overlap each other with no essential regard to 
their respective aims, qualities or characteristics. In 
this last example, however, and also to some extent already 
in the case of economic competition, we are faced with the 
conflict of interests between collective 'individuals', i.e. 
between personified collectives. This need not puzzle us 
unduly in view of the fact that clear lines of social cleav­
age and quasi-natural overriding loyalties on the part of 
their component persons (who are individuals in the proper 
sense) do actually exist. Men do obviously identify them­
selves, particularly in situations of acute conflict or 
division of interests, with their families, their countries, 
their sects or with other more or less massive and identi­
fiable communities to which they belong. This identifica­
tion is primarily directed to those collective wholes to 
which an individual belongs by virtue of his birth and up­
bringing, language and customs, etc., but very often also, 
and sometimes as the single crucial factor, it will involve 
an element of choice. 
Different persons do not as a rule insist on killing one 
another just because they have noticed that they are not one 
and the same person, or even that they belong to different 
clans and the like. But in regard to an event such as, say, 
the Franco-Prussian war, it is not incorrect or unnatural, 
nor gravely misleading - however fraught with problems it 
might be - to say that 'the French' and 'the Germans' are 
at war with each other, almost as if they were two men 
fighting each other over a fine horse, perhaps, or over a 
woman or a house of which each considers the proper owner 
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or legitimate occupant to be himself. Of course two such 
groups, as well as any two distinct individuals, might in 
fact also specifically dislike each other; but we would 
then have arrived at a point where the constructions placed 
upon the concept of interests have become so broad as to 
involve an outright transcending of the category. Interests 
as such do not intrinsically involve mutual hostility, 
though their emphatic directedness (e.g. to one finite 
unsharable object) giving rise to a particular clash of 
interests may also, through psychic fixation in the state 
of enmity, usher in a relation of hatred which extends to 
a mutual denigration of distinctive qualities. 
A coalition or an alliance still appears at this level 
to analyse into common or parallel interests on the part of 
its members which stand opposed to some other set of inter­
ests. Thus the French Crown had an enduring tradition of 
alliance with the Sublime or Ottoman Porte, aimed at weaken­
ing and circumscribing Habsburg Imperial power, and the 
Third Republic pursued a similar policy of cooperation with 
Russians, Poles and other Slavs in order to contain or 
possibly crush the power of modern Germany. And whilst 
between the extreme right and extreme left the unifying 
force of a shared conflict of interests is naturally less 
likely to operate in domestic politics, where the intrinsic 
ideological antithesis between the two is precisely at its 
sharpest, temporary alliances between right and left direct­
ed against a powerful centre have been known to occur in 
several if not in most European countries. One thinks, for 
example, of the transitory brotherhood between the Catholic 
and the rationalist anticlerical elements in Belgium which 
rose up against Dutch Calvinist rule in 1830. And there 
have been cases of cooperation between Carlists and Republic­
ans (or Anarchists) in Spain. But the classic example, 
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perhaps, is presented by the Democratic Party in the U.S.A., 
a permanent coalition, from Reconstruction days almost to 
the present, between the Southern aristocrats and the poor­
er, less capitalistic and less considered strata of the 
Northern population. 
The primary mechanics of divided and conflicting and 
of conjoined interests, then, is indeed a part of social 
reality. But its effects are easy to overrate. This is 
because, on the one hand, it seems to offer such transpar­
ent evidence of its functioning, and on the other hand 
because of the illusion of an absolutely rational schema 
which it is apt to evoke. A closer analysis of what really 
constitutes the 'interests' of an individual however, and, 
a fortiori r of how far the concept is really transferable 
to communities or organised collectives, would show the 
insufficiency of the interest approach taken alone, and 
reveal problems radically alien to the apparently cast-iron 
logic of interests with their ostensibly ready-made divi­
sions, antagonisms and identifications of the ideals, tastes 
predilections, conceptions, etc., either of individuals or 
of collectives and groups with which individuals identify. 
It is this sharing of views and principles and what lies 
behind it which will concern us in the section that follows. 
§3. The interpretation of politics in terms of shared ways 
of life 
It may happen, and is perhaps the case as a rule, that 
in a country where there are formally existent political 
parties and competitive elections a citizen votes for Party 
X because he thinks that an X-dominated government is likely 
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to be conducive to his self-regarding (largely, though not 
always exclusively,pecuniary) interests, whereas a rival 
Y-dominated government is likely to harm them more or less 
gravely. But it also happens, however uncommonly, that 
'on principle', 'from conviction', or following his 'opin­
ions' or 'sympathies', he votes for the party whose victory 
he expects to be positively bad for his interests. (Less 
rarely he will vote on the basis of his convictions in the 
belief that his interests are hardly, if at all, affected 
by the issue; still more often he will let his intrinsic 
preference for some part decide his vote with the feeling 
that he cannot estimate at all what impact, if any, the 
outcome of the election might have on his interests.) 
There are also situations in which it is possible to 
express openly one's sympathy for the national enemy - as 
did the pro-Boer faction in England at the time of the 
South African war. And it is always possible, to express 
the matter somewhat crudely, to cultivate such sympathies 
more or less covertly (but then perhaps all the more 
passionately) as did I myself living in Austria-Hungary 
from the first to the last moment of the 1914-18 war. More 
often are individuals inclined and in a position to voice 
their preference for the prospective enemy's cause in times 
of (uneasy) peace. Various kinds of strange states of con­
sciousness are observable in situations such as this. Thus 
in the Great War the vast majority of the German socialists, 
eager to conduct themselves patriotically but at the same 
time to exercise and flaunt their loyalty to their political 
cause, interpreted the conflict in terms of a 'war of liber­
ation against Tsarist tyranny', while the mass of the French 
leftists (including the majority of Socialists) likewise 
conceived of it, though naturally with different overtones 
and alongside other, more obvious democratic war aims, as 
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involving a struggle for the transformation of Russia into 
a progressive democracy. 
To come to grips with some of these issues we shall 
use the term 'ways of life' (cf. expressions such as 'the 
American way of life', etc.), as a portmanteau term for 
ideals, faiths, predilections, tastes, outlooks, ideologies, 
and so on. Ways of life differ structurally from interests, 
however interwoven they may be with these, in that they 
bear essentially on qualities of value and disvalue as 
possible characteristics of man's private or communal exis­
tence, and not, like interests, primarily on the mere dis­
tinctness and dividedness of individuals and of discrete 
collectives (i.e. collectives modelled on self-contained, 
delimited and unitary individuals). Ways of life are, it 
is true, as divisive as are interests. Indeed they may 
provide more potent sources of antagonisms, for contradic­
tory beliefs and divergent intrinsic preferences are not 
amenable to barter and compromise as interests naturally 
are. 
It is not that they are divisive ex vi terminorum, 
according to their expressible content. Catholics, Moslems 
and Communists would not necessarily repudiate - openly and 
formally - the possibility of the whole of mankind becoming, 
respectively, Catholic, Moslem, or Communist. I prefer El 
Greco to Murillo, Beethoven to Wagner, etc., and I should 
rather be glad than sorry if everyone came to share these 
and many more preferences of mine. And we do not wish that 
a section of mankind should reject, say, Euclid's prime 
number theorem, or Fermat's or Wilson's divisibility theor­
ems, simply in order that we may have somebody to despise. 
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Ways of life in this broad sense might indeed by cre­
dited with a primary tendency to unite men and to engender 
community of feeling and attitude rather than with any 
similarly implicit tendency to separate them and to foster 
opposition, isolation and enmity. One category of cases 
reveals indeed an inherently 'apostolic' trait, a messian-
istic urge towards unity, though even these cases are apt 
to evoke as a consequence violent reaction, scission, anta­
gonism and hatred. Private preferences, in contrast, pre­
ferences centred upon individual tasts, not linked to for­
mally held beliefs and putative evidence and thus not linked 
either to claims to universal acceptance, are likely to be 
peaceful and innocuous, though capable of exerting only the 
mildest possible unifying force: there is no contradiction 
between my being supremely fond of apricots and another 
person's peculiar predilection for grapefruit. And the 
code of ordinary deontic morality also, whilst embodying a 
comparatively high degree and permanence of unifying power 
(claiming to reproduce a 'universal consensus'), does not 
provide a contentual basis for sharply profiled identific­
ations, in contrast to the highly specific and ambitious 
religious, ethical and political 'ideals' which inspire a 
closely-knit unity and may, but need not always, involve a 
correspondingly highly strung attitude and encourage the 
growth of situations of total antagonism. In Chesterton's 
words : 
Likelier the barricades shall blare, 
Slaughter below and smoke above; 
And death and hate and hell declare 
That men have found a thing to love. 
The realm of undefeasible evidence, of pure reason and 
certain knowledge, the archetype of which is mathematics 
(though not the philosophy of mathematics), or again the 
realm of patently incontrovertible factual cognition, is 
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most permanently and universally unitive, while on the 
other hand not divisive at all (discounting irrelevant mar­
ginal cases), being accordingly powerless to articulate men 
into characteristic identities and forces of collective 
action. 
A further distinction should be noted here, dependent 
upon, though certainly not identical with, that between 
qualitative preferences on the one hand and comprehensive 
ideals with the pretension of universality on the other. 
Interests necessarily attach to individuated entities, to 
individuals and groups (I, you, he, them, us, etc.), in 
other words to concrete subjects situated in place and time. 
And they bear on 'goods' in the widest sense, i.e. on those 
things which can be conceived as objects of analogous 
desires. Preferences and ways of life, on the other hand, 
or anything generally related thereto, are centred either 
- and this I think has logical priority - on abstract qual­
ities, modes of being, dimensions and varieties of value 
and disvalue, or on persons and other concrete entities 
(countries, historically identified causes, organised 
political parties, and so on). Not primarily because these 
are to be identified with or opposed for their own sakes, 
but much more because they are admired or abominated or 
somehow graded in accordance with a particular scale of 
preferences. There are no doubt transitions between these 
two types. At the one extreme we may situate, say, our 
qualitative preferences for various kinds of dishes or 
drinks, somewhere in the middle we may situate our attitude 
of feeling ourselves centrally attached to something like 
'the Christian way of life', conceived as interpolated be­
tween the appropriate horizon of abstract values and con­
ceptions (charity, endurance, a certain style of humility, 
etc.) and, at the opposite pole, the concrescence of 
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'Christianity' in a hierarchically constituted, dogmatically 
orientated Church. Or, again, a central attachment to 
progress, interpreted in, say, socialist terms, as an inter­
mediary area between the abstract postulates of 'equal 
justice' or 'universal prosperity' or 'the ensured human 
dignity of each individual' on the one hand, and the Com­
munist Party or the Marxian Socialist movement on the other. 
The reason for attributing logical priority to the ex­
perience of quality, to what one might call the adjectival 
mode of valuation, is that it would clearly make more 
sense, say, to love and serve life outside of and inferior 
to ourselves without ever having heard of Francis of 
Assisi, than it would to venerate Francis of Assisi without 
any prius conceived in abstract terms,i.e. without any 
reason for our veneration. However I do not deny the psy­
chologically potent enlightening effect, the attractive or 
repulsive force, of exemplars. We may indeed love a person 
(sometimes a collective) more ardently or hate his (or its) 
guts more intensely than is proportionate to the clarity or 
intelligibility of the terms in which we may try to account 
for our attitude. Orthodox Jews and Moslems repudiate pork 
because of their religious orthodoxy, and may even feel a 
violent repugnance to its flavour if they happen to taste 
it. Our tender love for little birds and at the same time 
for the cat poised to pounce upon them may actually spring 
from the Franciscan strain in our, perhaps especially in 
the English, nature. And for all I know, a convinced and 
militant Communist may actually come to find the Internation­
ale an intrinsically fine song and the hammer-and-sickle 
cum pentagram a beautiful symbol. Nazism is said to have 
driven some German émigrés actually to detest the German 
language. 
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In these and countless similar phenomena the identity-
and-division motif reveals its power to outgrow and indeed 
to remodel or rearrange the complexion of original and 
intrinsic valuations on the part of individuals, in spite 
of the normal priority of the latter in relation to their 
experiences of identification and antagonism. Similarly, 
once I have identified myself with a social body, tradition 
or cause, and engaged in an antagonism, these positions 
will react upon and contribute to the shaping of my inter­
ests, partly in the objective sense that it will affect 
them by reason of determining some of the circumstances of 
my life, but partly also in a subjective sense. 
§4. Identity and division as a theme in its own right 
If the key question of the interest theme is 'Who?' -
meaning 'Who gets what (or how much and when) ?' - and 
that of the way of life theme may be formulated either as 
'What?' - meaning 'What kind of thing (or order) should 
prevail ?' - or again as 'Who?' i.e. as representative of 
'What quality ?', then it is, as we shall see, incomparably 
more difficult to formulate a corresponding question for 
the third theme, identity itself (always inseparable from 
the sister-concept of division) . It relates to a many-
faced problem of selection, e.g. of selection by the indi­
vidual of a corporate body to which he may belong or with 
which he may identify himself. But not everyone, of course, 
shall be allowed willy-nilly into every list. I owe allegi­
ance and feel loyal to..., I belong to and form part of..., 
which social bodies? As E. Gellner has expressed it in 
reference to the new African countries: nationalism is the 
programme, but the nations, with their frontiers, have 
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somehow to be recognised or created. 
All this is admittedly so far an over-sharp and mis-
drawn picture. For if the questions were not already an­
swered, at least in part, then they could not be asked at 
all, just as, in general, there must already have been given 
and become known to us a great deal that has come to be 
grasped and taken for granted as it were natively, in the 
mode of primary certitude, before we can become aware of 
any underlying problems and start being critical of the 
concepts involved. We need not invent for we already have 
the experience of kinship, neighbourhood, country and 
sovereignty, of nationality vs. state and empire, of right 
standing against wrong, of selective affinities governed by 
intrinsic agreement and disagreement, and of traditional 
bonds as well as of new unions in the making (the latter 
arising to a large extent out of long-standing, traditional 
dissatisfactions). But there exists nonetheless a dimension 
of highly intractible problems, and we can sometimes be 
confronted by a sense of arbitrary contingency in, for 
example, our national boundaries, comparable to a feeling 
of desolate vertigo when faced with a bottomless abyss. 
We might venture the following three-tiered analysis of 
that disquieting experience and of its associated dimension 
of problems. 
(a) At the first and, to ordinary consciousness, the 
most familiar level, we are concerned with the age-old, 
eminently practical problem of the straightforward conflict 
of loyalties. This sometimes acutely and painfully besetting 
phenomenon constantly confronts us all in a more or less 
dormant state. It is then constitutive of the social ego 
of a person who exhibits given loyalties, giving rise to 
a characteristic tension in his life and sometimes, when 
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it makes itself felt in an actualised manner, requiring an 
either/or decision on his part. Apart from trivial cases 
in which a comprehensive (e.g. national) allegiance stands 
in opposition to some linkage which is, in comparison, 
either narrow in scope or poor in content (e.g. some shallow 
kind of shared interest or hobby, whether or not it is 
embodied in a formal association, cutting across national 
divisions), there are no generally valid and self-evident 
criteria of decision or standards of priority. 
Thus the principle 'My country right or wrong' - which 
(except for the kind of jingoistic nationalist in whom con­
science shades into moral perversion and moral perversion 
into ideological insanity) is not tantamount to 'The inter­
est of my country is the standard of right or wrong' - may 
serve as a rule of thumb in acute situations of internation­
al crisis. But its validity is circumscribed by the un­
spoken and unevadable question of proportion which is 
implicit within it. How luminously evident and how over­
whelmingly weighty is the right involved and how monstrous 
the associated wrong? How vitally does a particular matter 
affect my country? If a substantially developed ethnic 
nationality, whose importance is perhaps increased by linger­
ing traditions of independent statehood, is locked in con­
flict with the state proper or with a highly integrated 
empire as, say, in the case of the Austrian Empire in 1848 
or, at the same time, the Croatians, Slavs, Rumanians, Swa-
bians and Saxons in Hungary vs. Hungary proper, where, in 
such cases does the obvious duty of loyalty lie? Are 
Austrians Germans, or is there an Austrian 'nation'? 
One can feel this kind of loyalty to a state in a narrow­
er sense even when this is a state which coincides with no 
ethnic nationality of its own. Thus General Lee, to my 
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knowledge heartily opposed to Secession, nevertheless at 
the call of Virginia, his patria chica, assumed supreme 
command of the Confederation armies and exercised it 
brilliantly until the tragic end. This was a decision 
which may well astound us, but which we should hardly dare 
to condemn outright. 
Naturally some people totally engaged on one side of 
such a dispute will appeal to unconvinced and hesitant by­
standers with specious claims as to the self-evidence of 
their case: Haven't you discovered yet that your real solid­
arity is with your fellow-proletarians all over the world, 
not with your home exploiters and their agents? Has it not 
dawned upon you yet that you are 'organically' linked to 
your fellow countryment of whatever class, that you and 
they are complementary organs in the organism to which you 
belong, and that this far outweighs any abstract analogy of 
social situation between you and some similarly placed 
category of aliens? These are, of course, nothing but rhe­
torical tricks. I am however far from wishing to imply 
that decision of this kind is of its very nature blind and 
arbitrary, beyond the possibility of justification and of 
subjection to the manifold of argument, nor that they are 
immune either to moral criticism or to the claims of wis­
dom as opposed to folly. If that were the case deliberation 
would lose its point, exactly as it would if the agent were 
simply to obey the dictate of 'reason' or to swallow the 
bait of spurious self-evidence. I mean only that, especial­
ly in the face of conflicting appeals to one's self-identi­
fication, there is a residuum of arbitrary choice from 
which we cannot escape, and that this should be regarded on 
its own terms as entirely legitimate. 
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A person cannot 'choose' his adhesion and alignment by 
sheer fantasy, without reference to objective data not of 
his making and to the moral demands which are prima facie 
binding upon him and of which he is in no conceivable 
sense the author. But within this objective yet incomplete 
set of facts and obligations, his own subjective preference 
or emergent feeling will itself assume the status of one 
valid and significant datum of the situation, for practical 
decisions are reducible neither to exercises in moral judg­
ment nor, much less, to intellectual conformity-to-the-
facts, as if they were somehow a matter of perceiving what 
is already present to the senses. -Thus if my own moral 
conceptions and sensibilities have some place in determin­
ing what it is objectively right for me to do, and if my 
own elucidation of what I 'really' and enduringly desire 
has an even more important place in determining what is 
likely to benefit me, then what I am in social or, more 
exactly,in political terms, i.e. which collective will, 
interest and teleology I shall assume as my own, is still 
more essentially dependent on what I myself as an individual 
feel, choose, will or commit myself to be. 
(b) The perspective of the second, higher, tier con­
cerns the collective's own awareness of, and the cult which 
it may weave in strenuous assertion of, its own identity? 
it concerns the techniques and policies of expansion and of 
self-delimitation and self-insulation, as well as the atti­
tudes, both sympathetic and antithetic, towards other col­
lective wholes which are implied thereby. The behaviour of 
collective entities displays an extreme variability in this 
respect, both according to the peculiar nature of a given 
collective: whether it is interest-centred or emphatically 
oriented about a particular outlook, whether it is "perfec­
tion-centred or power-centred, predominantly local and 
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esoteric or 'messianistic', 'universalist', and so on, and 
according to the content of the creeds or aims by which it 
may be constituted. It may however safely be said that 
any such entity is concerned on the one hand to assert its 
identity by making itself felt in the world, by extending 
its range of influence, by assimilation, absorption and 
attraction, and on the other hand to maintain its identity 
by protecting itself against disruption, dilution and de-
naturation, by the exclusion of 'heretical' elements and 
by inhibiting the influx of all that it deems to be alien, 
uncongenial, unassimilable or destructive. Expansion, con­
quest, incorporation, propaganda and a system of appeals to 
supposedly kindred or potentially subservient elements or 
to elements amenable to persuasion, and also identification 
of and cooperation with common interests in the outside 
world will thus alternate and often go hand in hand with 
policies of exclusion and defiance and with an overstrained 
emphasis on distinctness, contrast and antagonism. The 
maxims 'Whoever is not with us is against us' and 'Whoever 
is not against us is for us' will seldom fail to be applied 
in combination. 
Officially and with more or less explicit contrivance, 
as well as unofficially and spontaneously, a principle of 
hierarchy will come into operation. Not only in the serv­
ice of efficiency, but also, in a twofold and seemingly 
antithetic fashion, in the service of identity. The inner 
circle of rulers, leaders, models and exemplars, officials, 
close adherents and retainers, etc., - I am of course sim­
plifying matters - will on the one hand enjoy privileges 
of various kinds, including both the privilege of exerting 
an active influence on the establishment and of interpreting 
standards, and also - being less exposed to the suspicion 
of a basic breach of identity - the privilege of exercising 
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an occasional bout of deviant thought or other eccentricity. 
These are privileges denied both to the rank and file and, 
in a somewhat modified fashion, to the penumbra of second­
ary adherents. 
On the other hand however, both in the politically more 
highly strained and in more relaxed situations, the reverse 
attitude can be expected to prevail. There are, first of 
all, certain particularly onerous obligations which are 
customarily imposed on the privileged classes: thus much 
that would be considered unpardonable in its members may 
be quite readily condoned in the broader mass of those . 
belonging to the group and especially in extraneous sym­
pathisers, allies and mere candidate members. Where to 
aspirants to membership of the inner sanctum there applies 
the paradox of 'The more you give the more will be asked 
of you', and the more severely are such individuals exposed 
to ultimate failure even as a result of the barest and 
least noticeable lapse, to outsiders there is accorded a 
generous longanimity and unstinted encouragement. Hitler 
in Mein Kampf, with characteristically hyperbolic crudeness, 
wrote that whilst for the good of the National Socialist 
movement the number of secondary adherents could never be 
too large, the number of hard-core militants could not be 
small enough. Similarly he later disclaimed the policy of 
'Germanisation', i.e. of assimilation of subjugated or 
dependent races, which had been cherished as an element of 
the earlier and still partly liberal policies and programmes 
of German imperialism. 
Along with tendencies to personal rule, the choice of 
peculiar symbols and growth of peculiar linguistic habits, 
etc., we characteristically find in sectarian and totalit­
arian movements and also in other types of political and 
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institutional life an insistence upon the purity of the 
inner circle. When in 1952 I visited the city of Burgos 
in Old Castile I was told by some eminent local personages 
that the place had now a population approaching the 60,000 
mark, that this was far too many (some 30,000 might be the 
optimum) and that they were not a little apprehensive of 
further growth. Again in the epoch preceding the Great War 
the Austrian leaders of the Monarchy were much more anxious 
than their Hungarian counterparts to expand into the Balkan 
Peninsula by annexing new (Serbian) territories, and indeed 
the Hungarian Premier, Count Tisza, initially attempted to 
prevent the sending of the fatal ultimatum. For the 
Austrian concept of the state was that of a dynastic patri­
mony merging into a pluralistic federation of nationalities 
with only a mild aspect of German hegemony, whereas the 
Hungarian concept was that of a homogeneous national state 
within which the non-Magyar half of the population (consist­
ing of Rumanians and various groupings of Slavs) would be 
kept under subjugation with a view to achieving their almost 
complete Magyarisation, and this latter purpose was likely 
to be hampered or altogether frustrated by swamping Hungary 
(or Austria, or the Dual Monarchy as a whole) with still 
more Slavs. Thus concepts of identity and the policies 
consequent upon them may differ and, in conjoint or inter­
penetrating collectives, come into conflict. Both Austrian 
and Hungarian policy, each in its own way, proved to be 
suicidal - a potentiality hidden in all schemes of policy, 
individual perhaps no less than collective. 
There is also the idea of an inner core whose elements 
are somehow peculiarly representative of the collective 
(say, national) identity, - as somehow forming a crystal-
isation or purification of the latter - an idea not neces­
sarily restricted to the spiritual underworld of totalitar-
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ian perversion, even though it may reveal its full import­
ance only under the magnifying glass of the latter. This 
shows the inadequacy of the narrow distinction elaborated 
by modern political philosophers between 'descriptive' 
(as it were photographic) and 'prescriptive' (or mandatory) 
political representation. Besides these way may also dis­
cern what we might call 'substantive' or perhaps 'consens­
ual' (or voluntar i stia) representation, involving reference 
to the identity of the community, to what it is and what it 
has been (its distinctive traditions), but also to what it 
strives to be (its dominant currents of self-renewal and 
self-redefinition, its tasks and prospects). 'Who are we?' 
is then not simply a descriptive question. This has been 
grasped most clearly perhaps by Ortega in his albeit some­
what exaggerated theory of the 'project' as the constitu­
tive factor of nationhood. 
(c) Finally with the topmost level, the level of what 
I venture to call the impartial taking of sides, we return 
to the starting point of this essay, that is, to the arti­
culation of society itself, now viewed as itself a possible 
theme or controvertive issue of politics (always geared, 
needless to say, into other, 'lower' themes, involving more 
or less emphasis on collective identities and individual 
or sub-societal self-identification). Here we are faced 
with preferences and arguments relating to such questions 
as 'What are the most essential, the most meaningful, the 
most enduring, the most unchallengeable, perhaps the moral­
ly or culturally most justifiable criteria of identity in 
and lineaments of division of society?' 'Is any general 
primacy to be awared to the local, or to the national, 
imperial, or more or less federal type of polity?' 'How 
far is national identity based upon or definable in terms 
of linguistic community?' Or again: 'What is the relation 
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between the state, of whatever type, as a formalised and 
well-delimited legal and sovereign unit (or collective 
agency) and other kinds of significant collective entity 
such as an historic pattern of civilisation, a religion or 
a church, autonomous municipality or region, the family and 
the gens (S ippe , zadruga), and perhaps some kinds of inter­
national elite endowed with a measure of formal organisat­
ion and of consciousness of identity?' 
Is there, or can there be, any intrinsic reality under­
lying, say, the League of Nations or such concepts as 'Euro-
peanism', 'Panamericanism', 'Panslavism', 'Panarabianism', 
slogans such as 'Asis for the Asians', and so on? Could 
any meaningful con or pro attitudes be formed - independ­
ently of the conflicting interests and contrary tastes and 
preferences of the individuals concerned - in regard to, 
say, the dissolution of Belgium along ethnico-national 
lines, or to the creation of a new Switzerland in the 
Danube basin, or to the setting-up of an independent French 
State of Quebec? How far is India or Israel a true national 
state, how far something else? Or again, in the areas of 
domestic politics, which, if any, of the American, or Bri­
tish type of prevalently two-party parliamentary system, 
the classic European multi-party system of opposing coali­
tions of government and opposition, or the Swiss system of 
a quasi-automatic all-party coalition, is most conducive to 
the maintenance of a secure, established constitutional 
mode of life? What truth, if any, may there by in the 
declarations of certain African dictators that the one 
party régimes that they have established are distinct from 
totalitarianism proper? 
Proceeding in the opposite direction of philosophical 
abstraction we encounter such fundamental themes as the 
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desirability of any tidy pattern of clear-cut and sharply 
delimited large-scale identities, as against a predominance 
of smaller-scale overlapping identities, of a plurality of 
communal forms and of the maximum practicable level of 
autonomy. Should we be happier with a limited number of 
co-existing types (say the nation state, the federal state, 
and perhaps the city state) or ought we to accept and cul­
tivate an indefinite number of non-uniform types of iden­
tity (which reminds us of the view according to which cer­
tain diseases, in particular influenza or falling-in-love, 
are structurally different in each single case). 
§5. Conclusion: a note on conservative libertarianism 
A host of questions such as have just been presented 
would constitute a tedious and insipid conclusion which 
would be perhaps even worse than a mere unargued profession 
of faith. I would therefore beg permission to state ex­
plicitly that my own personal preference, as no doubt that 
of conservative libertarians in general, is fully on the 
side of plurality, manifoldness, mobile equilibrium and 
the unceasing play of tensions, of qualified and multiple 
allegiances, of the rejection of all unreserved identifi­
cation of the individual with any community or organised 
collective (even at the expense of the perspicuity of 
social outlines, of predictability and of efficiency). 
Although one's scale of preferences is primarily an expres­
sion of one's temper, and thus far above and also below 
the level of rational justification, still I believe that 
my attitude as here stated has this much to say for it, 
that it is grounded in, or is at any rate a response to the 
ontological fact that the individual alone is the ultimate 
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social reality: that however short-lived and changeable he 
may be, however tenuous his hold on reality, he is still 
the only bearer of invariant self-identity. Yet we must 
not lose sight of his essential and insurmountable incom­
pleteness. He is conditioned by society, chooses and acts 
under the influence of and on behalf of others, and is sub­
ordinated to the will and interests of collective wholes 
with which he cannot but identify himself or with which he 
has come to identify himself by voluntary choice. He 
'fulfils himself' not, as some have imagined, transitorily, 
as a mere phase of history, but ineluctably, constituting 
himself through the medium of a network of hundreds of 
alienations from interests and collectives, each one 
involving the pain, or a glimpse of the pain, of isolation 
and impoverishment, sometimes of total insecurity and in­
effectiveness. And the secret of his freedom resides not 
in his overcoming alienation by some kind of all-comprehen­
sive union, nor again by minimising his social ties, but 
in the balanced and pluralistic (as opposed to absolute and 
monistic) character of the collective identities to which 
he is a party, 
I draw a great deal of comfort from the following lines 
by Kipling, and wholly share the wonderment they express: 
All Power, each Tyrant, every Mob 
Whose head has grown too large,  
Ends by destroying its own job 
And earns its own discharge. 
And Many whose mere necessities 
Move all things from his path , 
Trembles meanwhile at their decrees 
And deprecates their wrath. 
What Kipling here calls 'Man' is however not every or any 
individual taken in his atomic nakedness. Even though he 
is capable of rising above and sweeping away that Power, 
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that Tyrant, that Mob, so long as the latter exist 'Man' is 
somehow represented by them, underlies them, acts through 
them (they are not extra-human entities). And when Man 
gets rid of them, which he may do and certainly ought to 
do, he does so by virtue of older and more legitimate 
identifications and by forming new, revised and modified 
identities. For it is through these alone that he can 
give effect to his act of disaffection and disidentification; 
it is through these alone that his divisive intenion can be 
hammered into shape. 
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